Primary Source Materials
TagsAgriculture Art Markets Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy Black Market Book Book Review Bseball Cartography CELAC Che Guevara Civil Society Comedy Communications Comparative Experience Compensation issue Cooperatives Corruption Cuba-Brazil Relations Cuba-Canada Relations Cuba-China Relations Cuba-European Union Relations Cuba-Haiti Relations Cuba-Russia Relations Cuba-Soviet Relations Cuba-Spain Relations Cuba-Venezuela Relations Cuban Diaspora Cuenta-Propistas Culture Daily Life 2012 Debt Issue Defense and Security Issues Democracy Demography Development Assistance Development Strategy Digital Library Dissidents Document Archive EBOLA Econmic Institutions Economic Growth Economic History Economic Illegalities Economic Institutions Economic Melt-Down Economic Prospects Economic Recovery Economic Reform Economic Reforms Economic Self-Correction Education Embar Embargo Emigration Employment Energy Enterprise Management Entrepreneurship Environment Exchange Rate Policy Export Processing Zone Exports External Debt Fidel Fidel Castro Finance Fiscal Policy Foreign Exchange Earninigs Foreign Investmenr Foreign Investment Foreign Trade Freedom of Assembly Freedom of Expression Freedom of Movement Gender Issues General Economic Analyses General Economic Performance Guantanamo Havana Health History Housing Human Rights Humor Hurricane Illegalities Industry Information Technology Infrastructure Innovation International Relations Internet Joint Ventures Labor Rights Labour Issues Lineamientos Literature Living Standards Macroeconomy Manufacturing Sector Maps Marabu Mariel Medical System Microfinance Miguel Diaz-Canel Military Mineral Sector MIning Missile Cisis 1962 Monetary System Music Narcotics Policy New York Times Nickel Industry Opposition Organization of American States Oscar Espinosa Chepe Pensions Petroleum PHOTOGRAPHS Politics Population President Raul Castro Private Sector Property Claims Property Market Public Finance Race Real Estate Market Rectification Process Regional Integration Religion Remittances Resources Self Self-Employment Sherritt Sherritt International Sixth Party Congress Small Enterprise Social Socially Responsible Enterprise Social Security Soviet Subsidization Special Period State Enterprise Structural Adjustment Structural Change Sugar Sector Taxation Tourism Trade Strategy Transportation Underground Economy UNDP HDR 2010 UNDP HDR 2011 Urbanization US-Cuba Normalization US-Cuba Relations Wage Levels Water Resouirces Yoani Sanchez
- Ablonczy Diane
- Adams David
- Agence France-Presse
- Aja Díaz Antonio
- Alarcón Ricardo
- Alvarez José
- Alzugaray Carlos
- Amnesty International
- Anaya Cruz Betsy
- Anio-Badia Rolando
- Armeni Andrea
- Associated Press
- Azel José
- Baranyi Stephen
- Barbería Lorena
- Barral Fernando
- Batista Carlos
- Bayo Fornieles Francesc
- Becker Hilary
- Becque Elien Blue
- Belt Juan A. B.
- Benjamin-Alvarado Jonathan
- Benzi Daniele
- Betancourt Rafael
- Betancourt Roger
- Blanco Juan Antonio
- Bobes Velia Cecilia
- Borjas George J.
- Brookings Institution
- Brundenius Claes
- Bu Jesus V.
- Buigas Daniel
- Burnett Victoria
- Bye Vegard
- Café Fuerte
- Cairncross John
- Campbell Morgan
- Campos Pedro
- Caruso-Cabrera Michelle
- Casey Michael
- Castañeda Rolando H.
- Castellano Dimas
- CASTILLO SANTANA MARIO G.
- Castro Raúl
- Catá Backer Larry
- Cave Damien
- Celaya Miriam
- Center for Democracy in the Americas’ Cuba Program
- Center for Latin American Studies at American University
- Centro de Estudios sobre la Economia Cubana
- César Guanche Julio
- CÉSPEDES GARCÍA-MENOCAL MONSEÑOR CARLOS MANUEL DE.
- Chaguace daArmando
- CHAGUACEDA ARMANDO.
- Chase Michelle
- Chepe Oscar
- Christian Solidarity Worldwide
- Community of Democracies
- Cuba Central Team
- Cuba Standard
- Cuba Study Group
- Cuban Research Institute
- DACAL ARIEL.
- Dade Carlo
- de Aragon Uva
- de Céspedes Monseñor Carlos Manuel
- De la Cruz Ochoa Ramón
- De la Fuente Alejandro
- de la Torre Augusto
- De Miranda Parrondo
- DFAIT Canada
- DIARIO DE CUBA
- Diaz Fernandez Ileana
- Diaz Ileana
- Diaz Moreno Rogelio Manuel
- Díaz Torres Isbel
- Díaz Vázquez Julio
- Díaz-Briquets Sergio
- Dilla Alfonso Haroldo
- Diversent Laritza
- Domínguez Jorge I
- DOMÍNGUEZ JORGE I.
- Dore Elizabeth
- Duany Jorge
- D´ÁNGELO OVIDIO.
- Echavarria Oscar A.
- Echevarría León Dayma
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Eduardo Perera Gómez Eduardo
- Ellsworth Brian
- Environmental Defense Fund
- Erikson Daniel P
- Escobar Reinaldo
- Espacio Laical
- Espino María Dolores
- Farber Samuel
- Faya Ana Julia
- Feinberg Richard E.
- FERNÁNDEZ ESTRADA JULIO ANTONIO.
- Fernandez Tabio Luis Rene
- Font Mauricio
- FOWLER VÍCTOR.
- Frank Mark
- Franks Jeff
- Fusco Coco
- Gabriele Alberto
- Gálvez Karina
- Gámez Torre Nora
- Gámez Torres Nora
- Garcia Alvarez Anicia
- Garcia Anicia
- Garcia Anne-Marie
- Garrett Laurie
- Gazeta Oficial
- Globe and Mail
- Gómez Manzano Rene
- González Ivet
- González Lenier
- González Mederos Lenier
- Gonzalez Roberto M
- González Roberto Veiga
- González-Corzo Mario A.
- Gonzalez-Cueto Aleida
- Gorney Cynthia
- Grant Tavia
- Gratius Susanne
- Grenier Yvon
- Grogg Patricia
- GUANCHE ZALDÍVAR JULIO CÉSAR.
- Gutiérrez Castillo Orlando
- Hagelburg G. B.
- Hakim Peter
- Hansel Frank-Christian
- Hansing Katrin
- Hare Paul Webster
- Havana Times
- Haven Paul
- Henken Ted
- Hernández Rafael
- Hernández Sánchez Lisbán
- Hernández-Catá Ernesto
- Hershberg Eric
- Hirschfeld Katherine
- Human Rights Watch
- Íñigues Luisa
- International Republican Institute
- Ize Alain
- Jiménez Guethón Reynaldo
- Justo Orlando
- Kergin Michael
- Kirk Emily J.
- Kirk John
- Klepak Hal
- Koring Paul
- Kornbluh Peter
- Kraul Chris
- Lafitta Osmar
- Latell Brian
- Legler Thomas
- Leiva Miriam
- LeoGrande William M.
- León-Manríquez José Luis
- Lo Brutto Giuseppe
- Lockhart Melissa
- Lopez-Levi Arturo
- López-Levy Arturo
- Luis Luis R.
- Lutjens Sheryl
- Luxner Larry
- Mao Xianglin
- Marino Mallorie E.
- MÁRQUEZ HIDALGO ORLANDO.
- Márquez Orlando
- Martínez Reinosa Milagros
- Martínez-Fernández Luis
- Maybarduk Gary
- Mayra Espina
- McKenna Peter
- McKercher Asa
- McNeil Calum
- Mesa-Lago Carmelo
- Messina Bill
- Milne Seumus
- Miroff Nick
- Monreal González Pedro
- Montaner Carlos Alberto
- Morales Domínguez Esteban
- Morales Emilio
- Morales Esteban
- Morales Rosendo
- Morris Emily
- Mujal-Leon Eusebio
- MULET CONCEPCION YAILENIS
- Muse Robert
- Nagy Piroska Mohácsi
- National Geographic
- New York Times
- Nicol Heather
- Nova González Armando
- Offman Craig
- Orro Roberto
- Orsi Peter
- Padura Fuentes Leonardo
- Pajon David
- Parker Emily
- Partido Comunista de Cuba
- Partlow Joshua
- Pedraza Sylvia
- Pérez Lorenzo
- Pérez Lorenzo L.
- Pérez Omar Everleny
- Pérez-López Jorge
- Pérez-Stable Marifeli
- PESTANO ALEXIS.
- Peters Phil
- Petras James
- Piccone Ted
- Piñeiro Harnecker Camila
- Pinero Harnecker Camila
- Piñón Jorge R.
- Pons Perez Saira
- Posner Michael
- President Obama
- Press larry
- PRIETO SAMSÓNOV DMITRI.
- Pujol Joaquín P.
- Pumar Enrique S.
- Radio Netherlands Worldwide
- Rathbone Jphn Paul
- Ravsberg Fernando
- Reporters Without Borders
- Ricardo Ramírez Jorge
- Ritter Arch
- Rodriguez Andrea
- Rodriguez Rodriguez Raul
- Rodriquez Jose Luis
- Rohrlich Justin
- Rojas Janet
- Romero Carlos A.
- Romeu Jorge Luis
- Romeu Rafael
- Ross Oakland
- Sagebien Julia
- Saladrigas Carlos
- Salazar Maria Elvira
- Sánchez Jorge Mario
- Sánchez Juan Tomas
- Sánchez Yoani
- Sanders Ronald
- Sanguinetty Jorge A.
- Scarpacci Joseph L.
- Scheye Rlaine
- Seiglie Carlos
- Sher Julian
- Spadoni Paolo
- Stevens Sarah
- Strauss Michael J.
- Stusser Rodolfo J.
- Tamayo Juan
- The Economist
- Toronto Star
- Torres Perez Ricardo
- Torres Ricardo
- Triana Cordovi Juan
- Triana Juan
- Triff Soren
- Trotta Daniel
- Tønnessen-Krokan Borghild
- US Department of Agriculture
- US Treasury
- USÓN VÍCTOR
- Valdés Dagoberto
- Vazquez Jose
- Vega Veronica
- Veiga González Roberto
- Verma Sonia
- Vidal Alejandro Pavel
- Vidal José Ramón
- Villalobos Joaquin
- Warren Cristina
- Weinreb Amelia
- Wells Cheney
- Werlau Maria C.
- Werner Johannes
- West-Durán Alan
- Whitefield Mimi
- Whitfield Esther
- Wolfe Andy
- Woolley Frances
- Wylie lana
- Zamora Antonio R.
PERSPECTIVE: OVERCOMING CUBA’S INTERNAL EMBARGO
29 Jan 2015
NOW THAT WASHINGTON HAS BEGUN TO DISMANTLE ITS TRADE EMBARGO, HAVANA MUST END ITS INTERNAL EMBARGO AGAINST ISLAND ENTREPRENEURS
20 Jan 2015
ABAJO CON EL BLOQUEO EN CONTRA DE LOS EMPRENDEDORES CUBANOS, TANTO EN LA HABANA COMO EN WASHINGTON
19 Dec 2014
THE CONCEPT OF A “LOYAL OPPOSITION” IN THE CUBAN CONTEXT
6 Nov 2014
DOES CUBA HAVE AN INDUSTRIAL FUTURE?
10 Sep 2014
Book Review: Al Campbell (Editor) Cuban Economists on the Cuban Economy.
9 Jul 2014
Cuba’s New Foreign Investment Law: Amplified Discrimination against Cuban Small Enterprise Operators and in Favor of Foreign Enterprises.
17 Apr 2014
Book Review: ¿Quo vadis, Cuba? La incierta senda de las reformas
14 Apr 2014
Reordenamiento Laboral: Quién se queda, quién se va?; Labor Force Down-Sizing in Cuba’s Medical System
9 Apr 2014
Cuba’s Conception Conundrum: A Valentine’s Day Puzzle
14 Feb 2014
POTENTIALS AND PITFALLS OF CUBA’S MOVE TOWARD NON-AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES
30 Jan 2014
Book Review: Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Jorge Pérez-López, Cuba Under Raúl Castro: Assessing the Reforms
28 Oct 2013
CAN WORKERS’ DEMOCRACY IN CUBA’S NEW NON-AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES CO-EXIST WITH AUTHORITARIANISM?
7 Oct 2013
CAN CUBA RE-INDUSTRIALIZE?
5 Oct 2013
The Tax Regimen for the Mariel Export Processing Zone: More Tax Discrimination against Cuban Micro-enterprises and Citizens?
26 Sep 2013
Oscar Espinosa Chepe, 1940-2013
23 Sep 2013
“Political Science”: When Will Cuban Universities Join the World?
17 Jun 2013
“ASSESSING THE GOALS AND IMPACT OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO AFTER 50 YEARS”
25 Mar 2013
Cuba-Russia Debt Write-Off and Aircraft Leasing: Win-Lose or Win-Win?
22 Feb 2013
Raul on a Roll; Anti-Reformers in Retreat!
21 Jan 2013
The Economic Implications for Cuba of Relaxing Restrictions on the Freedom of Movement
17 Oct 2012
Cuba’s Economic Problems and Prospects in a Changing Geo-Economic Environment
13 Jul 2012
My Skepticism Runs High, but Maybe I am Wrong! Some Articles on the Moringa Oleifera.
27 Jun 2012
Still More “Good Advice” from Fidel!
26 Jun 2012
Cuba in the 2012 Yale University “Environmental Performance Index Rankings.”
14 Jun 2012
Cuba’s Debt Situation: Official Secrecy and Financial “Jineterismo”
8 Jun 2012
Cuba: Still Paying Homage to the Economic Absurdities of “Che” Guevara
20 Apr 2012
Cuba’s World Heritage Sites
16 Mar 2012
The Concept of a “Loyal Opposition” and Raul Castro’s Regime
28 Feb 2012
Poor Fidel: Repudiated by his Own Brother and Reduced to Playing “Chicken Little’”
13 Jan 2012
Johann Sebastian Bach, the “Stasi” and Cuba
9 Dec 2011
Fidel Castro: The Cowardice of Autocracy
4 Nov 2011
Liberating Cuba’s Long-Suppressed Resource: Entrepreneurship
20 Oct 2011
The “Home Hardware” Cooperative Model and its Relevance for Cuba
19 Oct 2011
Can Cuba Recover from its De-Industrialization? I. Characteristics and Causes
27 Sep 2011
Cuba: A Half-Century of Monetary Pathology and Citizen’s Freedom of Movement
23 Sep 2011
A Further Step in the Liberalization of the Regulatory and Tax Environment for Small Enterprise Has Raul Now Got the “Horse before the Cart”?
27 May 2011
Up-Date on Canadian-Cuban Economic Relations
27 May 2011
Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba: Will Raul Forge His Own Legacy?
16 Apr 2011
Cuba’s Economic Agenda and Prospects: An Optimistic View!
8 Apr 2011
Cuba’s Economic Reform Process under President Raul Castro: Challenges, Strategic Actions and Prospective Performance
4 Apr 2011
Recuperation and Development of the Bahi ́a de la Habana
29 Mar 2011
An Overview Evaluation of Economic Policy in Cuba circa 2010
15 Mar 2011
A Major Slow-Down for the Public Sector Layoff / Private Sector Job Creation Strategy
1 Mar 2011
Cuba’s Standings in Social, Political, Economic and Environmental Indices in Comparative International Perspective
3 Feb 2011
Has the US Tourism Tsunami to Cuba Already Begun?
2 Feb 2011
Cuba’s Best Friend: the Canadian Winter
25 Jan 2011
Micro-enterprise Tax Reform, 2010: The Right Direction but Still Onerous and Stultifying
10 Jan 2011
“Shifting Realities in ‘Special Period. Cuba”, LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH REVIEW, volume 45 number 3, 2010
17 Dec 2010
- PERSPECTIVE: OVERCOMING CUBA’S INTERNAL EMBARGO
CUBAN ENTREPRENEURS CAN SELL EVERYTHING FROM SHOES TO SOAP IN THE UNITED STATES
24 Feb 2015
CUBA EMPRESARIAL: LA REALIDAD AHOGA A LOS BUENOS DESEOS
23 Feb 2015
WHO OWNS CUBA? AS CUBA-U.S. RELATIONS THAW, THE THORNY MATTER OF PROPERTY DISPUTES HEATS UP
23 Feb 2015
CANADIAN CEO RETURNS HOME AFTER IMPRISONMENT IN CUBA
23 Feb 2015
BAD HABITS CAN DERAIL US-CUBA NEGOTIATIONS
20 Feb 2015
LAS TRD MAL ADMINISTRADAS POR LOS MILITARES
19 Feb 2015
VENEZUELA: THE REVOLUTION AT BAY with major implications for Cuba!
16 Feb 2015
LIKELY CASTRO SUCCESSOR KEEPS A LOW PROFILE
9 Feb 2015
NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH CUBA MAY PORTEND CHANGES TO U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
2 Feb 2015
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, ASCE 2014
2 Feb 2015
- CUBAN ENTREPRENEURS CAN SELL EVERYTHING FROM SHOES TO SOAP IN THE UNITED STATES
- Larry Press on PERSPECTIVE: OVERCOMING CUBA’S INTERNAL EMBARGO
- Brian S. on DESPITE CHANGES, U.S. BUSINESSES STILL FACE A MINEFIELD OF SANCTIONS IN CUBA
- SOMOS TODOS AMERICANOS. I RAPPORTI USA-CUBA (E AMERICA LATINA) DOPO LA MORTE DELL' UNIPOLARISMO - tanamericana.it on CUBAN-AMERICANS AGREE: TIME TO END THE EMBARGO
- Ricardo Mansilla Corona on Jump-Starting the Introduction of Conventional Western Economics in Cuba
- Can Cuba become the bread basket of North America? – CNN (blog) | Superior News Update on Espacio Laical, “The Sixth Party Congress and “Lineamientos”: A Turning Point for Cuba?”
- Kf on ANALYSIS OF THE PORTFOLIO OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CUBA
- Latino Rebels | It’s Time to Embrace the Third Rail That Is #CubaPolicy on Cuba’s Achievements under the Presidency of Fidel Castro: The Top Ten
- Laz on ABAJO CON EL BLOQUEO EN CONTRA DE LOS EMPRENDEDORES CUBANOS, TANTO EN LA HABANA COMO EN WASHINGTON
- Arch Ritter on CUBA’S EXTRAORDINARY GLOBAL MEDICAL RECORD SHAMES THE US BLOCKADE; From Ebola to earthquakes, Havana’s doctors have saved millions. Obama must lift this embargo.
- Michael Wiggin on CUBA’S EXTRAORDINARY GLOBAL MEDICAL RECORD SHAMES THE US BLOCKADE; From Ebola to earthquakes, Havana’s doctors have saved millions. Obama must lift this embargo.
Mimi Whitefield, Miami Herald, 02/23/2015
When the U.S. State Department announced new rules for products that independent Cuban entrepreneurs could sell in the United States, it published a broad list detailing they couldn’t sell. That left many people scratching their heads over whether much of anything now produced by Cuba’s cuentapropistas would be allowed.
But after analyzing all the exceptions and drilling into the complicated U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule, Miami Customs attorney Lenny Feldman has come up with what he calls his “yes” list — imports from self-employed workers that are permitted even though the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba remains in place.
It turns out there are more potential products than originally thought and quite a few that at least some of the 483,396 Cubans registered as cuentapropistas — those who work for themselves — make.
“There’s actually a lot left,” said Feldman, an attorney in the Miami office of Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg.
The State Department says its new rules will encourage private Cuban entrepreneurs to develop products for export. While all live animals and animal products are prohibited, raw hides, skins, leather, furs, saddlery and harnesses, handbags, and travel goods are allowed. So are paper products, plastics and rubber articles, ceramics, glass and glassware, articles of stone, plaster and cement; footwear, hats, umbrellas, toys and games, artificial flowers and feathers.
Independent entrepreneurs who make soap, cosmetics, candles, waxes and polishes, perfume or photographic or cinematographic goods are also in the clear. Jewelry makers, including those who work with pearls and precious and semiprecious stones, also got a green light as did producers of cutlery and tools.
Importation into the United States of an array of home goods, including furniture, lamps, illuminated signs, bedding, mattresses and cushions, clocks, wicker products, baskets, and articles made from wood, cork and straw, is allowed. Watches and musical instruments are on the “yes” list, too.
Cuenta-Propista Arts and Crafts ready for Export to the US!
Party Supplies? Ready for Export — Soon.
Nora Gámez Torres; El Nuevo Herald, 02/21/2015
En los parques de pueblos en el interior de Cuba y en algunos barrios de la capital, los niños se entretienen montando carretones tirados por caballos y cabras. No es una actividad lucrativa que se asociaría inmediatamente con el término “pequeño empresario”, pero el “servicio de coche de uso infantil tirado por animales” es una de las 201 actividades que el gobierno cubano ha autorizado a ejercer “por cuenta propia”.
No es, por supuesto, lo que tienen en mente funcionarios del gobierno y congresistas estadounidenses que han visitado recientemente la isla cuando hablan de ayudar al florecimiento de los negocios en Cuba, pero quienes pasean a los niños en coches forman parte, junto a dueños de “paladares”, taxistas, fotógrafos, reparadores de todo tipo de objetos y “arrendadores de vivienda”, entre otros, de un emergente sector privado, al que la nueva política exterior de Estados Unidos ha colocado en el centro de atención.
El objetivo declarado es estimular a este sector para la mejoría económica del pueblo cubano y la promoción de una sociedad civil independiente que, eventualmente, podría promover un cambio político en la isla. Pero ¿qué dimensiones reales tiene ese sector y qué potencialidades tiene para expandirse bajo el control del gobierno de Raúl Castro?
Según las últimas cifras oficiales publicadas en el periódico estatal Trabajadores en enero, 483,396 personas laboraban “por cuenta propia” en Cuba. Una pequeña cifra todavía, en comparación con los más de cuatro millones empleados en la economía estatal.
Estos trabajadores necesitan una “licencia” u autorización gubernamental para operar en una de las 201 actividades permitidas y deben pagar mensualmente las cuotas fijadas por el Estado. En su mayoría son oficios o servicios que requieren poca capacitación e infraestructura tecnológica, como “forrador de botones”, “rellenador de fosforeras” y “cuidadores de baños públicos”. Entre los que arrojan más beneficio se encuentran la gestión de restaurantes o “paladares” y los servicios de taxi.
“Aunque Raúl ha hecho cambios significativos en cuanto a la economía y la microempresa en Cuba, no son cambios suficientes para lograr las metas del gobierno de crecimiento y de transferir a los trabajadores estatales al sector no estatal, privado o cooperativo”, explica el profesor de Baruch College, Ted Henken, autor junto al también profesor y economista Archibald Ritter, del libro Cuba empresarial: un contexto de políticas cambiantes, del cual este reporte tomó prestado el título.
“Hay un grupo de obstáculos burocráticos y de regulaciones. Por ejemplo, muchos profesionales no pueden trabajar en su profesión en el mercado laboral privado. La mayoría de los 201 oficios no son productivos, son de sobrevivencia”, apuntó.
Si las remesas son la principal fuente de inversión en los negocios privados en Cuba, como argumenta Henken, la nueva disposición anunciada por el gobierno de EEUU de eliminar restricciones a envíos destinados a “actividades de personas particulares y organizaciones no gubernamentales que promueven la actividad independiente para reforzar la sociedad civil en Cuba y el desarrollo de empresas privadas”, puede estimular la expansión de los negocios ya existentes o el surgimiento de otros. Pero la casi total ausencia de créditos nacionales es un obstáculo importante para aquellos que no tienen familiares o contactos en el extranjero.
Existe, además, “un obstáculo mayor del que todos se quejan: que no hay un mercado mayorista”, observa Henken.
Los altos impuestos es otra de las críticas a las regulaciones actuales, que establecen un impuesto progresivo sobre las utilidades hasta del 50%, más otros tributos por ventas, servicios, utilización de fuerza de trabajo, contribuciones a la Seguridad Social así como tasas por anuncios y publicidad comercial.
Los impuestos por utilidades comienzan en un 15% y llegan al 50% por ganancias superiores a $2,000 al año, lo que unido a las tasas arbitrarias de gastos deducibles, pueden generar impuestos reales que superan el 100 por ciento de lo generado en un año. “Obviamente esto podría matar a la empresa o promover el fraude”, argumentan los autores de Cuba empresarial.
En plena temporada de declaración de impuestos, algunos cuentapropistas han hecho pública su insatisfacción en cartas a medios oficiales como Granma o comentarios dejados en las páginas en internet de estas publicaciones.
La lectora Elizabeth González Aznar se quejó en Cubahora del bajo índice de deducción de gastos (hasta un 40% en dependencia del tipo de actividad) en el régimen de contribución de los cuentapropistas en condiciones en que “no existe mercado mayorista”, “los productos se adquieren en mercados minoristas y a precios muy altos”; “las tarifas eléctricas suben cada vez más” y “se abrió el cuentapropismo sin crear mecanismos elementales que mantuvieran una oferta de productos acorde a la demanda”.
González Aznar dijo verse obligada a comprar productos más caros en las tiendas de recaudación de divisas solo para poder obtener comprobantes que luego puede presentar al hacer su declaración.
Pero este no es el peor escenario. Históricamente, cada vez que el gobierno cubano ha permitido pequeños espacios para la iniciativa individual, ha perseguido duramente a quienes considera acumulan capital o se convierten en una competencia para el estado, como sucedió con la prohibición de comercializar ropa importada en 2013 o el cierre de paladares como El Hurón Azul.
La clausura de las salas de cine privadas en noviembre del 2013 ilustra, además, que el gobierno no está dispuesto a ceder en el control de espacios que considera esenciales, como la distribución de información y productos culturales, zonas que, por ahora, están vedadas a los negocios privados, al menos legalmente.
Que los emprendedores hayan reaccionado con la creación de “los paquetes”, un compendio de programas extranjeros distribuido informalmente en dispositivos portátiles de almacenamiento, ilustra que las autoridades solo pueden desplazar—pero ya no controlar—estas actividades hacia el mercado informal, que sigue interesado en este tipo de oferta.
Una última limitación impide la expansión de capital nacional en inversiones de mediano y gran alcance. La Ley 188, de inversión extranjera aprobada por el parlamento en marzo del 2014, regula las inversiones en Cuba de “personas naturales” y “jurídicas extranjeras”, así como las llamadas empresas “mixtas” con capital del estado cubano, pero no menciona que los cubanos, residentes o no en la isla, tengan el derecho de invertir en Cuba.
Para estimular las inversiones, el gobierno otorgó una excepción de ocho años a las empresas extranjeras que abran negocios en Cuba, entre otras facilidades, a las que no tienen derechos los pequeños empresarios cubanos, lo que constituye “un tipo sorprendente de discriminación en contra de los ciudadanos cubanos”, según escriben Henken y Ritter.
HAVANA — The Globe and Mail, Published Friday, Feb. 13 2015, 3:28 PM EST
Original here: WHO OWNS CUBA?
Tonito Ring Ring was a Latin-looking boy with a dial for a belly and a target on his head. In the 1950s, he was the cartoon mascot of the Cuban Telephone Company, then owned by American firm International Telephone & Telegraph. When the Revolution came in 1959, workers at company headquarters in Havana came looking for him. They tore Tonito down from the wall, thrust him into a coffin, walked him down Calle Aguila to the Malecon, and tossed him into the sea. The Communists, meanwhile, seized the entire Yanqui phone company and, in the ensuring three years, confiscated $1.6-billion worth of U.S property across the island.
Almost six decades later, the United States is intent on making the Cubans pay. Literally.
Now the property of the state-run phone monopoly ETECSA, the telephone company is just one of roughly 6,000 confiscated assets, estimated to be worth a total of more than $7-billion, to which American firms and citizens hold claims. If the Cubans want the United States to lift its gruelling economic embargo – now a possibility, after U.S. President Barack Obama announced the re-establishment of diplomatic relations in December – they’re going to have to address the thorny issue of compensation. With Mr. Obama’s presidency winding down, and Cuba’s economy suffering even more than usual thanks to the woes of petro patron Venezuela, pressure is beginning to build to tackle the elephant in the room.
Although Cubans have long considered the embargo a form of slow genocide, America clearly feels differently. In its eyes, Mr. Castro and his comrades took part in nothing less than illegal seizures of property, and should now pay for what they stole if they want to normalize trade. In fact, a two-decade-old American law dictates that there will be no normalization in trade until the claims are settled.
Compensation is a freighted emotional issue for these antagonists, whose mutual antipathy long precedes the revolution. It’s not just about land or assets, communism versus capitalism. It’s about the right to claim victimhood. “Cuba’s crime is not that it’s communist,” political scientist Rafael Hernandez told me as we sat down to talk in his Havana living room last month, the day before Assistant Secretary of State Roberta S. Jacobson made her historic visit to Cuba. “The two countries have a long way to develop a relationship that surpasses a century of mistrust.”
Mr. Obama’s announcement may bring an economic revolution to Cuba. Although the short-term aims include lifting travel and financial restrictions, and even moving toward an exchange of embassies, the long-term goal is to normalize trade.
But Ms. Jacobson has said that the two sides won’t broach the topic of compensation until much further down the road. For the payment issue, even the process is complicated. As previous Cold War-era attempts at land claims have proved, establishing a rate for repayment will be no small feat. For one thing, no one knows whether the United States, which represents all the claims, will seek to settle in one lump sum or want to address each case individually.
Tables from Archibald Ritter, “The Compensation Issue in U.S. – Cuba Normalization”, Chapter 16 in A. Ritter and J. Kirk, Editors, Cuba in the International System: Normalization and Integration, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1995 United Kingdom
Continue Reading: Who Owns Cuba
HAVANA — Reuters; , Feb. 21 2015, 2:00 PM EST
Cuba has freed Canadian businessman Cy Tokmakjian after more than three years in jail, his company said on Saturday, resolving a case that had strained Cuban-Canadian relations and alarmed foreign investors.
Tokmakjian, founder of the Ontario-based company, was convicted of bribery and other charges and sentenced to 15 years in September in what the transportation company had called a “show trial” and a “travesty of justice.”
Cuban prosecutors had outlined a pattern in which Tokmakjian wooed Cuban officials and their families with a series of gifts, helping the Tokmakjian Group do business estimated at $80 million annually with Cuba until the company was shuttered and its founder arrested in September 2011.
Tokmakjian “was welcomed home by his family, friends, and thousands of employees,” said the company statement, which also thanked the Canadian government. A spokesman said the 74-year-old was released early Saturday.
The statement made no mention of two Canadian aides from the Tokmakjian Group, Claudio Vetere and Marco Puche, who were also convicted and sentenced to 12 and 8 years. They had been under house arrest pending trial and while their convictions were being appealed.
Fourteen Cubans including the former deputy sugar minister and the former director of the state nickel company were also convicted and sentenced to terms ranging from 6 to 20 years.
Foreign companies and diplomats had raised concerns that Tokmakjian’s case could scare off investors while Cuba was actively seeking foreign capital. It also annoyed Canada, a major trading partner.
“His ordeal is a cautionary tale to any investor who thinks the Cuban playing field is level,” said Peter Kent, Tokmakjian’s member of parliament.
Cuba seized about $100 million worth of company assets including bank accounts, inventory and office supplies, a ruling the company was challenging in international arbitration.
No immediate reason was given for the sudden release of Tokmakjian, whom Cuba had previously hailed as a model business partner over 20 years for supplying crucial transportation equipment during a severe economic crisis after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The company was later caught up in an investigation of Cuba’s international trading sector, part of a crackdown on corruption.
Throughout the time Tokmakjian was tried in June and sentenced in September, the Canadian government was helping the United States and Cuba by serving as host to secret talks on restoring diplomatic ties.
It was unknown whether Canada’s role had any influence on Tokmakjian’s release.
Peter Hakim, President Emeritus, Inter-American Dialogue
Estado de S. Paulo, February 15, 2015.
In a belated response to the December 17 announcements of presidents Raul Castro and Barack Obama, Fidel Castro (or at least the message released in his name) tepidly endorsed their historic decision to normalize relations between the United States and Cuba—while rightly emphasizing that reconciliation would surely be a difficult and lengthy process in light of the accumulated distrust of the past fifty years.
But distrust, a predictable element in all negotiations between adversaries, is not the only challenge for US-Cuban diplomacy. What most threatens to derail the two nation’s ongoing talks is a clash of national character flaws: the terrible impatience of Washington in foreign affairs confronting the Havana government’s excessive caution and stubborn resistance to change.
Cuban-American relations since Fidel Castro took power in 1959 have been a narrative of US impatience squaring off against Cuba’s defiance. Although initially tolerant, in less than a year the Eisenhower Administration began efforts to topple the revolutionary regime, and shortly thereafter embargoed commerce with the island. Just months in office, President Kennedy launched the Bay of Pigs invasion.
Among US Presidents, Obama has been unusually cautious overseas, but he is well aware that he has an important stake in the pace of both political and economic reform in Cuba. Washington’s yardstick for judging his new Cuba policy will mostly be progress toward human rights, free expression, and more open politics—and these have appropriately been made a top priority of the US negotiating agenda. White House plans already include reinforcing ties with dissidents and other non-governmental actors, bolstering the incipient private economy, expanding Cuban access to information and opinion, and supporting other democracy-building initiatives. None of this should be a surprise to the Cuban government. Still, suspicious, distrustful Cuban authorities may view even modest new initiatives along these lines as “meddling” and “promoting regime change”. To paraphrase Fidel, if the US is allowed to take a finger, it will soon be after the hand, and then the arm.
Cuba is proud of its success in defying the US for half a century. Even as it seeks improved relations, it is not ready to yield much, if anything, to US pressures. There is little reason to doubt that the Cuban government genuinely wants a sustained thaw in relations with the US, principally to shore up a debilitated economy further jeopardized by a cut-off of support from crisis-ridden Venezuela. But Raul Castro and other Cuban officials have consistently declared their intention to keep Cuba’s political and economic systems intact. The excruciatingly slow process of vital economic reforms over the past eight years underscores the leadership’s resistance to change, to yielding any of its centralized control. At last month’s meeting of Latin American and Caribbean heads of state, Raul Castro demanded, as pre-conditions for normalized relationship, that the US lifts its embargo on Cuba and return Guantanamo Bay to Cuban sovereignty. This is a signal that Cuba’s leaders will not be rushed. They know that the US cannot meet these demands in any short period.
While secret negotiations over many months were needed to mark a path toward reconciliation, sustaining the process now requires transparency from both governments. There should be no surprises from either side. Official lines of communication should be opened at many levels. Both the American and Cuban people should be kept informed of key developments. Covert US operations, like the programs that funded Alan Gross’s internet-related activities and assisted dissident groups, should be replaced by fully public initiatives as the administration has wisely promised. Regime change is off limits.
For its part, the Cuban government should begin respecting international norms regarding human rights and rule of law. That means abandoning such common practices as mass arrests and jailing of opponents, harassment of dissidents whether by police or vigilante groups, cruel treatment of political prisoners, and other denials of basic rights. With Cuba now under an intensive media spotlight, such violations will gain immense attention worldwide. If they intensify, the political recoil in the US might well halt the emerging rapprochement.
It is also critical that the US appreciate the limits of its influence on Cuba’s political evolution. Enduring changes will come only from the actions of the government and people of Cuba. The US should not hesitate to urge Cubans to respect human rights and democratic principles, but it should keep its word to forego heavy handed demands, pressures, and deadlines. These could well backfire, increasing the Havana government’s resistance to change.
With most Latin American countries now committed to democratic politics at home, the region’s governments should be expected to help support political and economic reform in Cuba. Brazil, Mexico, and several other nations have particularly close ties to Cuba and could be instrumental in assisting the country’s transition. But it is only when the Cuban government makes clear that it values such assistance will the other Latin American nations be prepared to act. On this front they will surely not respond to US pressure.
The recipe for Cuban-American reconciliation is straightforward. More caution and patience from the US, along with a willingness to tolerate ambiguity, even inaction, for some time. More flexibility and risk-taking from a Cuba government that needs to accept less control and less certainty about its future. And Latin American nations prepared to show their solidarity by taking on responsibility for helping Cuba through a difficult period of potentially dramatic changes.
PRIMAVERA DIGITAL, febrero 18, 2015
Ensayo original aquí: Las TRD Mal Administradas por los Militares,
Por Osmar Laffita
Cuba actualidad, Capdevila, La Habana, (PD)
A los dos años de ejercer Raúl Castro como presidente, enviaba señales de que su política económica se desmarcaba del estatismo que aplicaba su predecesor, Fidel Castro, quien prácticamente había liquidado la actividad privada a pesar de que por ley estaba autorizada.
Como muestra de que su gobierno no iba en esa dirección, la primera medida del gobierno de Raúl Castro dirigida a reactivar los pequeños negocios privados fue la puesta en vigor de la Resolución No. 32 de 7 de octubre de 2010 del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social (MTSS), en la que se autorizaba nuevamente el ejercicio de178 actividades para ejercer las cuales se podía sacar licencias. Entre ellas estaba la no. 71, de modista y sastre.
El gobierno de Raúl Castro vio inicialmente la ampliación de la actividad privada como una vía para generar empleo para los casi 1 200 000 trabajadores que sobraban en las plantillas de las empresas estatales, resultado de la política voluntarista e irresponsable de pleno empleo que aplicó Fidel Castro.
El 6 de septiembre de 2012 el MTSS puso en vigor la Resolución No. 33, la cual ampliaba a 181 las actividades que se autorizaban a ejercer. En dicha Resolución se mantuvo la no. 71 de modista y sastre.
Tal fue el crecimiento de los pequeños negocios privados, que prácticamente en todas las ciudades y pueblos de la isla, comenzaron a funcionar cafeterías, pequeños restaurantes, pizzerías, casas destinadas al alquiler de habitaciones. En los portales de las casas, así como áreas y locales especialmente habilitados, había pequeños negocios en los que vendían ropa, calzados y bisuterías para el hogar y de uso personal. La mayor parte de estas mercancías eran traída de los Estados Unidos, Ecuador, Panamá y México. Pasaban por la aduana, eran declaradas como artículos sin carácter comercial, hasta un límite de 100 libras, y sus propietarios pagaban los impuestos correspondientes.
Tal fue el incremento de las ventas de productos importados que al finalizar el año 2012 estaban dedicados a este negocio, amparados en la licencia de sastre y modisto, cerca de 90 000 personas. Tal fue la aceptación por el pueblo de estas mercancías, principalmente por mujeres y jóvenes, que dejaron de ir a comprar en las Tiendas de Recuperación de Divisas (TRD). En estos pequeños negocios privados se encontraban mercancías variadas, más modernas y bien confeccionadas. Si bien los precios eran altos, se podía regatear con el dueño.
En las TRD muchas de esas mercancías no se ofertaban, y si tenían la suerte de encontrarlas, estaba pasada de moda, mal confeccionada y con precios muy elevados, que no se correspondían con su mala calidad. Como el dueño es el Estado, en las TRD no se puede regatear: lo tomas o lo dejas.
En el primer trimestre de 2012, con miras a ampliar el control de los militares sobre la economía, el gobierno tomó la decisión de traspasar al Grupo de Administración Empresarial(GAE), perteneciente a las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, la dirección de los diferentes grupos empresariales que se ocupaban de la venta minorista en dólares, léase CIMEX y su red de más de 2000 tiendas, gasolineras, cafeterías, servicios navales, bancarios, inmobiliarias, y CUBALSE, hoy desaparecida, que además de a las actividades que realizaba el CIMEX, también se ocupaba de los servicios al cuerpo diplomáticos y las empresas extranjeras radicadas en Cuba. Esta última actividad se la asignaron al Grupo Palco, junto con todas sus tiendas, hoteles, restaurantes, dulcerías, casas de modas y cafeterías, ahora bajo la dirección del GAE.
El grupo Palco fue liberado de la dirección del Palacio de Convenciones, PABEXPO, EXPOCUBA, el centro de reuniones “El Laguito” y las casas de protocolo, que pasaron a ser dirigidos directamente por el Consejo de Estado.
La Cadena Caracol, que era dirigida y administrada por el Ministerio de Turismo, también pasó a manos de los militares. Todas las tiendas que funcionan en los hoteles y en las diferentes instalaciones de veraneo, las agencias de renta de autos y las bases de ómnibus destinadas al servicio de los turistas nacionales y extranjeros, pasaron al GAE.
Por decisión del director ejecutivo del GAE, el general de brigada Luis Alberto Rodríguez López-Callejas, los trabajadores de todas las TRD pasaron a ser trabajadores civiles de las FAR y los obligaron a integrarse al sindicato de la Defensa. En una de las tanta reuniones del GAE celebradas en los primeros meses de 2012, su dirección pudo conocer de la caída en las ventas en las TRD y del alarmante crecimiento de los inventarios de los almacenes. Al analizar las causas, detectaron que las pérdidas eran originadas por la proliferación de miles de pequeños negocios privados debidamente autorizados que vendían disimiles artículos importados.
Para parar esto de raíz, el gobierno dio instrucciones a la titular del MTSS, Margarita González Fernández, para que sobre la base de argumentos legales, demostrara que la licencia de sastre y modista no facultaba a sus poseedores para importar y comercializar ropa, calzado, bisuterías y otros enseres, porque representaba una violación de lo establecido.
Para aniquilar el floreciente negocio de las ropas y enseres importados que habían sumido en la quiebra a las TRD, el MTSS puso en vigor la Resolución No 42 de 2013, en la que se fijaba el alcance de cada actividad autorizada. A los poseedores de mercancías importadas les dieron un plazo para liquidarlas antes del 31 de diciembre de 2013.
Ahora el GAE tiene el monopolio del mercado minorista de venta en dólares. La vicepresidenta de su principal conglomerado comercial, la corporación CIMEX, anunció que la facturación por las ventas realizadas en 2014 ascendió a una cifra muy cercana al monto total de lo recibido por el país por concepto de remesas recibidas desde el extranjero. Esto da una idea del enorme poder económico del GAE.
Un reportaje realizado por las periodistas Juanita Perdomo Larezada y Betty Beatón Ruiz, del semanario Trabajadores, bajo el título “Hay, pero no me gusta”, publicado el 9 de febrero, se refiere al desastroso estado de desabastecimiento de las TRD de Santiago de Cuba y Matanzas.
No es solo en esas ciudades. En el resto del país se repite similar situación. Cuando la población va a hacer sus compras en las TRD, chocan con un pésimo servicio y productos de la mala calidad. Pero ahora no tienen otra opción estos establecimientos, porque desaparecieron los vendedores particulares. Y los militares son administradores ineficaces e incompetentes. Para Cuba actualidad: firstname.lastname@example.org Foto: Osmar Laffita
Mismanagement, corruption and the oil slump are fraying Hugo Chávez’s regime
The Economist Feb 14th 2015 | CARACAS
Original here: Revolution at Bay
ON A Wednesday evening around 30 pensioners have gathered for a meeting in a long, brightly lit room in a largely abandoned shopping gallery in Santa Teresa, a rundown and overcrowded district in the centre of Caracas. After a video and some announcements, Alexis Rondón, an official of the Ministry of Social Movements and Communes, begins to speak. “Chávez lives,” he says. “Make no mistake: our revolution is stronger than ever.”
Mr Rondón’s rambling remarks over the next 45 minutes belie that claim. Saying Venezuela is faced with an “economic war”, he calls on his audience to check food queues for outsiders, who might be profiteers or troublemakers, and to draw up a census of the district to identify opposition activists and government supporters. “We must impose harsh controls,” he warns. “This will be a year of struggle”.
About this, at least, Mr Rondón is correct. Sixteen years after Hugo Chávez took power in Venezuela, and two years after he died, his “Bolivarian Revolution” faces the gravest threats yet to its survival. The regime is running out of money to import necessities and pay its debts. There are shortages of basic goods, from milk and flour to shampoo and disposable nappies. Queues, often of several hundred people, form each day outside supermarkets. Ten patients of the University Hospital in Caracas died over the Christmas period because of a shortage of heart valves.
Both debt default and the measures that would be required to avoid one pose risks to the regime. It is on course to lose a parliamentary election later this year, which might then be followed by a referendum to recall Chávez’s inept and unloved successor, Nicolás Maduro. That could bring Venezuela’s revolution to a peaceful and democratic end as early as 2016. But there are darker possibilities. Caracas buzzes with speculation that the armed forces will oust the president.
Venezuela is suffering from the combination of years of mismanagement and corruption, and the collapse in the price of oil, which accounts for almost all of its exports. Chávez, an army officer, was the beneficiary of the greatest oil boom in history. From 2000 to 2012, Venezuela received around $800 billion in oil revenue, or two-and-a-half times as much in real terms as in the previous 13 years. He spent the money on “21st-century socialism”.
Some went on health care and low-cost housing for the poor, who hailed Chávez as a secular saint. Some has gone on infrastructure: a few new roads and metro lines were built, years behind schedule. Another chunk was given away in the form of cheap oil to Cuba and to other Caribbean countries, assuring Chávez loyal allies. Perhaps the biggest slice was frittered away or simply stolen. Filling a 60-litre tank with petrol costs less than a dollar at the strongest official exchange rate. Unsurprisingly, petrol worth $2.2 billion a year, according to an official estimate, is smuggled to Colombia and Brazil, with the complicity of the armed forces.
Tracy Wilkinson, Los Angeles Times, February 8, 2015
Original here: Miguel Diaz-Canel
The man expected to run Cuba after Raul Castro steps down is nearly 30 years the president’s junior and is regularly on Facebook in this Internet-starved country. He is considered personable, with a certain charm, but has been careful to keep a low political profile.
Miguel Diaz-Canel’s appointment as first vice president is the most concrete signal that a generational change of leadership may hover on the horizon in Cuba, matching a demographic shift that makes the island’s population one of the youngest in the hemisphere.
Castro, 83, plucked Diaz-Canel from relative obscurity and appointed him to his new position in 2013 as he announced that he planned to leave office in 2018. That set Diaz-Canel up as heir apparent, especially after other possible candidates were unceremoniously dumped when they were secretly recorded talking about their ambitions.
That is still a no-no, and Diaz-Canel has taken pains not to steal the limelight from Castro or the president’s 88-year-old brother, Fidel, the legendary revolutionary commander and former president who has not been seen in public in months amid rumors of failing health. A new set of photographs of Fidel Castro popped up this week in official media.
The circumstances mean Diaz-Canel has yet to make much of a mark. On an island where around 80% of the population has never known a president who wasn’t named Castro, many Cubans are struggling to figure out who he is.
Asked who he thought would be the next president of Cuba, Jose Hernandez, 83, a retired farm worker in the Cuban city of Mariel, said: “It will be Raul.” Diaz-Canel, Hernandez said, “is a good negotiator who will help our community. But Raul is the president. There is nothing but Castro in our heads.”
Cuba’s younger generation is more receptive to new leadership, but many agree that whoever comes next has a herculean task to court the powerful military, restructure the economy and guide the normalization process with the United States that was announced in December.
“We’ve lived many years with a dynasty,” said Katrina Morejon, a health worker in her 20s from Havana. “People are tired of what’s happening.”
Key leaders of the army, of which Raul Castro is still the supreme commander, control several segments of the economy and will have to be carefully cultivated if Diaz-Canel is to work well with them. Diaz-Canel was born more than a year after the Cuban Revolution led by the Castro brothers ousted dictator Fulgencio Batista in 1959.
Raul Castro is expected in the final years of his government to continue with slow but important reforms in the economy, allowing a measure of free enterprise and lifting some restrictions on trade and travel. Whether it is enough as relations with the United States change will be the big test.
The goals stated by Cuba and the U.S. after decades of animosity include elevating diplomatic representations in both countries to full embassies rather than the limited “interests sections.” Handling the new relationship will put pressure on whoever is president of Cuba. Castro has made it clear that better diplomatic ties with Washington should not change Cuba’s domestic, political or economic system, nor its intolerance of dissent.
At 54, Diaz-Canel, a trained engineer with a full head of salt-and-pepper hair, is the freshest face in the highest echelons of Cuban power. He recognizes the importance of Cuba joining the Internet age, somewhat against the official grain, people who know him say. A 1982 graduate of the Marta Abreu University of Las Villas with an electrical engineering degree, Diaz-Canel essentially paid his dues, putting hard, careful work ahead of the overt ambition that has felled many an up-and-comer on the Cuban political landscape.
His work on behalf of the state has included teaching at the university level, running local governments, serving as a minister of education and holding regional Communist Party leadership posts. He was assigned management of what Cuban officials consider major areas of accomplishment by the revolution: education, sports and biotechnology. He also did an all-important stint in Nicaragua, representing the Communist Party before like-minded Sandinista leaders.
Much of his personal life has been kept private. He is thought to be married with children. Tall, with strong features, he is well-liked by Cubans in the provinces, many of whom see him as down-to-earth and accessible. His Facebook page has photographs of Diaz-Canel with workers, Raul Castro and others during visits to factories in Villa Clara and elsewhere. He is usually shown in a white guayabera, or a sports jacket and open-collar shirt. Someone has posted items calling him MDC, and at one point nominating him to run the country, saying, “MDC rocks!”
“He is well-liked, young, well-educated, and he’s gone through all the different hoops,” said Rafael Betancourt, a professor at the University of Havana. That he is admired in the often snippy world of university circles, Betancourt said, “is very significant” and shows he has talent for handling people.
It appears the Cuban leadership is gradually, gingerly trying to elevate his profile. He has been sent abroad representing Castro, especially to friendly nations like Venezuela and Laos.
It’s always a delicate balancing act, however. In a speech in Mexico in December, he managed to mention both Castros in the first three paragraphs of his comments, then quote Raul twice more.
Communist-controlled press on the island has started to run fairly regular articles about Diaz-Canel’s activities: his trip to Santiago de Cuba, his visit with workers in Santa Clara.
But there are no big billboards promoting Diaz-Canel; most such public advertising is still limited to a Castro or, especially, the five Cuban intelligence agents who were recently released from jail in the U.S., two because they finished their sentences and three as part of the deal to jump-start detente with the U.S. They are regarded as heroes in Cuba; the posters are out-of-date, still demanding freedom for the men. Diaz-Canel is nowhere to be seen.
“He is too much in the shadows of Raul,” said Arturo Lopez Levy, a former Cuban intelligence agent who knew Diaz-Canel in their hometown of Santa Clara and who now teaches in New York. “A good signal to send to the world now that things are changing would be to give him a more prominent role.”
If he were the son of a corporate boss brought into the firm, Diaz-Canel would fit the bill, having been assigned to Communist Party leadership posts in important provinces like Holguin and Villa Clara. There, people who know him say he cultivated good relationships with local military officials, some of whom have recently been promoted to key leadership posts.
His real distinction, people say, has been in social media and computer technology, an area where Cuba lags notoriously behind the rest of the world. Few Cubans have open access to the Internet, but Diaz-Canel knows its importance to any future growth in business, trade, tourism and education, analysts say.
“The development of information technology is essential to the search for new solutions to development problems” in Latin America, Diaz-Canel said in the Mexico speech. “But the digital gap is also a reality among our countries, and between our countries and other countries, which we must overcome if we want to eliminate social and economic inequalities.” Later, however, when he listed Cuba’s successes, he did not return to the theme of information technology.
“He understands that to prevent a brain drain, you have to give [Cubans] an opportunity to participate massively in the expansion of the Internet,” said an American analyst of Cuban affairs who did not want to be quoted speaking about Diaz-Canel. Whether such an expansion project is yet allowed remains unclear.
Diaz-Canel is also often praised as a hands-on problem solver, someone who could get things done at the grass-roots level and understands the politics of persuasion. He once defended a gay theater group against local officials who wanted to shut it down, earning respect among some of Cuba’s most marginalized citizens.
Diaz-Canel’s gradual ascension comes with a little-noticed, still-slight change in the Cuban political hierarchy.
Rafael Hernandez, a political commentator and editor of Temas magazine in Cuba, said conventional wisdom often holds that “the Cuban leadership is the same, you have Fidel and then Raul, and it’s more or less the same thing.” But, he says, closer examination shows a changing leadership that includes more women and Afro-Cubans, long excluded, than ever before.
That may bode well for Diaz-Canel’s future leadership, but many Cuba-watchers agree that it will ultimately be the military that calls the shots. “The military may not be a threat, but it will always be there,” Lopez Levy said. Diaz-Canel “has an arduous road to walk.”
January 13, 2015 Policy Beat
Original here: US :Cuba Immigration policy
By Marc R. Rosenblum and Faye Hipsman
The historic December 2014 agreement by President Barack Obama and Cuban President Raúl Castro to normalize relations between the United States and Cuba may herald revisions to immigration policy and create changes that affect the future migration of Cubans to the United States. The decision to re-establish diplomatic ties with the island nation, severed more than half a century ago after the Cuban revolution in which Fidel Castro seized power and established a socialist government, will prompt a series of sweeping changes. The United States will reopen an embassy in Havana; greatly relax restrictions on trade, travel, remittances, and financial transactions; and re-evaluate Cuba’s decades-old designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.
The two countries have also agreed to greater cooperation on areas such as counter-narcotics, environmental protection, and human trafficking. Despite the long estrangement, the United States and Cuba have cooperated on migration issues for decades and have agreed to do so in the future. While the United States has stated that its immigration policy toward Cuba—which affords Cubans uniquely favorable treatment—will for now remain unaffected, improved overall relations will make today’s immigration arrangements difficult to sustain.
Currently, Cubans who arrive in the United States, even without proper authorization, are granted entry and benefit from a fast-track process that allows them legal permanent resident (LPR) status after one year in the country. This unique policy, based on a presumption that all Cuban emigrants are political refugees in need of protection, may need revision now that a détente is at hand. As the two countries improve relations and open their travel channels, policies that automatically welcome Cubans—including illegal entrants and visa overstayers—and accelerate their access to a green card may need to be revisited.
A Cold War mentality has dominated the U.S. approach to its small southern neighbor since the Cuban revolution in 1959, focused chiefly on isolating the country through economic sanctions in opposition to Cuba’s socialist model. The United States has also cited major human-rights concerns for maintaining a trade embargo and implementing tough travel and financial restrictions. In his December announcement, President Obama called this approach outdated, saying that five decades of U.S. isolation of Cuba had failed to achieve the objectives of promoting democracy, growth, and stability there.
The U.S.-Cuba Migration Relationship
Fraught political relations between the two countries, combined with their geographic proximity, have afforded Cuba a place that is sui generis in U.S. immigration law and policy. On the one hand, the United States has offered generous refuge to Cubans fleeing communism; on the other, it has discouraged illegal and dangerous boat migration from Cuba, which has occurred in large waves several times in recent decades.
The population of Cuban immigrants in the United States surged after the revolution, rising from under 71,000 in 1950 to 163,000 by 1960. In the immediate aftermath of the overthrow of the Fulgencio Batista regime by Castro-led revolutionaries, many wealthy Cubans and other opponents of the Marxist forces fled, particularly as Castro began nationalizing private property. Under Operation Pedro Pan, organized by religious organizations in Miami with the support of the U.S. government, approximately 14,000 unaccompanied children whose parents opposed the Castro regime were flown to the United States between 1960 and 1962. In September 1965, the first Cuban “boatlift” began when the Cuban government announced that people were free to leave for the United States from the port of Camarioca. When thousands sought to take advantage of the opportunity, many in unsafe vessels, the United States and Cuba reached an agreement to instead allow Cubans to fly to Miami on chartered “Freedom Flights;” about 300,000 Cubans arrived this way between 1965 and 1973.
The cornerstone of U.S. immigration policy toward Cuba is the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA), which Congress passed to accommodate these flows after amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in 1965 limited the number of Cubans (and other Western Hemisphere immigrants) who could receive visas. Under CAA, all Cubans who arrive in the United States are presumed to be political refugees, and are eligible to become legal permanent residents (LPRs or green card holders) after one year, assuming they are otherwise admissible. Two decades later, when Congress passed the 1980 Refugee Act establishing the current U.S. refugee and asylum system, the CAA provisions were left in place. Under the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, the CAA will sunset once Cuba becomes a democracy.
Following termination of the Freedom Flight program, most Cubans seeking to enter the United States have traveled by sea, and the attempts of hundreds of thousands of Cubans to make the perilous journey across the Straits of Florida have played a large role in shaping U.S. immigration policy toward Cuba. In 1980, maritime departures surged dramatically during the Mariel boatlift, when Fidel Castro opened the Cuban port of Mariel, allowing anyone to depart the country—including several thousand criminals and mentally disabled individuals. In the six months the port remained open, 125,000 Cubans (along with 25,000 Haitians who joined the flotilla) arrived in South Florida. Boat migration again surged in the mid-1990s. U.S. Coast Guard interdictions of Cubans jumped from 2,882 in fiscal year (FY) 1993 to 38,560 in FY 1994.
The 1994 surge prompted a pair of far-reaching migration agreements between Cuba and the United States in 1994 and 1995. Before then, Cuban migrants interdicted at sea by the Coast Guard were admitted to the United States, a practice widely criticized for encouraging more Cubans to attempt the risky journey. Under the 1994 agreement, Cuba agreed to discourage boat departures, while the United States agreed to grant admission to at least 20,000 Cuban nationals annually and to place intercepted Cubans in safe havens to be considered for asylum. Under the 1995 agreement, the United States granted parole status to the roughly 30,000 Cubans awaiting an asylum determination, and changed its policy to returning future migrants interdicted at sea directly to Cuba. Cubans who expressed a fear of persecution upon return and were determined to meet the refugee definition would no longer be eligible for asylum in the United States, but resettled in third countries.
Combined with the CAA, the 1994 and 1995 migration accords set forth the current “wet-foot, dry-foot” policy. Cubans intercepted at sea are returned to Cuba, where the government has pledged not to retaliate against them. Those who successfully reach the United States are permitted to stay, and become eligible to apply for a green card after a year.
Furthermore, to meet the 20,000 admission floor negotiated in the 1994 accords, the United States instituted the Special Cuban Migration Lottery. The lottery, held in 1994, 1996, and 1998, allowed Cuban nationals between the ages of 18 and 55 to register for admission to the United States, provided they possess two of the three following characteristics: a secondary school or higher education, three years of work experience, or a relative residing in the Unites States. Up to 20,000 lottery winners per year (depending on the number of Cubans admitted through regular visa processing) are granted parole status, and may bring their spouse and children. With 541,000 Cubans entering the lottery between 1994 and 1998, Cubans selected in 1998 continue to be paroled into the United States today.
As a result of these policies, and in spite of the hostile relations between the two countries, Cubans represent one of the ten largest foreign-born groups in the United States, with an estimated 1.1 million immigrants (2.7 percent of the foreign-born population). Collectively, Cuban immigrants and their U.S.-born descendants represented a diaspora of 2.1 million in 2011. Cuba also ranks highly as a sending country for new green-card holders, which have numbered in the 30,000s in each of the past five years (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Annual Number of Cubans Gaining LPR Status, 1990-2013
Source: Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2000-2013 (Washington, DC: DHS, Office of Immigration Statistics, various years), www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics.
Loosening Travel Restrictions
Travel between Cuba and the United States has been tightly controlled for much of the last half-century. Americans are only permitted to travel to Cuba for certain authorized purposes, such as educational, religious, humanitarian, or journalism trips. In 2013, Cuba changed a long-standing policy requiring its citizens to obtain an exit permit and letter of invitation from a country abroad in order to travel internationally, even temporarily. Most Cuban nationals now only need a valid passport and visa to depart, although certain skilled workers are excluded from the loosened rules. In response to Cuba’s policy change, the State Department extended the validity of B-2 tourist visas issued to Cubans from six months (single-entry) to five years with multiple entries permitted. Between 2012 and 2013, nonimmigrant visas issued to Cubans jumped 82 percent, from 20,200 to 36,787.
Cuba receives unique treatment under U.S. immigration law. No other nationality is given a blanket right to green-card eligibility, no other country has a floor below which visas may not fall, and no other group of immigrants is guaranteed admission to the United States if they appear at or between ports of entry. In effect, Cuban nationals are exempt from deportation and immigration enforcement policies affecting all other noncitizens. Furthermore, because Cuban arrivals are treated similarly to refugees, many are eligible for federal assistance and means-tested benefits from which most noncitizens are barred.
As the Obama administration and Cuba take steps to normalize their relations, trade and travel between the two countries is only expected to increase. While Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson has stated that current immigration policy and law concerning Cuba will remain “for the time being,” expanded travel and trade raise questions about the viability of the wet-foot, dry-foot policy and the Cuban Adjustment Act: As visa issuance to Cuban nationals increases, will a growing number of Cubans overstay their visas in order to obtain green cards? A policy that rewards those who violate the terms of their visas is sure to invite questions of fairness. How will the U.S. policy of automatically treating Cubans who reach the United States as refugees affect bilateral relations once diplomatic ties are restored?
Indeed, the Coast Guard has already reported a spike in interdictions of Cubans at sea since the announcement, with 500 interdictions in December—three times the typical amount. The Coast Guard attributes the spike to fear among Cubans that the United States could soon repeal the wet-foot, dry-foot policy.
However, while improved relations may create a pressing need for normalized immigration policies toward Cuba, both Cuba and immigration are highly polarized political issues. Permanently changing these laws will ultimately require approval by the U.S. Congress, and faces a steep uphill climb.
Playas deEste, August 1994. Did They Make it?
The papers presented at the 2014 Conference of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy are now available.
Cuba in Transition: Volume 24: Papers and Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual Meeting.
The papers listed below are hypewr-linked to directly to their respective file on the ASCE web site.
- Conference Program
- Table of Contents
- Cuba’s Perplexing Changes: Is the Society in Crisis? Joaquín P. Pujol
- The Cuban Economy 15 Years Later—On Firmer Ground, But Much Still To Do Gary H. Maybarduk
- “Reformas Raulistas”: Apuntes Para un Balance Miriam Celaya
- Where Are We? The State of Negotiation of a New Treaty Between the European Union and Cuba Martin Palouš
- Political Implications of Recent Economic Reform Trends in Cuba: The 2014 Status Vegard Bye
- Cuba: Tres Fábulas Sobre las “Actualizaciones” Raulistas Rolando H. Castañeda
- The Cuban Communist Party: Current Status and Future Reform Larry Catá Backer
- Cuba 2014: A Different Perspective on Cuba’s “Structural” Reforms Roger R. Betancourt
- Comments on “A Different Perspective on Cuba’s ‘Structural’ Reforms” by Roger R. Betancourt Jorge A. Sanguinetty
- Reclamaciones por Propiedades Expropiadas en Cuba: Informe de Recomendaciones Legales Rolando Anillo, Esq.
- U.S. Socialism in Cuba: Implications of Prohibiting the Private Sector at Guantanamo Bay Michael J. Strauss
- New Opportunities for Business and Investment by Americans in Cuba under the Economic Opening Antonio R. Zamora
- The Position of Cuba’s Independent Trade Unions on Foreign Investment — The Special Economic Development Zone Mariel (ZDEM) Victor Manuel Domínguez García
- Self-Employment in Cuba: Results of a Survey Maybell Padilla Pérez
- El Pequeño Sector Privado en Cuba: Una Incógnita por Descifrar Osmar Laffita Rojas
- La Unificación del Tipo de Cambio: El Caso Cubano Augusto de la Torre y Alain Ize
- Cuba’s Currency Unification: Step-by-Step and Tensions Domingo Amuchástegui
- ZEDM: Una Estrategia Audaz pero Todavia Incierta al Futuro Emilio Morales
- La ZEDM: Un Proyecto Dependiente de las Libertades Fundamentales Dimas Castellanos
- Investment Incentives of the ZED Mariel: Will Foreign Investors Take the Bait? Jorge F. Pérez-López
- The Institutional Structure of Production in the Cuban Economy Ernesto Hernández-Catá
- Cuba’s Growth Strategy: Human Capital and Foreign Investment Luis R. Luis
- A Simple Growth Model of the Cuban Economy Carlos Seiglie
- Apuntes Breves sobre Algunos Desafíos Cubanos Lenier González Mederos
- Oposición Cubana: Una Mirada al Futuro Roberto Veiga González
- La Oposición y el Poder Autoritario: Apuntes a Propósito de la Situación Cubana Armando Chaguaceda
- Cuba: Apuntes Para el Debate sobre Oposición Leal y Soberanía Desde el Derecho Internacional y el Modelo de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos Arturo López-Levy
- The Concept of a “Loyal Opposition” in the Cuban Context Archibald R. M. Ritter
- Self-Employment in Today’s Cuba: Quantitative Expansion Amid Qualitative Limitation Ted A. Henken and Archibald R.M. Ritter
- Self-Employment in Cuba since the VI Party Congress Mario A. González-Corzo and Orlando Justo
- La Hoja de Rescate de un Sistema de Salud Defraudao Juan Tomás Sánchez
- The Port of Mariel and Cuba-Brazil’s Unusual “Medical Cooperation” María C. Werlau
- Comentario al Trabajo de María Werlau: “El Puerto de Mariel y la Cooperación Médica Cuba-Brasil” Jorge Hernández Fonseca
- Cuba en Transicion y las Relaciones Cuba-Estados Unidos Miriam Leiva
- Does Cuba Have a Future in Manufacturing? Archibald R. M. Ritter
- Cuba’s Evolving Agricultural Import Patterns William A. Messina, Jr.
- El Mercado Libre Campesino Hildebrando Chaviano Montes
- Cuba, Un Nuevo Modelo Económico o ¿Capitalizar el Entusiasmo de la Integración Latinoamericana? Dariela Aquique
- Los Cambios en Cuba Hacia un Verdadero Desarrollo Humano Integral Jorge Ignacio Guillén Martínez
- Cuba y Su Comercio Internacional Orlando Freire Santana
- Inversiones, ¿Para Qué? Orlando Luis Pardo Lazo
- Cuba: Assessment of the New Tax Law of 2012 Lorenzo L. Pérez
- Steps to Economic Normalization with Cuba: A Roadmap for US Policymakers Gary Hufbauer, Barbara Kotschwar, and Cathleen Cimino
- La Ley Cubana de la Inversión Extranjera: ¿A Quién Debe Servir? José Manuel Pallí
- Comentarios a “La Nueva Ley de Inversión Extranjera Cubana” de José Manuel Pallí Jorge A. Sanguinetty
- Réplica a Sanguinetty José Manuel Pallí
- La Evolución del Derecho Civil Cubano y la Ley De Inversión Extranjera en Cuba: Un Camino por Recorrer María Elena Cobas Cobiella
- La Nueva Ley de Inversión Extranjera y la Vulneración de Derechos Humanos Yaremis Flores
- Los Derechos Laborales en Cuba Frente a la Ley de Inversión Extranjera Jesús R. Mercader Uguina
- Cultural Policy, Participation and the Gatekeeper State in Cuba Yvon Grenier
- Internet, Cine Independiente y Actualización Económica Soren Triff
- Personal Networks and Party Affiliation in Status Attainment Processes in Cuba: How Do Individuals End Up in Economically Profitable Positions in Emergent Sectors? Sara Romanò
- El Reflejo del Presente Proceso de Reformas — “Actualización” — en la Prensa Cubana Vicente Morín Aguado
- La Exportación del Control de Estado: Más Allá De la Batalla de Ideas Juan Reinaldo Sánchez
- El Socialismo del Siglo XXI: Exportación Cubana Carlos Sánchez Berzain
- Cuba’s Housing Situation: A Perspective from the 2002 and 2012 Censuses Sergio Díaz-Briquets
- El Nuevo Programa de Desarrollo Local y Comunitario (PDLC) desde la Dimensión Sociocultural: Objetivos y Trascendencias Rosendo Romero Suárez
- Appendix A: About the Authors