• The objective of this Blog is to facilitate access to research resources and analyses from all relevant and useful sources, mainly on the economy of Cuba. It includes analyses and observations of the author, Arch Ritter, as well as hyper-links, abstracts, summaries, and commentaries relating to other research works from academic, governmental, media, non-governmental organizations and international institutions.
    Commentary, critique and discussion on any of the postings is most welcome.
    This Blog on The Cuban Economy is dedicated to Cuba's Generation "A". Although inspired by Yoani Sánchez' original blog "Generation Y" this is not dedicated to those with names starting with the letter "A". Instead, it draws from Douglas Coupland's novel Generation A which begins with a quotation from Kurt Vonnegut at a University Commencement:
    "... I hereby declare you Generation A, as much as the beginning of a series of astounding triumphs and failures as Adam and Eve were so long ago."

UNEXPECTED CUBA

Posted on January 9, 2015 by Arch Ritter

By Emily Morris

Complete article here: New Left Review 88, July-August 2014

Introduction:

What is the verdict on Cuba’s economy, nearly a quarter of a century after the collapse of the Soviet bloc? The story generally told is a simple one, with a clear message. It describes a cyclical alternation of government policy between moments of pragmatic capitulation to market forces, which account for any progress, and periods of ideological rigidity and re-assertion of state control, which account for all economic difficulties. [1] After the dissolution of the Comecon trading bloc, us Cuba watchers were confident that the state-socialist economy faced imminent collapse. ‘Cuba needs shock therapy—a speedy shift to free markets’, they declared. The restoration of capitalism on the island was ‘inevitable’; delay would not only hamper economic performance but would inflict grave human costs and discredit Cuba’s social achievements. Given his stubborn refusal to embark on a course of liberalization and privatization, Fidel Castro’s ‘final hour’ had at last arrived. [2]

The problem with this account is that reality has conspicuously failed to comply with its predictions. Although Cuba faced exceptionally severe conditions—it suffered the worst exogenous shock of any of the Soviet-bloc members and, thanks to the long-standing us trade embargo, has confronted a uniquely hostile international environment—its economy has performed in line with the other ex-Comecon countries, ranking thirteenth out of the 27 for which the World Bank has full data.

Continue reading: …….

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Conclusion: An alternative?

Raúl Castro’s second and final presidential term will end by 2018 at the latest. By 2016, when the five-year process of ‘updating’ under the current Guidelines comes to an end, the aim is for the economy to have a broader productive base and a larger private sector, while retaining universal health, education and welfare provision. To achieve this, the rate of investment will need to rise. Given Cuba’s success in cultivating official relations with new partners, including China, Brazil and Russia, the aspiration to increase the flow of foreign investment seems feasible. The trickier task will be to raise efficiency and dynamism within the domestic economy, while preventing widening income gaps and social divisions that threaten the state-socialist project.

Before writing off Cuba as a spent force, the magnitude of its achievement to date should be acknowledged. While conceding that market mechanisms can contribute to a more diversified and dynamic economy, Cuban policymakers have not swallowed the promises of full-scale privatization and liberalization, and have always been mindful of the social costs. This approach, shaped not least by exceptionally difficult international conditions, has been more successful in terms of both economic growth and social protection than Washington Consensus models would predict. Comparing Cuba’s experience with that of the former Comecon countries in Eastern Europe—or indeed with China and Vietnam—it is possible to identify some distinguishing features of its path.

First, Cuba was able to maintain a social safety-net during the crisis, in sharp contrast to the others. In the context of the island’s uniquely severe exogenous shock and hostile external environment, a commitment to universal welfare provision undoubtedly served to limit social hardship. Linked to this has been the process of extensive popular consultation, particularly at three critical moments—the onset of the crisis, the stabilization process, and the prelude to Raúl Castro’s new adjustment phase. Third, by retaining control of wages and prices during the early period of shock and recovery, it was possible to restore stability relatively quickly by restraining an inflationary spiral. Although fixed wages and prices created the conditions for a flourishing informal economy, they also served to minimize disruption and limit the income gap within the formal economy. Though the two are quite distinct, the strategy bears comparison with China’s ‘dual track’ system, in which the ‘planned’ track is maintained while a ‘market’ track develops alongside, providing opportunities for experimentation and learning. For all its inefficiencies and confusions, Cuba’s ‘bifurcation’ and ‘second economy’ played a part in adjustment to the new conditions.

Fourthly, the state retained control of the process of economic restructuring, allowing it to channel the very limited hard-currency resources to selected industries, achieving a remarkable recovery of foreign-exchange earnings relative to the amount of capital available. These enterprises also served as ‘learning opportunities’ for Cuban planners, managers and workers to think through how to adapt to altered international conditions. The export base created by this approach may be too narrow to drive sustainable growth over the long term, but it was an efficient way to restore capacity after the crisis period. Finally, Cuba’s rejection of the mainstream ‘transition-to-capitalism’ route allowed space for a process of adjustment—described by one official as ‘permanent evolution’ [57] —that has been flexible and responsive to Cuba’s changing conditions and constraints. This contrasts sharply with the more rigid recipes for liberalization and privatization pedalled by the hordes of transition consultants in other former Comecon countries. Cuba is a poor country, yet its health and education systems are beacons in the region. Its approach has shown that, despite contradictions and difficulties, it is possible to incorporate market mechanisms within a state-led development model with relatively positive results in terms of economic performance and social outcomes.

This raises the next question: why should we assume that the state will withdraw from its dominant role within the economy, or that the current approach to policy must eventually give way to a transition-to-capitalism path? A fundamental assumption of transition economics has been Kornai’s claim that ‘partial alteration of the system’ cannot succeed; efficiency and dynamism will only be maximized when the transformation from a ‘socialist planned’ economic system to a ‘capitalist market’ one is complete, because the former is too inflexible to survive over the long term. But the experience of former Comecon countries has demonstrated that success is far from guaranteed and that social costs can be high. Viewed without preconceptions, the Cuban case suggests that another way might be possible, after all.

untitledEmily Morris

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“NO ES FACÍL”: THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN CUBA–U.S. RELATIONS

Posted on January 9, 2015 by Arch Ritter

By Rafael Hernandez

January 8, 2015

Original here: “No Es Facíl”

Cubans have become used to preparing for war with the United States, not for dialogue and negotiation. U.S. policy-makers have specialized in attacking the island, which has kept them from learning to understand it. Neither side has been trained to deal with an adversary rather than an enemy. Each side’s success in a scenario of rapprochement depends on its ability to acquire such knowledge and turn it into real policy.

What does the United States have to gain in negotiations with Cuba? It hopes to moderate future Cuban actions, increase its ability to influence Cuban politics, and obtain benefits from specific areas of bilateral activity by doing the following:

1. Responding to a constituency of interest groups (agribusiness, biomedical, tourism, maritime transportation, health care, higher education, sports, entertainment, and perhaps oil) and freeing South Florida Cuban-American people and businesses, hostages of established policies, to organize in favor of tighter ties;

2. Paving the way for the 5,911 U.S. companies that were nationalized in 1960 to negotiate some kind of compensation under Cuban law (as Spanish, Canadian, French, Swiss, and other foreign firms did long ago);

3. Removing a point of contention with Latin America and U.S. allies that rejected the Helms–Burton Act on free-trade grounds, and easing the bilateral tension within international organizations like the U.N. Human Rights Commission;

4. Improving the flow of information between the two countries via legitimate exchange of radio and TV programs between public institutions, a fiber-optic cable connection, and improved mail, telephone, and Internet service;

5. Consolidating migration agreements (signed in 1994 and 1995); and

6. Reaching formal agreements to back ongoing cooperation in drug traffic interception, naval and air security, military and coast guard coordination, environmental protection, and other areas.

U.S. recognition of the socialist government favors Cuba’s independence and self-determination. For Cuba, dialogue with the United States could lead to additional benefits:

1. Lessening the cost of security and defense and the burden on economic development imposed by hostility and a multilateral embargo that affects Cuba’s relations with the rest of the world;

2. Gaining access to U.S. markets and capital flows, with a multiplier effect on all of Cuba’s foreign relations;

3. Forming alliances with various sectors of U.S. society;

4. Facilitating cooperation in areas related to geographic contiguity, like transportation and other trade-related issues, and environmental concerns, such as ocean pollution in the Florida Straits and protection of migratory species; and

5. Pursuing the return of the Guantánamo naval base territory to actual Cuban sovereign control. same Cuban regime that has been called illegitimate for half a century), and instate reciprocal agreements in place of unilateralism.

But there are also costs: The United States has to confront long-established resistance within the permanent bureaucracy and the Cuban-American right wing, admit that its Cuban policy has failed (and offer de jure recognition to the same Cuban regime that has been called illegitimate for half a century), and instate reciprocal agreements in place of unilateralism.

Although many Cubans favor détente and appreciate its economic benefits, they also remain worried about U.S. political and ideological intentions. In his recent statement on the new Cuban policy (Dec. 17), U.S. President Barack Obama stressed that U.S. policy will continue to focus “on issues related to democracy and human rights in Cuba … and promote our values through engagement.”

U.S.-style democracy and capitalist values are framed as a “peaceful evolution” strategy when applied to other cases (China, Vietnam) – another version of the old “regime change” policy.

Some Cubans are concerned about the effects of this policy, because it aims to undermine the socialist consensus among some groups in a period of changes during which social and political cohesion are of strategic value. U.S. government agencies and die-hard anti-communist groups in Miami, as well as their representatives in Congress, could use this opportunity to find new ways to fund political opposition, sending anti-government propaganda and trying to influence the Cuban domestic context.

The Cuban government finds itself in an unprecedented situation. It must choose between playing defensively and developing a new proactive strategy. Its ability to build up alliances and consensus will be decisive.

The identities of U.S. allies in Latin America, Europe, and Cuba are quite obvious. So, too, are the identities of Cuban allies, including many Latin American and Caribbean governments, emerging powers like Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), and some paradoxical ones, such as U.S. corporations, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the silent majority of the Cuban-American people.

The main weakness Cuba needs to overcome is not its lesser physical power, but its siege mentality. The United States, on the other hand, needs to overcome its sense of superpower arrogance vis-à-vis a small neighbor. Most counterproductive policies on both sides, from the U.S. Bay of Pigs fiasco to Cuba’s Internet restrictions, have been the consequence of these weaknesses.

As long as bilateral rapprochement moves forward, new issues could appear on the table. Cuba has only two foreign policy principles for negotiating differences, particularly with big powers like Europe and the United States: no preconditions and no double standards.

Cuba must figure out how to keep domestic political affairs within the area of dialogue and exchange rather than negotiation. Structural transformation in the Cuban economic and political system, individual liberties (particularly expression, movement, and association), the role of the mass media, and other issues related to citizens’ rights are internal affairs. To subject them to the dynamic of bilateral agreements with the United States could be politically counterproductive in terms of Cuban public opinion, even in the eyes of Cubans pushing for such changes. It would be like subordinating the patterns of life within a family to agreements with the upstairs neighbor.

Members of Cuban civil society, including rank and file party members, agree that dialogue with the United States may depressurize the domestic atmosphere and facilitate change, encourage generational turnover in the leadership, lead to a more decentralized system, and contribute to empowering the most constructive elements of both cultures and peoples.

Those who are in favor of a reformed Cuban socialism, not a Caribbean capitalism, support a détente with the United States that may help dissipate the siege mentality and lead to a political environment that facilitates a more democratic model.

Cuban socialists aspire to a kind of democracy that is defined by more than just a commitment to periodic elections within a highly regulated multiparty system. The Cuban public debate points toward radical democratization of the society and system as a whole – not just the polity, but also the community, schools, workplaces, economic management, and social and political organizations, including the Cuban Communist Party.

For the Cuban government, the issue will no longer be how to keep the ideological enemy from penetrating, because in a sense it is already inside. Instead, the government must be concerned with how to reshape and promote the domestic consensus, reactivate a socialist political culture on a new basis, and get rid of old rituals that have lost their meaning.

A new Cuba–U.S. relationship could certainly improve relations between Cuban-Americans and their counterparts on the island. Would the Cuban-American elite keep paying its dues to the declining industry of anti-Castroism as real business between the two shores prospers? Would its members hold on to their identities as ideologues rather than businesspersons, or would they opt to behave like other historical overseas economic elites (Vietnamese, Chinese)?

Finally, to what degree can those hostile networks withstand the emergence of economic and strategic interests that would broaden the surface of contact between the two sides? If this new correlation of forces emerges, classical torpedoes launched by hostile networks to destabilize the process of rapprochement will be less likely to succeed.

The conflict has already entered a transition phase. As often occurs between human beings, when favorable circumstances arise, a first step can unleash a march that exceeds all expectations. As President Obama said in his statement (adopting a Cuban expression made popular by Kermit the Frog), “no es fácil” – “it is not easy.” Although the process will be complicated, the most costly point for a U.S. president is now past: The ice has been broken.

rafaelhernandezRafael Hernandez

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A VIEW FROM HAVANA ON CUBAN-U.S. RELATIONS

Posted on January 8, 2015 by Arch Ritter

By Miriam Leiva

Huffigton Post, December 8, 2015

 Original here: View from Havana

The worrisome early announcement on December 17 — that Raul Castro would address the nation live on television that morning, concerning the United States — turned out to be the news many Cubans feared they would not live to hear. “As a result of a dialogue at the highest level, that included my phone conversation yesterday with President Obama, we were able to move forward in the solution of some issues of interest for both nations,” said the Cuban President. Cubans then burst into joy.

Among the ways they’re moving forward are the establishment of diplomatic relations and the release of contractor Alan Gross and a spy in prison for almost 20 years in exchange for the three Cubans serving sentences for spying in the U.S. For the last 55 years, the government here had been hammering Cuban’s minds, sending them to trenches through the island nation and abroad, depriving them of food, clothes, money, entertainment and the Internet, closely watching and repressing, alleging perils and shortages imposed by American imperialism and the embargo. Neither Santa Claus nor the Three Wise Men, but Barack Obama and Raul Castro, who anticipated them, brought hope on December 17.

Amazed Cubans then watched the “enemy” announcing the new measures, and read Obama’s speech published next to Raul Castro’s in the newspapers. Since then, anywhere one goes, there has been only one main issue in conversations — broad interpretations and hopeful expectations on the window of opportunities opened by Obama, expanding the proactive people-to-people policy started in 2009. Quiet concern and resistance from the old guard and its entourage exists, yet Raul Castro’s dramatic move shows their lack of influence over the government and their adaptation to preserve the privileges that still maintain. For the first time, Fidel Castro has not been in the spotlight. The major shift in his 56-years-long reign — even if he gave his approval — is too difficult for him to face (although grave illness cannot be discounted here).

The historic decisions by both presidents depend on how they are implemented, and how much the Cuban government is willing to allow. Nevertheless, once Pandora’s box is opened, it cannot be shut. Raul Castro desperately needs to ease tensions and reestablish relations with the U.S. The regime faces a 25-years-long economic crisis, which it has proven incapable of surmounting — and which could worsen if there is decreased financial support from Venezuela.

It has made limited changes in the framework of updating an economic model that has been a failure for 56 years. It is desperately seeking financial support and substantial foreign investment to recapitalize and develop, when the current international economic environment advises caution and assurance to property and benefits. The new Foreign Investment Law enacted in 2014 is intended to do so, but there are flaws. The Mariel Port and its Special Development Zone should give a boost to the Cuban economy, yet it depends on the U.S. lifting many restrictions and increasing trade.

Raul Castro is stepping down in three years, and is currently paving the way for new leaders. This period is crucial for the transition and the future of Cuba, both for the civil society and foreign partners. Mainly Brazil, Russia, and China have been positioning themselves in different sectors in Cuba, yet Americans and Cuban-Americans have been prevented by their government from participating in economic and commercial endeavors with Cuba — and from contributing their much-needed knowhow and technology. Moreover, Americans cannot travel freely to Cuba, and Cubans cannot benefit from the exchange of ideas, values and expertise.

For the United States, this new dialogue with Cuba eliminates an obstacle in the relations with all of Latin America and the Caribbean. President Obama stated an unwavering commitment to democracy, human rights and civil society, a continuation of U.S. programs aimed at promoting positive change in Cuba and encouragement of reforms in high-level engagement with Cuban officials. Many dissidents and opponents support the new American approach in the relations with the Cuban government, but many others do not. Raul Castro reaffirmed the usual accusations against the “counterrevolutionaries” a few days after reaching the agreement. He seemed to be warning the enthusiastic population that political openness was out of the question — and reminding the opposition that the regime was as repressive as ever. Nevertheless, the government has been losing credibility from its unfulfilled promises, and from the critical economic and social situation.

Awareness and empowerment have developed, and the interaction with Cuban-Americans and Americans visiting Cuba, and Cubans traveling to U.S., has played an important role. The years to come are full of challenges and threats in Cuba, but also of hope and opportunities.

red_Miriam-Oscar_8-5-11-1_400x400Miriam Leiva, with her husband,  the late Oscar Chepe

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ENDING CUBA EMBARGO URGED BY NEW AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY COALITION

Posted on January 8, 2015 by Arch Ritter

By Carter Dougherty,  January 08, 2015, Bloomberg

Original here: Coalition

A new agribusiness coalition is seeking an immediate end of the U.S. economic embargo on Cuba, prodding Congress to act as the Obama administration eases some restrictions in place for more than 50 years.

The U.S. Agriculture Coalition for Cuba, with more than 25 companies and farm trade associations, is being created Thursday in Washington to urge repeal of a 1996 law that made permanent sanctions on Cuba after Fidel Castro seized power in a communist revolution.

“It’s going to take time for Congress to get comfortable with Cuba,” Paul Johnson, the president of Chicago Foods International LLC, a company that handles logistics for products sold to Cuba. “But we need to end this embargo.”

President Barack Obama last month used the limited flexibility allowed by the law to ease travel, trade and finance with Cuba. But the economic embargo, in place since the early 1960s, needs congressional action to remove the restraints.

Johnson, vice-chairman of the coalition, said pushing for a quick end to the embargo might not be a pragmatic approach because Obama’s limited moves have already drawn criticism from Republicans in control of both the House and Senate. “But there’s a lot of sentiment for trade, and moving forward.”

The coalition will be led by Devry Boughner Vorwerk, director of international business relations at Cargill Inc., the closely held Minneapolis-based multinational

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IS CUBA READY FOR LIFE WITHOUT US TRADE EMBARGO?

Posted on January 8, 2015 by Arch Ritter

   Cuba Mar 2014 071 By Carlos Batista, 8 January 2015

Original here: IS CUBA READY

Havana (AFP) – As US President Barack Obama prepares to ask Congress to lift the Cuban trade embargo — in line with his decision to normalize diplomatic ties — some Cubans wonder if they’re ready for such an economic tidal wave.

The embargo outlawing most economic and financial transactions with the communist-run island was decreed in 1962 by then president John F. Kennedy and severely toughened under the so-called Helms-Burton law of 1996.

The Havana government regularly cites the embargo as an impediment to Cuban development. Damages — the opportunity cost of all the trade that never happened — are often estimated by Cuban officials at $100 billion over 50 years.

For opponents of the Cuban regime and some observers, the sanctions have certainly hurt the Western hemisphere’s only communist nation. But they have also given the government a target to blame for its troubled economy.

Soon, “the Cuban government will no longer have the big excuse that the island’s problems stem from the American embargo,” Patricio Navia, of the Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies at New York University, told AFP

The lifting of US sanctions would allow an injection of US capital into Cuba’s economy and the introduction of new products in a market that is light years away from the levels of a typical Western consumer society.

But Cuba’s economy — 90 percent controlled by the state — is not ready to welcome international investors and companies, said Carlos Alzugaray, a former diplomat who is now a university professor.  Reforms announced by President Raul Castro in 2008 have either yet to bear fruit or are still awaiting implementation, he said. “Fortunately the lifting of the blockage will be a slow process and probably gradual, which will allow for adaptation” in Cuba, said Alzugaray. He called for deeper and faster market-based reforms of the Cuban economy, a legacy of the Soviet model and now tottering on its last legs.

After six years of reforms undertaken by President Raul Castro, who took over for his ailing brother Fidel, the heroic leader of the Cuban revolution, the economy is still sputtering. GDP growth in 2014 was just 1.3 percent. Market-oriented changes have really only just begun.

The government encourages people to start up small businesses of their own and has adopted a law on foreign investment.  But decrepit infrastructure and industry, as well as the sluggish local bureaucracy, seem, at least for now, to be scaring away investors with money to spend.

In addition, Cuba has had two currencies — the official peso and another that is convertible — for more than 20 years. The government said more than a year ago it would do away with this messy system, but so far it has not.

Obama announced he intended to push for the embargo to be lifted when he made the historic announcement on December 17 that he would start the process of restoring diplomatic relations with Cuba. But lifting the sanctions is up to Congress, whose two chambers are now controlled by a Republican party opposed to such a change in Cuba policy. Lengthy debate in both chambers lies ahead.

Lifting the embargo could increase Cuba’s trade not just with the United States but also with countries that deal with the United States. Under current US law, companies that do business in America can be fined for doing business with Cuba.

Jerome Cottin-Bizonne, managing director of the Franco-Cuban rum manufacturer Havana Club International — owned jointly by the Pernod Ricard drinks group and the Cuban government — recently said his firm was ready to “conquer the US market,” which, he said, was brimming with potential. But for the time being, prospects for Cuban exporters seem limited. Only rum and Cuba’s famed cigars seem to have real potential to make inroads in the US market. However, they account for just $600 million a year in export revenue, less than four percent of Cuba’s $17.5 billion-total.

Cuba’s top export, generating $11 billion in revenue, are professionals, including doctors. But physicians are not needed in the United States. And Cuban-made medicines, which account for $900 million a year in export revenue, would have trouble obtaining approval in the US, which has some of the strictest regulations.

Cubans could also find their access to movies and computer software drastically changed. Currently, under the shelter of the embargo, Cubans pirate much of their content, but if the sanctions are lifted they would have to honor copyrights and pay.

But for better or for worse, said Esteban Morales, a specialist on US-Cuban relations, the country would have to get used to life without sanctions the same way it got used to the embargo in the first place. “What are we going to say, ‘postpone the lifting of the sanctions, because we are not ready’?”

“Listo”

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Cuba Mar 2014 095AA

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TANIA BRUGUERA LEAVES UNEAC AND RETURNS HER NATIONAL CULTURE AWARD

Posted on January 7, 2015 by Arch Ritter

14ymedio, Havana | Enero 06, 2015

Original here: Tania Bruguera

This Monday, the Cuban artist Tania Bruguera returned the National Culture Award (Distinción por la Cultura Nacional) she received in 2002, and decided to renounce her membership in the National Union of Writers and Artists of Cuba (UNEAC).

“I can not receive recognition from, nor be part of, an institution that speaks for all but only through the presidency of the organization. Cultural institutions which, instead of opening a dialogue and a space for aesthetic analysis criminalize and judge, reduce the response to a work to generating fear of the work, and on top of it, distance themselves from it,” says the letter addressed to Cuba’s Deputy Minister of Culture, Fernando Rojas, and delivered Monday to the headquarters of the Ministry of Culture.

Bruguera was released last Friday after her attempt to stage a ‘performance’ in the Plaza of the Revolution in Havana, which would have given one minute at the microphone to any citizen who participated. The artist could not reach the Plaza because she was arrested before leaving home and twice more in the following days. “To peacefully present yourself and speak for one minute is an example of political art and of the function of art in society. It is what is called ‘Art Made for a Specific Political Moment,’ which can be translated as a work undertaken for a specific political context and situation,” she added.

Bruguera-TEDGlobal-James-Duncan-Davidson_CYMIMA20150105_0017_13The text of the letter:

Compañero Fernando Rojas Vice Minister of Culture Republic of Cuba

Upon my return from  Documenta11, on 27 November 2002 the Ministry of Culture gave me, along with other young artists, the National Culture Award ( Distinción por la Cultura Nacional). For years I did not give importance to this event because it did not change anything in my life or in my thinking. In fact, I didn’t remember if I had saved it, or if it had been lost. After recent events, this Award has taken on another meaning for me.

Today I return the Award to the Ministry of Culture, I put it in the hands of the vice minister with whom I previously have had ideological discussions about censorship. Today I also renounce my membership in the National Union of Writers and Artists of Cuba (UNEAC). I can not receive recognition from, nor be part of, an institution that speaks for all but only through the presidency of the organization. Cultural institutions which, instead of opening a dialogue and a space for aesthetic analysis criminalize and judge, reduce the response to a work to generating fear of the work, and on top of it, distance themselves from it.

I have heard many times in Cuba that this is not the appropriate time to criticize or to use a metaphor or to stage a work. Many times I have censored myself in the face of these words that magically cast blame on a doubt or an opinion. Today I know that the appropriate time for an artist is ALWAYS, but especially when the ways of evaluating the social or the human are suspended, but the appropriate moment cannot be a government directive because this makes it propaganda and not art. The artist would be in service to a government and not to a society. Opinion and art cannot exist only when they are permitted by the institution. I believe that it was the appropriate moment to make a work of art because all the decisions about what Cuba is going to be are still not implemented. There is still hope, many believe that undefined spaces exist within which all of we Cubans could be a part.

The changes in Cuba cannot be real if the decision comes from above and is reported and must be accepted. The changes in Cuba cannot be real if a different opinion is given when the government invites it. The changes in Cuba cannot be real if Cubans are afraid to know certain words, for example Human Rights. The changes in Cuba cannot be real if Cubans fear that having an opinion will leave them without a job. The changes in Cuba cannot be real if what is of interest to the government about Cubans is their money and not their ideas.

How sad is a government that sees a threat to the state in allowing regular Cubans one minute in which they can say what they think without government control! How sad is a government that jails the audience of a work of art!

Un abrazo,

Tania Bruguera

Havana, 5 January 2015.

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CANADA’S INFLUENCE IN CUBA COULD WANE

Posted on January 5, 2015 by Arch Ritter

by Dr. Peter McKenna

The Ottawa Citizen; Published on January 2, 2015

Original here: “Influence”

fidel castro3

It’s not surprising that Canadians were at the centre of trying to foster some sort of rapprochement between Washington and Havana. In fact, we’ve been trying to play the role of intermediary between the U.S. and Cuban governments for over 50 years.

Let’s remember that Canada has been viewed as a useful interlocutor because of our amicable relations with both Cuba and the United States. In short, we’ve had the crucial ingredient of trust in the eyes of the two governments.

According to some U.S. officials, Canada’s involvement in the most recent secret talks was nothing short of “indispensable.” We were undoubtedly the bridge that was needed to bring the two sides together.

As we look ahead, though, what will a U.S.-Cuba reconciliation mean for the future of Canada-Cuba relations? Will it weaken or strengthen the historical linkages between the two countries? Will we be able to use our uninterrupted relations with Cuba to gain special dispensation or favours from Havana going forward?

For the Cubans, Canada was one of only two countries in the Americas (the other being Mexico) not to sever diplomatic relations with Revolutionary Cuba in 1962. Since 1959, Canada has embraced a Cuba policy of dialogue, commercial exchange and principled engagement — which was highlighted by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s 1976 visit to the country and Jean Chrétien’s difficult meetings in Havana with Fidel Castro in April of 1998.

Though relations between Canada and Cuba have not always been smooth or cordial (witness Ottawa’s refusal to invite Cuba to the Quebec City Summit of the Americas in 2001), neither side has deemed it necessary to shut down the channels of diplomatic communication. And the Cubans understand full well that the Canadians — who have been long-standing critics of the U.S. embargo against Cuba since the early 1960s — were not going to stab them in the back.

Canada, unlike the U.S., has been careful over the decades not to allow human rights considerations to impede bilateral relations with the Cubans. Official Ottawa has known for some time that hostility toward, and isolation of, Cuba has exhibited few tangible results.

castro_and_michelFidel with Margaret and Michel Trudeau, Michel not impressed!

For our American friends, we had “street cred” because Canadian officials in Cuba have been sharing with them intelligence on the country for over 50 years. They also knew that the Canadians have wanted the same things in Cuba as them since 1959 — political liberalization, respect for basic human rights and an open economy — while differing sharply on the means of securing those policy objectives.

It’s worth mentioning, though, that the normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations could have both positive and negative implications for Canada. We may very well benefit from seeing greater demand in Cuba for additional infrastructure projects (trading on our good name as long-time friends), investment opportunities in certain specialized sectors (like oil and mineral development along with financial and banking services) and from sharing Canadian expertise on tourism management.

But these recent developments could negatively impact Canada in terms of its own commercial relationship with Cuba (which exceeds $1 billion annually in two-way trade). While Canadian companies are highly regarded on the island, they could easily get squeezed out by their American competitors. As a result, we could eventually see a sharp decline in trade and investment dollars between Canada and Cuba.

In addition, a good part of Canada’s influence in Cuba is tied to Havana’s completely dysfunctional relationship with Washington. But as U.S.-Cuban relations take on greater importance, Canada’s leverage is likely to wane.

Still, this role of facilitator is precisely the kind of niche diplomacy that Canada should be conducting around the world — and thus Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Foreign Minister John Baird deserve a pat on the back. But we need to be vigilant here about making sure that both Havana and Washington don’t allow the enemies of normalization, and there are many, to undermine our outstanding efforts to date.

Peter McKenna is professor and chair of political science at the University of Prince Edward Island and the co-author of Canada-Cuba Relations: The Other Good Neighbor Policy.

UN-MILLENNIUM SUMMIT-CANADA/CUBA Fidel, perhaps listening?

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AMERICA AND CUBA: THE NEW NORMAL

Posted on January 5, 2015 by Arch Ritter

The Economist, January 3, 2015

 Original Here: The loosening of the embargo will pay dividends far beyond Cuba

ObamaMARCO RUBIO, a prospective Republican candidate for the White House, called it “a victory for oppressive governments the world over”. Only “the heinous Castro brothers, who have oppressed the Cuban people for decades” will benefit, thundered Jeb Bush, a likely rival, who is also based in Florida. The object of their fury: Barack Obama’s startling decision to loosen America’s 54-year-old embargo on Cuba.

Cuba’s Communist government is indeed oppressive, while the Castro brothers can fairly be called heinous and will probably do all they can to maintain control. Raúl Castro, who took over from Fidel in 2008, has said he will step down in 2018, but that is not a prelude to free elections. Nonetheless, easing the embargo is the right thing to do. The measures that Mr Obama and Mr Castro announced on December 17th—including a deal to restore diplomatic relations and the liberalisation of travel and remittances—will do much to normalise a relationship that has been trapped in the sterile logic of the cold war. But its significance goes beyond that. The embargo warps the United States’ relations with other Latin American countries, as well as their relations with one another.

The Economist has long argued that the embargo is self-defeating. Rather than ending the Castros’ rule, it has provided an evergreen excuse for their failures and so helped maintain them in power. The embargo kept Cuba out of international bodies such as the Organisation of American States, where other countries could have prodded the island towards greater openness. It put the United States at odds with most of its allies and nearly every other country in its hemisphere. It would be much better if the embargo were got rid of entirely, but its partial lifting is a step towards normality for the whole region.

So far most of the attention has been on Cuba. The Castros agreed to release 53 political prisoners (along with an aid worker and an American spy). Cubans will have more access to the internet, which should loosen the regime’s weakening grip on information. As Cuba’s relations thicken with the democratic giant next door, its citizens’ demands for freedom may grow more insistent. There is no guarantee that such engagement will unseat the Castros, but the embargo has manifestly failed for half a century. It has only remained there because of the political clout of a dwindling number of elderly Cuban exiles in Florida (which also explains the outrage of the normally more sensible Messrs Bush and Rubio).

But the biggest prize should be the advance of democracy and open markets in Latin America. The Castros are not the only ones who will be discomfited by the loss of the American alibi. Venezuela leads a loose coalition of countries that uses defiance of the United States as an excuse for policies that stunt economic growth and democratic rights. It has long supported Cuba (and other Caribbean countries) with sales of oil at heavily subsidised prices. Even for robustly democratic countries like Brazil, the American bogeyman makes it easier to justify resistance to trade deals and to cosy up to uglier regimes.

Now this depressing narrative may change. Venezuela’s government, reeling from the drop in oil prices, faces difficult parliamentary elections in 2015. Argentina’s next president is likely to be less prickly towards the rest of the world than Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who will stand down in 2015. Colombia, an American ally, may end its 50-year war with the leftist FARC guerrillas if peace talks succeed. Dilma Rousseff could be a more pragmatic president in her second term.

The scene is set for a new realism in Latin America. As commodity prices tumble and economic growth stalls, the region needs open markets, trade and regional co-operation—including with the yanquis to the north. With his move on Cuba, Mr Obama has opened the way for the sort of diplomatic engagement that Latin America rarely enjoyed during his first six years in office. But Latin America needs to return the compliment. The time for sulking and striking poses is over—in Brasília and Caracas as well as Havana and Miami.

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VENCEREMOS! CUBA’S LESSONS FROM EASTERN EUROPE

Posted on December 31, 2014 by Arch Ritter

Financial Times, | Dec 30 17:05

Original here: LESSONS|

By Piroska Mohácsi Nagy, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

An historic thawing of ties between Cuba and the United States has raised the question of how far the Communist island state is prepared to go in opening up its economy to the forces of the market and integration with the international community.

If and when Cuba does embark on a path of economic – and perhaps also a degree of political transformation – it could well enjoy the advantages of the late-comer, drawing lessons both positive and negative from eastern Europe over the last quarter of a century.

It can assess what worked and what proved much more difficult, emulating the successes and avoiding the pitfalls. There is no doubt that the east European process was painful, especially at the very start when the existing production systems collapsed in the face of real competition, leading to precipitous declines in output and employment.There is equally no doubt that the unprecedented experiment that was launched after the fall of the Berlin Wall has been a success, however tortuous the route and however many times there have been setbacks on the way.

There were four key building blocks in the reform process that was launched after 1989. These began with the – often initially painful – measures to deregulate and liberalise economic structures, including trade, prices and markets. They also comprised measures to achieve macro-economic stability, the creation of new institutions, regulatory bodies and the dismantling of state-ownership of output via the privatisation process.

Of these four policies, privatisation proved to be the most socially controversial, leading not necessarily to calls for a return to the dominance of the state, but resulting in what was often perceived as a corrupt process that unfairly favoured a privileged set of elite insiders.

But none of the four can be viewed independently of the others; they are intimately intertwined. Without deregulation of product and labour markets, privatisation will not work. Without privatisation, macro stabilisation will not succeed. And without appropriate institutions, none of the reforms can be sustained.

The eastern Europe experience provides pointers on how to approach the reform roll-out and Cuba could benefit from reflecting on the outcome of what in the early years of transition was a furious debate about “big bang” reform or gradualism.

With the benefit of hindsight it is now clear that the advocates of pursuing all the four elements simultaneously were, in the main, right. Those include the believers in the “big bang” as well as the “opportunists”, i.e. those who claim that reforms should be implemented as soon as an opportunity arises.

Gradualism in the sense of postponing any of the key elements has proven not to be a workable option because it can create new vested interest in half-baked reforms, as Ukraine’s experience until recently has shown.

Lessons from eastern Europe’s mistakes
It is, therefore, vitally important to take full advantage of the window of opportunity that exists in the earliest days of transition. One lesson that the international community learnt late was the key role that is to be played by reformed public authorities and the state in helping to define and anchor the reforms that support the market reforms.

In the early post-communism euphoria the mantra of “State=Bad – Market=Good” dominated, leading to some of the worst examples of unfettered capitalism and wild-west economics that enriched the few and impoverished the many.

It was only much later that the reformed state was recognised as being a key element in the transition process, removing itself where markets can do the job more effectively but remaining or even being strengthened where it can support an environment within which the free market can flourish fairly.It is important to bear in mind that simply destroying the state instead of reforming and adapting it to support market development and perform the provision of public goods can lead to chaos and the state’s eventual resurrection with autocratic features.

At the same time, privatisation has to be addressed sensitively, preferably using a combination of methods that ensure fairness and also an acceptable balance between foreign and domestic private ownership.

For many European countries the prospect of EU membership has provided an anchor that has proven to be a major incentive in bedding down reforms and modernising economic structures. Similar options may not be out of reach for Cuba, given the vicinity of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), for example. And even without a powerful external anchor, like many other economies, Cuba can look to reap the benefits from other forms of external economic opening and integration and joining international organisations that can help to inculcate higher economic standards.

External support can work only if reforms start in earnest. Then foreign capital can be just as transformational as it has been in eastern Europe. Foreign direct investment can support know-how and good governance, in addition to providing much needed fresh capital. While developing external links are crucial, it is just as important for countries to nurture an independent civil society and a free media that holds up the evolving systems to scrutiny. They can both be a major support for developing democracies and fairer economies, acting as a deterrent to corruption and injustice.

However, local ownership of reforms will be, just as in eastern Europe, absolutely critical. The clear communication of new processes and policies is essential. The best policies in the world will not be effective if people do not understand them. Effective communication can help change value systems, explain policy choices and ensure their ultimate success.

What we are witnessing today may well be one of the last pieces of the iron curtain to start coming down. When it finally does, just as for eastern European countries 25 years ago, the Cuban people will deserve strong financial support and the best policy advice by the international community so that they can guide their reforms and re-integration into the world economy with as little volatility as possible.

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Piroska Mohácsi Nagy is Director for Country Policy and Strategy and Initiatives, Office of the Chief Economist, at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

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VENEZUELA’S CUBA PROBLEM

Posted on December 31, 2014 by Arch Ritter

The Economist, December 19th 2014

In a surprise announcement on December 17th the US president, Barack Obama, and the Cuban president, Raúl Castro, announced a significant thaw in relations between their respective countries. The move has major implications for Venezuela, Cuba‘s main ally.

The Venezuelan president, Nicolás Maduro, appeared to be caught unawares on December 17th, right in the middle of a rhetorical campaign against “insolent, imperialist” sanctions passed by the US Congress just one week beforehand. Unlike the decades-old Cuba embargo, the sanctions are targeted at senior Venezuelan government officials accused of committing human rights violations. However, just as members of the ruling Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) were being invited to burn their US visas in public, Cuba was announcing the restoration of diplomatic relations with the US.

A quiet betrayal?

The process that led to the announcement, it is now clear, began not long after the death of Mr Maduro’s predecessor and mentor, the former Venezuelan president, Hugo Chávez (1999-2013). The Cuban government, which has benefited from billions of dollars in Venezuelan subsidies—including cheap oil under the PetroCaribe oil-financing initiative—needed a “plan B”, given the severe economic crisis facing the Maduro government and the likelihood that it would be unable to resist mounting pressure to divert resources away from foreign aid. However, with an extensive network of Cuban intelligence agents given free rein in Venezuela—particularly in the barracks—Mr Maduro must now be wondering what else has been (or might be) negotiated behind his back.

At the very least, the news of a US-Cuban rapprochement will exacerbate resentment in the military over its subordination to Cuban officials who, it seems, gather intelligence but do not share it. There is also some confusion within the ranks of the PSUV, whose militants find it hard to understand why Mr Obama is allegedly seeking to overthrow Mr Maduro, but is happy to shake Mr Castro’s hand.

Hard choices ahead for Mr Maduro

Anti-imperialism is a handy tool with which to maintain unity against an external enemy. However, it is hard to wield when your best friend is embracing the “empire” (swiftly renamed “the giant of the north” in Mr Maduro’s post-announcement comments). Cuba has for decades played a useful role for Latin American governments of both left and right. “Solidarity” with Cuba has been a convenient, mainly risk-free way to stand up to the US government and beat the nationalist drum.

Now Venezuela faces the prospect of replacing Cuba as the US’s main adversary in the region—just as its economy is imploding and its governability is at risk from internal dissent—or capitulating and losing the support of the already-restive domestic left. The timing could hardly be worse for Mr Maduro.

Maduro_y_Raul_Castro_3

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