Tag Archives: US-Cuba Relations

Washington Post: NEW POLL ON CUBAN CITIZENS’ VIEWS ON NORMALIZATION, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM, THE LEADERSHIP AND MORE

Posted on April 8, 2015 by Arch Ritter

Washington Post, April 8, 2015

By Joshua Partlow and Peyton M. Craighill

Original article here: NEW POLL ON CUBAN CITIZENS’ VIEWS

FULL RESULTS FROM THE CUBA POLL 

MEXICO CITY — The vast majority of Cubans welcome warmer relations with the United States, holding high expectations that closer ties pledged by the two countries will shake up the island’s troubled economy, according to a new survey of Cuban citizens. But they are doubtful that the diplomatic detente will bring political reforms to their Communist country.

The poll of residents on the island shows a people unhappy with the political system, eager to end the U.S. embargo and disenchanted with their state-run economy. More than half of Cubans say they would like to leave the country for good if they had the chance.

The survey, conducted in March through 1,200 in-person interviews by the Miami-based Bendixen and Amandi International research firm on behalf of the networks Univision Noticias and Fusion, is reported in collaboration with The Washington Post.

New Picture (12) New Picture (13) New Picture (14) New Picture (15) New Picture (16)

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ENTERPRISING CUBA: CITIZEN EMPOWERMENT, STATE ABANDONMENT, OR U.S. BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY?

Posted on April 3, 2015 by Arch Ritter

 AU-SSRC Implications of Normalization: Scholarly Perspectives on U.S.-Cuban Relations April 2015

 TED A. HENKEN AND GABRIEL VIGNOLI

Original here: ENTERPRISING CUBA

After cautiously consolidating his new government once becoming president in 2008, Raúl Castro made a series of unprecedented moves in late 2010 to encourage the reemergence of private self-employment (known as trabajo por cuenta propia or cuentapropismo in Cuba)—explicitly ending Cuba’s previous policy under Fidel Castro that, according to Raúl’s own bold assessment, had “stigmatized” and even “demonized” it.

Subsequently, both the number of legally allowed private occupations (up from 178 to 201) and of Cubans licensed to practice them have grown significantly, with the island seeing a veritable “boom” in entrepreneurial activity between 2011 and 2015. Indeed, in that time, the number of Cuba’s cuentapropistas (self-employed workers or micro-entrepreneurs) has more than tripled, growing from less than 150,000 in 2010 to nearly half a million by early 2015. Additionally, 498 new non-agricultural cooperatives have been authorized to operate on the island between 2013 and 2014, with another 300 under review at the start of 2015.

Moreover, on December 17, 2014, as part of a momentous diplomatic thaw between Washington and Havana, the Obama Administration announced a new policy of engagement targeted explicitly at “empowering” Cuba’s new class of private entrepreneurs by allowing U.S. companies to “support the emerging Cuban private sector,” in Obama’s historic words.

How might Washington’s new policy of “empowerment through engagement” and the larger bilateral process toward normalization impact the island’s emerging entrepreneurs as well as the emergent “non-state sector” of its economy? While there are many potential economic benefits of concerted U.S. private sector engagement with Cuba’s cuentapropistas, the monopolistic Cuban government poses significant challenges to those who want to do business on the island, reach out to island entrepreneurs, and hire Cuban workers—as many European and Canadian companies can already attest. How will this work in practice, who will be the likely winners and losers (both in Cuba and abroad), and how can the Cuban government deal effectively with the growth in socioeconomic inequality that will inevitably follow an expanded private sector?

Direct U.S. engagement with Cuban entrepreneurs through freer travel and more remittances; access to banking and other financial services; increased exports of badly needed inputs to island cuentapropistas; the import of private or cooperatively produced Cuban goods and services to the U.S.; and technology and know-how transfer are all encouraging elements of Obama’s new Cuba policy. These changes have the potential to both “empower” individual entrepreneurs—the stated goal of the U.S. policy shift—and incentivize the initial, if exceedingly cautious, private sector reforms already begun by the Cuban government.

However, to increase Cuba’s economic independence and overall prosperity, the U.S. should focus on addressing the specific economic needs of Cuban entrepreneurs, rather than framing its engagement as a way to effect “regime change” by other means. That is, given the need to build bilateral diplomatic trust after more than fifty years of mutual antagonism, Washington should eschew any “Trojan horse” approaches to entrepreneurial engagement that aim to empower the Cuban people by undermining the government. Such an antagonistic and divisive approach has not worked in the past and could derail Obama’s promising effort to encourage the incipient pro-market reforms already underway.

At the same time, a U.S. policy based on empowerment through economic engagement—even when motivated by the best and most transparent of intentions—will be a dead letter if the U.S. Congress insists on clinging to the outdated and counterproductive embargo and the Cuban government stubbornly refuses to ease its own auto-bloqueo (or “internal embargo”) against island entrepreneurs. As it implements a self-described economic “updating of socialism,” will Cuba continue to hold fast to its monopolistic “command and control” economic model—one that “ya no funciona ni para nosotros” (“no longer works even for us”), as Fidel Castro himself famously admitted in a rare moment of economic candor in 2010?

Continue reading: AU-SSRC-Henken-Vignoli-Enterprising-Cuba-FINAL 

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CAPITULO TORMENTOSO EN LAS RELACIONES CUBA-ESTADOS UNIDOS-VENEZUELA

Posted on March 18, 2015 by Arch Ritter

El proceso de negociaciones distendido y promisorio entre Cuba y Estados Unidos peligra debido a la    gran confrontación motivada por la Orden Ejecutiva del Presidente Obama el 9 de marzo contra 7 altos cargos chavistas, al declarar estado de emergencia nacional porque Venezuela constituía una amenaza a la seguridad de Estados Unidos.  Se  ha argumentado que esa es la redacción establecida para la imposición de las sanciones, adoptadas por ambas cámaras del Congreso y  aprobada por el presidente el 18 de diciembre de 2014, un día después del anuncio de Raúl Castro y Barack Obama sobre el restablecimiento de las relaciones diplomáticas y la apertura de embajadas.

Sin embargo su implementación llegó en un momento  delicado,  y ha desviado la atención de la represión a la oposición y los demás problemas internos en Venezuela. Los cubanos en la isla han pasado del optimismo al temor de volver a vivir en gran  tensión y que las medidas anunciadas por el presidente Obama sean obstruccionadas por el gobierno de Cuba, nuevamente pretextando la confrontación.

Nicolás Maduro recién había visitado a Fidel Castro, y acusado al gobierno de Obama de  fomentar un golpe de estado para justificar la detención de dirigentes opositores, establecer visado para todos los norteamericanos, ordenar la reducción del personal de la embajada norteamericana en Caracas a igual cantidad que la venezolana en Washington, y que los funcionarios tendrían que reportar sus actividades  y solicitar permiso para efectuarlas. Respondió a la Orden Ejecutiva con la demanda a la Asamblea Nacional de una Ley Habilitantes Antiimperialista, enardecidas concentraciones y  demanda de Cumbres de la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR) y ALBA-TCP, aunque no logró una de CELAC.   Los cancilleres de Colombia, Ecuador y Brasil y el secretario general de UNASUR habían estado en Caracas el 6 de marzo en una infructuosa gestión de promoción de diálogo con la oposición y  la participación en las próximas elecciones parlamentarias. Todos los cancilleres se reunieron en Quito, su sede, el 14 de marzo para aprobar una declaración de apoyo al gobierno de Maduro.  Ese día, el canciller Bruno Rodríguez  visitó a Maduro para declarar que Estados Unidos no puede tener una política de zanahoria con Cuba y una política de garrote con Venezuela.

La Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América-Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos (ALBA-TCP)  realizó el 17 de marzo una Cumbre Extraordinaria de solidaridad con Venezuela y  para coordinar una posición común con vista a la VII Cumbre de las Américas (10-11 de abril). En la Declaración se rechazó

“la Orden Ejecutiva injusta e injustificada, que constituye una interferencia contra el principio de soberanía y el principio de no intervención en los asuntos internos de los Estados”. Se ratificó “el compromiso y apoyo irrestricto con la hermana República Bolivariana de Venezuela en la búsqueda de mecanismos de diálogo con el gobierno de Estados Unidos, para que cesen las agresiones de este gobierno contra Venezuela”, y se propuso crear un Grupo de Facilitadores de CELAC, UNASUR, ALBA-TCP y CARICOM “para facilitar una diplomacia de compromiso entre los gobiernos de Estados Unidos y Venezuela para aliviar las tensiones y garantizar la resolución amigable”.

Raúl Castro se expresó fuertemente contra Estados Unidos y llamó a que eliminara la Orden Ejecutiva y normalizar las relaciones con Venezuela.  Manifestó que

“Estados Unidos debería entender de una vez que es imposible seducir o comprar a Cuba ni intimidar a Venezuela. Nuestra unidad es indestructible. Tampoco cederemos ni un ápice en la defensa de la soberanía e independencia, ni toleraremos ningún tipo de injerencia ni condicionamiento en nuestros asuntos internos.  No cejaremos en la defensa de las causas justas en nuestra América y en el mundo, ni dejaremos nunca solos a nuestros hermanos de lucha”.

Reveló los objetivos para la VII Cumbre de las Américas:

“Rechazaremos con determinación toda tentativa de aislar y amenazar a Venezuela, y reclamaremos el fin definitivo del bloqueo a Cuba.  La sociedad civil cubana será la voz de los sin voz, y desenmascarará a los mercenarios que presentarán allí como sociedad civil de Cuba y a sus patrones”.

Llama la atención que antes y durante el año y medio que duraron las negociaciones que culminaron el 17 de diciembre, las relaciones de Estados Unidos y Venezuela se deterioraban intensamente, lo que no impidió que Raúl Castro llegará a los sorprendentes acuerdos con Barack Obama. En 2010 quedaron sin embajadores; en 2013 comenzaron y se suspendieron negociaciones, y Maduro ofreció asilo a Edward Snowden; Kelly Keiderling, encargada de negocios y dos diplomático fueron expulsados, supuestamente por alentar acciones de sabotaje; en 2014 Maduro acusó al gobierno  norteamericano de estar detrás de las protestas como parte de un plan en su contra.

La sorpresiva  tercera ronda de conversaciones para el restablecimiento de las relaciones diplomáticas entre Roberta Jacobson, subsecretaria de estado, y Josefina Vidal, directora general de Estados Unidos en la Cancillería cubana, y  el alejamiento de la prensa indicaron la urgencia para tratar  la confrontación Estados Unidos-Venezuela,  en La Habana, el 16 de marzo. Resultaba obvio que el proceso sería complejo y prolongado, pero no se esperaba la abrupta interferencia de este diferendo.  En poco menos de un mes se requieren muchas negociaciones y voluntad de resolver asuntos muy complejos. La Cumbre de las Américas junto a la novedosa participación del gobierno de Cuba y el encuentro de Raúl Castro y Barack Obama, debería ser un espacio de diálogo constructivo y relanzamiento de las relaciones  Estados Unidos-América Latina y el Caribe.

La Habana, 18 de marzo de 2015

Miriam Leiva

Miriam Leiva, Periodista Independiente

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WHO OWNS CUBA? AS CUBA-U.S. RELATIONS THAW, THE THORNY MATTER OF PROPERTY DISPUTES HEATS UP

Posted on February 23, 2015 by Arch Ritter

CRAIG OFFMAN

HAVANA — The Globe and Mail, Published Friday, Feb. 13 2015, 3:28 PM EST

Original here: WHO OWNS CUBA?

Tonito Ring Ring was a Latin-looking boy with a dial for a belly and a target on his head. In the 1950s, he was the cartoon mascot of the Cuban Telephone Company, then owned by American firm International Telephone & Telegraph. When the Revolution came in 1959, workers at company headquarters in Havana came looking for him. They tore Tonito down from the wall, thrust him into a coffin, walked him down Calle Aguila to the Malecon, and tossed him into the sea. The Communists, meanwhile, seized the entire Yanqui phone company and, in the ensuring three years, confiscated $1.6-billion worth of U.S property across the island.

Almost six decades later, the United States is intent on making the Cubans pay. Literally.

Now the property of the state-run phone monopoly ETECSA, the telephone company is just one of roughly 6,000 confiscated assets, estimated to be worth a total of more than $7-billion, to which American firms and citizens hold claims. If the Cubans want the United States to lift its gruelling economic embargo – now a possibility, after U.S. President Barack Obama announced the re-establishment of diplomatic relations in December – they’re going to have to address the thorny issue of compensation. With Mr. Obama’s presidency winding down, and Cuba’s economy suffering even more than usual thanks to the woes of petro patron Venezuela, pressure is beginning to build to tackle the elephant in the room.

Although Cubans have long considered the embargo a form of slow genocide, America clearly feels differently. In its eyes, Mr. Castro and his comrades took part in nothing less than illegal seizures of property, and should now pay for what they stole if they want to normalize trade. In fact, a two-decade-old American law dictates that there will be no normalization in trade until the claims are settled.

Compensation is a freighted emotional issue for these antagonists, whose mutual antipathy long precedes the revolution. It’s not just about land or assets, communism versus capitalism. It’s about the right to claim victimhood. “Cuba’s crime is not that it’s communist,” political scientist Rafael Hernandez told me as we sat down to talk in his Havana living room last month, the day before Assistant Secretary of State Roberta S. Jacobson made her historic visit to Cuba. “The two countries have a long way to develop a relationship that surpasses a century of mistrust.”

Mr. Obama’s announcement may bring an economic revolution to Cuba. Although the short-term aims include lifting travel and financial restrictions, and even moving toward an exchange of embassies, the long-term goal is to normalize trade.

But Ms. Jacobson has said that the two sides won’t broach the topic of compensation until much further down the road. For the payment issue, even the process is complicated. As previous Cold War-era attempts at land claims have proved, establishing a rate for repayment will be no small feat. For one thing, no one knows whether the United States, which represents all the claims, will seek to settle in one lump sum or want to address each case individually.

q1 001Q4 001Q2 001Tables from Archibald Ritter, “The Compensation Issue in U.S. – Cuba Normalization”, Chapter 16 in A. Ritter and J. Kirk, Editors, Cuba in the International System: Normalization and Integration, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1995 United Kingdom 

Continue Reading: Who Owns Cuba

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BAD HABITS CAN DERAIL US-CUBA NEGOTIATIONS

Posted on February 20, 2015 by Arch Ritter

Peter Hakim, President Emeritus, Inter-American Dialogue

Estado de S. Paulo, February 15, 2015.

In a belated response to the December 17 announcements of presidents Raul Castro and Barack Obama, Fidel Castro (or at least the message released in his name) tepidly endorsed their historic decision to normalize relations between the United States and Cuba—while rightly emphasizing that reconciliation would surely be a difficult and lengthy process in light of the accumulated distrust of the past fifty years.

But distrust, a predictable element in all negotiations between adversaries, is not the only challenge for US-Cuban diplomacy. What most threatens to derail the two nation’s ongoing talks is a clash of national character flaws: the terrible impatience of Washington in foreign affairs confronting the Havana government’s excessive caution and stubborn resistance to change.

Cuban-American relations since Fidel Castro took power in 1959 have been a narrative of US impatience squaring off against Cuba’s defiance. Although initially tolerant, in less than a year the Eisenhower Administration began efforts to topple the revolutionary regime, and shortly thereafter embargoed commerce with the island. Just months in office, President Kennedy launched the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Among US Presidents, Obama has been unusually cautious overseas, but he is well aware that he has an important stake in the pace of both political and economic reform in Cuba. Washington’s yardstick for judging his new Cuba policy will mostly be progress toward human rights, free expression, and more open politics—and these have appropriately been made a top priority of the US negotiating agenda. White House plans already include reinforcing ties with dissidents and other non-governmental actors, bolstering the incipient private economy, expanding Cuban access to information and opinion, and supporting other democracy-building initiatives. None of this should be a surprise to the Cuban government. Still, suspicious, distrustful Cuban authorities may view even modest new initiatives along these lines as “meddling” and “promoting regime change”. To paraphrase Fidel, if the US is allowed to take a finger, it will soon be after the hand, and then the arm.

Cuba is proud of its success in defying the US for half a century. Even as it seeks improved relations, it is not ready to yield much, if anything, to US pressures. There is little reason to doubt that the Cuban government genuinely wants a sustained thaw in relations with the US, principally to shore up a debilitated economy further jeopardized by a cut-off of support from crisis-ridden Venezuela. But Raul Castro and other Cuban officials have consistently declared their intention to keep Cuba’s political and economic systems intact. The excruciatingly slow process of vital economic reforms over the past eight years underscores the leadership’s resistance to change, to yielding any of its centralized control. At last month’s meeting of Latin American and Caribbean heads of state, Raul Castro demanded, as pre-conditions for normalized relationship, that the US lifts its embargo on Cuba and return Guantanamo Bay to Cuban sovereignty. This is a signal that Cuba’s leaders will not be rushed. They know that the US cannot meet these demands in any short period.

While secret negotiations over many months were needed to mark a path toward reconciliation, sustaining the process now requires transparency from both governments. There should be no surprises from either side. Official lines of communication should be opened at many levels. Both the American and Cuban people should be kept informed of key developments. Covert US operations, like the programs that funded Alan Gross’s internet-related activities and assisted dissident groups, should be replaced by fully public initiatives as the administration has wisely promised. Regime change is off limits.

For its part, the Cuban government should begin respecting international norms regarding human rights and rule of law. That means abandoning such common practices as mass arrests and jailing of opponents, harassment of dissidents whether by police or vigilante groups, cruel treatment of political prisoners, and other denials of basic rights. With Cuba now under an intensive media spotlight, such violations will gain immense attention worldwide. If they intensify, the political recoil in the US might well halt the emerging rapprochement.

It is also critical that the US appreciate the limits of its influence on Cuba’s political evolution. Enduring changes will come only from the actions of the government and people of Cuba. The US should not hesitate to urge Cubans to respect human rights and democratic principles, but it should keep its word to forego heavy handed demands, pressures, and deadlines. These could well backfire, increasing the Havana government’s resistance to change.

With most Latin American countries now committed to democratic politics at home, the region’s governments should be expected to help support political and economic reform in Cuba. Brazil, Mexico, and several other nations have particularly close ties to Cuba and could be instrumental in assisting the country’s transition. But it is only when the Cuban government makes clear that it values such assistance will the other Latin American nations be prepared to act. On this front they will surely not respond to US pressure.

The recipe for Cuban-American reconciliation is straightforward. More caution and patience from the US, along with a willingness to tolerate ambiguity, even inaction, for some time. More flexibility and risk-taking from a Cuba government that needs to accept less control and less certainty about its future. And Latin American nations prepared to show their solidarity by taking on responsibility for helping Cuba through a difficult period of potentially dramatic changes.

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Peter Hakim

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NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH CUBA MAY PORTEND CHANGES TO U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY

Posted on February 2, 2015 by Arch Ritter

January 13, 2015 Policy Beat

 Original here: US :Cuba Immigration policy

By Marc R. Rosenblum and Faye Hipsman

 The historic December 2014 agreement by President Barack Obama and Cuban President Raúl Castro to normalize relations between the United States and Cuba may herald revisions to immigration policy and create changes that affect the future migration of Cubans to the United States. The decision to re-establish diplomatic ties with the island nation, severed more than half a century ago after the Cuban revolution in which Fidel Castro seized power and established a socialist government, will prompt a series of sweeping changes. The United States will reopen an embassy in Havana; greatly relax restrictions on trade, travel, remittances, and financial transactions; and re-evaluate Cuba’s decades-old designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.

The two countries have also agreed to greater cooperation on areas such as counter-narcotics, environmental protection, and human trafficking. Despite the long estrangement, the United States and Cuba have cooperated on migration issues for decades and have agreed to do so in the future. While the United States has stated that its immigration policy toward Cuba—which affords Cubans uniquely favorable treatment—will for now remain unaffected, improved overall relations will make today’s immigration arrangements difficult to sustain.

Currently, Cubans who arrive in the United States, even without proper authorization, are granted entry and benefit from a fast-track process that allows them legal permanent resident (LPR) status after one year in the country. This unique policy, based on a presumption that all Cuban emigrants are political refugees in need of protection, may need revision now that a détente is at hand. As the two countries improve relations and open their travel channels, policies that automatically welcome Cubans—including illegal entrants and visa overstayers—and accelerate their access to a green card may need to be revisited.

A Cold War mentality has dominated the U.S. approach to its small southern neighbor since the Cuban revolution in 1959, focused chiefly on isolating the country through economic sanctions in opposition to Cuba’s socialist model. The United States has also cited major human-rights concerns for maintaining a trade embargo and implementing tough travel and financial restrictions. In his December announcement, President Obama called this approach outdated, saying that five decades of U.S. isolation of Cuba had failed to achieve the objectives of promoting democracy, growth, and stability there.

The U.S.-Cuba Migration Relationship

Fraught political relations between the two countries, combined with their geographic proximity, have afforded Cuba a place that is sui generis in U.S. immigration law and policy. On the one hand, the United States has offered generous refuge to Cubans fleeing communism; on the other, it has discouraged illegal and dangerous boat migration from Cuba, which has occurred in large waves several times in recent decades.

The population of Cuban immigrants in the United States surged after the revolution, rising from under 71,000 in 1950 to 163,000 by 1960. In the immediate aftermath of the overthrow of the Fulgencio Batista regime by Castro-led revolutionaries, many wealthy Cubans and other opponents of the Marxist forces fled, particularly as Castro began nationalizing private property. Under Operation Pedro Pan, organized by religious organizations in Miami with the support of the U.S. government, approximately 14,000 unaccompanied children whose parents opposed the Castro regime were flown to the United States between 1960 and 1962. In September 1965, the first Cuban “boatlift” began when the Cuban government announced that people were free to leave for the United States from the port of Camarioca. When thousands sought to take advantage of the opportunity, many in unsafe vessels, the United States and Cuba reached an agreement to instead allow Cubans to fly to Miami on chartered “Freedom Flights;” about 300,000 Cubans arrived this way between 1965 and 1973.

The cornerstone of U.S. immigration policy toward Cuba is the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA), which Congress passed to accommodate these flows after amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in 1965 limited the number of Cubans (and other Western Hemisphere immigrants) who could receive visas. Under CAA, all Cubans who arrive in the United States are presumed to be political refugees, and are eligible to become legal permanent residents (LPRs or green card holders) after one year, assuming they are otherwise admissible. Two decades later, when Congress passed the 1980 Refugee Act establishing the current U.S. refugee and asylum system, the CAA provisions were left in place. Under the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, the CAA will sunset once Cuba becomes a democracy.

Following termination of the Freedom Flight program, most Cubans seeking to enter the United States have traveled by sea, and the attempts of hundreds of thousands of Cubans to make the perilous journey across the Straits of Florida have played a large role in shaping U.S. immigration policy toward Cuba. In 1980, maritime departures surged dramatically during the Mariel boatlift, when Fidel Castro opened the Cuban port of Mariel, allowing anyone to depart the country—including several thousand criminals and mentally disabled individuals. In the six months the port remained open, 125,000 Cubans (along with 25,000 Haitians who joined the flotilla) arrived in South Florida. Boat migration again surged in the mid-1990s. U.S. Coast Guard interdictions of Cubans jumped from 2,882 in fiscal year (FY) 1993 to 38,560 in FY 1994.

The 1994 surge prompted a pair of far-reaching migration agreements between Cuba and the United States in 1994 and 1995. Before then, Cuban migrants interdicted at sea by the Coast Guard were admitted to the United States, a practice widely criticized for encouraging more Cubans to attempt the risky journey. Under the 1994 agreement, Cuba agreed to discourage boat departures, while the United States agreed to grant admission to at least 20,000 Cuban nationals annually and to place intercepted Cubans in safe havens to be considered for asylum. Under the 1995 agreement, the United States granted parole status to the roughly 30,000 Cubans awaiting an asylum determination, and changed its policy to returning future migrants interdicted at sea directly to Cuba. Cubans who expressed a fear of persecution upon return and were determined to meet the refugee definition would no longer be eligible for asylum in the United States, but resettled in third countries.

Combined with the CAA, the 1994 and 1995 migration accords set forth the current “wet-foot, dry-foot” policy. Cubans intercepted at sea are returned to Cuba, where the government has pledged not to retaliate against them. Those who successfully reach the United States are permitted to stay, and become eligible to apply for a green card after a year.

Furthermore, to meet the 20,000 admission floor negotiated in the 1994 accords, the United States instituted the Special Cuban Migration Lottery. The lottery, held in 1994, 1996, and 1998, allowed Cuban nationals between the ages of 18 and 55 to register for admission to the United States, provided they possess two of the three following characteristics: a secondary school or higher education, three years of work experience, or a relative residing in the Unites States. Up to 20,000 lottery winners per year (depending on the number of Cubans admitted through regular visa processing) are granted parole status, and may bring their spouse and children. With 541,000 Cubans entering the lottery between 1994 and 1998, Cubans selected in 1998 continue to be paroled into the United States today.

As a result of these policies, and in spite of the hostile relations between the two countries, Cubans represent one of the ten largest foreign-born groups in the United States, with an estimated 1.1 million immigrants (2.7 percent of the foreign-born population). Collectively, Cuban immigrants and their U.S.-born descendants represented a diaspora of 2.1 million in 2011. Cuba also ranks highly as a sending country for new green-card holders, which have numbered in the 30,000s in each of the past five years (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Annual Number of Cubans Gaining LPR Status, 1990-2013

AAASource: Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2000-2013 (Washington, DC: DHS, Office of Immigration Statistics, various years), www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics.

Loosening Travel Restrictions

Travel between Cuba and the United States has been tightly controlled for much of the last half-century. Americans are only permitted to travel to Cuba for certain authorized purposes, such as educational, religious, humanitarian, or journalism trips. In 2013, Cuba changed a long-standing policy requiring its citizens to obtain an exit permit and letter of invitation from a country abroad in order to travel internationally, even temporarily. Most Cuban nationals now only need a valid passport and visa to depart, although certain skilled workers are excluded from the loosened rules. In response to Cuba’s policy change, the State Department extended the validity of B-2 tourist visas issued to Cubans from six months (single-entry) to five years with multiple entries permitted. Between 2012 and 2013, nonimmigrant visas issued to Cubans jumped 82 percent, from 20,200 to 36,787.

Future Implications

Cuba receives unique treatment under U.S. immigration law. No other nationality is given a blanket right to green-card eligibility, no other country has a floor below which visas may not fall, and no other group of immigrants is guaranteed admission to the United States if they appear at or between ports of entry. In effect, Cuban nationals are exempt from deportation and immigration enforcement policies affecting all other noncitizens. Furthermore, because Cuban arrivals are treated similarly to refugees, many are eligible for federal assistance and means-tested benefits from which most noncitizens are barred.

As the Obama administration and Cuba take steps to normalize their relations, trade and travel between the two countries is only expected to increase. While Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson has stated that current immigration policy and law concerning Cuba will remain “for the time being,” expanded travel and trade raise questions about the viability of the wet-foot, dry-foot policy and the Cuban Adjustment Act: As visa issuance to Cuban nationals increases, will a growing number of Cubans overstay their visas in order to obtain green cards? A policy that rewards those who violate the terms of their visas is sure to invite questions of fairness. How will the U.S. policy of automatically treating Cubans who reach the United States as refugees affect bilateral relations once diplomatic ties are restored?

Indeed, the Coast Guard has already reported a spike in interdictions of Cubans at sea since the announcement, with 500 interdictions in December—three times the typical amount. The Coast Guard attributes the spike to fear among Cubans that the United States could soon repeal the wet-foot, dry-foot policy.

However, while improved relations may create a pressing need for normalized immigration policies toward Cuba, both Cuba and immigration are highly polarized political issues. Permanently changing these laws will ultimately require approval by the U.S. Congress, and faces a steep uphill climb.

 Playas deEste, August 1994. Did They Make it?

Cuba-leaving-1 Cuba-leaving-2

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U.S.-CUBA RELATIONS: A DOCUMENT ARCHIVE

Posted on January 27, 2015 by Arch Ritter

The Center for Latin American and Latino Studies (CLALS) at American University in Washington, DC has just created an on-line archive on U.S. Cuban relations focussing especially on the process of normalization.

Its web site is here:

U.S.-Cuba Relations: A Document Archive

At a moment when Cuba is undergoing significant change and Latin America is clamoring for the United States to change its policy toward Cuba, leaders in both Washington and Havana have expressed a desire to move beyond the hostility that has characterized relations for more than half a century. Overcoming the legacy of that hostility is no easy matter; the issues to be resolved are many and complex.

The purpose of this archive is to provide a resource for scholars, researchers, and policymakers interested in U.S.-Cuban relations by creating a single point of easy access to relevant articles, laws, and reports on the full range of U.S.-Cuban issues. From human rights to migration to environmental protection, the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies has assembled the best and most current resource materials available—over 160 documents in all. We hope that this archive will help to better inform the interested public about the interests at stake and the issues to be resolved. We plan to keep the collection current by adding new materials as they become available. As part of the Center’s Cuba Initiative, the U.S.-Cuba Archive is supported by generous funding from the Christopher Reynolds Foundation.

New Picture (1)

Topics

Analysis for Normalization

Commission for Assistance to Free Cuba

Committee on Foreign Relations

Counter-Narcotics Cooperation

Cuban Internal Affairs

Democracy Programs

Economic Opportunity

Economics in Normalization

Environmental Protection

Executive Discretion

Health Cooperation

Human Rights Migration

NGO Responses, Research and Recommendations

Normalizing Relations

Property Claims

Public Opinion

Telecommunications

Terrorism

Travel and Remittances

TV and Radio Martí

U.S. Laws and Regulations

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U.S.-CUBA RELATIONS: ENTERING A TESTING PERIOD

Posted on January 21, 2015 by Arch Ritter

Arturo Lopez Levy, University of Denver

 Huffington Post, January 19, 2015

Original here: TESTING PERIOD

In August 2010, Cuban Roman Catholic Cardinal Jaime Ortega went to Washington and shared with many a message he heard directly from Raul Castro:

“He repeated to me on several occasions that he is ready to talk to the United States government directly, about every issue.”

This message was music to the ears of many U.S. foreign-policy officials and politicians who were convinced the time had come to bring American relations with Cuba into the post-Cold War 21st century. It took more than four years for the promise of Ortega’s message to be fulfilled.

Last December 16, Raul Castro and Barack Obama had a direct phone call to discuss the general situation of the relations between Cuba and the United States. The two presidents agreed to a spy-swap accompanied by some Cuban humanitarian gestures to release USAID subcontractor Alan Gross and 53 prisoners confined for different reasons in Cuban jails. Most importantly, they also agreed to re-establish diplomatic relations between the two countries. President Obama asked Secretary Kerry to conduct a non-ideological assessment likely to lead to Cuba’s removal from the State Department list of Terrorism Sponsoring Nations. President Obama negotiated with Cuba “chivalrously, not like a shyster” as Henry Kissinger recommended to his diplomats in 1975.

President Obama’s December 17 discourse undermined the basis of the embargo policy. Obama introduced a new American official narrative about Cuba. He discussed Cuba’s situation not as a threat to U.S. national security but as a country in a transition the United States should support. President Obama also acknowledged that “It does not serve America’s interests, or the Cuban people, to try to push Cuba toward collapse.” He discussed several initiatives to help Cuba’s growing non-state economic sectors and wide-range civil-society groups, not only those in the political opposition.

This is a significant departure from the course U.S. policy has followed for almost six decades, but actions must now be undertaken by both countries to make these changes durable and real.

A strategic and realistic view of U.S-Cuba engagement

Cuba and the United States need to develop a strategic view of the process their presidents launched on December 17, 2014. A crucial issue, perhaps the crucial issue, is how to neutralize those opposed to the dismantlement of the hostility structures at both sides of the Strait of Florida. There are powerful spoilers in key positions such as Senator Marco Rubio, who will now chair the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee for Western Hemisphere Affairs. Rubio and anti-normalization of relations groups in Miami and Havana are already trying to trigger a crisis to roll back the rapprochement and return to the old patterns of hostility and isolation.

The Obama Administration should not restrain itself from partnering with Cuba to make the agreement stick. Cuban officials have historic reasons to suspect about American intention and see plots everywhere. Good communications from Washington clarifying when plots have nothing to do with the Administration can help to diminish spoilers’ political influence. One big issue to watch is the democracy-promotion program. Washington should not apologize for defending its democratic values but the Secretary of State can provide responsible guidelines to shape these programs into less intrusive practices that are more in line with international law.

On the other side, Cuba has a complex track record of managing thorny provocations by anti-normalization Miami groups. The shooting down of the Brothers to the Rescue planes in 1996 demonstrated the Cuban military’s lack of understanding about the U.S. political debate in that electoral year. Bill Clinton wrote in his memoirs: “I later received word from Castro — indirectly of course — that the shoot down was a mistake. Apparently he had issued earlier orders to fire on any aircraft that violated Cuban airspace and had failed to withdraw them when the Cubans knew the Brothers to the Rescue were coming.”

Cuba needs to be pro-active rather than reactive, not only toward the United States actors but also empowering independent civil-society groups. A vibrant autonomous community, separated from U.S. regime-change policy but independent from the Cuban Communist Party (CCP), would be the best alternative to the pro-embargo small opposition groups who count on a Cuban government’s repressive response to their provocations for derailing the process.

It is important to translate into the two societies’ gains, the opening steps taken by their governments. People-to-people exchanges are the most resilient bond connecting two countries. Economic interdependence, educational programs, travel, religious communities’ contacts, and family ties are building blocks of a durable relationship. Whether American and Cuban policymakers can make the December 17 changes irreversible will depend on how their regulations motivate and empower pressures from different U.S. constituencies to liberalize cross-Strait relations.

The best way to reinforce Obama’s discourse about a Cuba in transition is to advance, as much as it is safely possible, toward a more efficient market-based mixed economy and establish economic ties and trade with the U.S. private sector. One important new development is Obama’s announcement of a license to export U.S. agricultural machinery for Cuba’s private sector. The Cuban government should prepare legislation and infrastructure to eliminate red tape and unnecessary regulations of the private sector’s importation of agricultural machinery.

A stable move to a pluralist and open political society is also in line with Cuba’s national interests and international human-rights standards. Cuba’s internal political discussion is today more open than ever since 1961, except on the issue of the one-party system. There is a widely spread civil society of intellectuals, religious communities and second-culture publications, think tanks, and rights advocates interested in responsibly expanding the representation and competitiveness of the political system without opening the door to embargo advocates.

Decentralization — planned by the CCP since 2011 — can be a major democratization step by transferring power from the center to the municipalities and provinces.

There are a few strongly symbolic steps Cuba can take in its foreign policy. Havana could establish diplomatic relations with Israel and South Korea, helping to have a more balanced Latin American attitude toward these two American allies located in key strategic regions. Cuba can also use the Summit of the Americas to join at least some parts of the Inter-American system, such as the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism and the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission. These steps are not an abandonment of any nationalist principle but could demonstrate that Cuba is — to use Kissinger’s words about Iran — “more a country than a revolutionary cause.” A nationalist Cuba, focused on economic development, is not incompatible with a U.S.-led world order.

The time between now and the Summit of the Americas in April 2015 is a critical juncture for rapprochement chances. The immoral, illegal and counterproductive U.S. embargo remains in place, harming Cuba’s chances for economic reform and political liberalization. No one expects that Cuba would become a model democracy overnight. The Cuban Communist Party is not committed yet to the universal human rights as they are written in international conventions. But a Rubicon was crossed by the two presidents in December 17, 2014. U.S.-Cuba relations are still far from optimal, but they have never had a more promising framework since President Carter departed from the White House in 1981.

This post is part of a Huffington Post blog series called “90 Miles: Rethinking the Future of U.S.-Cuba Relations.” The series puts the spotlight on the emerging relations between two long-standing Western Hemisphere foes and will feature pre-eminent thought leaders from the public and private sectors, academia, the NGO community, and prominent observers from both countries. Read all the other posts in the series here.

Cuba Mar 2011 111

A New Day Dawns at the US Interest Section Embassy in Havana

Cuban_interest_section_dcAnd at the Cuban Interest Section  Embassy in Washington

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FACT SHEET: TREASURY AND COMMERCE ANNOUNCEMENT OF REGULATORY AMENDMENTS TO THE CUBA SANCTIONS

Posted on January 15, 2015 by Arch Ritter

U.S. Treasury Department, Office of Public Affairs

EMBARGOED FOR 9:00 AM EST:  January 15, 2015

CONTACT:  Hagar Chemali, Treasury Public Affairs (202) 622-2960                  

FACT SHEET: TREASURY AND COMMERCE ANNOUNCEMENT OF REGULATORY AMENDMENTS TO THE CUBA SANCTIONS

 Amendments Implement Changes Announced by the President on December 17 Related to the Easing of Cuba Sanctions

WASHINGTON – On December 17, 2014 the President announced a set of diplomatic and economic changes to chart a new course in U.S. relations with Cuba and to further engage and empower the Cuban people.  The U.S. Department of the Treasury and the U.S. Department of Commerce today are announcing the forthcoming publication of the revised Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) and Export Administration Regulations (EAR), which implement the changes announced on December 17 to the sanctions administered by Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).  The changes take effect tomorrow, when the regulations are published in the Federal Register.

 These measures will facilitate travel to Cuba for authorized purposes, facilitate the provision by travel agents and airlines of authorized travel services and the forwarding by certain entities of authorized remittances, raise the limits on and generally authorize certain categories of remittances to Cuba, allow U.S. financial institutions to open correspondent accounts at Cuban financial institutions to facilitate the processing of authorized transactions, authorize certain transactions with Cuban nationals located outside of Cuba, and allow a number of other activities related to, among other areas, telecommunications, financial services, trade, and shipping.  Persons must comply with all provisions of the revised regulations; violations of the terms and conditions could result in penalties under U.S. law.

To see the Treasury regulations, which can be found at 31 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), part 515, please see here.  To see the Commerce regulations, which can be found at 15 CFR parts 730-774, please see here.  The regulations will be effective as of Friday, January 16. Major elements of the changes in the revised regulations include:

Travel –

  • In all 12 existing categories of authorized travel, travel previously authorized by specific license will be authorized by general license, subject to appropriate conditions.  This means that individuals who meet the conditions laid out in the regulations will not need to apply for a license to travel to Cuba.
  • These categories are: family visits; official business of the U.S. government, foreign governments, and certain intergovernmental organizations; journalistic activity; professional research and professional meetings; educational activities; religious activities; public performances, clinics, workshops, athletic and other competitions, and exhibitions; support for the Cuban people; humanitarian projects; activities of private foundations or research or educational institutes; exportation, importation, or transmission of information or information materials; and certain authorized export transactions.
  • The per diem rate previously imposed on authorized travelers will no longer apply, and there is no specific dollar limit on authorized expenses.  Authorized travelers will be allowed to engage in transactions ordinarily incident to travel within Cuba, including payment of living expenses and the acquisition in Cuba of goods for personal consumption there.
  • Additionally, travelers will now be allowed to use U.S. credit and debit cards in Cuba.

 Travel and Carrier Services –

  • Travel agents and airlines will be authorized to provide authorized travel and air carrier services without the need for a specific license from OFAC.

Insurance –

  • U.S. insurerswill be authorized to provide coverage for global health, life, or travel insurance policies for individuals ordinarily resident in a third country who travel to or within Cuba.  Health, life, and travel insurance-related services will continue to be permitted for authorized U.S. travelers to Cuba.

 Importation of Goods –

  • Authorized U.S. travelers to Cuba will be allowed to import up to $400 worth of  goods acquired in Cuba for personal use.  This includes no more than $100 of alcohol or tobacco products.

Telecommunications –

  • In order to better provide efficient and adequate telecommunications services between the United States and Cuba, a new OFAC general license will facilitate the establishment of commercial telecommunications facilities linking third countries and Cuba and in Cuba.
  • The commercial export of certain items that will contribute to the ability of the Cuban people to communicate with people within Cuba, in the United States, and the rest of the world will be authorized under a new Commerce license exception (Support for the Cuban People (SCP)) without requiring a license.  This will include the commercial sale of certain consumer communications devices, related software, applications, hardware, and services, and items for the establishment and update of communications-related systems.
  • Additional services incident to internet-based communications and related to certain exportations and reexportations of communications items will also be authorized by OFAC general license.

 Consumer Communications Devices –

  • Commercial sales, as well as donations, of the export and reexport of consumer communications devices that enable the flow of information to from and among the Cuban people – such as personal computers, mobile phones, televisions, memory devices, recording devices, and consumer software – will be authorized under Commerce’s Consumer Communication Devices (CCD) license exception instead of requiring licenses.

 Financial Services –

  • Depository institutions will be permitted to open and maintain correspondent accounts at a financial institution that is a national of Cuba to facilitate the processing of authorized transactions.
  • U.S. financial institutions will be authorized to enroll merchants and process credit and debit card transactions for travel-related and other transactions consistent with section 515.560 of the CACR.  These measures will improve the speed and efficiency of authorized payments between the United States and Cuba.

 Remittances –

  • The limits on generally licensed remittances to Cuban nationals other than certain prohibited Cuban Government and Cuban Communist Party officials will be increased from $500 to $2,000 per quarter.
  • Certain remittances to Cuban nationals for humanitarian projects, support for the Cuban people, or development of private businesses will be generally authorized without limitation.  These general licenses will allow remittances for humanitarian projects in or related to Cuba that are designed to directly benefit the Cuban people; to support the Cuban people through activities of recognized human rights organizations, independent organizations designed to promote a rapid, peaceful transition to democracy, and activities of individuals and non-governmental organizations that promote independent activity intended to strengthen civil society in Cuba; and to support the development of private businesses, including small farms.
  • Authorized travelers will be allowed to carry with them to Cuba $10,000 in total family remittances, periodic remittances, remittances to religious organizations in Cuba, and remittances to students in Cuba pursuant to an educational license.
  • Under an expanded general license, banking institutions, including U.S.-registered brokers or dealers in securities and U.S.-registered money transmitters, will be permitted to process authorized remittances to Cuba without having to apply for a specific license.

Third-Country Effects –

  • U.S.-owned or -controlled entities in third countries, including banks, will be authorized to provide goods and services to an individual Cuban national located outside of Cuba, provided the transaction does not involve a commercial exportation of goods or services to or from Cuba.
  • OFAC will generally authorize the unblocking of accounts of Cuban nationals who have permanently relocated outside of Cuba.
  • OFAC is issuing a general license that will authorize transactions related to third-country conferences attended by Cuban nationals.
  • In addition, a general license will authorize foreign vessels to enter the United States after engaging in certain trade with Cuba.

Small Business Growth –

  • Certain micro-financing projects and entrepreneurial and business training, such as for private business and agricultural operations, will be authorized.
  • Also, commercial imports of certain independent Cuban entrepreneur-produced goods and services, as determined by the State Department on a list to be published on its website, will be authorized.

 “Cash in Advance” –

  • The regulatory interpretation of “cash in advance” is being redefined from “cash before shipment” to “cash before transfer of title to, and control of,” the exported items to allow expanded financing of authorized trade with Cuba.

 Supporting Diplomatic Relations and USG Official Business –

  • The President announced the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba.  To facilitate that process, OFAC is adding a general license authorizing transactions with Cuban official missions and their employees in the United States.
  • In addition, in an effort to support important U.S. government interests, an expanded general license will authorize Cuba-related transactions by employees, grantees, and contractors of the U.S. government, foreign governments, and certain international organizations in their official capacities.

Support for the Cuban People –

  • Exports and reexports to provide support for the Cuban people in three areas:  improving living conditions and supporting independent economic activity; strengthening civil society; and improving communications – will be eligible under Commerce’s SCP license exception.
  • To improve living conditions and support independent economic activity, SCP will authorize: (1) building materials, equipment, and tools for use by the private sector to construct or renovate privately-owned buildings, including privately-owned residences, businesses, places of worship, and building for private sector social or recreational use; (2) tools and equipment for private agricultural activity; and (3) tools, equipment, supplies, and instruments for use by private sector entrepreneurs.
  • To strengthen civil society, SCP will authorize export and reexport of donated items and temporary export and reexport by travelers to Cuba of items for use in scientific, archaeological, cultural, ecological, educational, historic preservation, or sporting activities.  SCP will also authorize exports and reexports to human rights organizations, individuals, or non-governmental organizations that promote independent activity intended to strengthen civil society.
  • Travelers will also be able to export temporarily items for use in professional research in the traveler’s profession or full time field of study under SCP.  The activities or research must not be related to items on the United States Munitions List or items controlled for sensitive reasons on the Commerce Control List.
  • To improve communications, SCP will authorize exports and reexports of items for use by news media personnel and U.S. news bureaus.
  • SCP will not authorize the export of items on the Commerce Control List for sensitive reasons such as national security, nuclear proliferation, regional stability, missile technology, and other reasons of similar sensitivity.

Gift Parcels –

  • Consolidated shipments of gift parcels will be eligible for the same Commerce license exception that authorizes individual gift parcels.

Liberalizing License Application Review Policy –

  • Commerce will set forth a general policy of approval for applications to export or reexport items necessary for the environmental protection or enhancement of U.S. and international air and water quality or coastlines (including items that enhance environmental quality through energy efficiency).
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The US Tourism Tsunami to Cuba Begins! U.S. WILL EASE RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL TO CUBA

Posted on January 15, 2015 by Arch Ritter

New York Times, JAN. 15, 2015 Original here: TOURISM TSUNAMI By PETER BAKER

New Picture (3).bmpAAA Arriving at Jose Marti International Airport,  June 1966, Photo by Arch Ritter

hav-terminal-3-arrivals-1_26835.jpgaaa Arrivals, José Martí International Airport, 2013

W ASHINGTON — The United States government on Friday will begin making it easier for Americans to travel to Cuba than it has been for more than half a century, opening the door to a new era of contact between neighbors that have been estranged longer than most of their citizens have been alive.

The Obama administration announced on Thursday a set of new regulations to take effect on Friday easing decades-old restrictions on travel, business and remittances, putting into reality some of the changes promised by President Obama last month when he announced plans to resume normal diplomatic relations with Havana.

Under the new regulations, Americans will now be allowed to travel to Cuba for any of a dozen specific reasons without first obtaining a special license from the government. Airlines and travel agents will be allowed to provide service to Cuba without a specific license. And travelers will be permitted to use credit cards and spend money while in the country and bring back up to $400 in souvenirs, including up to $100 in alcohol or tobacco.

The new regulations will also make it easier for American telecommunications providers and financial institutions to do business with Cuba. Americans will be allowed to send more money to Cubans, up to $2,000 every three months instead of the $500 currently permitted.

“These changes will have a direct impact in further engaging and empowering the Cuban people, promoting positive change for Cuba’s citizens,” Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew, whose department oversees sanctions policy, said in a statement. “Cuba has real potential for economic growth,” he added, “and by increasing travel, commerce, communications, and private business development between the United States and Cuba, the United States can help the Cuban people determine their own future.”

The administration moved to ease the restrictions after obtaining confirmation that 53 incarcerated people it deemed political prisoners had been released in accordance with the agreement Mr. Obama and President Raúl Castro of Cuba struck last month. Cuba has also released an American held prisoner for years, Alan P. Gross, and a Cuban who had worked as a spy for the United States. Mr. Obama released three Cuban spies who had been held for years and were considered folk heroes in Havana.

The broader trade embargo first imposed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower after the Cuban revolution that brought Mr. Castro’s brother Fidel to power will remain in place unless Congress decides to lift it, as Mr. Obama has urged it to do. But the moves announced on Thursday go further than any president has gone in 50 years to facilitate travel and trade with Cuba.

Critics, led by Senator Marco Rubio, a Cuban-American Republican from Florida, have argued that Mr. Obama is playing into the hands of the Castro brothers by relaxing sanctions without obtaining any meaningful commitment to change on their part. Cuba remains one of the most repressive countries in the world, according to human rights groups and the State Department, which have catalogued the many ways freedom is restricted on the island nation.

Mr. Obama argued that the approach of the last 50 years had not worked and that it was time to try something new. The president is sending an assistant secretary of state, Roberta S. Jacobson, to Havana next week to discuss migration and other issues in the relationship as he moves toward re-establishing a full-fledged embassy with an ambassador.

Americans for years have found ways to circumvent travel restrictions to Cuba. Many simply fly to another country like Mexico first and then head to Cuba from there. According to the Cuban government, 98,000 American citizens visited Cuba in 2012, a year after Mr. Obama previously loosened the restrictions, twice as many as traveled there five years earlier. That does not include perhaps hundreds of thousands of Cuban-Americans who travel there each year but are not counted by the Havana government because they are still considered Cubans.

Under previous rules, Americans wanting to travel legally to Cuba had to justify their trips under 12 categories and then obtain a specific license from the Treasury Department to do so. Among those categories are family visits; journalistic, religious, educational, professional and humanitarian activities; artistic or sports performances; and “support for the Cuban people.” Private firms arranged “people to people” programs to allow Americans to travel under those categories.

Under the new regulations, Americans will not need licenses to certify that they fit those categories. As a practical matter, experts say that will make it possible for many more Americans to travel without having to use such firms or satisfy government agents about the specific purpose of their visits.

Moreover, travelers will be allowed to spend money in Cuba, which was previously restricted.

Havana_Airport_departure_Lounge_(3214814919)

 Departures, José Martí International Airport, 2013

Jose marti, Airport, 1966 001

José Martí International Airport, 1966

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