Tag Archives: Energy

Cuban oil hopes sputter as Russians give up for now on well

Posted on May 31, 2013 by Arch Ritter

By Jeff Franks

Original Here: Cuban Oil Hopes Sputter…

HAVANA, May 29 (Reuters) – Russian state-owned oil company Zarubezhneft said this week it was giving up for now on a problem-plagued exploration well off Cuba’s north-central coast, which brings to an end the communist-led island’s only active project in its search for offshore oil fields.

The news was not all bad because the company said it would return to the same spot next year. But it was another blow to Cuba’s hopes for energy independence, which have acquired new urgency with the March death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, the communist-led island’s top ally and benefactor.

The Russians’ plan to drill 6,500 meters (21,325 feet) below the sea floor and hopefully find oil appears to have been derailed by the same issue that others have encountered in Cuban waters – difficult geology – as well as problems with its rig, the Songa Mercur, which at one point lost its blowout preventer.

The Songa Mercur Drilling Platform

“Taking into consideration geological complications, Zarubezhneft and (Cuban state oil company) Cubapetroleo have jointly decided to make changes in the initial drilling program by dividing it into two stages,” the company told Reuters this week.

“The second stage of exploration work on Block L is due to be launched in 2014,” it said, declining to comment further. The well, begun five months ago, was in shallow water about 200 miles (320 km) east of Havana, near the popular tourist destination Cayo Santa Maria.

The premature end of the Zarubezhneft well was not totally unexpected because Songa Offshore, owner of the Songa Mercur, earlier said the rig would leave by June 1 for a project in Southeast Asia. It had originally been scheduled to stay in Cuba until July 1.

There was a Russian press report that the rig would come back for another attempt by Zarubezhneft, but Songa Offshore Chairman Jens Wilhelmsen told Reuters the report was “completely without foundation.”

“We have not any agreement that Mercur will return and we have not received any inquiries from Zarubezhneft that they want it back,” he said. “So I can just deny that Mercur will return.”

BACK TO SQUARE ONE

All of which means that Cuba is back to square one in its quest to tap into fields off its northern coast that it says may hold 20 billion barrels of oil. The U.S. Geological Survey has estimated a more modest 4.6 billion barrels.

In the last year, Spain’s Repsol SA, Malaysia’s Petronas and Venezuela’s PDVSA sank wells in waters more than a mile deep off Cuba’s northern and western coasts. They all came up dry, and encountered a thick layer of dense rock difficult to drill through.

The Caribbean island’s hopes now lie with projects under consideration that may or may not come to fruition and are likely at least a year or more away if they do. Should oil be found, it would take another three to five years to put it into production, experts say.

Time is of the essence for Cuba because, under a generous deal made with Chavez, it gets 110,000 barrels per day, or two-thirds of its oil, from Venezuela in exchange for the services of more than 40,000 Cubans, most of them doctors and other medical personnel.

Chavez’s successor, President Nicolas Maduro, vowed during a recent visit to Havana to keep the oil flowing, but he faces mounting economic problems and political pressure from opponents to stop shipping oil to Cuba.

Repsol, which also drilled an unsuccessful well in deep water near Havana in 2004, pulled out of Cuba, but some of the other oil partners are still around.

Petronas is continuing to conduct seismic studies in the four blocks it leases with Russian partner Gazprom and is considering another well, as is Venezuela’s PDVSA, which has four blocks at Cuba’s western tip, industry and diplomatic sources said.

A unit of India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corp, which had a share of the Repsol wells, has two offshore blocks of its own and has been looking for a partner to drill a well.

GARDENS OF THE QUEEN

In a development that is potentially both interesting and controversial, Norway’s Statoil ASA, which also partnered with Repsol, appears to be looking at possibilities on Cuba’s mostly unexplored Caribbean side.

A Cubapetroleo map on display at a recent geosciences conference in Havana indicated that as of last November, Cuba was in negotiations with the Norwegian oil giant to lease three large blocks along the central and southeastern coast, between the archipelago of the Gardens of the Queen and the coast in the Gulf of Ana Maria and the Gulf of Guacanayabo.

Statoil does not comment on pending projects, but industry sources said it may just be sniffing around as it does all over the world looking for oil prospects and that its level of interest remains to be seen. The company has not mentioned Cuba in its drilling plans for the next two years.

It is likely also mindful of the sensitivity and potential dangers of drilling near the Garden of the Queens, which is regarded as one of the world’s most pristine coral reefs and whose preservation as such has become a cause for international environmental groups.

The same Cubapetroleo map showed that a Brazilian firm, Synergy Corp, was in negotiations for a near-shore block on Cuba’s north coast that state-owned Petrobras abandoned two years ago, citing poor prospects.

Attempts to reach Synergy for comment were unsuccessful.

A number of factors are working against Cuba’s oil hopes, among them the political and logistical difficulties imposed by the long-standing U.S. trade embargo against the island.

The embargo makes it difficult to find rigs that do not violate its limitations on the use of U.S. technology in Cuba and, according to experts, adds an estimated 20 percent to costs because everything in the project has to be shipped in from distant, non-U.S. sources.

There is also Cuba’s history of failed wells, which makes it hard to compete for the oil industry’s interest in a world where there are many other areas with proven oil reserves.

“It is very difficult today with other opportunities out there for a major oil company to justify going to Cuba and spending what will certainly be over $100 million in areas where it is yet to be proven they have recoverable reserves,” said Jorge Pinon, an expert on Cuban oil at the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy at the University of Texas in Austin.

“It is going to be extremely challenging (for Cuba),” he said.

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Cuba’s energy problem and oil in the Gulf of Mexico

Posted on December 20, 2012 by Arch Ritter

By Ricardo Torres Perez, CEEC – University of Havana, December 20, 2012

from the Cuban Studies Group

Original Article here:   Torres, Cuba’s Energy Problem and Oil in the Gulf of Mexico

On-Shore Petroleum Extraction on the Bacuranao Oil Field between Matanzas and Varadero, Photo by Arch Ritter, 1996,

Cuba has historically suffered from an acute dependence on foreign sources to meet its  energy needs. Until now, the island has had a small supply of conventional energy resources such as oil1, gas and coal, key sources in the current energy model. During the last century, and for different reasons, the country concentrated its oil imports in two major contemporary economic and military powers, the U.S.  and the extinct Soviet Union. The analysis of the evolution of this dependence is essential to explain the possibilities of development for the country. Therefore, any event with the power to mitigate this  constraint has sizeble economic and geopolitical significance for the Caribbean nation.
After 1959, the Soviet Union became the quintessential foreign supplier. Preferential  supply conditions notably eased the pressures of the road towards diversified energy and greater weight for domestic sources, although there was a breakthrough in energy production from sugarcane biomass, logical result of the growth in volumes of sugarcane.

Twenty-two years ago, that model was in crisis. The country was forced to severely restrict consumption between 1990 and 1995, which was only partially relaxed to the extent that the economy left this critical period in the early nineties. The symbol par
excellence was the blackout, an extreme measure used frequently in exceptional circumstances. One of the immediate responses to alleviate the situation was the decision to double efforts to increase domestic oil production. That attempt was made feasible by the participation of foreign companies, under a scheme of risk contracts. The results have been very good, increasing output by nearly six times in the period. Progress was also made in the use of natural gas, which plays a major role in the generation of electricity2 and the supply of fuel for cooking in the capital of the country. In both examples, the role of foreign investment has been crucial.

Petroleum Exploration Concessions

Author: Ricardo Torres, CEEC Universidad de La Habana

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Cuba oil dreams on hold as drill rig set to depart

Posted on November 14, 2012 by Arch Ritter

By Peter Orsi,  November 13, 2012; Associated Press,

Original Article here:  Cuba oil dreams on hold

Scarabeo 9

The only rig in existence that can drill in deep waters off Cuba is preparing to sail away from the island, officials said Tuesday, after the third exploratory well sunk this year proved nonviable in a blow to government hopes of an oil bonanza.

While production was always years off even in the event of a big discovery, analysts said the Scarabeo-9’s imminent departure means Havana’s dreams of injecting petrodollars into a struggling economy will be on hold indefinitely.

“Bottom line: This chapter is finished. Close the book, put it on the shelf,” said Jorge Pinon, a Latin America oil expert at the University of Texas’ Center for International Energy and Environmental Policy. “But do not discard. Maybe there is a good ending to this story … someday.”

Geological surveys indicate that between 5 billion and 9 billion barrels of oil may lie in deep waters off Cuban shores, but finding it has turned out to be trickier than officials hoped.

The Scarabeo-9, a 380-foot-long (115-meter), semisubmersible behemoth that leases out for prices approaching a half-million dollars a day, steamed all the way from Asia at tremendous cost to arrive in Cuba in January. That was the only way companies could avoid sanctions under Washington’s 50-year-old embargo against Cuba. The Scarabeo is the only rig of its kind built with less than 10 percent American parts — an extreme rarity in an industry where U.S. technologies play a major role.

An exploratory well sunk early this year by Spanish company Repsol turned out to be commercially nonviable. After Repsol declined an option to try again, the Scarabeo passed to a group led by Malaysia’s Petronas, which drilled its own dud. Cuban officials announced Nov. 2 that Venezuela’s PDVSA had also missed the mark.

For this baseball-mad nation, it was strike three. Cuba’s Ministry of Basic Industry, which oversees oil matters, confirmed Tuesday that the rig is on its way out, with no word on when it might return.

“The Scarabeo-9 will leave Cuba soon,” it said in a brief statement emailed to The Associated Press.

It referred questions about the platform’s destination to owner Saipem of Italy. Saipem’s parent company Eni declined to comment, but various reports have had it bound for Africa or Brazil.

Oil’s existence off Cuba is not in doubt. Russian company Zarubezhneft is contracted to use a different rig to drill in shallower waters off Cayo Coco, a key Cuban tourist destination, later this month. But the more promising deposits lie in the deep waters of the west.

The only way to get at them is to bring back the Scarabeo or build an entirely new rig, and the three failed holes plus the ongoing hassle of avoiding sanctions from the U.S. embargo will likely make companies think twice.

Pinon noted that the Repsol and Petronas wells were not dry holes, only that exploiting the oil there was not currently commercially viable due to the structure of the ocean floor and the porosity of the rock.

“If oil continues at over $100 and if the industry continues to learn and develop new technologies, they could probably come back to Cuba … and go for a second round,” he said.

Cuban drilling in the Gulf of Mexico had raised fears in the United States that a big spill could slick U.S. shores from the Keys to the Carolinas. It also attracted heated criticism from anti-Castro exiles in Florida’s Cuban-American community.

“The (U.S.) administration must finally wake up and see the truth that an oil rich Castro regime is not in our interests,” Florida Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen said in a recent statement.

Some cited Cuban oil exploration to argue for strengthening the embargo, which bans U.S. companies from doing business with Cuba and threatens sanctions against foreign firms if they don’t play by its rules. Others said it demonstrated the opposite: a need to ease the embargo so U.S. companies could more smoothly participate in disaster response to any spill.

Cuba has long campaigned for an end to the embargo, which remains in place despite 21 consecutive U.N. votes against it — most recently on Tuesday when the world’s nations voted 188-3 to condemn the sanctions.

Off-Shore Petroleum Exploration Concessions

On-Shore Petroleum Extraction Rigs, Matanzas, 1996, Photo by Arch Ritter

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Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), “Bridging the Gulf: Finding Common Ground on Environmental and Safety Preparedness for Offshore Oil and Gas in Cuba

Posted on September 8, 2012 by Arch Ritter

A new comprehensive and well-researched examination of  U.S.-Cuba cooperati9n in petroleum exploration and development  in the Gulf of Mexico has just been published.

The original document has not yet been posted on the Environmental Defense Fund web site (as of September 10, 2012) but it is available here on the Cuba Central site under the heading Not Like Oil and Water – Cuba and the US Can Cooperate on Drilling. 

Authors: Emily A. Peterson, Daniel J. Whittle, J.D., and Douglas N. Rader, Ph.D.

Table of Contents

 Background on EDF’s involvement in Cuba 1

Cuba: crown jewel of the Caribbean 2

High connectivity and shared resources with the United States 4

Cuba’s energy supply and demand: current and forecasted 5

Energy relationship with Venezuela 7

Cuba’s offshore energy sector 8

Cuba’s offshore energy resources 8

Concessions in Cuba’s EEZ 10

Risks of a spill in Cuban waters 12

Projected trajectory of a spill 12

Shared environmental resources at risk 13

Economic assets at risk 15

Oil spill preparedness and response 16

International Offshore Drilling Response Plan 19

Model international agreements on oil spill response 20

Lessons from the Deepwater Horizon spill 21

Environmental impacts 22

Economic costs 23

Technical and regulatory capabilities 23

Public communications 24

National Commission findings and recommendations 25

State of U.S.-Cuba environmental cooperation 26

Current collaborations 26

Constraints on collaborations 28

Path forward: policy recommendations 29

Unilateral actions 29

Bi-lateral engagement 30

 

Executive Summary

 In May 2012, the Spanish oil company Repsol announced it had drilled a dry hole during its deepwater exploration in Cuba. After having spent roughly $150 million on two failed wells in Cuba’s waters (the first being in 2004), the company revealed it would likely exit the island and explore more profitable fields such as those in Angola and Brazil. In August 2012, Cuba’s state oil company announced that the latest offshore exploration project—a well drilled by Malaysia’s state-owned Petronas on Cuba’s northwest coast—was also unsuccessful.

To some, the outcome of three failed wells out of three attempts in Cuban waters may suggest that the threat of a catastrophic offshore spill impacting U.S. waters and the shared ecosystems of the Gulf of Mexico is now moot. To the contrary, the issue is salient now more than ever. Cuba has an existing near-coastal oil industry on its north coast near Matanzas, a near- single-source dependency on imported petroleum from Venezuela, and has exhibited continued strong interest in developing its own offshore capacity. Several additional foreign oil companies are slated to conduct exploratory deepwater drilling in Cuba at least through 2013.

Current U.S. foreign policy on Cuba creates a conspicuous blind spot that is detrimental to the interests of both countries. The United States government enacted stricter regulations governing deepwater drilling in U.S. waters in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and has publicly acknowledged a need to better prepare for a potential major spill in neighboring Cuban waters of the Gulf of Mexico. Yet U.S. policy still does not do enough to lessen the likelihood of such a spill or to ensure that sufficient resources will be at the ready to respond to a spill in a timely and effective manner. Beyond their geographical proximity, Cuba and the United States are tightly interconnected by ocean currents and share ecosystems such that a spill in either country could have profound impacts on fisheries, tourism, and recreation in the entire region. Yet, due to longstanding U.S. economic sanctions, international operators working in Cuba are unable to turn northward to the United States to freely access equipment and expertise in the event of an oil disaster.

The purpose of this report is to present EDF’s position that direct dialogue and cooperation between the United States and Cuba on environmental and safety matters associated with  offshore oil and gas development is the only effective pathway to protect valuable environmental and economic interests in both countries. Cooperation now on safety and environmental  preparedness surrounding offshore oil can also lay a foundation for broader constructive engagement on environmental protection and natural resources management in the future.

Principally, this report addresses U.S. policy toward Cuba and makes recommendations for improving environmental and safety preparedness related to offshore oil exploration and development in Cuba. This report is not intended nor does it purport to serve as a comprehensive analysis of Cuba’s domestic energy strategy, policies, laws, or regulations.

Deepwater drilling off the northern coast of Cuba and in many other areas of the Gulf of Mexico poses a potential threat to sensitive and vulnerable marine and coastal ecosystems and to coastal communities. Cuba has a sovereign right to determine whether to exploit oil and gas resources within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), in the same way other nations do, including Cuba’s neighbors in the Gulf of Mexico, the United States and Mexico. Other Caribbean countries, such as the Bahamas, are also considering offshore oil and gas operations in the future. The underlying reality is that the Cuban government will continue with its drilling activities, with or without the acquiescence of U.S. policymakers.

Therefore, EDF proposes policy recommendations along two dimensions: those that the U.S. government should take unilaterally and those that require the U.S. government to engage in meaningful dialogue and cooperation with the Cuban government. In this report, we recommend the following:

  • Unilaterally, the United States should revise its licensing process to ensure that the resources of U.S. private companies and personnel could be deployed in a timely and comprehensive manner should an oil spill occur in Cuba.
  • On a bilateral level, the U.S. and Cuban governments should create a written agreement similar  to existing agreements with neighbors like Mexico and Canada. Such an agreement should stipulate proactive joint planning aimed at maximizing preparedness and response to prevent or mitigate the consequences of an offshore oil spill. (This agreement would supplement any regional, multi-lateral agreement that may result from ongoing discussions described in this report.)
  • U.S. and Cuban government agencies should fund and facilitate collaborative research on baseline science of shared marine resources in the Western Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico. The high level of connectivity between the two countries underscores that developing baseline science is an imperative that should not wait for a disaster to occur.

These and other recommendations in this report are pragmatic and fully consistent with those put forth by the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. The co-chair of the commission and former U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator, William K. Reilly, concurs that environmental cooperation is as critical to U.S. interests as it is to Cuba’s. “Our priority with Cuba should be to make safety and environmental response the equivalent of drug interdiction and weather exchange information, both of which we have very open, cooperative policies with the Cuban government,” Reilly said.

Finally, we are hopeful that the Cuban government will continue to expand its promising energy efficiency and renewable energy programs, so as to minimize fossil fuel reliance and to mitigate environmental threats on the island and beyond.

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Mark Frank: “Cuba drags feet on foreign investment”

Posted on May 16, 2012 by Arch Ritter

* No increase in foreign investment despite reforms

* Potential new partners wait for answers

* Existing ventures under scrutiny

Camilo Cienfuegos Refinery

By Marc Frank

HAVANA, May 15 (Reuters) – Cuba’s reform plans to attract more overseas investment are off to a slow start as the government focuses more on regulating existing foreign joint ventures than encouraging new ones, businessmen and diplomats say.

In fact, Cuba has closed more joint ventures than it has opened since the ruling Communist Party adopted wide-ranging economic reforms a year ago, and remains far off highs reached in the 1990s, according to official reports.

The list of endangered or terminated joint ventures includes one big name, Unilever PLC, the Anglo-Dutch consumer giant, and a number of others that have operated in the country for 15 years or more.

Cuba’s investment reform plan announced last year spoke positively of foreign investment, promised a review of the cumbersome approval process and stated that special economic zones, joint venture golf courses, marinas and new manufacturing projects were planned.

Most experts believe large flows of direct investment will be needed for development and to create jobs if the government follows through with plans to lay off up to a million workers in an attempt to lift the country out of its economic malaise.

It will be particularly critical given the health of cancer-stricken ally Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who has championed close cooperation between Cuba and oil-rich Venezuela.

While the reform plan built up hopes of an opening to foreign capital, it also made clear that existing and future investments would be subject to “rigorous controls” on “regulations and procedures, as well as the commitments assumed by foreign partners.” This part of the program has been vigorously carried out, according to both business and Cuban sources, with a review of the country’s approximately 240 foreign investment projects recently concluded.

That number is a decline from the 258 projects Foreign Trade and Investment Minister Rodrigo Malmierca reported at the close of 2009 and way down from the 700 Cuba had a decade ago.

The issue in part appears to be the result of old ideological habits dying hard, said Geoff Thale, program director at the Washington Office on Latin America.

Other reforms, such as encouraging more self employment and private farming, have been easier to implement.

“From the point of view of the state, an opening to foreign investment seems like a much bigger step to take in changing the economic model than does the liberalizing of domestic agriculture or current opening to small business,” Thale said.

VENTURES CLOSE

Unilever PLC, the Anglo-Dutch consumer giant, is the latest and best known of the foreign firms to pack its bags.

The company’s 15-year, 50-50 economic association has expired and a dispute over the controlling interest in a new venture could not be resolved.

“We wanted 51 percent of the new venture and so did the Cubans. At this point we are leaving, even though some discussion is still going on,” a company manager said, requesting anonymity.

Israeli investors, operating out of the Panama-based BM Group, recently pulled out of their longstanding juice processing business after new contract negotiations broke down, according to the business sources.

Investors in Havana’s container terminal are leaving as Cuba prepares to open a new terminal at Mariel, diplomats said.

Several ventures controlled by two Canadian trading firms and British investment fund Coral Capital under investigation for alleged corrupt practices are in the process of liquidation. Th e ir offices were closed last year and their top executives arrested as part of the crackdown on corruption.

SOCIALIST INVESTMENT

Following the election in Venezuela in 1998 of president Hugo Chavez, an avowed socialist, Cuba turned away from encouraging private investment in favor of state-funded cooperation with its new oil-producing ally.

Venezuela has since become Cuba’s biggest economic partner, with some 50 joint ventures signed over the last 10 years, although many are still only on the drawing board.

Cuba depends on Venezuelan oil to meet its domestic energy needs and Chavez’s uncertain future makes it more imperative that the Cuban government pick up the pace if it wants more foreign investment, said a western diplomat.

“The Cubans may be allergic to foreign investment, but the clock is ticking, and concessions on this front are inevitable,” the diplomat said.

“Instead, they are going over existing companies with a fine-tooth comb. It is hard to understand. Perhaps they are waiting for oil to be discovered offshore,” she said.

Other investment projects remain up in the air. A dozen golf course projects report no progress despite government promises to sign off after years of negotiations, as do companies negotiating ventures with the sugar industry since 2006.

Billion dollar plans to expand refineries and build a petrochemical complex around a refinery in central Cienfuegos, announced years ago, have yet to be signed off on.

On the other hand, in perhaps the most promising joint venture in decades, offshore oil exploration began in earnest this year with foreign partners planning at least three wells drilled by a massive, Chinese-built rig now parked 20 miles off the coast in the Gulf of Mexico.

Camilo Cienfuegos Refinery

$900 Million Brazil-financed Port Development at Mariel

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Council on Foreign Relations: “Addressing the Risk of a Cuban Oil Spill”

Posted on March 8, 2012 by Arch Ritter

Original here: Council on Foreign Relations: Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 15   March 2012

Scarabeo 9, en route to Cuba

Authors: Captain Melissa Bert, USCG, Military Fellow, U.S. Coast Guard and Blake Clayton, Fellow for Energy and National Security

The imminent drilling of Cuba’s first offshore oil well raises the prospect of a large-scale oil spill in Cuban waters washing onto U.S. shores. Washington should anticipate this possibility by implementing policies that would help both countries’ governments stem and clean up an oil spill effectively. These policies should ensure that both the U.S. government and the domestic oil industry are operationally and financially ready to deal with any spill that threatens U.S. waters. These policies should be as minimally disruptive as possible to the country’s broader Cuba strategy.

The Problem

A Chinese-built semisubmersible oil rig leased by Repsol, a Spanish oil company, arrived in Cuban waters in January 2012 to drill Cuba’s first exploratory offshore oil well. Early estimates suggest that Cuban offshore oil and natural gas reserves are substantial—somewhere between five billion and twenty billion barrels of oil and upward of eight billion cubic feet of natural gas. Although the United States typically welcomes greater volumes of crude oil coming from countries that are not members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), a surge in Cuban oil production would complicate the United States’ decades-old effort to economically isolate the Castro regime.

Deepwater drilling off the Cuban coast also poses a threat to the United States. The exploratory well is seventy miles off the Florida coast and lies at a depth of 5,800 feet. The failed Macondo well that triggered the calamitous Deepwater Horizon oil spill in April 2010 had broadly similar features, situated forty-eight miles from shore and approximately five thousand feet below sea level. A spill off Florida’s coast could ravage the state’s $57 billion per year tourism industry.

Washington cannot count on the technical know-how of Cuba’s unseasoned oil industry to address a spill on its own. Oil industry experts doubt that it has a strong understanding of how to prevent an offshore oil spill or stem a deep-water well blowout. Moreover, the site where the first wells will be drilled is a tough one for even seasoned response teams to operate in. Unlike the calm Gulf of Mexico, the surface currents in the area where Repsol will be drilling move at a brisk three to four knots, which would bring oil from Cuba’s offshore wells to the Florida coast within six to ten days. Skimming or burning the oil may not be feasible in such fast-moving water. The most, and possibly only, effective method to respond to a spill would be surface and subsurface dispersants. If dispersants are not applied close to the source within four days after a spill, uncontained oil cannot be dispersed, burnt, or skimmed, which would render standard response technologies like containment booms ineffective.

Repsol has been forthcoming in disclosing its spill response plans to U.S. authorities and allowing them to inspect the drilling rig, but the Russian and Chinese companies that are already negotiating with Cuba to lease acreage might not be as cooperative. Had Repsol not volunteered to have the Cuba-bound drilling rig examined by the U.S. Coast Guard and Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement to certify that it met international standards, Washington would have had little legal recourse.

The complexity of U.S.-Cuba relations since the 1962 trade embargo complicates even limited efforts to put in place a spill response plan. Under U.S. law and with few exceptions, American companies cannot assist the Cuban government or provide equipment to foreign companies operating in Cuban territory.

Shortfalls in U.S. federal regulations governing commercial liability for oil spills pose a further problem. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) does not protect U.S. citizens and property against damages stemming from a blown-out wellhead outside of U.S. territory. In the case of Deepwater Horizon, BP was liable despite being a foreign company because it was operating within the United States. Were any of the wells that Repsol drills to go haywire, the cost of funding a response would fall to the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF), which is woefully undercapitalized. OPA 90 limits the OSLTF from paying out more than $50 million in a fiscal year on oil removal costs, subject to a few exceptions, and requires congressional appropriation to pay out more than $150 million.

The Way Forward

As a first step, the United States should discuss contingency planning for a Cuban oil spill at the regular multiparty talks it holds with Mexico, the Bahamas, Cuba, and others per the Cartagena Convention. The Caribbean Island Oil Pollution Response and Cooperation Plan provides an operational framework under which the United States and Cuba can jointly develop systems for identifying and reporting an oil spill, implement a means of restricting the spread of oil, and identify resources to respond to a spill.

Washington should also instruct the U.S. Coast Guard to conduct basic spill response coordination with its counterparts in Cuba. The United States already has operational agreements in place with Mexico, Canada, and several countries in the Caribbean that call for routine exercises, emergency response coordination, and communication protocols. It should strike an agreement with Cuba that is substantively similar but narrower in scope, limited to basic spill-oriented advance coordination and communication. Before that step can be taken, U.S. lawmakers may need to amend the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 to allow for limited, spill-related coordination and communication with the Cuban government.

Next, President Barack Obama should issue an export-only industry-wide general license for oil spill response in Cuban waters, effective immediately. Issuing that license does not require congressional authorization. The license should allow offshore oil companies to do vital spill response work in Cuban territory, such as capping a well or drilling a relief well. Oil service companies, such as Halliburton, should be included in the authorization.

Finally, Congress should alter existing oil spill compensation policy. Lawmakers should amend OPA 90 to ensure there is a responsible party for oil spills from a foreign offshore unit that pollutes or threatens to pollute U.S. waters, like there is for vessels. Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and Congressman David Rivera (R-FL) have sponsored such legislation. Lawmakers should eliminate the requirement for the Coast Guard to obtain congressional approval on expenditures above $150 million for spills of national significance (as defined by the National Response Plan). And President Obama should appoint a commission to determine the appropriate limit of liability cap under OPA 90, balancing the need to compensate victims with the desire to retain strict liability for polluters.

There are two other, less essential measures U.S. lawmakers may consider that would enable the country to respond more adeptly to a spill. Installing an early-response system based on acoustic, geophysical, or other technologies in the Straits of Florida would immediately alert the U.S. Coast Guard about a well blowout or other unusual activity. The U.S. Department of Energy should find out from Repsol about the characteristics of Cuban crude oil, which would help U.S. authorities predict how the oil would spread in the case of a well blowout.

Defending U.S. Interests

An oil well blowout in Cuban waters would almost certainly require a U.S. response. Without changes in current U.S. law, however, that response would undoubtedly come far more slowly than is desirable. The Coast Guard would be barred from deploying highly experienced manpower, specially designed booms, skimming equipment and vessels, and dispersants. U.S. offshore gas and oil companies would also be barred from using well-capping stacks, remotely operated submersibles, and other vital technologies. Although a handful of U.S. spill responders hold licenses to work with Repsol, their licenses do not extend to well capping or relief drilling. The result of a slow response to a Cuban oil spill would be greater, perhaps catastrophic, economic and environmental damage to Florida and the Southeast.

Efforts to rewrite current law and policy toward Cuba, and encouraging cooperation with its government, could antagonize groups opposed to improved relations with the Castro regime. They might protest any decision allowing U.S. federal agencies to assist Cuba or letting U.S. companies operate in Cuban territory.

However, taking sensible steps to prepare for a potential accident at an oil well in Cuban waters would not break new ground or materially alter broader U.S. policy toward Cuba. For years, Washington has worked with Havana on issues of mutual concern. The United States routinely coordinates with Cuba on search and rescue operations in the Straits of Florida as well as to combat illicit drug trafficking and migrant smuggling. During the hurricane season, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provides Cuba with information on Caribbean storms.

The recommendations proposed here are narrowly tailored to the specific challenges that a Cuban oil spill poses to the United States. They would not help the Cuban economy or military. What they would do is protect U.S. territory and property from a potential danger emanating from Cuba.

Cuba will drill for oil in its territorial waters with or without the blessing of the United States. Defending against a potential oil spill requires a modicum of advance coordination and preparation with the Cuban government, which need not go beyond spill-related matters. Without taking these precautions, the United States risks a second Deepwater Horizon, this time from Cuba.

Oil Wells, along the Via Blanca, Matanzas Province, Photo by Arch Ritter, 1997

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Centro de Estudios de la Economía Cubana (CEEC)

Posted on December 2, 2011 by Arch Ritter

By Arch Ritter

Centro de Estudios de la Economía Cubana (CEEC)

The University of Havana’s Centro de Estudios de la Economia Cubana has made itself the foremost research institution on the Cuban economy since its establishment in 1989.  Its faculty includes many of the best-known analysts on the Cuban economy, including both senior and newer faculty members. The work of the Cuban Economy Team is especially impressive and is certainly worth careful study by anyone interested in Cuba. I have often thought that Cuba would benefit immensely if some of the members of CEEC were in key Cabinet positions in the Government of Cuba responsible for the management of the economy.  I expect that this in fact will happen before too long! Cuban Economy Team: Dr. Juan Triana Cordoví, Dr. Omar Everleny Pérez (Director), Dr. Armando Nova González, Dr. Hiram Marquetti Nodarse, Dr. Jorge Mario Sánchez Egozcue, Dr. Pavel Vidal Alejandro, Ms. Betsy Anaya, Ms. CamilaPiñeiro Harnecker, Ms. Ricardo Torres Pérez and Lic. Saira Pons Pérez Enterprise Management Team: Dr. Orlando W. Gutierréz Castillo, Dr. Humberto Blanco Rosales, Dr. Rosendo Morales González, Dr. Jorge Ricardo Ramírez, Dra. Aleida Gonzalez-Cueto, Dra. Dayma Echevarría León, Dra. Ileana Díaz Fernández, Ms. Mercedes González Sánchez, Ms. Maria Isabel Suárez González,  Lic. Dayrelis Ojeda Suris and Lic. Mariuska Cancio  Fonseca The CEEC publishes a number of “Boletínes” each year that usually include valuable analyses of various aspects of Cuba’s economy and economic policy. Here are the Tables of Contents of the last three issues. The “Boletínes” are hyper-linked to the CEEC Web Site and some of the essays are linked to the PDF files for rapid access.

Boletín Agosto 2011

El sistema de gestion y direccion de la economia hoy. Ileana Diaz,  Dra.Ileana Diaz Experiencias noruegas relevantes para la agricultura cubana, Dr. Anicia Garcia La propiedad en la economia cubana. Armando Nova,  Dr.Armando Nova Los sistemas de direccion  de la economia  1961- 1975,  Dra.Ileana Diaz Turismo de salud en Cuba. David Pajon Dr. David Pajon

Boletín Abril-Agosto 2010

Competitividad e innovacion, donde esta Cuba. Ileana Diaz, Dr. Ileana Díaz El impacto del postgrado en la educacion superior Cuba- Venezuela. Rosendo Morales Dr. Rosendo Morales El mercado y el estado, dos partes que forman un todo. Armando Nova, Dr. Armando Nova González Entre el ajuste fiscal y los cambios estructurales, se extiende el cuentapropismo, Dr. Pavel Vidal y Dr. Omar Everleny Pérez Fuerzas favorables y restrictivas a la dirección estratégica de la empresa. Dayrelis Ojeda y Humberto Blanco Lic. Dayrelis Ojeda y Dr. Humber

Boletin Enero-Mayo 2010

El mercado libre agropecuario en 2009. Armando Nova, Dr. Armando Nova González El sector energetico cubano entre 2005 y 2009. Ricardo Torres_0 Ms. Ricardo Torres Pérez La política fiscal actual. Pavel Vidal_0 Dr. Pavel Vidal Alejandro Estrategia. Mito o realidad. Ileana Diaz y Roberto Cartaya_0 Dr. Ileana Díaz y Dr. Roberto Cartaya La producción agricola y ganadera en 2009. Armando Nova_0 Dr. Armando Nova González La universidad, la economía y el desarrollo. Juan Triana_0 Dr. Juan Triana Cordoví Los cambios estructurales e institucionales. Pavel Vidal_0,  Dr. Pavel Vidal Alejandro

Universidad de la Habana, “Alma Mater”

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US-Cuba policy, and the race for oil drilling

Posted on September 30, 2011 by Arch Ritter
By Sarah Stephens,Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas. Jake Colvin, Vice President for Global Trade Issues at the National Foreign Trade Council – 09/29/11 03:39 PM ET
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To protect the national interest — and for the sake of Florida’s beaches and the Gulf of Mexico’s ecosystem — it is time to stop sticking our heels in the sand when it comes to U.S.-Cuba policy.

Before the end of the year, a Chinese-made drilling platform known as Scarabeo 9 is expected to arrive in the Gulf.  Once it is there, Cuba and its foreign partners, including Spain’s Repsol, will begin using it to drill for oil in waters deeper than Deepwater Horizon’s infamous Macondo well.  The massive rig, manufactured to comply with U.S.-content restrictions at a cost of $750 million, will cost Repsol and other companies $407,000 per day to lease for exploration.

They are taking this financial risk because Cuba needs the oil and its partners — Spain, Norway, Russia, India, Vietnam, Malaysia, Canada, Angola, Venezuela, and possibly China — believe that drilling in waters said to contain undiscovered reserves of approximately 5 billion barrels of oil is good business.

In virtually every other country in the world, developments like these would prompt high-level discussions about how to exploit these resources safely or to anticipate a crisis were a disaster to strike. Experts who have studied the currents say a spill in Cuban waters would send 90 percent of the oil into the Keys and up the East Coast of Florida. But the embargo leaves Florida’s sensitive coastal resources defenseless.

Due to the fact that the drilling involves Cuba, American companies and workers cannot lend their expertise to what could be a risky operation.  U.S. economic sanctions prevent our private sector from helping Cuba drill safely and paralyze the U.S. government, which ought to be convening bilateral discussions on best practices and coordinating disaster response.  In fact, the U.S. has no emergency response agreement with Cuba for oil spills.  While some specific licenses have been granted to permit U.S. firms to conduct limited transactions with Cuba, current sanctions bar the United States from deploying the kind of clean-up equipment, engineers, spare parts for blow-out prevention, chemical dispersants, and rigs to drill relief wells that would be needed to address an oil crisis involving Cuba.

One welcomed development came earlier this month, when William Reilly, a former head of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and co-chair of the Commission that investigated the Deepwater Horizon disaster, led a group of experts to Cuba to take a look at their plans.  While the administration has done well giving permission to Mr. Reilly, as well as to other experts, to discuss the problem with Cuban counterparts, it should move more aggressively to work with the Cuban government to cooperate on plans for safe drilling and responding to a possible crisis.

Rather than moving forward, some in the U.S. Congress would make the problem worse.  Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (FL-R), who criticized Mr. Reilly’s visit to Cuba as “giving credibility to the regime’s dangerous oil-drilling scheme,” has offered legislation to try and stop Repsol from drilling.  Rep. Vern Buchanan (FL-R) would deny Repsol the right to drill in U.S. waters if it helped Cuba drill in its waters.   Thirty-four members of both parties have written Repsol directly, threatening the company if it drills with Cuba.
Yet this tactic can’t work.  Even if they could deter Repsol from drilling – which is unlikely – they cannot stop Cuba and partners from countries like China, Russia, and Venezuela, from using the rig and searching for oil.

At some point, it is likely that drilling will begin and the United States ought to do what it can to prepare for that eventuality.  The U.S. government should facilitate access by Cuba and its drilling partners to the resources they need to drill safely.  President Obama should instruct the Treasury Department to issue a blanket general license now that would allow private industry to provide what oil expert Jorge Piñon calls ”any conceivable response” in the event of a crisis.

As we have already done with Mexico and Canada, the U.S. should join Cuba in crafting a crisis response agreement covering on-scene coordinators, a joint response team, response coordination centers, rapid notification protocols, customs and immigration procedures, and communications.  The plan should be written, signed, tested, and implemented as quickly as possible.

Earlier this year, the Deep Water Horizon Commission, which Mr. Reilly co-chaired, said in its final report “that neither BP nor the federal government was prepared to deal with a spill” of its magnitude or complexity; that industry and policy makers were lulled by a “culture of complacency” that resulted in 5 million barrels of oil being dumped into the Gulf.

Having seen this movie once before, complacency is inexcusable.  Politics should not blind Washington to the reality of the situation unfolding off of our shores.

Sarah Stephens is Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas.  Jake Colvin is Vice President for Global Trade Issues at the National Foreign Trade Council.

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Cuba’s Offshore Petroelum Exploration and U.S. Policy

Posted on September 28, 2011 by Arch Ritter
POLITICO: Cuba drilling next hurdle for U.S.
By: Darren Goode (Courtesy of Jorge R. Piñón)
September 27, 2011 10:38 PM EDT
The White House must crisscross complex political and policy waters as it faces the impending reality of oil drilling off Cuba a mere 60 miles from the Florida Keys.

“It’s just like firing a shotgun in a crystal store,” said Jorge Piñón, a visiting fellow with the Florida International University Latin American and Caribbean Center’s Cuban Research Institute. “You’re going to break something eventually.”

That presents multiple challenges for the Obama administration, which is tasked with protecting the U.S. coastline and waters if a catastrophe begins off Cuba.

“I think there is a lot of a tendency to hold the breath and hope it doesn’t happen,” said Lee Hunt, president of the International Association of Drilling Contractors. “I can assure you that inaction and lack of leadership against a potential disaster would be this administration’s Katrina.”

Administration officials have already upgraded drilling standards for operations off the U.S. coast and have established a partnership with Mexico to set higher bilateral standards in the Gulf of Mexico since last year’s historic spill. And Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement Director Michael Bromwich said last week that “the issue of drilling offshore Cuba has been on our screen for many months.”

“I can say that this issue has been focused on and discussed in very high levels of the government,” Bromwich said.

The Spanish company Repsol is expected by January to begin drilling a deepwater exploratory oil well off Cuba in waters about 60 miles south of Key West and slightly deeper than BP’s doomed Macondo exploration well. Other exploratory wells from the same Chinese-built semi-submersible rig owned by the Italian company Saipem would follow in subsequent months — involving companies such as Russia’s Gazprom.

“Politicians don’t like to take the risk with Cuba unless they see a clear positive payback of some sort,” said Bill Reilly, a former EPA administrator under President George H.W. Bush. “Now that we see the rig approaching Cuban waters, the political calculus will change.”

Reilly — who co-chaired a bipartisan commission that investigated last year’s Gulf spill — and Hunt were among a group granted permission by the administration to trek to Havana in early September to talk to senior Cuban officials in the absence of direct talks between the two governments.

“The message was drilling in deepwater is a highly challenging, risky, technologically complex job, and the lessons of Macondo show that even very experienced companies and very practiced regulators can get it wrong,” Reilly said.

Hunt, who was following up on a trip he made to Cuba last year, said the biggest difference between the two trips is the Cuban government “had taken a great deal more investigation” into safety and other protocols adopted by the U.S. and Mexico.

“In a way, I would say in 2010 they had a very solid regulatory plan. In 2011, they had a fairly sophisticated regulatory plan,” Hunt said. “I don’t have too many concerns about their ability to drill safely.”

Reilly and former Royal Dutch Shell Vice President Richard Sears, the chief technical adviser to the president’s spill commission, were in Cuba to explain the commission’s recommendations and findings.

“Turned out they knew the oil spill commission’s recommendations cold,” said Reilly, who later briefed Bromwich and White House officials about the trip. “That was kind of surprising and reassuring. They are aware they have very serious challenges, as any country that’s never done this before should have.”

But for many, the main concern is that U.S. equipment and personnel would not be ready to act quickly enough to respond to a spill.

“What’s in place from the U.S. side to respond and basically prepare for a worst case or really a spill of any kind?” asked Dan Whittle, director of the Environmental Defense Fund’s Cuba program, who was also on this month’s five-day trip to Havana.

Because of the decades-old U.S. embargo against Cuba, Hunt said, many resources would have to be shipped from as far away as the North Sea, the United Kingdom, North Africa or Asia.

Reilly, Hunt and Whittle are among those asking the Obama administration to grant general licenses or narrow emergency exemptions to the embargo to ensure that U.S. companies of all stripes can assist in preventing and responding to a subsea well leak.

The Commerce Department and the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control have granted licenses to some U.S. companies that operate in Cuban waters, including those that could help with oil spill preparation and response. Both agencies promised to act quickly on any additional approvals that are required.

But some say granting a wider exemption is needed so that various companies — including parts manufacturers and vessel and plane operators — can respond quickly.

“It’s very complex, so the easiest way is to issue a general license and to make sure that the general license is only to be used during an emergency,” Piñón said. “There are hundreds of companies. We don’t know who is going to have that valve that is going to be needed.”

For example, well containment systems developed by the Marine Well Containment Co., a coalition of major Gulf oil producers that formed after last year’s spill, and the Helix Energy Solutions Group were instrumental in the Interior Department’s decision to start granting deepwater drilling permits again this year. Repsol has contracts with MWCC and Helix for their operations in U.S. waters, but not in Cuba.

Bromwich said he is not pressuring the Treasury to issue or not issue a general license to companies.

“It would be in the national interest to make sure that everything that can be done certainly in U.S. waters is done,” he said. “Whether it goes beyond that, I think, is among the issues that are being discussed in high levels of the government.”

Regular talks also continue with Repsol, Bromwich said.

But while Cuba appears willing to adopt offshore drilling standards modeled after those in the U.S. and Mexico, Piñón said there needs to be direct talks between the two governments.

While the embargo tightened during the George W. Bush administration, the Obama administration has loosened some sanctions, including easing specific travel restrictions in January.

One challenge will be the politics in Florida, which will again be a swing state in the 2012 election. The state includes critics of any oil or gas drilling near the state’s coastline, along with hard-line Cuban refugees who wince at any melting of relations with the Castro regime. Florida congressional members from both parties have offered bills punishing companies that operate in Cuba.

Republicans on Capitol Hill, and potentially on the presidential trail, could also accuse the Obama administration of focusing more on shoring up Cuba’s domestic energy production rather than at home.

But Florida political observers say any concern about fiddling with the embargo runs a distant second to the state’s economic doldrums and the devastating impact that a spill could have on the Sunshine State.

“It’s much more of an issue for the Republican candidates than it is for the administration,” said Florida Republican strategist Ana Navarro. “I frankly don’t think the administration cares about the hard-lined Cuban-American vote, and I don’t think the hard-lined Cuban-American vote cares for the administration. And I don’t think that’s changing anytime soon.”
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Can Cuba Recover from its De-Industrialization? I. Characteristics and Causes

Posted on September 27, 2011 by Arch Ritter

By Arch Ritter

[Note: a subsequent Blog Entry will analyze “Consequences and Courses of Action” ]

Since 1989, Cuba has experienced a disastrous de-industrialization from which it has not recovered. The causes of the collapse are complex and multi-dimensional. Is it likely that the policy proposals of the Lineamientos approved at the VI Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba will lead to a recovery from this collapse? What can be done to reverse this situation?

One of the last Cane-Harvesting Machines Fabricated in Cuba, en route to its Destination, November 1994

Perhaps it should be noted to begin with that the  manufacturing sector of many if not most high income countries have shrunk as a proportion of GDP and especially in terms employment. This has been due to the migration of  labor-intense manufacturing to lower wage countries, most notably China and India, as well as technological change and rising labor productivity in many areas of manufacturing. However, given Cuba’s income levels and its historical record, it could and should be expanding its manufacturing base and perhaps even increasing employment in the sector rather than remaining in melt-down phase

I. Characteristics of Cuba’s De-Industrialization, 1989-2010

The accompanying Charts and Tables, all using data from Cuba’s Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas, indicate the severity of Cuba’s manufacturing situation.

Chart 1 illustrates the almost 60% decline in the physical volume of industrial output – excluding sugar – from 1989 to 1998. By the year 2010, the level of output was at 49.9% of the 1989 level. This does not constitute a recovery.

The physical volume of output by destination is presented in Appendix Table 11.2 below. This Table indicates industrial output including sugar in 2010 was at 43% of its 1989 volume. Products for Consumption were at 81.8% of their 1989 value in 2010. Some product areas had improved, namely manufactures for consumption and “other manufactures” but food drink and tobacco production were at 71.5% of their 1989 volume. Footwear and clothing were at 21.8% of their 1989 volume.  Equipment production had almost totally disappeared and was at 6.6% of their 1989 volume in 2010. Intermediate products were at 34.7% of their 1989 volume, despite a near 50% increase in volumes of mineral extraction. .

Volumes of industrial output by origin or industrial sub-sector are presented in Appendix in Table 11.1 Some manufacturing sub-sectors have virtually disappeared with production at very low levels as a percentage of 1989 levels. For example, for the following sectors, 2010 levels as a percentage of 1989 levels were as follows:

  • Textiles:                                     6.9%
  • Clothing:                                      27.8%
  • Paper and paper products:        6.5%
  • Publications and recordings:   18.0%
  • Wood products:                         12.3%
  • Construction Materials:           27.1%
  • Machinery and Equipment:      0.4%

On the other hand, pharmaceutical production increased dramatically, with 2008 production at 822% of the 1989 level. Tobacco, drinks (presumably alcoholic) and metal products were approximately at the 1989 levels. But almost everything else was around 25% of the levels of 1989 or less.

The collapse of the sugar agro-industrial complex is well known and is illustrated in Chart 2.

II. Causal factors

There are a variety of reasons for the collapse of the industrial sector.

1.      The initial factor was the ending of the special relationship with the Soviet Union that subsidized the Cuban economy generously for the previous 25 years or so. This resulted from the shifting of the Soviet Union to world prices in its trade relations with Cuba rather than the high prices for Cuba’s sugar exports as well as an end to the provision of credits to cover Cuba’s continuing trade deficits with the USSR. The break-up of the Soviet Union and recession in Eastern Europe also damaged Cuba’s exports. These factors reduced Cuba’s imports of all sorts, especially of imported inputs, replacement parts, and new machinery and equipment of all sorts.  The resulting economic melt-down of 1989-1993 reduced investment to disastrous levels and resulted in cannibalization of some plant and equipment for replacement parts. The end result was a severe incapacitation of the manufacturing sector.

2.      The technological inheritance from the Soviet era as of 1989 was also antiquated and uncompetitive, as Became painfully apparent after the opening up of the Soviet economy following Perestroika.

3.      Since 1989, levels of investment have been continuously insufficient. For example, the overall level of investment in Cuba in 2008 was 10.5% of GDP in comparison with 20.6% for all of Latin America, according to UN ECLA, (2011, Table A-4.)

4.      Maintenance and re-investment was also de-emphasized even before 1989. After 1989, maintenance and re-investment were a category of economic activity that could be postponed during the economic melt-down – for a little while. But over a longer period of time, lack of adequate maintenance of the capital stock has resulted in its serious deterioration or near destruction. This can be seen graphically by the casual observer with the dilapidated state of housing in Havana and indeed the frequent “derrumbes” or collapse of houses and abandoned urban areas.

5.      The dual monetary and exchange rate system penalizes traditional and potential new exporters that receive one old (Moneda Nacional) peso for each US dollar earned from exports – while the relevant rate for Cuban citizens is 26 old pesos to US$1.00. This makes it difficult if not impossible for some exporters and was a key contributor to the collapse of the sugar sector.

6.      The blockage of small enterprise for the last 50 years has also prevented entrepreneurial trial and error and the emergence of new manufacturing activities.

7.      Finally, China has played a major role in Cuba’s de-industrialization as it has done with other countries as well. China has major advantages in its manufacturing sector that have permitted its meteoric ascent as a manufacturing power house. These include

  • Low cost labor;
  • An industrious labor force;
  • Past and current emphases on human development and higher education;
  • A relatively new industrial capital stock;
  • Massive economies of scale;
  • Massive “agglomeration economies”;

But of particular significance has been its grossly undervalued exchange rate that has permitted it to incur continuing trade and current account surpluses and amass foreign assets now amounting to around US$ 3 trillion. Indeed, in my view, China has cheated  in the globalization process and captured the lion’s share of its benefits through manipulation of the exchange rate, and has contributed to the generation of major imbalances for the rest of the world, including both the United States and Cuba among other countries. .

China’s undervalued exchange rate has co-existed with Cuba’s grossly overvalued exchange rate that has been partly responsible for pricing potential Cuban exports of manufactures out of the international market. The result is that Cuba is awash with cheap Chinese products that have replaced consumer products that Cuba formerly – in the 1950s as well as the 1970s – produced for itself.

With respect to the sugar sector, there are a number of factors have been responsible for its decline.

1.      Most serious, the sector essentially was a “cash cow” milked to death for its foreign exchange earnings, by insufficient maintenance and by insufficient re-investment preventing productivity improvement.

2.      The monetary and exchange rate regimes under which it labored have also damaged it badly. Earning one “old peso” for each dollar of sugar exports has deprived the sugar sector of the revenues needed to sust4ain its operations.

3.      Finally the decision by former President Fidel Castro to shut down close to half the industrial capacity of the sector and try to convert former sugar lands to other uses sealed its fate.  In view of Cuba’s natural advantages in sugar cultivation, the sophistication and diversity of the whole sugar agro-industrial cluster of activities, the high sugar prices of  recent years and the competitiveness of ethanol derived from sugar cane, this decision was foolish in the extreme.

Next: Part II, The Consequences of Deindustrialization and Possible Future Courses of Action. will be published in the next Blog Entry

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