Ted Henken appeared on he Maria Elvira Salazar television show in Miami discussing our new book Entrepreneurial Cuba: the Changing Policy landscape.
The full discussion can be seen here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BvKS3tb8_Ds&feature=youtu.be
Maria Elvira Salazar
Ted and Maria Elvira
Ted Henken
Maria Elvira
By Emily Morris
Complete article here: New Left Review 88, July-August 2014
Introduction:
What is the verdict on Cuba’s economy, nearly a quarter of a century after the collapse of the Soviet bloc? The story generally told is a simple one, with a clear message. It describes a cyclical alternation of government policy between moments of pragmatic capitulation to market forces, which account for any progress, and periods of ideological rigidity and re-assertion of state control, which account for all economic difficulties. [1] After the dissolution of the Comecon trading bloc, us Cuba watchers were confident that the state-socialist economy faced imminent collapse. ‘Cuba needs shock therapy—a speedy shift to free markets’, they declared. The restoration of capitalism on the island was ‘inevitable’; delay would not only hamper economic performance but would inflict grave human costs and discredit Cuba’s social achievements. Given his stubborn refusal to embark on a course of liberalization and privatization, Fidel Castro’s ‘final hour’ had at last arrived. [2]
The problem with this account is that reality has conspicuously failed to comply with its predictions. Although Cuba faced exceptionally severe conditions—it suffered the worst exogenous shock of any of the Soviet-bloc members and, thanks to the long-standing us trade embargo, has confronted a uniquely hostile international environment—its economy has performed in line with the other ex-Comecon countries, ranking thirteenth out of the 27 for which the World Bank has full data.
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Conclusion: An alternative?
Raúl Castro’s second and final presidential term will end by 2018 at the latest. By 2016, when the five-year process of ‘updating’ under the current Guidelines comes to an end, the aim is for the economy to have a broader productive base and a larger private sector, while retaining universal health, education and welfare provision. To achieve this, the rate of investment will need to rise. Given Cuba’s success in cultivating official relations with new partners, including China, Brazil and Russia, the aspiration to increase the flow of foreign investment seems feasible. The trickier task will be to raise efficiency and dynamism within the domestic economy, while preventing widening income gaps and social divisions that threaten the state-socialist project.
Before writing off Cuba as a spent force, the magnitude of its achievement to date should be acknowledged. While conceding that market mechanisms can contribute to a more diversified and dynamic economy, Cuban policymakers have not swallowed the promises of full-scale privatization and liberalization, and have always been mindful of the social costs. This approach, shaped not least by exceptionally difficult international conditions, has been more successful in terms of both economic growth and social protection than Washington Consensus models would predict. Comparing Cuba’s experience with that of the former Comecon countries in Eastern Europe—or indeed with China and Vietnam—it is possible to identify some distinguishing features of its path.
First, Cuba was able to maintain a social safety-net during the crisis, in sharp contrast to the others. In the context of the island’s uniquely severe exogenous shock and hostile external environment, a commitment to universal welfare provision undoubtedly served to limit social hardship. Linked to this has been the process of extensive popular consultation, particularly at three critical moments—the onset of the crisis, the stabilization process, and the prelude to Raúl Castro’s new adjustment phase. Third, by retaining control of wages and prices during the early period of shock and recovery, it was possible to restore stability relatively quickly by restraining an inflationary spiral. Although fixed wages and prices created the conditions for a flourishing informal economy, they also served to minimize disruption and limit the income gap within the formal economy. Though the two are quite distinct, the strategy bears comparison with China’s ‘dual track’ system, in which the ‘planned’ track is maintained while a ‘market’ track develops alongside, providing opportunities for experimentation and learning. For all its inefficiencies and confusions, Cuba’s ‘bifurcation’ and ‘second economy’ played a part in adjustment to the new conditions.
Fourthly, the state retained control of the process of economic restructuring, allowing it to channel the very limited hard-currency resources to selected industries, achieving a remarkable recovery of foreign-exchange earnings relative to the amount of capital available. These enterprises also served as ‘learning opportunities’ for Cuban planners, managers and workers to think through how to adapt to altered international conditions. The export base created by this approach may be too narrow to drive sustainable growth over the long term, but it was an efficient way to restore capacity after the crisis period. Finally, Cuba’s rejection of the mainstream ‘transition-to-capitalism’ route allowed space for a process of adjustment—described by one official as ‘permanent evolution’ [57] —that has been flexible and responsive to Cuba’s changing conditions and constraints. This contrasts sharply with the more rigid recipes for liberalization and privatization pedalled by the hordes of transition consultants in other former Comecon countries. Cuba is a poor country, yet its health and education systems are beacons in the region. Its approach has shown that, despite contradictions and difficulties, it is possible to incorporate market mechanisms within a state-led development model with relatively positive results in terms of economic performance and social outcomes.
This raises the next question: why should we assume that the state will withdraw from its dominant role within the economy, or that the current approach to policy must eventually give way to a transition-to-capitalism path? A fundamental assumption of transition economics has been Kornai’s claim that ‘partial alteration of the system’ cannot succeed; efficiency and dynamism will only be maximized when the transformation from a ‘socialist planned’ economic system to a ‘capitalist market’ one is complete, because the former is too inflexible to survive over the long term. But the experience of former Comecon countries has demonstrated that success is far from guaranteed and that social costs can be high. Viewed without preconceptions, the Cuban case suggests that another way might be possible, after all.
Emily Morris
Financial Times, | Dec 30 17:05
Original here: LESSONS|
By Piroska Mohácsi Nagy, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
An historic thawing of ties between Cuba and the United States has raised the question of how far the Communist island state is prepared to go in opening up its economy to the forces of the market and integration with the international community.
If and when Cuba does embark on a path of economic – and perhaps also a degree of political transformation – it could well enjoy the advantages of the late-comer, drawing lessons both positive and negative from eastern Europe over the last quarter of a century.
It can assess what worked and what proved much more difficult, emulating the successes and avoiding the pitfalls. There is no doubt that the east European process was painful, especially at the very start when the existing production systems collapsed in the face of real competition, leading to precipitous declines in output and employment.There is equally no doubt that the unprecedented experiment that was launched after the fall of the Berlin Wall has been a success, however tortuous the route and however many times there have been setbacks on the way.
There were four key building blocks in the reform process that was launched after 1989. These began with the – often initially painful – measures to deregulate and liberalise economic structures, including trade, prices and markets. They also comprised measures to achieve macro-economic stability, the creation of new institutions, regulatory bodies and the dismantling of state-ownership of output via the privatisation process.
Of these four policies, privatisation proved to be the most socially controversial, leading not necessarily to calls for a return to the dominance of the state, but resulting in what was often perceived as a corrupt process that unfairly favoured a privileged set of elite insiders.
But none of the four can be viewed independently of the others; they are intimately intertwined. Without deregulation of product and labour markets, privatisation will not work. Without privatisation, macro stabilisation will not succeed. And without appropriate institutions, none of the reforms can be sustained.
The eastern Europe experience provides pointers on how to approach the reform roll-out and Cuba could benefit from reflecting on the outcome of what in the early years of transition was a furious debate about “big bang” reform or gradualism.
With the benefit of hindsight it is now clear that the advocates of pursuing all the four elements simultaneously were, in the main, right. Those include the believers in the “big bang” as well as the “opportunists”, i.e. those who claim that reforms should be implemented as soon as an opportunity arises.
Gradualism in the sense of postponing any of the key elements has proven not to be a workable option because it can create new vested interest in half-baked reforms, as Ukraine’s experience until recently has shown.
Lessons from eastern Europe’s mistakes
It is, therefore, vitally important to take full advantage of the window of opportunity that exists in the earliest days of transition. One lesson that the international community learnt late was the key role that is to be played by reformed public authorities and the state in helping to define and anchor the reforms that support the market reforms.
In the early post-communism euphoria the mantra of “State=Bad – Market=Good” dominated, leading to some of the worst examples of unfettered capitalism and wild-west economics that enriched the few and impoverished the many.
It was only much later that the reformed state was recognised as being a key element in the transition process, removing itself where markets can do the job more effectively but remaining or even being strengthened where it can support an environment within which the free market can flourish fairly.It is important to bear in mind that simply destroying the state instead of reforming and adapting it to support market development and perform the provision of public goods can lead to chaos and the state’s eventual resurrection with autocratic features.
At the same time, privatisation has to be addressed sensitively, preferably using a combination of methods that ensure fairness and also an acceptable balance between foreign and domestic private ownership.
For many European countries the prospect of EU membership has provided an anchor that has proven to be a major incentive in bedding down reforms and modernising economic structures. Similar options may not be out of reach for Cuba, given the vicinity of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), for example. And even without a powerful external anchor, like many other economies, Cuba can look to reap the benefits from other forms of external economic opening and integration and joining international organisations that can help to inculcate higher economic standards.
External support can work only if reforms start in earnest. Then foreign capital can be just as transformational as it has been in eastern Europe. Foreign direct investment can support know-how and good governance, in addition to providing much needed fresh capital. While developing external links are crucial, it is just as important for countries to nurture an independent civil society and a free media that holds up the evolving systems to scrutiny. They can both be a major support for developing democracies and fairer economies, acting as a deterrent to corruption and injustice.
However, local ownership of reforms will be, just as in eastern Europe, absolutely critical. The clear communication of new processes and policies is essential. The best policies in the world will not be effective if people do not understand them. Effective communication can help change value systems, explain policy choices and ensure their ultimate success.
What we are witnessing today may well be one of the last pieces of the iron curtain to start coming down. When it finally does, just as for eastern European countries 25 years ago, the Cuban people will deserve strong financial support and the best policy advice by the international community so that they can guide their reforms and re-integration into the world economy with as little volatility as possible.
Piroska Mohácsi Nagy is Director for Country Policy and Strategy and Initiatives, Office of the Chief Economist, at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
TED A. HENKEN Y ARCHIBALD R.M. RITTER*
Source: Abajo con el bloqueo en contra de los emprendedores cubanos, tanto en La Habana como en Washington, 14 y medio, Diciembre 13, 2014
Original article here: Abajo con el bloqueo
En docenas de entrevistas que hicimos a empresarios cubanos durante los últimos 15 años solíamos oír dos refranes: “El ojo del amo engorda el caballo” y “el que tenga tienda que la atienda, o si no, que la venda”. El primero indica que la calidad de un bien o un servicio mejora (o “engorda”) cuando la persona que lo presta goza de autonomía y obtiene una ganancia económica. El segundo exige que el Gobierno entregue al sector privado las actividades económicas (o “tiendas”) que no ha logrado operar con efectividad, muchas de las cuales ya se practican en la economía sumergida cubana.
En otras palabras, el embargo norteamericano, que ha sido criticado mucho últimamente, no es el “bloqueo” principal que está obstaculizando la revitalización de la economía cubana. Aunque el embargo ha sido condenado constantemente (y creemos correctamente) tanto por el Gobierno cubano como por los editores de The New York Times, en la Isla es mucho más común oír críticas al “auto-bloqueo” (embargo interno) impuesto por el mismo Gobierno cubano en contra del ingenio empresarial de su propio
pueblo.
Entre 1996 y 2006, Fidel Castro dio una gradual marcha atrás a las aperturas económicas que él mismo había implementado durante el llamado Período Especial a principios de los años noventa, demostrando que estaba más preocupado por los riesgos políticos que la iniciativa empresarial popular tendría para su control centralizado que en los beneficios económicos que estos traerían a Cuba. Por eso no estuvo dispuesto a transferir más que una porción simbólica de la “tienda” estatal a los emprendedores privados.
En cambio, durante la presidencia de Raúl Castro, aunque se declara que el objetivo de los cambios económicos sigue siendo “preservar y perfeccionar el socialismo,” él ha empezado a hacerle caso a la sabiduría popular de los refranes citados arriba reduciendo el tamaño de la “tienda” estatal al transferir la producción de últiples bienes y servicios a las cooperativas y pequeñas empresas privadas. De hecho, el número de los trabajadores por cuenta propia ha aumentado de menos de 150.000 en 2010 a casi medio millón hoy.
No obstante, hace falta hacer mucho más para que los empresarios cubanos puedan contribuir plenamente al crecimiento económico. Por ejemplo, el 70% de los nuevos trabajadores por cuenta propia vienen de las filas de los “desempleados”, una cifra que indica que simplemente legalizaron sus empresas informales ya existentes, por lo que no están creando empleos que absorban a los 1,8 millones trabajadores del sector estatal despedidos por el Gobierno.
Solamente un 7% de los trabajadores por cuenta propia son universitarios y la mayoría trabajan en actividades de bajo nivel porque casi todos los empleos por cuenta propia profesionales están prohibidos. Esta prohibición resulta ser un “bloqueo” bastante eficaz que obstaculiza el uso productivo de la fuerza de trabajo cubano altamente calificada.
Para “acabar con el bloqueo” contra los empresarios cubanos y así facilitar el surgimiento de un sector privado de empresas cooperativas y de pequeña y mediana escala hay que emprender reformas más profundas y audaces. Entre estas, una apertura de las profesiones a la empresa privada; la implementación de mercados mayoristas y crédito asequibles; acabar con el fuertemente custodiado monopolio de estado sobre las importaciones, las exportaciones y la inversión; permitiendo el establecimiento de empresas de venta al detalle; y relajar la presión fiscal sobre la pequeña empresa, que actualmente discrimina a las empresas nacionales a favor de las extranjeras.
¿Tiene Raúl Castro la voluntad política para profundizar sus reformas?
La prohibición de las actividades que el Gobierno prefiere monopolizar le permite ejercer un control sobre las ciudadanos cubanos e imponer un orden aparente sobre la sociedad. Sin embargo, esto se alcanza al precio de empujar toda la actividad económica prohibida (y toda ganancia impositiva) nuevamente al mercado negro donde se desarrollaba antes del 2010.
Por el otro lado, la legalización y regulación de las muchas actividades creadas y puestas a prueba en el mercado por el creativo sector empresarial cubano crearía más puestos de trabajo, una mayor calidad y variedad de bienes y servicios a precios más bajos, al tiempo que aumenta los ingresos fiscales. Pero estos beneficios vendrían a costa de permitir una mayor autonomía económica, la concentración de riqueza y propiedad en manos privadas y abrir la competencia contra los monopolios de estado por mucho tiempo protegidos.
La viabilidad de estas reformas depende también de cambios en la política norteamericana hacia Cuba y de la política cubana hacia su diáspora, la cual ya juega un papel importante en la economía cubana como proveedores de capital inicial a través de los miles de millones de dólares que mandan cada año en remesas. Otro fenómeno cada vez más importante es el amplio coro de voces en Estados Unidos, incluyendo a muchos prominentes miembros de la comunidad cubana-americana, que reclaman una nueva política norteamericana hacia Cuba.
Al reclamar reformas económicas más profundas dentro de Cuba, también creemos que unos cambios calibrados en la política norteamericana podrían estimular la apertura del mercado al permitir más apoyo material y técnico a los nuevos empresarios cubanos. Este acercamiento responsable al cada vez más robusto sector de las pequeñas empresas independientes de Cuba, puede y de hecho debe ser permitido, para estimular la expansión de las reformas económicas de Cuba y por tanto potenciar la autonomía económica del pueblo cubano.
Si el Gobierno cubano insiste en mantener un embargo a su propio pueblo, no debemos nosotros ayudarlo con nuestro propio embargo externo. Por el contrario, deberíamos hacer lo opuesto trabajando directamente con los florecientes empresarios de Cuba.
*Ted A. Henken es Jefe del Departamento de Sociología y Antropología de Baruch College, City University of New York. Archibald R.M. Ritter es Profesor de Investigación Distinguido Emérito de Economía y Asuntos Internacionales de Carleton University, Ottawa, Canadá. Su nuevo libro, Entrepreneurial Cuba: The Changing Policy Landscape, se publica en enero de 2015.
By Mimi Whitefield, Miami Herald
12/14/2014
Read more here: New Economy
Just a couple years ago, tourists who wanted to sample one of Cuba’s paladares were on their own. A bus from state tour operator Havantur wouldn’t think of stopping to allow visitors to dine on roast pork or grilled red snapper at one of these small private restaurants.
No more. Now, government tourism companies are doing business with them, booking reservations for tour groups at both paladares and casa particulares — private bed-and-breakfasts. “A few of our casas have been block-booked by Havanatur and Transtur,” said Matthew Sellar, who runs Scotland-based CubaCasa, an online booking site for private accommodations.
Call such co-existence the inevitable advance of market forces as the hemisphere’s only communist nation reforms its creaking state-owned, centrally planned economy. But entering the fifth year of a process that ultimately led to the economic reforms, the changes are still very much a work in progress with daunting challenges ahead.
MUCH UNFINISHED WORK REMAINS AS CUBA REFORMS ITS ECONOMY
The reforms are not nearly as fast or as profound as many — inside and outside the country — would hope. Cuban leader Raúl Castro has often said the process will continue “sin prisa pero sin pausa” (without haste but without pause).
Since the economic guidelines — or lineamientos — were approved, Cuba has allowed limited self-employment and worker-owned cooperatives, revamped its foreign investment law and agriculture system, allowed the private sale of homes and cars, changed rules so Cubans can more freely travel abroad and begun to phase out the ration book.
“The biggest change is that the government and the party have now accepted the idea of a larger private sector,” said Phil Peters, president of the Cuban Research Center and a regular traveler to Cuba. “You see it in every town in Cuba — and it’s being discussed around every family table in Cuba. It’s a huge ideological shift, and it’s not something you would have seen under Fidel Castro.”
But when Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Garcia-Margallo visited Cuba in November, he urged the government to pick up the pace. “Spain would like to see a more rapid pace to the economic reforms that give more space for private initiative and foreign investment,” he said.
The changes extend beyond the purely economic.
In 2013, Cuba removed the bureaucratic barriers that made it so hard for Cubans to take foreign trips and also allowed its people to stay abroad for up to two years without losing citizenship rights. That meant Cubans seeking an economic solution no longer had to leave their homeland definitively to take part in the global economy or seek new opportunities.
The reforms also have laid bare Cuba’s racial divide. But unlike in the past, the government has now sanctioned discussion about the economic inequities between blacks and whites.
“The population generally speaking wants change. There is a thirst for change,” said Arch Ritter, an economist and Cuba scholar at Carleton University in Ottawa. “The economic changes are real.” But the government “could prevent the reforms from going much further if they threaten the political control of the [Communist] Party,” he added.
Already some targets have slipped. The government initially said it wanted to move 500,000 Cubans off state payrolls into self-employment by 2011. Then the target was revised to 1.8million workers by 2015. Early this year, state payrolls had been reduced by 596,500 workers through layoffs and by converting workplaces to co-ops. Some 476,000 self-employed workers were registered at the end of September.
But analysts say significantly speeding up dismissals from state enterprises is risky for the Cuban government because it could cause social problems.
So far, the government has made reforms only around the edges. Castro talks of perfecting or updating the current socialist system instead of doing away with it. But it’s also clear Havana wants a smaller government, a more vibrant economy and citizens who don’t look at emigration as the only solution to economic problems.
Though the government has blown hot and cold on foreign investment, officials now say foreign investors are essential to spurring the type of growth Cuba needs to develop. This fall, it released a wish list of 246 projects for which foreign money is welcome.
And the 800-pound gorilla — unifying Cuba’s dual monetary system and fixing its haphazard pricing system — has yet to be dealt with, although the government says it is preparing conditions for elimination of the two-tiered system.
What all the reforms will add up to is something of a mystery. “The Cuban government hasn’t set out clearly what the desired end state should be. They haven’t laid out a clear development model,” said Richard Feinberg, a professor of international political economy at University of California, San Diego and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.
Castro — who officially became Cuba’s leader in 2008, two years after he took the reins from his ailing brother — has made it clear he won’t be rushed. He “likes to experiment before moving forward and measure the results and the repercussions,” said Domingo Amuchastegui, a former Cuban intelligence analyst who now lives in South Florida.
“That’s reasonable, but Raúl just doesn’t have the time,” said Carmelo Mesa-Lago, a Cuba expert and economics professor emeritus at the University of Pittsburgh.
FAILED STATUS QUO
The reforms were fueled not so much because Cuban leaders truly embraced them but because they had little choice as the world shifted, support from traditional allies came into question, and the economic status quo became unsustainable.
Cuba has previously flirted with economic reforms and pulled back when its economy has improved. But Amuchastegui said “reversing the process is now out of the question, and everyone knows that.”
So far, the results have been mixed and economic growth has remained sluggish.
The Cuban economy is expected to grow by only 1.3 percent this year, according to government estimates. The 2014 target was 2.2 percent. The merchandise trade deficit in 2013 topped $9billion — the second-highest ever.
At a recent Cabinet meeting, Economy Minister Marino Murillo Jorge said 2015 growth was expected to come in at just over 4 percent. The U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean estimates 2015 growth at 3 percent. Mesa-Lago finds both estimates optimistic.
The problem in gauging the reforms’ success or failure, said Peters, is that the process isn’t complete. “There has been substantial progress in many areas, but they’re not done,” he said.
Although self-employment is proceeding more slowly than the government envisioned, it now seems to have moved beyond simply legalizing the shadowy realm of Cuba’s informal economy and black marketeers.
Among the most popular fledgling businesses are those linked to the tourist trade. Both casas and paladares have been legal since the 1990s, when the collapse of the Soviet Union plunged Cuba into an economic crisis. Then the regime seemed to view them grudgingly as competition rather than business partners.
“Now, they’ve begun to integrate them into the broader economy,” said William LeoGrande, an American University professor who specializes in Latin America.
Also spurring the establishment of new paladares is a change in rules that allows them to hire staff rather than just family members. Up to 50 seats are also permitted, compared to 12 previously. Mood lighting, contemporary art, terrace or poolside dining, nouveau cuisine and Cuban fusion dishes are among the features of the most upscale ones.
Sellar recently visited Havana to add more casas particulares to his online booking site. The 20 new ones he liked will bring the total on the site to 120. During the high season in December and January, most have no vacancies, he said. Casa owners also have been busy upgrading with new Chinese bathroom fixtures, air conditioning — even rooftop hot tubs — and adding services. The Artedel Luxury Penthouse in Havana, for example, offers a private driver, a translator and assistant, massage and laundry and will organize salsa and Spanish classes for guests.
In September, the government announced plans to gradually shift Cuba’s 8,984 state-owned restaurants into private hands — although it will still own the land they sit on. And more than three years ago, the government began turning over state-owned beauty salons and barber shops to employees who run them as cooperatives. Murillo said the creation of 498 cooperatives has been approved, and 329 of them are in operation. Another 300 proposals are under evaluation, he said.
“The key now is these non-agriculture cooperatives. If the Cubans do this right, it will create a means to move a large number of small and medium-sized state businesses to the private sector,” Peters said.
But many of the self-employed are hustling to merely get by. During a recent trip to Cuba, LeoGrande found one street-corner cuentapropista whose business was refilling disposable plastic lighters. He’d drill a hole, fill it up with lighter fluid and then cover the hole. Almost all the private ventures he saw — from bicycle repair shops to pizza stalls were tiny. “I got the sense they are open to taking advantage of any opportunity they see,” he said.
When Amuchastegui traveled to Artemisa, a small city west of Havana, in November, he found lots of home building and renovation taking place as well as many small private businesses from cellphone and computer repair shops to carpenters’ workshops. “It’s become business and making money, business and making money,” he said. At the Banco de Crédito y Comercio, said Amuchastegui, lines snaked down the block as people waited to apply for credits, mostly for home improvements.
WEAK AGRICULTURE REFORM
But if self-employment is the most visible of the reforms and among the most popular, agricultural reform may be the least successful.
“For me, agriculture is the key to a successful economic reform, and so far they don’t have the results,” said Mesa-Lago.
In an effort to boost its agricultural output, Cuba announced a new plan for land tenure in 2009 and then further reformed the process in 2012 to allow larger plots and permit small farmers to build homes and barns on the land. Although the state retains ownership of the land, farmers are allowed to cultivate it under 10-year contracts with the state.
“It is not doing the trick,” Mesa-Lago said. Among the problems, he said, is the farmer must be tied to inefficient state farms or cooperatives to get seeds and farm equipment and must market through them. Investments in the land also are restricted by the state.
Other reforms established wholesale markets for farm supplies and eliminated the requirement that 70 percent of the harvest be sold to the state at set prices. But the latter reform applies to only three provinces — Havana, Mayabeque and Artemisa.
“Essentially, they need to provide more incentives for farmers,” Feinberg said.
It’s possible agricultural production will edge up slightly this year, but it will be below 2005 levels and well below the peak year of 1989, said Mesa-Lago. “Cuba is still importing 70 to 90 percent of the food it needs at a cost of around $2 billion annually,” he added. Next year, the government estimates food imports will increase to $2.194 billion.
Since Cuba began allowing its people and permanent residents to freely buy and sell real estate in November 2011, se vende signs have begun to pop up on homes and apartments. Last year, real estate agents, who had long operated illegally, were added to the list of approved self-employment jobs.
Internet sites like Revolico.com and cubisima.com also have sprung up. The cubisima site recently listed a four-bedroom, three-bath colonial home on Miramar’s Fifth Avenue that had been partially renovated for $280,000.
“This is a game changer,” said Antonio R. Zamora, a Miami lawyer who specializes in foreign investment. For the first time since the early days of the revolution, Cubans have been able to unlock the value of their homes and begin building capital, he said. “It’s a big change in the net worth of the Cuban people — and it doesn’t really involve the government” other than making payment through a state bank, recording a sale and paying tax on it, Zamora said.
Despite all the activity, Mesa-Lago said, there are still only pockets of a market economy in Cuba. The changes to date, he said, add up to only a “fraction of the total economy.” He’d like to see the reforms accelerate and deepen — and he believes Castro, who is 83 years old and plans to retire in February 2018, may have the best chance of pushing them through.
That’s because it’s unclear whether Miguel Díaz-Canel, first vice president of Cuba’s Council of State and Castro’s heir apparent, or whoever succeeds Raúl Castro will have the same political clout as he does to carry out reforms that may be unpopular with Communist Party conservatives, Mesa-Lago said. “They are afraid of delegating economic power, and they fear what happened in Eastern Europe,” he said. “They want to avoid the classic example of the snowball that gets bigger and bigger and can’t be stopped.”
SOME PHOTOS OF THE NEW ECONOMY (by Arch Ritter, 2014)
Cooperative Bus, coming up Aguilar St. at Reina
Food Vender in the Street
Private Barber Shop on Agramonte
“Casas Particulares” on Neptuno
Advertising Private Enterprises
Tourists at the Plaza Vieja
Not the New Economy: Old Sugar Mill Locomotive on Display near the Capitolio
MARIO A. GONZÁLEZ-CORZO and ORLANDO JUSTO,
Journal of Devevelopment Entrepreneurship, 19, 1450015 (2014) [26 pages] DOI: 10.1142/S1084946714500150
The complete essay is available here, though access is restricted, unfortunately, unless your University provides automatic access: http://www.worldscientific.com/toc/jde/19/03
Abstract:
This paper examines the evolution of Cuba’s self-employed entrepreneurs since the sector became an officially-recognized alternative to State sector employment in 2010. Despite the expansion of authorized self-employment activities and the implementation of gradual economic reforms to “update” the country’s socialist economic model since 2010, Cuba’s emerging self-employed entrepreneurs still face a series of constraints and limitations, such as an onerous tax system, underdeveloped banking and financial sectors, lack of access to organized input markets and a still hostile business climate that hinder their ability to expand and contribute to the country’s economic growth.
Orlando Justo is in the Department of Economics and Business, City University of New York (CUNY), Lehman College, Carman Hall, 377, 250 Bedford Park Boulevard West, Bronx, NY 10468, USA
Mario Gonzalez Corzo (Ph.D. Rutgers University) is Associate Professor at the Department of Economics at Lehman College (CUNY). He is also Faculty Fellow at the Bildner Center for Western Hemisphere Studies at The Graduate Center, CUNY, and a Research Associate at the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, FL. His research interests and areas of specialization include Cuba’s post-Soviet economic developments, agricultural reforms, entrepreneurship, and financial sector reforms in post-socialist transition economies.
Mario Gonzalez Corzo
.
Crafts Market, on the Malecon
The Barrio Chino
Portrait Photographer, at the Capitolio
Bicitaxis, Central Havana
Crafts Market, by the Plaza de la Catedral
By Larry Luxner
November 10, 2014 http://newsismybusiness.com/planner-economic-prospects/
WASHINGTON — When Miguel Coyula discusses Cuba’s struggling economy, he sounds more like a Miami-based critic of the Castro regime than a retired Cuban official visiting the United States on a lecture tour, then going back home to Havana. But times have changed, and Coyula says he isn’t afraid to speak his mind.
“In Cuba, the word ‘criticize’ means to blame or demonize. But I try to be like a doctor. I tell the truth,” said the renowned architect and urban planner, who recently returned to Havana after a month-long trip that began in Providence, R.I., and included speaking engagements in not only Washington but also New York, Atlanta and Miami.
“To quote Raúl, we need to learn to listen to others, even when we don’t like what we hear. He’s invited people to speak out,” Coyula said. “These days, people who work for the government are more open. The instruction coming from the top is that it doesn’t matter what people say; no one can be interrupted.”
Miguel Coyula
A prominent architect and urban planner, Coyula, 72, advised Havana’s municipal government for more than 20 years as part of a progressive think tank known as Grupo para el Desarrollo Integral de la Capital (GDIC). He spoke to us following a private roundtable briefing at Downey McGrath Group, a Washington lobbying firm.
Among Coyula’s key predictions:
“By the end of this year, they’ll begin substituting CUCs for regular pesos, so if today you pay 2.50 CUC for a liter of oil, you’ll pay 60 pesos. Considering that the average monthly salary is 150 pesos, that’s a lot of money,” said Coyula. With the planned phase-out of convertible pesos, people are trying to get rid of their CUCs and acquire dollars instead. Officially, the exchange rate is 87 cents per CUC, but on the black market, it’s 96 to 98 cents per CUC.
“Prices are astronomically high, and there’s a lack of economic education after decades of no education on this subject,” he said. “People don’t realize that the society creates wealth. The state administers that wealth, but it must come from somewhere.”
Embargo is ‘ethical issue’
Coyula’s U.S. visit was sponsored by the Center for Democracy in the Americas, a Washington-based NGO that favors lifting the embargo and all U.S. travel restrictions against Cuba. His cousin, the well-known architectural historian Mario Coyula — who headed the GDIC — died this past July at the age of 79.
“For me, the embargo is an ethical issue,” he said. “But lifting it doesn’t necessarily mean that the day after people’s mindsets will change. The Cuban economy needs to be more efficient and dynamic — with or without the embargo.”
In Coyula’s opinion, “the revolution spends more than 40 percent of its time surviving. It’s maneuvering back and forth, and this has created a reactive mentality — always reacting to problems and not being pro-active. The present leadership is committed to the legacy of the revolution. They will try to keep the boat afloat as long as possible, until they die. Then they’ll pass the problems to the new leaders.”
And one of Cuba’s biggest problems, he said, is the rampant corruption that has impeded foreign investment — even as the government attempts to crack down on corruption by jailing foreigners such as Canadian businessman Cy Tokmakjian, who in September was sentenced to 15 years in prison.
“Recently, the World Bank ranked 189 countries based on the ease of investing. The best place to invest was Singapore. Last on the list was Chad,” he said. “Cuba is not even on the list. Imagine, Chad is there and Cuba’s not.”
Even North Korea, the world’s most isolated state, has something Cuba doesn’t have, Coyula pointed out: a sprawling free zone built with foreign (South Korean) investment that employs tens of thousands of workers.
“Mariel is the most promoted place in Cuba, with special development zones for investors. But soon it’ll be a year after the opening of Mariel, and there is absolutely nothing. Even the container terminal in Havana was moved to Mariel to give it a sense of activity, but no one will invest there,” he complained.
It’s the same thing with half a dozen golf course projects that have been enthusiastically proposed by overseas firms — yet Cuba’s new foreign investment law by itself won’t be enough to drum up business.
“All these projects are about to happen, but they haven’t happened yet,” Coyula told us. For one thing, potential foreign investors in Mariel don’t like the fact that they can’t hire employees on their own, but instead must pay a government employment agency in dollars for that labor. The agency, in turn, pays workers in Cuban pesos. That’s because the Castro government wants to avoid creating a class of highly paid Cubans who work for foreign companies, “but inequalities are there whether you like it or not.”
For example, Coyula spoke of a woman he knows who works for an Italian joint venture. That company pays the state $850 a month for her services, but the woman herself receives only 360 Cuban pesos (worth about $14 a month).
“Part of that money is used to sustain a bunch of bureaucrats,” he said. “Because of that, many foreign companies give their employees a bonus in dollars or CUCs. You never discuss with your employer how much [extra] you’re going to earn. They say it’s to protect the worker.”
Cubans have become speculators
Because salaries are so low relative to the high prices for just about everything, Cubans have become speculators — especially when it comes to food, he said.
“People will buy everything, because if you don’t someone else will and speculate with it. So you get a pound of rice for 30 cents,” he explained. “In the free market, it costs five pesos, and in the dollar shop, it’s 25 pesos. So you sell the rice you don’t need. You wouldn’t give it to your neighbor for 30 cents a pound, you’ll sell it for two pesos, which is cheaper than the free market.”
As prices for ordinary Cubans rise, the benefits they’ve long become accustomed to, such as free education and healthcare, are rapidly drying up because the state can no longer afford to provide them.
“Cuba has 67 universities, and the idea is to leave only 15 — more or less one per province. But Havana will have more than one, so some provinces will be left with none. They’re merging institutions and reducing the budget for higher education.
They’ve already cut the healthcare budget by 15 percent. These are things that people don’t see. These measures have implications,” Coyula said, adding that old university deficits continue.
“In none of Cuba’s 67 universities can you study for an MBA. Today, we need managers and people to understand what economics really is. We don’t teach planning in our universities, either. You want to buy a book on business administration? They don’t have any. The government gives some courses in business, but in my opinion, they’re shallow.”
Telecom, tourism are bright spots
One bright spot, he said, is telecommunications. In 2009, Cuba had only 40,000 or so mobile phones in use. Today, more than 2 million Cubans have cell phones, more services are available than ever before, and costs have fallen dramatically.
“Raúl also lifted restrictions for Cubans to have access to hotels and resorts,” he said. “Last summer, half a million Cubans stayed in beach hotels. The domestic market is saving the tourism from the low season.”
But while tourism has boosted the economies of some of Cuba’s 15 provinces, others have not been helped at all. “For example, Matanzas and Cárdenas are taking advantage of Varadero, which generates hundreds of millions of dollars in tourism revenues. And Havana is, of course, the jewel of tourism,” he said. “But Las Tunas and Guantánamo have nothing.”
The resumption of normal relations resume between Washington and Havana would be dire news for Cuba’s closest Caribbean competitors, predicts Coyula.
“The day the embargo is lifted, the Dominican Republic will commit suicide,” he warned. “The Dominicans inherited our sugar, tobacco and tourism industries. Once Cuba is open again, nobody will be interested in the D.R. You wait and see.”
Mariel Special Development Zone
Latin American Research Review, Volume 49, Number 3 (2014)
By Arch Ritter
Original article here: https://lasa.international.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol49no3/49-3_246-255_Ritter.pdf
Cuban Economists on the Cuban Economy. Edited by Al Campbell. Gainesville, FL: The University Press of Florida, 2013. Pp. xvii + 337. $79.95 cloth. ISBN: 9780813044235.
Cuban Economic and Social Development: Policy Reforms and Challenges in the 21st Century. Edited by Jorge I. Domínguez, Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva, Mayra Espina Prieto and Lorena Barberia. David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, USA, 2012. Pp. iii + 333. $24.99 paper. ISBN: 9780674062434.
Cuba Since the Revolution of 1959: A Critical Assessment. By Samuel Farber. Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2011. Pp.ix + 369. $24.00 paper. ISBN: 9781608461394.
Cuban Revelations: behind the Scenes in Havana, By Marc Frank, University Press of Florida, 2013. Pp. iii + 327. $29.95 cloth. ISBN: 9789813944651
Cuba Under Raúl Castro: Assessing the Reforms. By Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Jorge Pérez-López. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2013. Pp.xv + 295. $65.00 cloth. ISBN: 9781588269043.
¿Quo vadis, Cuba? La incierta senda de las reformas . Edited by Pavel Vidal and José Antonio Alonso. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011. Pp. xvii + 453. $48.00 paper. ISBN: 9780268029830.
When President Fidel Castro experienced a medical emergency on July 31, 2006, First Vice-President Raúl Castro assumed the role of Acting President, and was then declared President in February 2008 by the National Assembly. Hopes for change were high relative to the almost half century of Fidel’s presidency because Raúl was considered to be more pragmatic than Fidel. During the first years of Raúl “acting” and then full Presidency, policy changes were modest, uncertain and hesitant. However, after deliberation and some modest policy experimentation, the pace of reform accelerated in 2010.
In his first major speech in July of 2007, Raúl acknowledged the difficulties that the economy faced and the dimension of the reform effort that would be needed to overcome its problems. “To have more, we have to begin by producing more, with a sense of rationality and efficiency, so that we may reduce imports, especially of food products –that may be grown here– whose domestic production is still a long way away from meeting the needs of the population.”[1] This contrasted with the complacency of the last years of the Fidel era. Raúl emphasized the necessity of improving agriculture as well as industry and mentioned the possibility of increasing direct foreign investment. He discussed “social indiscipline” and the expansion of the underground economy. He assured citizens that the government was studying these issues and would soon introduce appropriate policies. In subsequent speeches – shorter and less frequent than those of his elder brother – Raúl demonstrated increased pragmatism and decreased ideological rigidity. He also has shown an awareness of the need to break with some traditional Cuban economic institutions and policies. Such change was ultimately necessary in his view for political reasons, to ensure the long-term viability of Cuba as an independent nation he stated:
We are facing unpleasant realities, but we do not close our eyes to them. We are convinced that we need to break away from dogmas and assume firmly and confidently the ongoing upgrading of our economic model in order to set the foundations of the irreversibility of Cuban socialism and its development, which we know is the guarantee of our national sovereignty and independence.[2]
He did not view such changes as adoption of any sort of “capitalism,” but instead considered it an “up-dating” or “modernization” (actualización) of Cuban socialism. However, Raúl’s concept of socialism reflected a change from the Fidelista view: it no longer implied an aspiration to equal outcomes.
Socialism means social justice and equality, but equality of rights and opportunities, not salaries. Equality does not mean egalitarianism. This is, in the end, another form of exploitation, that of the exploitation of the responsible worker by the one who is not, or even worse, by the slothful.[3]
Raúl also emphasized that policy changes were to be introduced with deliberativeness and caution. This was certainly the approach prior to mid-2010.
The major reforms of 2010 began with the proposal to downsize employment in the state sector by 500,000 presumably redundant state employees by the end of March 2011 and 1.5 million by the end of 2012 with the hope that they would somehow be absorbed productively by an invigorated small enterprise sector. Then came the publication of the ambitious and comprehensive “Draft Guide for Economic and Social Reform” published in November 2010. The Guide was discussed broadly throughout Cuba, revised, and then approved at the Sixth Congress of Cuba’s Communist Party in April 2011. Since then, there has been a steady series of economic reforms introduced that are transforming the economy increasingly into a “mixed” economy with significant state, private, cooperative and joint venture sectors (the latter with foreign and state enterprises) together with a greater reliance on the market mechanism for the social control of economic activity.
Is this a “Revolution in the Revolution”, to hijack Regis Debray’s catchy book title?[4] The answer is “probably yes”. Raúl’s reforms amount to a repudiation of almost a half century of the institutions and policies mainly borrowed from and/or inspired by the countries of the Soviet Bloc. The reforms also constitute a rejection of the impetuous and capricious policy experimentation of Fidel. Indeed, by 2014 Raúl already had been successful in forging his own legacy and emerging from the shadow of his elder brother.
Eight years after the accession of Raúl, it is time for an analysis and evaluation of his revised approach to economic management. Not surprisingly, a large number of books dedicated to this task have been published recently. The volumes reviewed here all focus directly on, or include lengthy analyses of the Raúlista reforms.[5]
The authors come from a variety of analytical traditions and disciplines. They include Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Jorge Pérez-López as well as the Spanish authors of the Vidal-Alonso volume whose approach is by and large mainstream economics, the more radical economist Al Campbell and also political scientists Samuel Farber and Jorge Domínguez. Included are analysts from the Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy (CEEC) and other institutes of the University of Havana (in the Vidal-Alonso and the Domínguez et. al. volumes) many of whom have been moderate reformists since the early 1990s. About half of the analysts in Al Campbell’s volume have been working in the National Institute for Economic Studies (INIE), the main governmental economic think-tank, with the remainder from other branches of the government or its institutes. It is tempting to label these authors the “old guard” but some such as Miguel Figueras and José Luis Rodríguez can be said to have been moderate reformists as well, and all profess to be supporters of Raúl’s reforms.
These volumes all make important contributions to the analysis and understanding of Cuba’s overall economic situation. However, economic policies in a range of vital issue areas remain to be analyzed in greater depth as part of the process of the actualización of the Cuban economy.
One hopes that the next round of major publications on the Cuban economy will investigate some of these specific policy areas more profoundly than was possible in any of the general volumes reviewed here. Of particular relevance would be analyses of the policies toward agriculture, industry, energy, infrastructure, the service sector, small enterprise and the private sector, cooperatives, state enterprise, foreign investment and joint ventures, exchange rate and monetary issues, trade policy, policy towards foreign investment, social policies, health and education, labor issues, pensions demographic issues, cultural areas, etc. The work ahead is daunting.
What remains to be seen is how far economic reforms can proceed without any actualización of Cuba’s political system.
CONTINUE READING: Revolution in the Revolution, LARR, Ritter, October 2014
![larr-cover[1]](https://thecubaneconomy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/larr-cover1.jpg)
NOTES
[1] Cuban Communist Party, “Speech by the First Vice-President of the Councils of State and Ministers, Army General Raúl Castro Ruz, at the main celebration of the 54th Anniversary of the attack on Moncada and Carlos Manuel de Céspedes Garrisons, at the Major General Ignacio Agramonte Loynaz Revolution Square in the city of Camagüey. July 26th, 2007, ‘Year 49 of the Revolution.,’” Diario Granma, July 27, 2007.
[2] Yohandry Fontana, “Key Address by Army General Raúl Castro Ruz, President of the State Council and the Council of Ministers and Second Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba Central Committee,” Yohandryweb’s Noticias, April 4, 2009, http://yohandryweb.wordpress.com/2010/04/04/300/.
[3] President Raúl Castro, Speech at the Close of the Seventh Legislature of the national Assembly, 11 July 2008, http://www.ratb.org.uk/raul-castro/149-full-text-of-a-speech- president-raul-castro-at- the-first-ordinary-period-of-sessions-of-the-seventh-legislature-of-the-national-assembly. Accessed March 5, 2014
[4] Régis Debray, Revolution In The Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle In Latin America (New York: Penguin Books Ltd),1968.
[5] Other books focusing on this theme include: Muricio A. Font and Carlos Riobo (Editors). Handbook of Contemporary Cuba: Economy, Politics, Civil Society and Globalization, Boulder and London: Paradigm Publishers, 2013; Claes Brundenius and Ricardo Torres Perez (Editors). No More free Lunch: Reflections on the Cuban Economic Reform process and Challenges for Transformation, Switzerland: Springer, 2013; and Alberto Gabriele (Editor). The Economy of Cuba after the VI Party Congress, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2012.
By Marc Frank HAVANA (Reuters Oct 24 2014) –
Some of Cuba’s best-known economists are openly questioning the very core of the Soviet-style command economy and saying market reforms under way are too modest to boost weak growth.Emboldened by freer debate in the country, they are increasingly vocal in criticizing rigid instructions coming down from the top and the uneven management of policies across the economy, from banking to agriculture. Their influence on government policy-makers is difficult to gauge due to the secretive nature of the ruling Communist Party, but they clearly have been given leeway to call for changes.
Seeking to build a “prosperous and sustainable” socialism, President Raul Castro pushed through a 311-point reform agenda that was adopted by the Communist Party in 2011. It has led Cuba to liberalize farming and retail services by turning much of them over to cooperatives and allowing small private businesses. The Caribbean island is also actively seeking foreign investment. Castro, who took over from his older brother Fidel in 2008, has repeatedly said he despises false consensus and has encouraged debate as long as it takes place within the system.
The economists now talking out are generally members of the Communist Party and some have contact with high-ranking officials, suggesting they may be able to influence the debate inside government on the speed and scope of reforms.They have called for economic reforms for years, but never targeted so sharply the very pillars of the system.
Juan Triana, one of the best-known and most influential economists, says the government’s reforms have signaled a reliance on market mechanisms but officials have still not embraced competition for core parts of the economy and more than 2,000 state companies. “The cost of not recognizing the importance of competition for development are paid in lower rates of growth than the potential, the incorrect assigning of resources, lower than possible rates of productivity and efficiency, and most of all a lack of incentives for innovation, one of the principal motors of development,” he said in a recent presentation to mid-level government officials and peers at a seminar in Havana. The seminar was hosted by the Havana University Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy (CEEC), known for its bold stand for reform over the last 15 years and its criticism of the status quo.
Speaker after speaker joined Triana in urging deeper reform, according to copies of presentations seen by Reuters. Central planning, the government’s sway over strategic company decisions and the state’s monopoly in foreign trade were all criticized.
Centro de Estudios sobre la Economia Cubana (CEEC), Universidad de la Habana
“Probably, the so-called state monopoly on foreign trade is a big obstacle to the diversification and growth of exports,” said Miguel Alejandro Figueras, winner of Cuba’s top economics prize in 2007.
While Castro’s reforms have raised the expectations of many Cubans, they have largely disappointed. Public frustration over a lack of well-paid jobs has contributed to a sharp increase in the number of Cubans risking dangerous and illegal journeys on home-made boats in search of better opportunities in the United States. “Most Cubans support the reforms but are coming to realize that much more needs to happen. I think everyone from top to bottom is concerned with the numbers and reality on the ground,” said one Cuban economist, who asked to remain anonymous due to a prohibition on talking with foreign journalists without permission.
The economists generally believe Cuba’s leaders are listening, in part because the reforms so far have failed to lead to growth. They say they hope to reinforce the more reform-minded leaders in closed-door debates at the highest levels. Many liken Cuba’s process to the first years of reform in China and Vietnam, when partial measures proved ineffective and eventually gave way to deeper reforms. But Castro has moved at a deliberate pace, and despite official calls for a more critical press unorthodox views rarely get aired in the state-controlled media. The government revised down its economic growth forecast for this year to 1.4 percent, a second straight year of slowing growth, and food prices are rising on average 10 percent a year. Meanwhile, more than 70 percent of the economy remains in state hands, usually in the form of monopolies.
At the recent seminar, economist Jorge Mario Sanchez criticized state monopolies as out of step with a growing mixed economy and international competition. “The state-centrist culture of production and trade by the state and for the state should begin to transition to another broader mode from and for society,” he said.
Others say harsh U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba are only partially to blame for a lack of state financing and delays in the arrival of supplies and parts, which lead to disruptions in production and shortages. “Our top leaders are very aware of these problems, but unsure how to proceed without creating greater inequality,” said the economist who asked to remain anonymous.
Hal Klepak, a Canadian military historian and author of two books on the Cuban military and Raul Castro, said he thought Castro and other leaders “find criticism welcome not because it is comfortable but because it allows them to push for more and faster movement of a deeply cutting kind.” “There will be more and deeper reform since there is really little hope for any other option,” Klepak said.
Another outside expert differed, doubting that major changes were coming any time soon. “There is still no blueprint as to where the major state-controlled sectors will be in 5 or 10 years time,” said Paul Hare, a former British ambassador to Cuba who now teaches at Boston University.
Juan Triana, CEEC
Jorge Mario Sanchez, CEEC
2014/373 pages
ISBN: 978-1-62637-163-7 hc $79.95 $35
A FirstForumPress Book
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“A provocative, compelling, and essential read. The ethnographic work alone is worth the price of admission.” —John W. Cotman, Howard University
“A multifaceted analysis of Cuban economic activity…. Ritter and Henken paint a lively picture of daily life in entrepreneurial Cuba.” —Julia Sweig, Council on Foreign Relations
SUMMARY
During the presidency of Raúl Castro, Cuba has dramatically reformed its policies toward small private enterprises. Archibald Ritter and Ted Henken consider why—and to what effect.
After reviewing the evolution of policy since 1959, the authors contrast the approaches of Fidel and Raúl Castro and explore in depth the responses of Cuban entrepreneurs to the new environment. Their work, rich in ethnographic research and extensive interviews, provides a revealing analysis of Cuba’s fledgling private sector.
THE AUTHORS
Archibald R.M. Ritter is distinguished research professor of economics and international affairs at Carleton University.
Ted A. Henken is associate professor of sociology and Latin American studies at Baruch College, CUNY.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Lynne Rienner Publisher’s page on Entrepreneurial Cuba: https://www.rienner.com/title/Entrepreneurial_Cuba_The_Changing_Policy_Landscape
For order and general inquiries, please contact: questions@rienner.com
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