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Jump-Starting the Introduction of Conventional Western Economics in Cuba

By Arch Ritter

I.   Initiation of the Joint Havana-Carleton Universities Economics MA  

As the Cuban economy was sinking into the nadir of its depression following the ending of the “Special Relationship” with the former Soviet Union, the Faculty of Economics at the University of Havana decided that the time was right to introduce conventional economics into University curricula and into Cuba generally. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transition to mixed economies throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the Soviet version of the discipline of Economics virtually disappeared. Cuban economists were left orphaned with a discipline that had become extinct. They generally were unfamiliar with the near-universal language of economics and found it difficult to communicate in the discipline with their colleagues in Latin America and the rest of the world.

This move to introduce conventional economics was spear-headed by Dra. Lourdes Tabares, who was the Chair of the Economics Department at the University of Havana at the time. It had broad though far from unanimous support within the University.

A meeting was arranged in early December 1993 in Havana to discuss alternative approaches to accelerating the process of developing instruction in conventional economics. Financed by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), and coordinated by Dr. Gary McMahon, this meeting brought together a number of academics and officials from Chile and Argentina and me from Canada, with University of Havana counterparts.

A decision was reached at that meeting to organize a joint MA program in Economics mainly for young faculty members from Cuban Universities to be given in Cuba at the University of Havana. An agreement was subsequently reached between the President of Carleton University, Dr. Robin Farquhar and the Rector of the University of Havana. Juan Vela, to provide the Carleton program adapted to the circumstances of Cuba.

The program was conceived in December 1993 and was up and running six months later in Havana.

The Economics MA was financed for the first two years by the IDRC and was supported by Gary McMahon and Pierre Beemans. Following that, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) financed another three years of the MA Program. The program received crucial support from the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (UN ECLAC), which lent its good name as a co-sponsor of the program and provided about 40% of the faculty at its own expense. Particularly vital was the support of Francisco Leon and the Secretary General Gert Rosenthal of UN ECLAC. The Canadian Embassy in Havana, notably through Ambassador Mark Entwistle and Nobina Robinson, were instrumental in the extension of the program. CIDA was so pleased with the first two IDRC-financed years that it decided to extend the Economics MA for an additional three years.

It also agreed to expand collaboration between Carleton University and the University of Havana for five years and to five other units at the two Universities: Biology, Business, Linguistics, Women’s Studies and Public Administration. Professors were recruited from a number of Latin American countries as well as Canada. Among the contributing professors were

  • Canada: Keith Acheson, Zhiqi Chen, Donald McFetridge, Gary McMahon, Carl McMillan, Soo Bin Park, Simon Power, Arch Ritter, Nicholas Rowe, Larry Willmore (also with the United Nations), and Frances Woolley.
  • UN ECLAC: Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, Michael Mortimer, Bernardo Kosakoff Juan Carlos Lerda, Luis Felipe Jimenez, , Jorge Katz, , Joe Ramos, Daniel Titelman.
  • Argentina: Jose Maria Fanelli. Mario Damill, Guillermo Rozenwurcel
  • Bolivia: Juan Antonio Morales
  • Brazil: Ricardo Paez de Barras
  • Peru: Alberto Pasco-Font

Senior Cuban professors worked with the visiting Canadian and Latin American professors and took over some of the classes. Among the Cuban professors were Felix Marero, Elena Hernandez, Lourdes Tabares, Nelida Gancedo, Vilma Hidalgo, Manuel Miranda, Frank Hidalgo, Ela de Quezada, Raul Sandoval, Celia Fernandez, Ermida Gonzalez and, and Marta Madero.  

 

II. Impacts of the Program

The objective of the five years of the MA Economics Program was to support the introduction of conventional economics into the curriculum of Cuba’s universities. From this perspective, I think that it could be considered to have been reasonably successful. At the University of Havana for example, a program in conventional economics was initiated quickly and is in operation. Similarly the University of Oriente soon established a conventional economics program, under the leadership of the MA graduate Ulisses Pacheco who became Dean of the Faculty. These programs have been producing some impressive graduates and new academics for over a decade.

A substantial number of the MA graduates went on to earn Doctoral degrees in Economics both inside Cuba, notably in a program with the University of Barcelona and outside Cuba at Carleton University, Ottawa Canada. However, significant numbers of the graduates have emigrated and built their lives elsewhere. This is undoubtedly a loss for Cuba, as all were just at the early stages of their productive professional and family lives. (Remittances are small compensation for this loss.) 

Of the 76 graduates of the program, 16 now are employed in Cuban Universities, 22 have other employment in Cuba, most in government, 7 were citizens of other countries and have returned to their own countries, and 31 have left Cuba. The visiting professors were particularly happy with the level of qualification and the strong commitment and motivation of the Cuban students. It was a positive and pleasant experience for all the professors involved. There were of course some minor frictions in the implementation of the program but surprisingly few and most were resolved quickly and satisfactorily. 

One such issue was a conflict with the Ministry of Cooperation and Foreign Investment, MINVEC. The problem was that the University of Havana had entered into an agreement with Carleton and IDRC but had not gone through MINVEC. It was some five months after the beginning of the program in July 1994 that MINVEC finally gave its approval.

Another issue that had to be dealt with has been described by Luis Casaco in a his Blog entitled “historias mínimas – short tales, palabras, amigos y un poco de música”,  and can be seen at the following address: when carleton university knocked my door at  http://kaskouy.blogspot.com/2008/03/when-carleton-university-knocked-door.html.

 

III. Where are They Now: Graduates of the Havana-Carleton Economics MA, 1995-1999

As of October 15, 2010 This listing is based on information mainly from around 2002. Much has happened since then, and undoubtedly there are many inaccuracies. Please forward any corrections that you may be aware of regarding locations and employment or contact information. Please send any corrections or new information to Arch_Ritter@Carleton.Ca

1994-1995 COHORT

  • Raul Ávila Rodríguez, Ottawa Canadá
  • Regino Boti Llanes, Londres, RU
  • Idania Coello Caballero, La Habana, Cuba
  • Ledya Fernández Lleal, Facultad de Economía, Universidad de La Habana, Cuba
  • Luis René Fernández Tabío, Instituto de Investigaciones (CESEU), La Habana, Cuba
  • Nélida Lamelas Castellano. University of Santiago de Compostela, Santiago, España
  • María Rosa Moreno Fernández, PNUD, La Habana, Cuba
  • Ulises Pacheco Feria, Decano, Facultad de Economía, Universidad de Oriente, Santiago de Cuba
  • Carmen Quintela F., (Facultad de Economía, Universidad de La Habana,) Cuba, Deceased
  • María C. Sabourin Jovel, Miami USA 
  • Mario Sánchez Egozcue, Centro de Estudios sobre la Economía Cubana, La Habana, Cuba
  • Juana Sánchez Mesa, PNUD, La Habana, Cuba
  • José Somoza Cabrera, Dpto. del Medio Ambiente, Universidad de La Habana, La Habana, Cuba
  • Magda Valera Cepero, Miami, Estados Unidos
  • Ignacio Vera Paneque, Naciones Unidas, Nueva York

Class of 1995-1996

  • Fausto Arias Araluce, “Interholdings” Spain
  • Even Chi Pardo (ciudadano panameño) Universidad de Panamá, Panamá
  • Pablo Crespo Brito, Barcelona, España
  • Bernardo Cutié Rizo, Miami, Estados Unidos
  • Gelvis de Armas O., Facultad, ISRI, La Habana, Cuba
  • Pierre Fils Aimee, (ciudadano haitiano) Toronto, Canadá
  • Idania Gancedo Gaspar, Facultad de Economía, Universidad de La Habana, Cuba
  • Eduardo Hernández Roque, Banco Central de Cuba, La Habana, Cuba
  • Nelson Lim Chang, Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Oriente, Santiago de Cuba
  • Boris Moreno Capote, Iglesia Católica, San Antonio de los banos, Cuba
  • Olga Pérez Soto, Facultad de Economía, Universidad de La Habana, Cuba
  • Amarylis Rodríguez R., Ferris Management Ltd., La Habana, Cuba
  • Maria Sanabria Pis, Banco Central de Cuba, La Habana, Cuba
  • Javier Tella Reyes, USA
  • Jorge A. Uriarte Landa, Gobierno de Canadá, Ottawa, Canadá

Class of 1996-1997

  • Alex Gay Cabrera, ¿Alemania?
  • Yuri Gracia Morales, Integral S. A., La Habana, Cuba
  • Arturo López Callejas, Universidad de Denver, Estados Unidos
  • Ricardo Mansilla Corona, Center for interdisciplinary Research in Sciences and the Humanities of the National University of Mexico (UNAM) Ciudad de Mexico. Web site :  http://www.ceiich.unam.mx/0/13PerCur.php?tblPersonalAcademico_id=12  
  • René Mujica López, España
  • Mahe Parodi Heydrich, Mississauga, Canadá
  • Karel Regalado Alonso, Tembec, Temiskiming, Canadá
  • Judith Rodríguez Marcial, FinTur (empresa financiera) La Habana, Cuba
  • Luciano Rondón Hernández, Montreal, Canada
  • Ana Julia Yanes Faya, Gobierno de Canadá, Ottawa, Canadá

Class of 1997-1998

  • Alexis Aguilera Borges, Cuzco, Peru  
  • Raysa Alcalá Martínez, Investigadora, Oficina Nacional de Administración Tributaria (ONAT), La Habana, Cuba
  • Alberto Baly Gil, ¿Cuba?
  • Luis Casaco, Montevideo, Uruguay
  • Vladimir Díaz, Empresa Seguridad y Protección, La Habana, Cuba
  • Yaimí Farías Dominguez, Miami, Estados Unidos
  • Tania García, Facultad de Economía, Universidad de Oriente, Santiago de Cuba
  • Abel Izquierdo Falcón, Profesor, Universidad Central de Las Villas, Cuba
  • Ernesto Landa Falcón, Gobierno de Cuba, La Habana, Cuba
  • Adrián López Denis, Profesor, Universidad Princeton, Princeton, Estados Unidos
  • Osmel Martínez Trujillo, Toronto, Canadá
  • Cristian Meneses Torres (ciudadano chileno), ¿Chile?
  • Hector Molina, Facultad de Economía, Universidad Central de Las Villas, Cuba
  • Antonio Ruiz Cruz, Facultad de Economía, Universidad de Las Villas, Santa Clara
  • Esteban Salido Gamboa, Miami, United States
  • Víctor Sombart, Faculty de Economía, Universidad de Oriente, Santiago de Cuba
  • Thanh Huong Tran (“Alina”), (ciudadano vietnamita) Viet Nam
  • Eileen Tur, Toronto, Canadá

Class of 1998-1999

  • Maritza Álvares Herrera, Miami, Estados Unidos
  • Hamma Bachra Ahmed, (ciudadano saharaui), Sahara Occidental
  • Maria Boiko, (ciudadana ucraniana) Ucrania
  • Vilma Cervantes R., La Habana, Cuba
  • Marco Díaz Díaz, La Habana, Cuba, (deceased)
  • Kim Frederick, (ciudadano granadino) Grenada
  • Antonio Galis-Menéndez, Estados Unidos Radamés Gonzáles, Santiago de Chile
  • Tatiana González, Ministerio de Comercio Exterior, La Habana, Cuba
  • Luis Gutiérrez Urdaneta, La Habana, Cuba
  • Zoe Medina Valdés, Facultad de Economía, Universidad de La Habana, Cuba
  • Yenniel Mendoza, Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Económicas, La Habana, Cuba
  • Mavis Morales, Rusia
  • Ana M. Pérez de la Cruz, Panamá
  • Heidi Portuondo C., Barcelona, España Eduardo Ramos D., n.a. Cuba
  • Lester Rodríguez, Business Analyst, Finantix (Italian financial software house),
  • Padua Italy Paul Valdes-Miranda, Market Research Analyst, Ciudad Mexico, Mexico
  • Katty Yeja López, Bahamas

At the Inauguration of the Program, Ambassador’s Residence,September 1994 Gary McMahon, Ambassador Mark Entwisle, Francisco Leon, and Lourdes Tabares

Nicholas Rowe, teaching a Macroeconomics class, October 1994

 

Class of 1996-1997 From left to Right: Nicki; Nicki’s son Junior, (Canadian, not known), Elizabeth Rohr (Carleton University), Rene Mujica, Victor Sombert,  Luciano Rondon,  Ana Julia Yanes Faya, Mahe Parodi, Karel Regalado, E. V. Diaz, Judith Rodriguez, Yuri Gracia,  

Class of 1997-1998   From left to right, Back:  Osmel Martinez, Yaimi Farias Dominguez, Raysa Alcala, Ernesto Landa, Belkis, Alberto Baly, Alina, Paul Valdes-Miranda, Tran Thang Huong, Esteban Salido, Eileen Tur, Alexis Aguilera and Arch Ritter. In front: Ricardo Mansilla, Adrian Denis with Luis Casaco’s son Mauri and Luis Casaco, Guabano, February 1998

Class of 1998-1999 Front row. left to right: M. Bachra-Ahmed, Maritza Alvarez,  Maria Boiko, Kim Frederick, Tatiana Gonzalez, Marcos Diaz Diaz Back row:  Radamez Gonzalez, Vilma Cervantes, Zoe Medina, Katty Yeja, Mavis Morales, Eduardo Ramos, Heidi Portuondo, Ana Margarita Perez. Luis Gutierrez, Paul Valdes-Miranda

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Cuba’s Achievements under the Presidency of Fidel Castro: The Top Ten

NOTE: For additional articles on various aspects of Fidel Castro’s presidency, see:

Fidel Castro: The Cowardice of Autocracy

Fidel’s Phenomenal Economic Fiascoes: the Top Ten

Fidel’s No-Good Very Bad Day

The “FIDEL” Models Never Worked; Soviet and Venezuelan Subsidization Did

On September 17, I published and entry on this blog entitled “Fidel’s Phenomenal Economic Fiascoes: the Top Ten” but stated that I would also write a statement on Cuba’s greatest achievements under the leadership of President Fidel Castro. Here it is.

There certainly were economic policy blunders from 1959 to mid-2006 when Fidel Castro stepped aside in favor of his brother Raul. However, as is well known, Cuba made major achievements over these years in socio-economic terms. I will begin with a quick summary of Cuba’s socio-economic performance from 1959 to 1990 and 1990-2010, and then proceed to a listing of the Tip Ten Achievements

I. Socio-Economic Performance, 1959-1990

While the performance of the Cuban economy from 1959 to 1990 period was mixed, major improvements were made in terms of socio-economic well-being. The summary of changes in a few key socio-economic indicators in Table 1 illustrates the absolute and relative improvements achieved in human well-being. Life expectancy and infant and child mortality are summary indications of nutrition, income distribution and poverty and the quality of a nation’s health care system. Literacy and educational attainment are key factors in the investment in human capital and in citizen empowerment in a modern economy.

(click to enlarge)

Cuba’s rankings for these indicators in 1960 were relatively high in the Latin American context so that it was building on reasonably strong foundations.

However, despite improvements in the rest of Latin America, Cuba raised its relative ranking for all five of the socio-economic indicators vis-à-vis the rest of Latin America (excluding the English-speaking Caribbean.)  However Cuba’s economic ranking – in terms of the purchasing power of GDP per person – fell well down the list in 1990 placing Cuba at the 14th rank. As a result, Cuba placed at #10 in the UNDP Human Development Index.

II.        Socio-Economic Performance 1990-2010

Despite the economic difficulties of the 1990s, Cuba continued to improve its socio-economic performance in relative and absolute terms, at least as these are measured by the indicators in Table 2. Cuba continued to lead the Latin American countries in infant mortality and the education indicators. The improvements in education and health indicators and rankings occurred despite weakening of resource allocations and problems of maintaining quality. Cuba’s success in these areas was due largely to the quality and quantity of the educational systems built up in the previous1960-1990 period and institutional momentum.

(click to enlarge)

III.             Top Ten Achievements

Here is a listing of the Cuba’s socio-economic and economic achievements under the Presidency of Fidel Castro. They are not presented in order of importance. Some are the result of specific policy decisions or design or negotiations of Fidel Castro, though others are not.

#1        The 1961 Literacy Campaign

#2        Reorganization of the Health Sector

#3        Redesign of the Educational System

#4        Rapid Expansion of the Tourism Sector

#5       Provision of Medical Services to Latin America and Other Countries

#6        Survival in the Face of the 1989-1993 Economic Melt-Down

#7        Winning Economic Support from the Soviet Union, 1961-1990 and Venezuela, 2004-2010

#8        Establishment of the “Polo Cientifico” and the Development of the Bio-Technological Sector

#9        Dedication to their Jobs by Cuban Citizens during the Catastrophic Decline in Real Wages and Incomes after 1990

#10      Fruitful Collaboration with Foreign Enterprises


IV.             Achievements in Detail

#1        The 1961 Literacy Campaign

The 1961 literacy campaign was an inspired approach to improving educational levels among the relatively large proportion of the population that was illiterate in 1959. This was done at relatively low cost with strongly motivated volunteers. It quickly improved literacy rates immensely, though there is some disagreement as to the quality of the literacy that was achieved.

#2       Reorganization of the Health Sector

Cuba succeeded in reorganizing its medical system so as to provide universal access to health services, and managed to obtain excellent results relative to the amounts of resources that it was able to devote to the health sector.  As a result, Cuba’s health indicators improved quickly and remain among the very best in Latin America (See Tables 1 and 2)

#3        Redesign of the Educational System

Cuba’s reorganization and expansion of the educational system in the early 1960s also made education universally accessible and increased investment in people (human capital.) As a result, Cuba moved from 5th place in Latin America in terms of literacy and school enrolment in 1970 to 1st in 2007 – a fine achievement.

#4        Rapid Expansion of the Tourism Sector

As a result of the 1989-1994 economic melt-down, it was decided to earn foreign exchange by expanding the tourist sector. This required massive involved massive investment by both Cuba and foreign enterprises and the rapid shifting of resources to the sector. This was done and by 2008, Cuba was earning almost MN 2.4 billion from tourism.

#5        Provision of Medical Services to Latin America and Other Countries

By the latter 1990s, Cuba had a major surplus of medical personnel, with doctors and nurses posted in small tourist hotels and day care centers. However, this was converted into a major humanitarian asset, with Cuba’s provision of medical assistance to many countries in need, and expanding the Latin American Medical School outside Havana. The services of medical personnel are also exported to other countries – paid mainly by the Government of Venezuela. The foreign exchange earnings from medical (and educational) service exports amounted to MN 6.1 billion, almost half of Cuba’s foreign exchange earnings in 2008, as indicated in the accompanying chart.

#6        Survival in the Face of the 1989-1993 Economic Melt-Down

With the loss of Soviet subsidization and the near 40% decline in income per capita from 1989 to 1994, Cuba reorganized its economy, “depenalizing” the use of the US dollar, legalizing farmers’ markets, liberalizing self-employment and promoting new economic activities and exports etc. With no support from the international financial institutions of which it was not a member, thanks to the embargo with the United States, Cuba survived, at a cost borne almost directly, immediately and totally by its citizens.

#7       Winning Economic Support from the Soviet Union, 1961-1990 and Venezuela, 2004-2010

As noted in an earlier blog, The “FIDEL” Models Never Worked; Soviet and Venezuelan Subsidization Did posted on September 9, 2010 ,  Cuba received generous subsidization from the Soviet Union for a substantial period of time. An estimate of the amount of the subsidization is presented in the accompanying chart.  Presumably President Fidel Castro is responsible for negotiating this support. Similarly, Cuba has received substantial support from President Chavez of Venezuela through export and investment credits, low-cost oil imports and generous payments for Cuba’s exports of medical services.  How beneficial any of this assistance has been is debatable partly because it has been and is unsustainable and it has made possible the continuation of economic policies and institutions that have been counterproductive in the longer term. Fidel Castro can undoubtedly take the credit for these special relationships.

(click to enlarge)

#8        Establishment of the “Polo Cientifico” and the Development of the Bio-Technological Sector

To my knowledge, there has been no careful analysis of Cuba’s huge investment in the “Polo Cientifico” and the Bio-Technological sector. Indeed, I have not seen any analysis of the investment in the sector so I cannot judge accurately if it has been commercially viable so far or not.

However, Cuba is beginning to achieve major exports of pharmaceutical products amounting to MN 296.8 million pesos vis-à-vis MN 233.4 million for sugar in 2008.  These exports should continue to increase in future and the investment in the sector may be valuable. Moreover, Cuba’s investment in the “Polo Cientifico” has built a professional and institutional foundation for future success in pharmaceutical and other scientific areas.

#9        Dedication to their Jobs by Cuban Citizens despite the Decline in Real Incomes after 1990

I have always been impressed at the professionalism of many Cuban citizens that I have known over the years since 1990. In the face of huge declines in the purchasing power of their incomes, they continued to work seriously and with dedication in medicine, the Universities, the schools, the public service, or other employment. Many professionals and others in effect subsidized their state sector employers by earning other incomes that permitted them to survive in the unofficial economy. We have all heard of the doctors and engineers forced to provide taxi services on the side in order to make ends meet and continue to function in their professional capacities. The dedicated work of countless citizens over the difficult years of the Special Period, 1990-2010, is essentially what has brought about some recovery since the depths of the depression in 1993.

#10      Fruitful Collaboration in Nickel, Oil, Gas and Electric Power Generation with Sherritt International

Cuba opened up to foreign direct investment in joint venture arrangements with state firms. This has paid off handsomely, most notably with Sherritt International (nickel, cobalt, oil, gas, and electric power) and other enterprises as will be argued later in this Blog.

 

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State Sector Lay-offs then Private Sector Job Creation: Has Raul Got the Cart before the Horse?

On Monday September 13 2010, the Cuban Labour Federation announced a new government policy on lay-offs in the state sector and expansion of self-employment and cooperative sector employment.( Pronunciamiento de la Central de Trabajadores de Cuba.) As is now well known, the policy calls for the lay-off of some 500.000 workers, about 10% of Cuba’s entire labor force and their re-incorporation into self-employment activities mainly, but also some co-operative activities. This of course marks a major strategic re-orientation of Cuba’s economic structure. The economy already was a “mixed economy” though with a small self-employment sector outside of agriculture, but it will now shift further towards a “marketization.” Raul basically is asking the small and harassed self-employment to come to the rescue of the Cuban economy by generating productive employment because the state sector ostemsibly has failed to do so. Many questions can be and have been raised by outside observers as to how this new approach will be implemented. A couple of questions are noted here. I. Has Raul Got it “Bass Ackwards”? 1.      Prior to any state sector lay-offs, would it not be wise to redesign the framework within which small enterprise operates so that it will be in a position to expand and absorb the laid-off state sector workers? Firing state sector workers and hoping that they somehow will be reabsorbed somewhere sounds distinctly un-socialist. 2.      If workers’ efforts and productivity are low, is this due mainly to sloth and laziness? Or is it instead due to a dysfunctional incentive structure in which workers are paid very little in Moneda Nacional, but somehow have to acquire  “Convertible Pesos” to survive with purchase in the Hard Currency (formerly dollar) stores? As the old saying goes:  “They pretend to pay us and we pretend to work.” Maintenance Workers at the Australia Sugar Mill, November 1994; Certainly working hard, but probably laid off in 2002 when the Mill was converted to a museum;  visited with Nick Rowe who “blogs”  at “Worthwhile Canadian Initiative” and Larry Willmore, who “blogs” at “Thought du Jour” (Photo by A. Ritter) 3.      Is low productivity also due to mismanagement that wastes human effort? Is inefficiency also the result of low capacity utilization in enterprises  for example, in state stores that have little to sell, in offices with little to do, or in industrial enterprises idled through poor maintenance, insufficient imported inputs, breakdowns etc.? (Note the diagram below that illustrates the reduction in non-sugar industrial output since 1989. Despite allegations of record economic growth in the late 2000s, industrial output remains around half of its 1989 level.) II.   Who will be laid off and how will it be done? 1.      Will those who are laid off be good candidates for creating their own self-employment small businesses? 2.      Will those laid-off be offered “severance packages” or “buy-outs” that would provide them with an amount of capital to begin their own small businesses? 3.      Will older workers be offered “early retirement packages” that would assist them in starting a small business or co-operative? 4.      Will workers be free to self-select – with a “severance package” – so that they can start a small business? 5.      Will those who are laid off be the truly redundant and unproductive workers, in which case they may not have the aptitude to start their own small business? 6.      If laid-off workers can self-select, will the state sector enterprises or bureaucracies then lose their more capable and industrious workers? 7.      How generous will the unemployment benefits be and how long will they last while workers look for new jobs or attempt their own job-creation? In any case, the process of laying people off will be most difficult. The anxieties generated among the population must be intense and the Workers Assemblies now discussing these issues must be acrimonious. III.   Creating an “Enabling Environment” for Micro, Small and Cooperative Enterprise Since 1995, public policy has been aimed at containing small enterprise – after liberalizing it in 1993 – by licensing limitations, tight and vexatious regulations, onerous taxation, harassment by inspectors and negative political and media stigmatization. This has not been an easy environment for the functioning of self-employed to operate. Major changes will be necessary if the small enterprise sector is to expand in order to be able to absorb the lion’s share of the displaced state workers. How can this be done? A previous Blog outlined some possible measures: Raul Castro and Policy towards Self-Employment: Promising Apertura or False Start? Here are some of the key policies that would be necessary to generate a flowering of the micro, small, and cooperative enterprise sector. Additional policies regarding advertising and vending 1. Liberalize Licensing: Let anyone and everyone open a small enterprise ( Result: competition will push prices downwards and quality upwards); 2. Permit All Types of Self-Employment, including Professional and High-Tech while maintaining state medicine and health systems intact; 3. Raise the limit on employees to 5, 10 or 20; 4. Provide legal sources for the purchase of Inputs; 5. Permit access to imported inputs (outside TRDs and at the exchange rater available for the state sector); 6. Eliminate silly and vexations restrictions; 7. Make microenterprise taxation simpler and fairer; 8. Establish micro-credit institutions; 9. Establish a “Ministry for the Promotion of Small Enterprise.” Photographer, at the Capitolio circa 1996, (Photo by A, Ritter)

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Fidel’s Phenomenal Economic Fiascoes: the Top Ten

Fidel Castro recently clarified an allegedly erroneous quotation and stated something to the effect that “Yes the Cuban Model does indeed work”. It would have been difficult for Fidel to do a “Mea Culpa” and agree that half a century of his own management of the Cuban economy had been erroneous and counter-productive.

However, as the grand economic “strategizer” as well as the micro-manager of many issues that captured his attention President Fidel Castro was responsible for a long list of economic blunders. Here is my listing of Fidel’s most serious fiascoes.

Next week I will try and produce a listing of Cuba’s Greatest Achievements under President Castro. Unfortunately I find this more difficult than to identify the failures.

Top Ten Economic Fiascoes

Fiasco # 10     The Instant Industrialization Strategy, 1961-1963:

Fiasco #9        The 10 Million Ton Sugar Harvest Strategy, 1964-1970

Fiasco #8        The “New Man”

Fiasco #7        The “Budgetary System of Finance”

Fiasco #6        The “Revolutionary Offensive” and the Nationalization of Almost Everything

Fiasco #5        Revolucion Energetica

Fiasco #4 Shutting Down Half the Sugar Sector

Fiasvco #3 A Half Century of Monetary Controls and Non-Convertibility

Fiasco #2        Suppression of Workers’ Rights

Fiasco #1        Abolition of Freedom of Expression


Fiasco # 10     The Instant Industrialization Strategy, 1961-1963:

Cuba’s first development strategy, installed by the Castro Government in 1961, called for “Instant Industrialization”, the rapid installation of a wide range of import-substituting industries, such as metallurgy, heavy engineering and machinery, chemical products, transport equipment and even automobile assembly.

The program proved unviable as it was import-intensive, requiring imported machinery and equipment, raw materials, intermediate goods, managerial personnel, and repair and maintenance equipment. Because the sugar sector was ignored, the harvest fell from 6.7 million tons in 1961 to 3.8 in 1963 generating a balance of payments crisis. The end result was that Cuba became more dependent than ever on sugar exports, on imported inputs of many kinds and on a new hegemonic partner, the Soviet Union.

The strategy was aborted in 1964.

Fiasco #9        The 10 Million Ton Sugar Harvest Strategy

The failure of the “Instant Industrialization” strategy led to an emphasis on sugar production for export with a guaranteed Socialist Bloc market for 5 million tons per year at a price well above the world price – from 1965 to 1970. The over-riding preoccupation became the 10 million ton goal, which according to President Castro was necessary for “defending the honor, the prestige, the safety and self-confidence of the country” (February 9, 1970.)

Fidel seemed happiest when conducting a campaign military style as he did during the effort to produce 10 million tons of sugar.

If it had been implemented in a measured way, a strategy to increase export earnings from sugar would have been reasonable. However, as 1970 approached, the implementation of the 10 million ton target became increasingly forced. Other sectors of the economy were sacrificed as labor, transport capacity, industrial inputs, energy, raw materials and national attention all focused on sugar.

This strategy was aborted in 1970.

Fiasco #8        The “New Man”

In order to mobilize human energies for the 10 million ton harvest a radical “Guevaraist” approach was adopted involving the construction of the so- called  “New Man.” The idea behind this was a vision of the Cuban Nation as a guerrilla column marching behind Fidel – somewhat like his marches down the Malecon in 2000-2006 – single-mindedly pursuing a common objective, willingly sacrificing individual interests for the common good and with the esprit de corps, discipline and dedication of an idealized guerrilla band. To promote this revolutionary altruism, the government used public exhortation and political education, “moral incentives” instead of material incentives and proselytizing and enforcement by the Party and other “mass organs” of society.

By 1970, it was apparent that people could not be expected to sacrifice their own and their family’s material well-being and survival for some objective decreed and enforced by the Party. The approach was dropped in 1970.

Fiasco #7        The “Budgetary System of Finance”

In a simultaneous experiment, a so-called “budgetary system of finance” was installed under which enterprises were to operate without financial autonomy and without accounting, neither receiving the revenues from sales of their output nor paying for their inputs with such revenues – somewhat like University Departments.

Without a rational structure of prices, and without knowledge of their true costs or the value of their output, neither enterprises nor the planning authorities could have an idea of the genuine efficiencies of enterprises, of sectors of the economy, or of resource-use anywhere. The result of this was disastrous inefficiency.  In President Castro’s words:

“..What is this bottomless pit that swallows up this country’s human resources, the country’s wealth, the material goods that we need so badly? It’s nothing but inefficiency, non-productivity and low productivity.” (Castro, December 7, 1970)

This system was also terminated in 1970.

Fiasco #6        The “Revolutionary Offensive” and the Nationalization of Almost Everything

In the “Revolutionary Offensive” of 1968, Fidel Castro’s government expropriated most of the remaining small enterprise sector on the grounds that it was capitalistic, exploitative, and deformed people’s characters, making them individualistic instead of altruistic “New Men”. The result was true living standards were impaired, product quality, quantity and diversity deteriorated, enterprises were pushed into the underground economy,  theft from state sector and illegalities become the norm and citizen’s entrepreneurship was suppressed. This policy was changed in 1993, then contained by tight regulation, licensing and taxation after 1985,.

Again in September 2010, the government of Raul Castro appears ready to expand the small enterprise sector in hopes that it will absorb most of the 500,000 workers to be laid off from the state sector.

Fiasco #5        “Revolucion Energetica”

President Castro’s “Revolucion Energetica” included some valuable elements such as conservation measures, re-investment in the power grid and the installation of back-up generators for important facilities such as health centres. A questionable feature of the plan is the replacement of large-scale thermal-electric plants with numerous small generators dispersed around the island. But the use of the small-scale generators likely constitutes a major error for the following reasons:

  • The economies of large scale electricity generation are lost;
  • Synchronizing the supply of electricity generated from numerous locations to meet the minute-by-minute changes in electricity demand is complicated and costly;
  • Problems and costs of maintaining the numerous dispersed generators are  high;
  • Logistical control and management costs escalate as the national grid is replaced with regional systems.
  • Expensive diesel fuel is used rather than lower cost heavy oil:
  • Diesel fuel has to be transported by truck to the generators around the island;
  • Investments for the storage of diesel fuel in numerous supply depots are necessary;
  • Problems of pilferage of diesel fuel may be significant, and costs of security and protection may be high.

No other country in the world has adopted this method of generating electricity, suggesting that it does not make sense economically.

The energy master-plan also ignores a possible role of the sugar sector in producing ethanol and contributing to energy supplies. The experience of Brazil indicates that at higher petroleum prices, ethanol from sugar cane becomes economically viable. The shut-down of some 70 out of Cuba’s 156 sugar mills in 2003, the moth-balling of another 40 and the contraction of the whole sugar agro-industrial service cluster is also a major loss for electricity generation.

Fiasco #4        Shutting Down Half of the Sugar Sector

In 2002, Castro decided that there was no future in sugar production, a decision prompted by low sugar prices at the time and undoubtedly the continuing difficulties in the sector. He decreed the shut-down of 71 of 156 sugar mills, taking some 33% of areas under sugar cane out of production and displacing about 100,000 workers. It was hoped that land-use would shift to non-sugar crops, that remaining mills would become more productive, and that displaced labour would be reabsorbed elsewhere.

In any case, sugar production has continued to decline which is unfortunate given high prices in recent years. There has not been a shift into ethanol production. The physical plant has continued to deteriorate. The cluster of activities surrounding sugar must be near collapse.  The sugar communities are left without an economic base and some face the prospect of becoming ghost towns.

Fiasco #3        A Half Century of Monetary Controls and Non-Convertibility

Responsibility for Fiasco #3 is shared in part with Che Guevara, who as President of the Banco Nacianal de Cuba, presided over imposition of monetary controls and implementation of the policies that made Cuba’s peso non-convertible for half a century.

Cuba’s monetary system has been and is a serious obstacle to the freedom of Cuban citizens. Citizens’ incomes have had purchasing power outside the country only when permitted to be exchanged for a foreign convertible currency and then only at a discount for some decades. As is well known, the official exchange rate for Cuban citizens has been in the area of  22 pesos (Moneda Nacional) to US $1.00, so that the purchasing power of the average monthly salary – 415 pesos in 2008 (Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas, 2009, Table 7.4) is about US$20.00.

Fiasco #2        Suppression of Workers’ Rights

Thanks to the regime implanted by President Castro, Cuban workers do not have the right to undertake independent collective bargaining or to strike. Unions are not independent organizations representing worker interests but are official government unions. Independent unions and any attempts to establish them are illegal.

Cuba has signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and is a member of the International Labor Organization.  The basic United Nations Declarations support freedom of association for labor. The International Labor Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work includes, as the first fundamental right of labor, “freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining”

The central function of independent labor unions is to provide countervailing power to oligopolistic or monopolistic employers in wage determination and in the setting of the terms and conditions of work. Unions have been successful in western countries in raising wages, improving the equity of income distribution and improving work conditions.

In the Cuban case, workers have confronted a monopolistic employer – the state – that also controls their unions which are in effect “company unions.” By controlling the unions and containing their wage demands, wages have been held down. The absence of independent unions has permitted the government to implement counterproductive economic policies year after year and has muted the urgency of undertaking economic reforms.

Fiasco #1        Abolition of Freedom of Expression

An important requirement for the sustained effectiveness of an economic system is the ability to freely, openly and continuously analyze and criticize its functioning.  Open analysis and criticism in a context of free generation and diffusion of information provide a necessary spur for self-correction, exposing illegalities, flawed policies and errors.  Free analysis and criticism is vital in order to bring illicit actions to light, to correct errors on the part of all institutions and enterprises as well as policy makers and to help generate improved policy design and implementation. This in turn requires freedom of expression and freedom of association, embedded in an independent press, publications systems and media, independent universities and research institutes, and freely-functioning opposition political parties.

Unfortunately this has been lacking, thanks to the Castro regime.  The media and the politicians have largely performed a cheerleader role, unless issues have been opened up for discussion by the President and the Party.

The near-absence of checks and balances on the policy-making machinery of the state also contributes to obscuring over-riding real priorities and to prolonging and amplifying error.  The National Assembly is dominated by the Communist Party, meets for very short periods of time – four to six days a year – and has a large work load, so that it is unable to serve as a mechanism for undertaking serious analysis and debate of economic or other matters. The cost for Cuba of this situation over the years has been enormous.  It is unfortunate that Cuba lacks the concept and reality of a “Loyal Opposition” within –the electoral system and in civil society.  These are vital for economic efficiency, not to mention, of course, for authentic participatory democracy.

NOTE: For additional articles on various aspects of Fidel Castro’s presidency, see:

Fidel Castro: The Cowardice of Autocracy

Cuba’s Achievements under the Presidency of Fidel Castro: The Top Ten

Fidel’s No-Good Very Bad Day

The “FIDEL” Models Never Worked; Soviet and Venezuelan Subsidization Did

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Fidel’s No-Good Very Bad Day

A “Senior Moment”? On Wednesday September 8, former President Fidel Castro was quoted as saying: “The Cuban model doesn’t even work for us anymore”, when asked if Cuba’s economic system was still worth exporting to other nations, by Jeffrey Goldberg, of The Atlantic. A few days later, Friday September 10, Fidel said that it was a misunderstanding though Jeff Goldberg and Julia Sweig insisted that this is what he said. Had Fidel been experiencing a “Senior Moment?” Had he been speaking in jest- a throw-away line in a jocular conversation, but also revealing concerning his legacy to Cuba and the world? Was he misunderstood or misheard or mistranslated?

Fidel’s Economic Legacy: Rejected by Brother Raul and Questioned by Cuba’s Government

Then on Monday September 13, the Pronunciamiento de la Central de Trabajadores de Cuba announced the new policy on lay-offs in the state sector and expansion in the self-employment and cooperative sector employment. This statement outlines a new direction for the Cuban economy, namely towards greater reliance on the market mechanism, private ownership and entrepreneurship and a reduced role for the state and (attempted) planning. Cuba already had a “mixed economy” with a substantial private sector in agriculture and some 143,000 in non-agricultural activities, not to mention all those in the underground economy. However, the statement by the Cuban Federation of Labour indicates a major shift of emphasis towards a more marketized, decentralized, private-sector economy. This shift in direction for the Cuban economy negates all that Fidel has stood for regarding the economy in the past. Fidel was responsible for

  • the initial nationalizations of almost all the private sector, including self-employment in 1961-1963 and 1968 (with the “Revolutionary Offensive” )
  • the continuous fulminations against the self-employment and “capitalism” from a variety of perspectives
  • the shut-down of the farmers’ markets in 1986 with the “Rectification program”
  • the tight containment of self-employment after 1995 and
  • discrimination against self-employed Cuban citizens vis-à-vis foreign enterprise in joint ventures in terms of tax regimes.

President Raul Castro’s new approach instead is placing its faith in the small enterprise and cooperative sector, hoping that these will to come to the rescue of the economy by absorbing the underemployed labour in the state sector to be laid off in the next six months. . This is strong confirmation that President Raul Castro himself is convinced that the Cuban model is not working any more – if it ever did. It also is likely that the Communist Party and the National Assembly will not contradict Raul on this. I argued earlier that none of the variants of the “Cuban Model” had worked effectively. (The “FIDEL” Models Never Worked; Soviet and Venezuelan Subsidization Did) Many foreign analysts and observers had of course questioned the value of Fidel’s legacy in the economy as well as politically and in terms of human rights. It now appears that Fidel’s legacy is questioned by his own Government. President Raul Castro has implicitly rejected Fidel’s life work regarding the economy of Cuba.

A Difficult Day – and Situation – for Fidel

Fidel Castro allegedly said to the judges in his famous 1953 speech in his own defense at his trial after the unsuccessful attack on the Moncada army barracks “Condemn me, History will absolve me.” However, “History” will not absolve Fidel. It appears also that even the official versions of “history” under Cuba’s current Communist system will not absolve Fidel either. Small wonder that he is attempting to portray himself as the elder statesman, altruistically offering advice and warnings on international issues, many of which appear to him to be apocalyptic in character. How will Fidel respond to the official Cuban rejection of his vision of “socialism” that he has been attempting to impose on Cuba for almost half a century? . PS. It is instructive that the labour federation, the CTC, is placed in charge of implementing the lay-offs on the part of the government rather than trying to defend the interests of the state sector workers. This pretty much confirms the view of the CTC as an arm of the regime not an organization to defend workers’ rights and interests.

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The “FIDEL” Models Never Worked; Soviet and Venezuelan Subsidization Did

“The Cuban model doesn’t even work for us anymore” stated former President Fidel Castro, when asked if Cuba’s economic system was still worth exporting to other nations, by Jeffrey Goldberg, of  The Atlantic magazine during an interview in Havana. (JIM WYSS ,  AND LUISA YANEZ, Miami Herald, September 9, 2010), broken.html.

Was this a throw-away line? A rare moment of candor and  self-criticism? Or a mis-translation? Or is the implication that Raul can’t make things work anymore. but he, Fidel, could if he were back in charge?

In fact, the “Cuban Model” was a series of “FIDEL” MODELs. None of them ever worked effectively. They were all characterized by a dictatorial, overpowering and personal control by Fidel himself. From 1959 to 2006, the central feature of Cuba’s economic existence was Fidel’s micro-management of the economy. This was observed and analyzed in 1962 by the French agronomist Rene Dumont who lamented Fidel’s itinerant and ill-informed decision-making on every issue or problem that came to his attention. We saw it in January 2006, shortly before he left office, with “La Revolucion Energetica” in which again he micro-managed the issue.

The abolition of private enterprise in 1961, 1963 and 1968 (with the “Revolutionary Offensive”) has been a continuous disaster, suppressing and wasting the energies and entrepreneurial capabilities of the Cuban people. The 1961-1963 “Instant Industrialization” strategy was a disaster, quickly aborted. Likewise, the 1964-1970 “10 Million Ton Sugar Harvest” plus “New Man” plus Hyper-Centralization were all fiascos that also were aborted in 1970.

The Cuban economic expanded steadily from 1970 to 1985. Unfortunately this success was ephemeral, based as it was on Soviet support as well as a convertible currency debt build-up that led Cuba ultimately to declare a moratorium on debt servicing in 1986.

Cuba’s “Golden Age” of economic prosperity from 1970 to 1986 or so was one of Soviet economic Orthodoxy under-girded by massive Soviet subsidization.  This subsidization of the Cuban economy occurred mainly through the pricing of merchandise trade products. The USSR paid a ruble price for its sugar imports from Cuban that was a multiple of the prevailing world price at official exchange rates for many years. At the same time, Cuba paid a price that was below the prevailing market price for its petroleum imports from the USSR. The accompanying chart, derived from the work of William Leogrande, and J. M. Thomas illustrates the magnitudes of the assistance. My own quantitative estimates placed the value of this subsidization at around 23% to over 36% of National Income in the 1980 to 1987 period. (See the Table at the bottom of this note for the detail of the calculations.)

When economic stagnation set in 1985, Fidel designed the “Rectification Process” which was supposed to correct previous errors, re-centralize and de-marketize the economy and reignite economic expansion. This also failed.

Then with the termination of Soviet subsidies came the economic melt-down and the “Special Period in Time of Peace”. The latter in fact is not “special” but instead is the real world. In the “Special Period” the expansion of 2004 to 2008 is in large part due to the special relationship with Venezuela and the subsidization that this has produced. President Chávez supports Cuba through low-cost oil exports to Cuba, export and investment credits, and generous foreign exchange payments for Cuban exports of medical services.

In summary, the various development models and approaches that have dominated in Cuba have been Fidel’s personal models. Fidel Castro is correct in stating that they don’t work anymore. However, they have never worked.

Source:

Ritter, Archibald R. M. “The Cuban Economy inb the 1990s: External Challenges and Policy Imperatives.” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 32:3; Fall, 1990.

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Raul Castro and Policy towards Self-Employment: Promising Apertura or False Start?

In his speech before the National Assembly on August 2, 2010, President Raul Castro stated that the Council of Ministers had agreed to expand self-employment by eliminating various prohibitions in the granting of licenses and on some types of goods and services. and by making the employment of workers in such enterprises more flexible. At the same time, he referred to a strengthening of taxation on such enterprises.

If the policy environment is indeed liberalized, it will be a great thing for the Cuban economy and for people’s material levels of living. However, the reference to strengthened taxation is worrisome.

Advantages of an Apertura for Small Enterprise

What might be the impacts of the liberalization of self-employment as well as small enterprise (to five or ten employees)? Here is a quick listing of the benefits:

  • An increase in small enterprise would Increase competition, lower prices, improve quality and broaden diversity of the goods and services produced.
  • Productive employment  would be created
  • Incomes would be generated.
  • The average levels of incomes would be lowered in the small enterprise sector if it were opened up for free entry by anyone wanting to enter the area
  • Citizens would gain when reduced effort and time was necessary to obtain the goods and services necessary for survival.
  • Improved productivity of small enterprises would permit higher material well-being throughout Cuban society.
  • The massive underground economy would shrink.
  • Tax revenues from the sector would increase as it expanded .
  • Foreign exchange earnings and savings would occur as domestic products replaced imported products and as markets for tourists and for export expanded.
  • Innovation and Improvement would be promoted.
  • Urban and rural commercial revival would occur.
  • Improved general quality of life.
  • The culture of compliance and respect for public policy rather than regulation avoidance and illegality would in time take effect.

If one doubts the advantages of small enterprise liberalization, consider the arts and handicrafts sector. Before these areas were liberalized in 1993, the souvenirs and craft products available for purchase by tourists or Cuban citizens were of abysmal quality and without diversity, coming as they did from a number of state workshops. However, following liberalization, this area sprang to life. Very quickly the Place de la Catedral and Avenida “G” (de los Presidentes) were filled with vendors providing a rapidly widening range of crafts and arts. Very soon there were too many vendors for these locales and they were relocated to the Malecn, La Rampa, and the park between Avenida del Puerto and the Cathedral. They now constitute a major tourist attraction and earn significant amounts of foreign exchange for Cuba.

The apertura for the arts and crafts liberated the creativity, innovativeness, entrepreneurship and energies of Cuban citizens who quickly seized the opportunities available. They earn a living for themselves and make a valuable contribution to Cuban society. An apertura in all areas of the economy to small entrepreneurship would make similar contributions.

Art Market, Plaza de la Catedral, 1994

Market Stall for Sculpture, Malecon, circa 2002

 

Disadvantages of an Apertura for Small Enterprise

There are always disadvantages as well as advantages – costs as well as benefits – in economics and in the evaluation of public policy. However, I have trouble finding any disadvantages or costs in a liberalized policy environment for small enterprise.

There are three concerns, however.

First, would such an aperture worsen income distribution? In time, as some small enterprises increased in size, this would indeed likely occur. However, Cuba already has an income tax and system for taxing small enterprise so that this effect could be managed. But opening self-employment and small enterprise up to all possible entrants would also increase competition in the sector and push prices and thence incomes towards average levels.

Second, would an aperture encourage pilferage of inputs from the state sector – as has happened in the past? This is a possibility that has to be managed. It can be managed by establishing a market for inputs for the sector that is reasonable and fair. At present, it is difficult for small enterprises to obtain their necessary inputs – except at the Tiendas para la recaudacion de Divisas (TRDs) or (former) dollar stores – leading to purchases of inputs that have found their way out of the state sector. A reasonable market for the provision of inputs to the sector is thus vital.

Third, would an aperture lead to an expansion of “infractions” and illegalities as small enterprises tried to evade rules and taxes? This could indeed occur if regulations remained asinine and if tax burdens were impossible.  However, if an aperture to small enterprise were accompanied by the dropping of silly regulations and controls, and if the tax regime was made reasonable and fair, it is likely that compliance would improve. However, building a culture of respect for regulations and taxes will also take some time as the self-employed have come to view government as an enemy force imposing rules and regulations that are aimed not just at their containment  but also their elimination.

Current Policy towards Self-Employment

The current policy environment within which the self-employed operate is particularly difficult.

There are a variety of controls and prohibitions that seem designed to obstruct, contain and eliminate the “Cuenta-Propistas”. Here is a summary of the policy environment:

Controls and Prohibitions:

1. All activities are prohibited except those specifically permitted

  • All professional self-employment is prohibited
  • Of the initial 156 legalized activities 41 were prohibited in around 2005

2. The number of the self-employed is strictly controlled through the granting of licenses (See Chart 1.)

3. Taxation is onerous and indeed is much heavier than that facing foreign multi-national corporations in joint ventures. This is  a shocking type of discrimination against Cuban citizens (See Chart 2.)

4. There are numerous prohibitions

  • No access to credit;
  • No access to foreign exchange or imports (except through state “TRD” stores)
  • No advertising
  • No intermediaries
  • Limits on numbers of employees;

5. There are innumerable petty restrictions (See Chart 3.)

6. The political and media environment has been negative since 1995.

For these reasons, the self-employment sector has stagnated over the last 10 years following the initial expansion of 1993-1994 following its initial liberalization (See Chart 4.)

Possible Policies towards a Small-Enterprise Apertura

If President Raul Castro wished or was able to provide a definitive aperture for small enterprise, here are the types of policies that would be under consideration.

1. Liberalize Licensing: Let anyone and everyone open a small enterprise (  Result: competition will push prices downwards and quality upwards;

2. Permit All Types of Self-Employment, including Professional and High-Tech while maintaining state medicine and health systems intact;

3. Raise the limit on employees to 5, 10 or 20;

4. Provide legal sources for the purchase of Inputs;

5. Permit Access to Imported Inputs (outside TRDs and at the exchange rater available for the state sector);

6. Eliminate silly and vexations restrictions;

7. Make Microenterprise Taxation Simpler and Fairer;

8. Establish Micro-Credit Institutions;

9. Establish a Ministry for the Promotion of Small Enterprise.

However, needless to say, former President Fidel Castro undoubtedly would disapprove of any aperture judging from (a) the Initial near shut-down of small enterprise during the 1968 Revolutionary Offensive; (b). the further tightening of the prohibition on self employment during the “Rectification Program” of 1986-1990; and (c) His statement lamenting the 1993 opening to Self-employment in 1995.

On the other hand, Raul Castro has displayed a streak of pragmatism that seems to be lacking in his elder brother, witness his initiative in re- opening the farmer’s markets in 1994.  Moreover, his reputation is more for talking quietly and eventually acting rather than talking with grandiosity and making false starts. Time will tell.

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Freedom of Expression, Economic Self-Correction and Self-Renewal

An important requirement for the sustained effectiveness of an economic system and society is the ability to analyze and criticize – freely, openly and continuously – its functioning.  Open analysis and criticism in a context of free generation and diffusion of information provide a necessary spur for self-correction, exposing illegalities, flawed policies and errors.  Free analysis and criticism are vital in order to bring illicit actions to light, to correct errors on the part of all institutions and enterprises as well as policy makers and to help generate improved policy design and implementation. This in turn requires freedom of expression and freedom of association, embedded in an independent press, publications systems and media, independent universities and research institutes, and freely-functioning opposition political parties.

The absence of free economic criticisms means that major policy errors or indeed fiascos are not “nipped in the bud” and terminated quickly but steam ahead to disaster. Some major examples of this in Cuba have been

  • The 1961-1963 instant industrialization strategy, aborted in 1963
  • The 10 Million Ton Sugar Harvest effort, from 1964 to 1970;
  • The attempt to use the “New Man” ideology as a labour mobilization device, 1966-1970
  • The shut-down of half of Cuba’s sugar agro-industrial complex (2002)
  • The billion dollar mini-generator component of the “Revolucin Energtica (2006)

Pluralistic democratic countries have free presses and open debate on the issues of the day.  Opposition political parties, academics, interest groups and NGOs, and journalists continuously analyze and critique public policy issues and proposals and the functioning of private and public enterprises and institutions.  Indeed, there is major competition among economic and business journalists as well as academics to be the most perspicacious analysts and critics of public policy.

Unfortunately much of this has been lacking in Cuba.  The media largely performs a cheerleader role, unless issues have been opened up for discussion by the President and the Party.  For example, there was virtually no public discussion or debate concerning the shut-down of half of the sugar sector in 2002, the attacks on self-employment, the dysfunctional parts of the “Revolución Energética” or of the imprisoning of the critics  – or so-called “dissidents” –in  2003.This means that public policies get announced and implemented full-blown without critical input into their formulation, and without subsequent criticism and early correction.

Are the restrictions on freedom of expression becoming more or less severe in recent years? Some indications suggest that there is some relaxation of such restrictions, notably:

  • On June 16 to 20, the Catholic church was able to organize the Semana Social Católica including a Panel on “Economy and Society” with Pavel Vidal Alejandro, Omar Everleny Perez, Carmelo Mesa-Lago y Cristina Calvo.
  • The presentation of information on the economy has improved over the last 10 years. The web site of the Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas is now surprisingly good and the Anuario Estadistico Economico is quite comprehensive and appears in a timely way. (However, the methodologies for the measurement of some fundamental economic data such as labor force, employment and unemployment, consumer price index, and national accounts are opaque and ambiguous so that the analyses based on them are not as strong as they could be.)

But on the other hand, there are also some indications of a hardening of the restrictions on freedom of expression.

  • The containment and harassment of the bloggers continues. They have been denied access to the web. They have been harassed and intimidated – unsuccessfully – by actions of state security. They have been vilified as “mercenaries” in the service of foreign powers. They have been denied the right to travel abroad. They are often denied the right to participate in relevant domestic events such as a conference on civil society and the new media! Their web sites and therefore their commentaries are available within Cuba only with difficulty. But they have not been shut down as of mid-2010, though this could change.
  • The expulsion of Esteban Morales, Professor of Economics and Political Science, University of Havana, from the Communist Party also represents a hardening of restrictions on freedom of expression. Morales comments on the character of racism in Cuba, Challenges of the racial problem in Cuba seemed reasonably innocuous. His April 22 essay entitled “Corruption: The True Counter Revolution” was more hard hitting. But being expelled from the Party looks to me like a reward, not a punishment. Of course, this is not correct, because expulsion from the Party usually means exclusion from foreign travel which is vital for academics as a means of buttressing their inadequate Moneda Nacional incomes.

  • Certain areas of the economy appear to continue to be off limits to analysis and scrutiny, notably the bio-technological industry and the conglomerate enterprises that straddle the peso and the convertible peso economies.
  • The political decision-making process on economic and other matters within the highest levels of the Government continues to be a “black box,” the workings of which we can only speculate about.  Cuban Universities need some real Departments of Political Science!

The near-absence of checks and balances on the policy-making machinery of the state also contributes to obscuring over-riding real priorities and to prolonging and amplifying error.  The National Assembly, dominated by the Communist Party, meets for very short periods of time – four to six days a year – and has a large work load, so that it is unable to serve as a mechanism for undertaking serious analysis and debate of economic or other matters. The cost for Cuba of this situation over the years has been enormous.  It is unfortunate that Cuba lacks the concept and reality of a “Loyal Opposition” within the electoral system and in civil society.  These are vital for economic efficiency, not to mention, of course, for authentic participatory democracy.

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Has Cuba’s Catastrophic Decline in Real Wage Levels Been Reversed?

The level of “real” or “inflation-adjusted wage levels collapsed catastrophically in the economic melt-down of 1989-1993. Has this been reversed during the alleged economic recovery from 1994 to 2010?

The chart below indicates that real wage levels may have increased steadily after 1994, but they are still a small fraction of their pre-melt-down level. This Chart is based on calculations presented by Pavel Vidal Alejandro, an analyst in Cuba’s primary economic research institute, the Centro de Estudios sobre la Economia Cubana (CEEC), also reproduced below.

According to this data, Cuba’s real wage collapsed from high of around 190 pesos (Moneda Nacional) to 20 pesos by 1993, recovering only slowly to 2008. For those who observed this collapse in the early 1990s, these figures are indeed credible.  How Cuban citizens reliant upon peso incomes survived through this catastrophic decline constitutes several million stories of endurance and innovation – or the practices encapsulated by the “Special Period” terms “resolver”, “luchar”, “conseguir” and “inventar”.

Chart 1: Cuba: Real Inflation-Adjusted Wages, 1989-2009
(Pesos, Moneda Nacional)

Source: Pavel Vidal Alejandro, “Politica Monetaria y Doble Moneda”,
in Omar Everleny Perez et. al., Miradas a la Economia Cubana,
La Habana: Editorial Caminos, 2009, p.35

The 1989-1993 economic contraction – approaching 40% of GDP – resulted from the termination of the subsidization from the former Soviet Union camouflaged in the form of credits never to be repaid, the above market prices paid for Cuban exports, the below-market prices for Cuban imports with that country.  In terms of official statistics on aggregate per capita economic growth rates, it would appear that the Cuban economy has fully recovered and surpassed the 1989 level by about 20% in GDP per capita terms as indicated in Chart 2.

Source: the author on the basis of statistics from the Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas, Anuario Estadistico de Cuba, various issues and UN ECLAC, Preliminary Overview of theEconomies of Latin America and the Caribbean, various issues

“Where’s the economic recovery? We don’t see it.”

But this raises the question: How could the economy recover so fully while real wages are still only at about 22 to 25 % of the 1989 level? This is indeed a puzzle. Citizens of Cuba have observed the contradiction for some years, as suggested by the saying mentioned above.

One possibility is that the GDP statistics are dubious. Indeed the Cuban government adopted a new approach to measuring GDP relabeling it as “Sustainable Social” GDP, measuring the value of services not at the cost of their provision but at an estimated evaluation of their worth internationally.  This revised GDP measure increased Cuba’s GDP per capita and increased the ostensible growth rate as the service sector expanded.
A second partial explanation for the immense gap between overall economic performance levels and wage levels is that substantial portions of the goods and services produced in the economy are pilfered and distributed through the ubiquitous underground economy so that revenues seem seldom to permit higher wage and salary payments but actually more is produced but leaks out of official circuits.

There are undoubtedly other factors explaining this situation as well.

“Resolver”, “luchar”, “conseguir” and “inventar”

How have Cuban citizens managed to survive with real incomes still around 22 – 25% of their 1980s levels. In fact, many Cubans have been able to generate incomes higher than the official wages and salaries. The additional sources of income include:

  • “Income in kind” ranging from lunches for workers, food supplements for seniors;
  • “Income in kind” and special access to transportation and housing for well-placed government officials (e.g. use of official vehicles for private purposes);
  • Illegal but tolerated salary supplements for employees of joint foreign-state enterprises and embassies;
  • Remittances from abroad;
  • Legal self-employment incomes;
  • Home produced goods and services for exchange or sale with friends and neighbours;
  • Informal (un-registered or underground) economy activities;
  • Pilferage from the state sector for resale or personal use.

If citizens can tap such other income sources, as many or most do, then they can survive reasonably well. However, there are some that have no access to any of these additional sources of income – or perhaps only simple survival activities such as selling cigarettes or Granma in the street. Which groups of citizens fall into this category? Perhaps the following:

  • Some pensioners;
  • Workers in the state sector outside the major cities;
  • Some agricultural workers

However, given that the rationed monthly food allowance is meager and on balance covers around 10 to 14 days of food requirements, while the rest of food requirements and basically everything else must be purchased from the dollar stores – where products bear a 140% sales tax – or the farmers markets or self-employment sector or the underground economy , these individuals obviously are in dire straits.

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