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FAR FROM SILICON VALLEY, CUBA CULTIVATES STARTUP SCENE
BY Leani García |
Americas Quarterly, June 15, 2016
Original Article Here: Cuba Cultivates Startup Scene
Cuba’s startup community is developing despite a lack of funding, equipment or fast internet.
Cubans can access the internet at government-run wireless hotspots.
The barriers to founding a tech startup in Cuba are high. For starters, hardly anyone has access to internet connections faster than dial-up.
But that’s not stopping a generation of young entrepreneurs on the island, where a nascent tech community is challenging the idea that tech innovation has to come from places like Silicon Valley.
Two of those entrepreneurs, Eliecer Cabrera Casas and Pablo Rodríguez Yordy, spoke with AQ at a recent tech startup event in Miami about their experience founding the Yelp-like app Conoce Cuba.
“Cuba is an emerging market where there are a lot of opportunities and talented professionals,” Cabrera said. “You can’t invest at the moment, but in a short amount of time conditions can change. We’re preparing the field for the future.”
In addition to the challenges that entrepreneurs face region-wide – from weak infrastructure to innovation-stifling corruption – Cubans like Cabrera face a number of unique obstacles to getting their ideas off the ground.
One of the first hurdles they face is funding. While bank lending on the island is increasing, it’s still not sufficient to meet the needs of the 500,000 registered self-employed Cubans. And having been excluded from Cuba’s recent foreign investment law, tech entrepreneurs don’t have a legal avenue to receive direct funding from foreign companies or investors. Instead, they rely on a combination of state salaries and family connections to support their ideas. An estimated 70 to 80 percent of Cuba’s small businesses are funded with remittances and family money, according to Sergio Lázaro, president of the Cuban software engineering startup Ingenius.
Then there’s web access. Cuba has the lowest internet penetration rate in the region, at just 3.4 percent for authorized households. For businesses like Ingenius, which specializes in cloud computing, the key is to make the most of limited time on the internet. Programmers connect just twice a day, once in the morning to download what they’re working on and again in the evening to push finished products to their clients.
The spotty internet can also create opportunities. Conoce Cuba, which functions as an offline app and website, was built as an upgrade to traditional phone books, one of the few ways to discover business and restaurants on the island. Because Cuba has limited internet and nearly non-existent 3G or 4G cell phone network coverage, the app was first distributed through a network of cell phone repair shops. The shops agreed to act as physical app stores where Cubans could download the latest version of Conoce Cuba.
“Now there are about 70 of these repair shops in Havana that can […] install or update [the app] for users for free,” Cabrera said.
Today, the Conoce Cuba app is also distributed through the paquete semanal — a digital selection of TV shows, movies, foreign newspapers and music known in the U.S. as the internet in a box because it can be downloaded and shared without an internet connection.
The company’s founders acknowledged the difficulties in coding software so smartphones function as if they’re on the web even while not being connected to the internet. But a bigger challenge has been a lack of access to hardware, in part because of the U.S. embargo.
“We weren’t able to see what we’d created come to fruition because we lacked the resources,” explained Rodríguez.
Like many Cubans, however, they said they found ways to resolver, or overcome. By borrowing devices from friends and the repair shops they used to distribute the app, or by purchasing them outside Cuba, Cabrera and Rodríguez found creative ways to test and distribute their product on the island. Now, the task is to convince business owners and consumers that their product deserves a look.
“We were doing something new that people had never seen before, we had to earn their trust,” Rodríguez said. “The biggest challenge for us, and for any entrepreneur in Cuba, is to change the Cuban mentality about how to consume a tech product.”
More on: THE NORTH KOREA-CUBA CONNECTION
Tuesday, June 7, 2016, North Korea Cuba Connection
By Samuel Ramani in The Diplomat:On May 24, 2016, the Korea Times reported that senior officials from North Korea’s governing Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and the Communist Party of Cuba held talks on strengthening ties between Pyongyang and Havana. This meeting followed Cuba’s congratulatory rhetoric toward Kim Jong-un after his re-election during last month’s historic Workers’ Party Congress. That congress was the first such-meeting since 1980.
While relations between North Korea and Cuba have been close since the Cold War, this revelation is an embarrassing blow to the Obama administration’s attempts to normalize relations with Cuba. North Korea’s close ties to Cuba can be explained by a shared normative solidarity against American values and perceived American imperialism. This ideological bond is formed out of historical experience and has occasionally manifested itself in symbolically significant shipments of arms and manufactured goods. These trade linkages persist to this day, despite tightened UN sanctions and strides towards a less confrontational U.S.-Cuba relationship.
North Korea and Cuba: A Cold War-Born Ideological Alliance
Over the past half-century, Cuba has been one of North Korea’s most consistent international allies. This alliance has caused Havana to resist diplomatically recognizing South Korea, despite growing economic cooperation with Seoul. Cuba’s firm pro-Pyongyang stance has deep ideological underpinnings, stemming from both countries’ shared Communist experiences. In 1960, Che Guevara visited North Korea, praising Kim Il-sung’s regime as a model for Fidel Castro’s Cuba to follow.
While both regimes preserved authoritarian systems and the trappings of a planned economy, their ideological synergy did not translate into convergent governance trajectories, as Guevara predicted. As Wilson Center expert James Person argued in a July 2013 BBC article, North Korea wanted to avoid Cuba’s dependency on Soviet weaponry following Khrushchev’s retreat from confrontation during the Cuban Missile Crisis. This resulted in North Korea transitioning toward a military-first policy, to the detriment of the country’s economic development. Meanwhile, despite visiting North Korea in 1986, Fidel Castro avoided creating a cult of personality resembling Pyongyang’s, as he felt that statues erected in his honor were incompatible with the Soviet Marxist-Leninist principles that he adhered to.
Despite their divergent development courses, both countries have remained close allies to this day, and there are signs that the bilateral relationship has strengthened further under Raul Castro’s rule. Panama’s interception of a North Korean ship in 2013 containing Cuban arms concealed under bags of sugar represented the most significant Havana-Pyongyang commercial linkage since the 1980s. Despite Cuban attempts to downplay the controversy, Panama’s foreign minister regarded this action as just part of a much larger Cuba-North Korea arms deal. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power, also condemned Cuba for violating international sanctions.
The U.S.-Cuba normalization has done little to shake Cuba’s close ties with North Korea. In March 2015, Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez declared that Cuba maintained solidarity with the North Korean regime, despite Pyongyang’s increased international isolation. Rodriguez justified his stance on the grounds that Cuban foreign policy is based on upholding just principles and resisting Western interference into the internal affairs of countries.
While leading North Korea expert Andrei Lankov interpreted these statements as proof that Cuba’s criticisms of U.S. imperialism would continue unabated despite the normalization, some NK News analysts have contended that Cuba’s show of support for North Korea may be more rhetorical than substantive. Cuba is mentioned only sporadically by the North Korean state media, and in a limited range of contexts. This suggests that the Obama administration’s Republican critics may have overblown the strength of the Havana-Pyongyang bilateral linkage.
Even if the extent of the relationship has been periodically exaggerated, Cuba’s September 2015 and May 2016 reaffirmations of an alliance with North Korea suggest that the ideological partnership remains alive and well. South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se’s visit to Cuba for the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) summit on June 4 and Seoul’s open calls for normalization with Cuba are unlikely to cause illicit trade between Cuba and North Korea to diminish or become more covert. This is because the symbolic significance of arms shipments and small-scale trade deals between the two countries still outweighs the economic benefits Cuba could glean from enhanced South Korean capital investments.
How Illegal Trade Persists Between Cuba and North Korea
Despite the immense international controversy resulting from Cuba’s 2013 arms sales to North Korea, sporadic trade linkages between the two countries have continued largely unhindered. In January 2016, Cuba and North Korea developed a barter trade system, which officially involved transactions of sugar and railway equipment.
According to Curtis Melvin, an expert at the Washington D.C.-based U.S. Korea Institute, barter trade is an effective way for Cuba and North Korea to evade international sanctions without depleting their hard currency reserves. Cuba’s use of sugar as a medium of bilateral trade has close parallels with Myanmar’s historical use of rice in exchange for North Korean military technology assistance. This form of trade has been vital for the North Korean regime’s survival in wake of the Soviet collapse and more inconsistent patronage from China.
While Cuba’s ability to use North Korean railway equipment remains unclear, NK News reported in January that Kim Jong-un was planning to modernize the DPRK’s railway networks, This development initiative could result in heavy industry production that can be bartered to Havana.
While trade in civilian goods between Cuba and North Korea appears to be on the upswing, trade in illicit arms continues to be the most symbolically potent and controversial form of bilateral trade. A 2013 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report noted that a large number of North Korean arms brokers speak fluent Spanish. This language training demonstrates the importance of Cuba as a trade destination for the DPRK. The SIPRI report notes that Cuban arms dealers are especially attractive because they can deal with North Korea with a sense of impunity. This contrasts sharply with a British arms dealer who faced prison time in 2012 for purchasing North Korean weapons.
While the 2013 incident remains the most recent confirmed incident of weapons trading between Havana and Pyongyang, recent revelations of a lost U.S. Hellfire missile turning up in Cuba have sparked fresh concerns about a revival of the long-standing arms trade.
Cuba has consistently insisted that its arm shipments to the DPRK are for repair purposes, and therefore do not violate sanctions, which only ban one-way arms transfers. But Mary O’Grady of the Wall Street Journal recently speculated that Cuba’s intelligence sharing and close cooperation with the DPRK constituted a highly pernicious blow to the prospects of U.S.-Cuba normalization.
While the Obama administration has removed Cuba from the state sponsors of terrorism list and taken a big stride toward lifting the Kennedy-era embargo on Cuba, Havana’s continued cooperation with Pyongyang is an alarming blow to the normalization process. The current linkage between anti-Americanism and the Cuban Communist Party’s regime security makes a shift in Havana’s North Korea policy unlikely in the short-term. It remains to be seen if Castro’s planned retirement in 2018 will take Cuban foreign policy in a more pragmatic direction, and allow South Korean diplomatic overtures to finally be successful.
Vice President Miguel Diaz-Canel meet with Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang over the world’s widest conference table.
Jong Un posed for a photo with a Cuban delegation, led by Miguel Diaz-Canel Bermudez (third left)
DOES CUBA HAVE A FUTURE IN MANUFACTURING?
By Archibald R. M. Ritter
June 7 2016.
Complete Article Here: A Futute in Manufacturing? June 7 2016
Cuba has experienced a serious “de-industrialization” from which, by mid-2016, it had not recovered. The causes of the collapse are complex and multi-dimensional. The consequences include job and income loss, the loss of an important part of its economic base, the loss of much of the potential for export expansion and diversification, and rust-belt style industrial and urban decay. Can Cuba‘s manufacturing sector recover from this collapse? What can be done to reverse this situation?
I. THE COLLAPSE OF MANUFACTURING, 1989-2014
II. CAUSAL FACTORS ANE CONSEQUENCES
III. THE “LINEAMIENTOS” ON MANUFACTURING
IV. WHAT MIGHT BE THE SUCCESSFUL MANUFACTURING SUB-SECTORS IN FUTURE?
V. A POLICY ENVIRONMENT FOR THE PROMOTION OF MANUFACTURING
CONCLUSION
Does Cuba have a future in manufacturing? There are some general comparative advantages as well as dis–advantages for manufacturing that Cuba is facing as of mid-2016. First, the disadvantages:
- Cuba’s manufacturing base has collapsed significantly;
- Its capital stock and infrastructure generally is decayed and obsolete;
- Low investment levels impede up-grading the capital stock;
- Human skills relevant for manufacturing are badly decayed, mis-fitted and obsolete;
- Cuba’s domestic market size small due mainly low real income levels;
- Agglomerative and scale economies are minimal.
.But Cuba also has important advantages:
- Cuba’s citizens generally are well-educated with an incentive for further learning;
- Many Cuban citizens are energetic, creative, and entrepreneurial;
- Cuba has a some strong manufacturing sub-sectors such as pharmaceutical products and traditional products (beverages and tobacco);
- Cuba has potential in some agricultural products, namely fruits and vegetables;
- Cuba will be able to capitalize on its locational advantage with respect to the US market;
- The potential symbiotic relationship between Cubans on the Island and the Cuban-American community will stimulate the future development of economic activities in many areas, including manufacturing.
So, does Cuba have a future in manufacturing?
The answer is “Yes” – if policy reforms are significant and expeditious regarding further enterprise liberalization and taxation and if successful monetary and exchange rate reform lead to currency convertibility. (However, I am a pathological optimist.)
A broad-based industrial revival for Cuba is possible but will be difficult.
CUBA’S SOUTH KOREAN AND NORTH KOREAN CONNECTIONS
SOUTH KOREA AND CUBA MOVE TOWARD ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
June 7, 2016 – Hankyoreh
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/747159.html
During a meeting with his Cuban counterpart in Havana on June 5, South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se apparently communicated Seoul’s sincere desire to normalize diplomatic relations with Cuba. Yun is the first South Korean Foreign Minister to visit the country.
There were no reports about the initial reaction offered by Cuba, which has a special relationship with North Korea and considers the North a “brother country.” Rather than moving directly into negotiations about normalizing relations, South Korea and Cuba are likely to follow up the meeting of foreign ministers with a number of subsequent deliberations.
Yun met Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez at the Palacio de Convenciones, a Cuban government building in Havana, on Monday. “I emphasized that the time has come to further realize the potential that our two countries have, and I expressed our intention of moving in that direction,” Yun told reporters immediately after the meeting. Yun’s use of the phrase “the time to realize our potential” presumably expressed a desire to normalize diplomatic relations.
“The meeting ran for 75 minutes – an unusually long period of time – and the mood was very amiable, serious and candid,” Yun emphasized. “They talked about issues of mutual interest, including bilateral issues, global cooperation and personnel exchange. We said everything that we wanted to say, and the Cubans were seriously engaged in the conversation,” said a source who was present at the meeting.
During the meeting, Yun explained the significance of his visit to Cuba by quoting Neil Armstrong, the first person to set foot on the moon: “That’s one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind.” “The Cubans were very pleased by Yun’s remark,” the source said.
Yun did not say exactly how Rodriguez had responded to the idea of normalizing Cuba‘s relations with South Korea. “Personally, I felt that a tacit bond was forming between us,” he said.
“As they say, well begun is half done. Moving forward, we’re thinking about following up with a variety of deliberations,” Yun said, suggesting that the two countries had not immediately initiated negotiations for establishing official diplomatic relations.
The two countries are likely to use a number of ongoing deliberations, including meetings between senior officials, to speed up the normalization process.
In Feb. 2015, Yun announced to the National Assembly that he would push to normalize diplomatic relations with Cuba. The South Korean government made its first official overture to Cuba about discussing the establishment of diplomatic relations in 2000, during the presidency of Kim Dae-jung.
THE NORTH KOREA-CUBA CONNECTION
June 07, 2016 – The Diplomat – Samuel Ramani
http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/the-north-korea-cuba-connection/
On May 24, 2016, the Korea Times reported that senior officials from North Korea’s governing Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and the Communist Party of Cuba held talks on strengthening ties between Pyongyang and Havana. This meeting followed Cuba’s congratulatory rhetoric toward Kim Jong-un after his re-election during last month’s historic Workers’ Party Congress. That congress was the first such-meeting since 1980.
While relations between North Korea and Cuba have been close since the Cold War, this revelation is an embarrassing blow to the Obama administration’s attempts to normalize relations with Cuba. North Korea’s close ties to Cuba can be explained by a shared normative solidarity against American values and perceived American imperialism. This ideological bond is formed out of historical experience and has occasionally manifested itself in symbolically significant shipments of arms and manufactured goods. These trade linkages persist to this day, despite tightened UN sanctions and strides towards a less confrontational U.S.-Cuba relationship.
North Korea and Cuba: A Cold War-Born Ideological Alliance
Over the past half-century, Cuba has been one of North Korea’s most consistent international allies. This alliance has caused Havana to resist diplomatically recognizing South Korea, despite growing economic cooperation with Seoul. Cuba’s firm pro-Pyongyang stance has deep ideological underpinnings, stemming from both countries’ shared Communist experiences. In 1960, Che Guevara visited North Korea, praising Kim Il-sung’s regime as a model for Fidel Castro’s Cuba to follow.
While both regimes preserved authoritarian systems and the trappings of a planned economy, their ideological synergy did not translate into convergent governance trajectories, as Guevara predicted. As Wilson Center expert James Person argued in a July 2013 BBC article, North Korea wanted to avoid Cuba’s dependency on Soviet weaponry following Khrushchev’s retreat from confrontation during the Cuban Missile Crisis. This resulted in North Korea transitioning toward a military-first policy, to the detriment of the country’s economic development. Meanwhile, despite visiting North Korea in 1986, Fidel Castro avoided creating a cult of personality resembling Pyongyang’s, as he felt that statues erected in his honor were incompatible with the Soviet Marxist-Leninist principles that he adhered to.
Despite their divergent development courses, both countries have remained close allies to this day, and there are signs that the bilateral relationship has strengthened further under Raul Castro’s rule. Panama’s interception of a North Korean ship in 2013 containing Cuban arms concealed under bags of sugar represented the most significant Havana-Pyongyang commercial linkage since the 1980s. Despite Cuban attempts to downplay the controversy, Panama’s foreign minister regarded this action as just part of a much larger Cuba-North Korea arms deal. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power, also condemned Cuba for violating international sanctions.
The U.S.-Cuba normalization has done little to shake Cuba’s close ties with North Korea. In March 2015, Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez declared that Cuba maintained solidarity with the North Korean regime, despite Pyongyang’s increased international isolation. Rodriguez justified his stance on the grounds that Cuban foreign policy is based on upholding just principles and resisting Western interference into the internal affairs of countries.
While leading North Korea expert Andrei Lankov interpreted these statements as proof that Cuba’s criticisms of U.S. imperialism would continue unabated despite the normalization, some NK News analysts have contended that Cuba’s show of support for North Korea may be more rhetorical than substantive. Cuba is mentioned only sporadically by the North Korean state media, and in a limited range of contexts. This suggests that the Obama administration’s Republican critics may have overblown the strength of the Havana-Pyongyang bilateral linkage.
Even if the extent of the relationship has been periodically exaggerated, Cuba’s September 2015 and May 2016 reaffirmations of an alliance with North Korea suggest that the ideological partnership remains alive and well. South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se’s visit to Cuba for the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) summit on June 4 and Seoul’s open calls for normalization with Cuba are unlikely to cause illicit trade between Cuba and North Korea to diminish or become more covert. This is because the symbolic significance of arms shipments and small-scale trade deals between the two countries still outweighs the economic benefits Cuba could glean from enhanced South Korean capital investments.
How Illegal Trade Persists Between Cuba and North Korea
Despite the immense international controversy resulting from Cuba’s 2013 arms sales to North Korea, sporadic trade linkages between the two countries have continued largely unhindered. In January 2016, Cuba and North Korea developed a barter trade system, which officially involved transactions of sugar and railway equipment.
According to Curtis Melvin, an expert at the Washington D.C.-based U.S. Korea Institute, barter trade is an effective way for Cuba and North Korea to evade international sanctions without depleting their hard currency reserves. Cuba’s use of sugar as a medium of bilateral trade has close parallels with Myanmar’s historical use of rice in exchange for North Korean military technology assistance. This form of trade has been vital for the North Korean regime’s survival in wake of the Soviet collapse and more inconsistent patronage from China.
While Cuba’s ability to use North Korean railway equipment remains unclear, NK News reported in January that Kim Jong-un was planning to modernize the DPRK’s railway networks, This development initiative could result in heavy industry production that can be bartered to Havana.
While trade in civilian goods between Cuba and North Korea appears to be on the upswing, trade in illicit arms continues to be the most symbolically potent and controversial form of bilateral trade. A 2013 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report noted that a large number of North Korean arms brokers speak fluent Spanish. This language training demonstrates the importance of Cuba as a trade destination for the DPRK. The SIPRI report notes that Cuban arms dealers are especially attractive because they can deal with North Korea with a sense of impunity. This contrasts sharply with a British arms dealer who faced prison time in 2012 for purchasing North Korean weapons.
While the 2013 incident remains the most recent confirmed incident of weapons trading between Havana and Pyongyang, recent revelations of a lost U.S. Hellfire missile turning up in Cuba have sparked fresh concerns about a revival of the long-standing arms trade.
Cuba has consistently insisted that its arm shipments to the DPRK are for repair purposes, and therefore do not violate sanctions, which only ban one-way arms transfers. But Mary O’Grady of the Wall Street Journal recently speculated that Cuba’s intelligence sharing and close cooperation with the DPRK constituted a highly pernicious blow to the prospects of U.S.-Cuba normalization.
While the Obama administration has removed Cuba from the state sponsors of terrorism list and taken a big stride toward lifting the Kennedy-era embargo on Cuba, Havana’s continued cooperation with Pyongyang is an alarming blow to the normalization process. The current linkage between anti-Americanism and the Cuban Communist Party’s regime security makes a shift in Havana’s North Korea policy unlikely in the short-term. It remains to be seen if Castro’s planned retirement in 2018 will take Cuban foreign policy in a more pragmatic direction, and allow South Korean diplomatic overtures to finally be successful.
EL NUEVO EVANGELIO, SEGÚN EL GENERAL SAN RAÚL, EL VERDE OLIVO, PORTADOR DE LA VERDAD REVELADA POR SU ANTECESOR, EL MAGNO ORATE, NOS ANUNCIA UNA “BUENA NUEVA”
Jueves, mayo 26, 2016 | Miriam Celaya |
Original Article: El Nuevo Evangelio,
Raúl Castro habría deslizado los designios del PCC en el tabloide con los documentos analizados y aprobados durante el VII Congreso
LA HABANA, Cuba.- El partido-estado-gobierno cubano acaba de publicar un tabloide que contiene dos de los documentos raigales analizados y aprobados durante el VII Congreso del PCC, el pasado mes de abril de 2016. Se trata del Proyecto de Conceptualización del Modelo Económico y Social Cubano de Desarrollo Socialista y delProyecto Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Económico y Social hasta 2030: Propuesta de Visión de la Nación, Ejes y Sectores Estratégicos.
Sin dudas, estamos ante un caso de “desclasificación parcial”, teniendo en cuenta que los cuatro documentos aprobados en el rito oculto de abril tuvieron un carácter estrictamente secreto y en su discusión y aprobación, producida en condiciones de clandestinidad, participaron alrededor de un millar de ungidos (dizque “delegados”) y –según cifras oficiales– 3 500 “invitados”.
Aún quedan por desclasificar los dos misteriosos pergaminos restantes, a saber, el Informe sobre los Resultados de la Implementación de los Lineamientos de la Política Económica y Social del Partido y la Revolución, con la Actualización de los Lineamientos para el período 2016-2021, y el que contiene el Trabajo del partido en cumplimiento de los objetivos aprobados en la Primera Conferencia Nacional y de las Directrices del Primer Secretario del Comité Central, es decir, los sagrados mandamientos del propio General-Presidente.
Lo primero que llama la atención en la divulgación de este tabloide es la indiferencia de la población cubana, que no ha dado la menor importancia a un documento donde, se supone, quedaron trazados y consagrados los destinos de la nación. En contraste, algunas agencias de prensa extranjeras han desatado una ola de comentarios que tienden a magnificar los referidos documentos como si se tratase del nacimiento de un milagro, centrando el foco de atención sobre lo que consideran la gran novedad: el supuesto reconocimiento del PCC a la “propiedad privada”, incluyendo en esa categoría a pequeñas y medianas empresas. A la vez, sus analistas más audaces sugieren cierta voluntad política del gobierno cubano de potenciar o permitir el desarrollo de este tipo de gestión económica.
Semejante espejismo agitado por los “co-responsables” de prensa acreditados en La Habana –tan diligentes en legitimar el discurso oficial de la cúpula como refractarios a adentrarse en la investigación seria y profunda de la realidad cubana– parte de una errónea interpretación del punto número 91 de la “Conceptualización…”, que expone textualmente “Otra transformación para contribuir a la economía, al empleo y al bienestar de la población es el reconocimiento del papel complementario de la propiedad privada sobre determinados medios de producción…”.
Sin embargo, es sabido que la verdadera propiedad privada solo es posible en sociedades donde los individuos, grupos o entidades empresariales estén en condiciones de ejercer el derecho de poseer, controlar, heredar, administrar y hacer producir sus bienes y capitales con el fin de alcanzar riquezas. Derechos estos que incluyen la posibilidad de ampliar sus propiedades en dependencia de sus capacidades, o de adquirir (incluso importar) materias primas, maquinarias, equipos y cualquier elemento necesario para el desarrollo de su actividad comercial o productiva, lo cual implica la existencia de un marco jurídico que ofrezca garantías legales a los “propietarios”. No es el caso de Cuba, como deberían conocer los corrillos de la prensa acreditada.
De hecho, el documento recién publicado refrenda todo lo contrario de lo que cabe esperarse allí donde existe la verdadera propiedad privada, cuando expone en el punto número 104: “No se permite la concentración de la propiedad y la riqueza en personas naturales o jurídicas no estatales conforme a lo legislado, de modo consecuente con los principios de nuestro socialismo”. Y, por si esto no bastara, se coloca otro clavo sobre el ataúd de la ilusoria “propiedad privada” en el punto 201, cuando dicta: “el Estado regula la constitución, disolución, liquidación y reestructuración de las personas jurídicas de todas las formas de propiedad, define sus ámbitos de actuación y actividades principales”.
Pero precisamente el valor más relevante del “Proyecto de Conceptualización…” es la enorme suma de elementos contrapuestos y excluyentes entre sí, lo que refleja con claridad meridiana no solo la magnitud y profundidad de la crisis socioeconómica cubana, sino la imposibilidad de darle solución desde el marco político-jurídico establecido en los últimos 57 años.
Esto se hace evidente a lo largo de todo el documento, pero bastan unas pocas cuestiones esenciales que contradicen los presupuestos ideológicos sobre los que se pretende construir el “Modelo”. Pongamos por caso las inversiones extranjeras, una “forma de propiedad” que ahora se reconoce oficialmente por el gobierno como “una fuente de desarrollo y vía de acceso a capitales, tecnologías, mercados y experiencia gerencial, que tributa a la solución de importantes desequilibrios estructurales y a encadenamientos productivos…” (Punto número 90).
No obstante, se mantiene el principio de que el sistema de dirección de la economía es planificada, regulada y controlada desde el Estado, que también controla las relaciones con la economía internacional (punto 203).
Es decir, que la solución a la crisis estructural del socialismo cubano se encuentra en las formas de producción capitalistas, pero la distribución de la riqueza que se obtenga de las relaciones de mercado a través del comercio exterior y de la inversión extranjera (capitalista) será ejercida por el Estado socialista. Luego, la riqueza obtenida de la capacidad de producción capitalista sería de propiedad estatal-socialista, ya que, como expone el punto 124, “el Estado actúa como representante del dueño, que es el pueblo”.
Y como, además, “Dada su condición de representante del dueño, el Estado decide y controla los destinos de las utilidades de las empresas propiedad socialista de todo el pueblo, una vez cumplidas las obligaciones tributarias y otros compromisos” (punto 148), se mantiene la colosal estatificación de la economía.
Esta “representatividad” incluye la regulación y control de las instituciones, empresas y medios de comunicación, como recurso estratégico del Estado –es decir, el monopolio estatal de los medios–, “según la política trazada” por el PCC, “preservando la soberanía tecnológica, con observancia de la legislación establecida en materia de defensa y seguridad nacionales” (puntos 110 y 111), en lo que presupone la ratificación de la Ley 88 (Ley Mordaza).
Desde luego, ese papel del Estado (a la vez gobierno y partido único) como “padre” administrador de la riqueza y de las propiedades en virtud de “representante del pueblo” es más que discutible en una nación donde no se realizan elecciones para el cargo de Presidente desde hace más de 60 años, y donde más del 70% de la población nació después de 1959 y nunca ha tenido la posibilidad de legitimar semejante paternidad.
Precisamente esto determina que la “nueva” propuesta –absurdamente futurista, pero casi idéntica a toda la retórica discursiva de las décadas precedentes– desde la misma cúpula octogenaria y retrógrada, no despierte interés alguno entre los cubanos comunes. ¿A qué “debatir” acerca del mismo viejo hecho consumado?, se preguntan con la apatía que domina a la sociedad cubana.
Pocos se han detenido a pensar que con “el debate” popular que, según se dice, se producirá en torno a estos documentos, la casta gobernante persigue “legitimar” la consagración del capitalismo de estado para su propio beneficio, y mantenerse aferrada al poder más allá de las posibilidades biológicas de los bandoleros verde olivo. Así parece quedar expresado en la presentación del mamotreto en cuestión: estamos ante el legado estratégico de la “generación histórica” a las nuevas generaciones.
No es posible agotar en un solo texto todos los ambiguos vericuetos que se deslizan a lo largo de los 330 puntos del Proyecto de Conceptualización. Baste, por el momento, con resumir que ellos constituyen la “buena nueva” que nos anuncia San Raúl, el verde olivo, portador de una verdad que seguramente le ha sido revelada por su antecesor, el Magno Orate: si nos apegamos al concepto de “Revolución” de aquel sabio anciano, si se cumplen los “Lineamientos” y si los resultados de la implementación de éstos resulta efectiva, para el año 2030 los cubanos estaremos en condiciones de “construir una nación soberana, independiente, socialista, democrática, próspera y sostenible”.
No se sorprenda nadie si en las semanas venideras se incrementa exponencialmente el número de emigrados desde esta ínsula imposible.
Partido Comumunista de Cuba: CONCEPTUALIZACIÓN DEL MODELO ECONÓMICO Y SOCIAL CUBANO DE DESARROLLO SOCIALISTA y PLAN NACIONAL DE DESARROLLO ECONÓMICO Y SOCIAL HASTA 2030: PROPUESTADE VISIÓN DE LA NACIÓN, EJES Y SECTORES ESTRATÉGICOS
Partido Cumunista de Cuba
May 2016
Complete Documents: Cuba PCC, May 2016, CONCEPTUALIZACIÓN DEL MODELO ECONÓMICO
CUBA’S SHAMEFUL FRIENDS
Yoani Sanchez,
14ymedio, Generation Y, Havana, 25 May 2016
14ymedio, Cuba’s first independent daily digital news outlet, published directly from the island, is available in Spanish here. Translations of selected articles in English are here.
People with whom we share sorrows and joys are a reflection of ourselves, however different they may appear. As friends we choose them to accompany us, but also to complete us, with the diversity and continuity that our human nature needs. The problem is when our choices of coexistence are not based on affinities and preferences, but on interests and alliances focused on annoying others.
In the same week, the Cuban executive has embraced two deplorable authoritarian regimes. A few hours after Cuban Vice President Miguel Diaz-Canel Bermudez met with government functionaries in Belarus, Havana’s Plaza of the Revolution hosted a meeting between Raul Castro and a special representative from North Korea’s Workers Party. Disgraceful comrades, shamelessly embraced and praised by the island’s officialdom.
In a world where civil society, calls for the respect for human rights, and movements that promote the recognition of rights are making themselves heard ever more loudly, it is difficult for the Cuban government to explain his good relations with Europe’s last dictator and with the cruelly capricious grandson who inherited power through his bloodline. What united the island’s authorities with similar political specimens?
The only possible answer is sticking their finger in the eye of Western democracies and the White House. The problem with this attitude lies in the demands from these fellow travelers for commitments and silences. Diplomatic friendship is converted into complicity and the comrades end up defining the nature of those who have chosen their company.
Alexandr Lukashenko, who has been in power in Belarus since 1994
Cuban President, Raul Castro Ruz, received on Tuesday afternoon May 24, Kim Yong Chol, a member of the Politburo of the Worker’s Party of Korea.
GRANMA, OFFICIAL RECORD OF THE SEVENTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA.
GRANMA, EDICIÓN ESPECIAL, SÁBADO, 14, M AYO 2016
“El desarrollo de la economía nacional, junto a la lucha por la paz y la firmeza ideológica, constituyen las principales misiones del Partido”
The complete document in a PDF File is here: GRANMA, EDICIÓN ESPECIAL, SÁBADO, 14, M AYO 2016
Or Here: http://www.granma.cu/file/pdf/gaceta/congreso%20pcc.pdf
Posted in Blog
Tagged Economic Reforms, Fidel Castro, Politics, President Raul Castro, Seventh Party Congress
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