Tag Archives: International Relations

¿Más allá de la cooperación Sur-Sur? Contexto, luces y sombras de la alianza Cuba-Venezuela

Posted on November 1, 2013 by Arch Ritter

Daniele Benzi y Giuseppe Lo Brutto

Daniele Benzi (dbenzi@flacso.edu.ec) Profesor Asociado del Departamento en Estudios Internacionales y Comunicación FLACSO-Ecuador; Giuseppe Lo Brutto (giuseloby@msn.com) Profesor-Investigador del ICSyH, BUAP-México.

En proceso de publicación en Ayala, C., Rivera, J. (2013), De la diversidad a la consonancia: la CSS latinoamericana, AMEXCID/INSTITUTO MORA/BUAP.

El Ensayo completo esta aqui:   Benzi_y_Lo_Brutto,Mas_alla_de_la_cooperacion_Sur-Sur

 Nicolas_Maduro_y_Raul_Castro_1

Resumen

 Además de constituir el núcleo originario y eje central de la propuesta de integración denominada ALBA-TCP, las relaciones bilaterales entre Cuba y Venezuela destacan en el panorama regional por los estrechos vínculos políticos y económicos establecidos en la última década, que, en la actualidad, se plasman y articulan en un amplio espectro de áreas de cooperación, proyectos conjuntos, inversiones e intercambios comerciales.

 Si para algunos autores se trata de un modelo paradigmático y al mismo tiempo novedoso de cooperación Sur-Sur que recupera y se alimenta del legado histórico de solidaridad internacional y entre los pueblos propio de la revolución cubana; otros, en cambio, críticos o escépticos a menudo, prefieren referirse al eje La Habana-Caracas como a un “caso singular” y hasta a una “utopía bilateral” (Romero, C. A. 2010: 127; 2011) inclusive dentro del panorama de las nuevas relaciones y cooperación Sur-Sur.

 En el presente artículo, tras caracterizar la posición de ambos países en términos de inserciónregional e internacional, líneas estratégicas en política exterior y áreas de cooperación, los autores abordan el análisis de sus relaciones y vínculos recíprocos, buscando profundizar todos aquellos aspectos útiles para revelar luces y sombras.

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Reflexiones finales

Una evaluación de las relaciones entre Cuba y Venezuela resulta una tarea nada sencilla. Al margen de las numerosas informaciones que se desconocen, las cuales indudablemente podrían aclarar distintos aspectos de este peculiar matrimonio en el cuadro de las relaciones internacionales contemporáneas, la valoración final depende en buena medida de la postura política adoptada por el observador. Lo cual implica, además, tener en cuenta factores de orden ideológico, político y de seguridad relativos a ambas naciones y que afectan profundamente sus vínculos, que apenas hemos mencionado a lo largo de este artículo.

Aunque quizás sería oportuno introducir alguna y otra variable de naturaleza política y de clases, en el corto plazo y en términos de coyunturas enfrentadas particularmente críticas, las ventajas en términos globales han sido sustanciales para ambos países. Por ello, desde la perspectiva cubana, Pérez Villanueva (2008: 63) ha afirmado que:

este vínculo abre una serie de potencialidades que podrían aprovecharse para desarrollar programas de reindustrialización, que por un lado complementen y sean funcionales a los sectores más dinámicos de la economía y, por otro, posibiliten la recuperación y el relanzamiento de sectores estratégicos por su impacto en la calidad de vida de la población y sus efectos sobre el sector externo.

Por otro lado, “En cuanto a los servicios médicos que el país exporta, fundamentalmente a Venezuela, su impacto directo en el sector productivo es muy reducido” (Sánchez y Triana, 2008: 82). Sin embargo, agregan los mismos autores:

“Otra perspectiva del análisis está en el hecho real de que Cuba ha venido creando una especie de rampa de lanzamiento en torno al sector de la salud. […] Si tenemos en cuenta, junto a los servicios médicos, la exportación de equipos médicos y medicamentos genéricos y biotecnológicos y la inversión en el exterior en el sector biotecnológico junto a negocios de transferencia de tecnología, entonces estamos en presencia de uno de los sectores más dinámicos de la economía nacional, con altas posibilidades de generación de sinergias que potencien su efecto sobre el resto de la economía en un futuro próximo.” (Ibidem: 91)

No obstante, a la vez que algunos cuestionan la supuesta capacidad de los servicios médicos de volverse una efectiva “rampa de lanzamiento”, evaluándolos más bien como una peligrosa “terciarización disfuncional de la estructura económica” (Monreal, 2007, cit. en Mesa-Lago, 2008: 47), la actual dependencia energética y financiera de Venezuela, junto a lo que se percibe como una escasa diversificación de las relaciones económicas y comerciales del país, constituyen de momento el factor crucial de la realidad cubana. Una dependencia que, además, como advierte Mesa-Lago (2011: 5), “creció justo cuando la economía venezolana sufrió el peor desempeño regional”.

Otro punto importante a considerar es el impacto de la exportación de servicios médicos o salida de cooperantes a Venezuela y a otros países en el desempeño del sector nacional de salud. Si por un lado, como aclara Feinsilver (2008: 121), “la diplomacia médica ha proporcionado una válvula de escape para los disgustados profesionales de la salud que, aunque han sacrificado su tiempo, estudiado y trabajado con ahínco, ganan mucho menos que buena parte de los empleados menos calificados de la industria del turismo”; por el otro, el déficit interno es ahora evidente. Mesa-Lago (2011: 17) calcula “que aproximadamente un tercio de los médicos está en el exterior”. Así, sigue el autor, “Uno de los acuerdos [del último Congreso del PCC] estipula garantizar que la graduación de especialistas médicos cubra «las necesidades del país y las que se generen por los compromisos internacionales»” (Ibidem).

Por todo lo anterior, no resulta sorprendente constatar que mientras en Cuba el vínculo con la República Bolivariana es visto por lo general como una oportunidad para la mejora social y el necesario relanzamiento de la economía del país, muchos teman al mismo tiempo el repetirse de la tragedia de un nuevo CAME, tanto más en cuanto particularmente a partir del referéndum de 2007 perdido por el oficialismo en Venezuela y de la crisis económica de 2008, se revelaron cabalmente las fragilidades de un aliado estratégico y vital, como hemos visto, en el sentido literal de la palabra.

Entre 2008 y 2009, en efecto, una serie de eventos fuera del control de los gobiernos cubano y venezolano se ha encargado de evidenciar la inestabilidad y los límites de una alianza cuya principal fortaleza es dada por la afinidad humana e ideológica entre las respectivas cúpulas del poder y, sólo hasta cierto punto, de las elites políticas y algunos segmentos de la sociedad civil y organizaciones populares.

La drástica, aunque temporánea, caída en los precios del petróleo, sumándose en el caso de Cubaal desplome del precio mundial del níquel, de la reducción de los ingresos por turismo, de las remesas y del impacto catastrófico provocado por el paso seguido de tres huracanes, destacaron la impotencia de los subsidios y solidarid bolivariana para mantener a flote una economía estancada, en un cuadro de agotamiento y necesario replanteamiento también de la dinámica política.

Para esta fecha, sin embargo, esas cuestiones ya habían sido asumidas por la dirigencia cubana como un problema, a la hora de darle forma y contenidos al proceso de “actualización” del modelo. En este sentido, el pragmatismo de Raúl Castro y el ajuste intraelite que supuso su definitiva toma del poder, han significado también, en un marco de continuidad por el momento, un cambio cualitativo y de perspectiva en la relación con Venezuela, cuyos contornos apenas empiezan a esclarecerse.

Lo único cierto, por ahora, es que tanto la consolidación de la “utopía bilateral” que tanto preocupa a Carlos A. Romero (2011), como la “ilusión neocastrista”, en palabras de Alain Touraine (2006), de emprender nuevamente un proyecto revolucionario a escala continental a partir del eje La Habana-Caracas, ya no figuran en la agenda de quienes, verosímilmente, llevarán por un tiempo todavía las riendas del proceso de “actualización” del socialismo cubano31 .

Desde la perspectiva venezolana, la evaluación se torna tal vez aun más complicada. Hasta los críticos más enconados y menos reflexivos tienen cierta dificultad a la hora de sustentar con argumentos serios la descalificación total de la cooperación cubana dentro de las Misiones, unque éstas fueran meras políticas de corte asistencial con un perfil netamente partidista y/o políticoideológico.

Briceño (2011: 71), por ejemplo, sostiene que “Es cierto que Venezuela se ha beneficiado de la ayuda cubana en el desarrollo de las Misiones, pero surgen [algunas] cuestiones. La primera es la cuestión del equilibrio en la cooperación, que en el caso concreto del ALBA se plantea en comparar el aporte de la cooperación de Venezuela con Cuba, y la de este país con Venezuela”. El tema de las asimetrías en la cooperación ofrecida y recibida es inocultable y lo sería probablemente aun más en la medida en que fueran oficializadas las cifras estimadas en los párrafos anteriores y, especialmente, las que se refieren al supuesto sobrepago por servicios profesionales médicos.

Nuestro punto, sin embargo, en el marco de estas conclusiones, es otro. El gobierno bolivariano, aunque quizás no parezca evidente, también ha desarrollado cierta dependencia tanto de los servicios médicos cubanos, como en general de la asistencia técnica y política, así como en la orientación ideológica y hasta simbólica procedente de este país.

Si en algunos sectores y programas efectivamente se podría cuestionar un “exceso” de cooperación – en términos de presencias, capacidad operativa, escasa coordinación, oportunidad y/o falta de resultados – la colaboración cubana es por el momento un ingrediente esencial de las políticas desplegadas con las Misiones y de los resultados obtenidos en distintos indicadores.

De instrumento transitorio y excepcional, se ha pasado a su multiplicación y establecimiento semi permanente, pero siempre paralelo a las estructuras preexistentes, manteniendo un carácter híbrido de dispositivo extraordinario en mano del poder ejecutivo, que ha creado “una numerosa y desordenada burocracia paralela al funcionariado ministerial formal existente, para atender el desarrollo de cada actividad propia en estos programas sociales” (Viloria, 2011: 8-9)33 .

En el caso de Barrio Adentro, además, la Misión médica cubana goza de una autonomía cuasi absoluta con respecto a las autoridades venezolanas y al resto del sistema nacional de salud. Si por un lado se podría poner en tela de juicio su capacidad para llevar a cabo un programa tan complejo y prolongado en el tiempo en un país tan polarizado como es actualmente la República Bolivariana, por el otro, a pesar de no ser la única responsable de esta situación, su autonomía y falta de articulación con otras instituciones supone determinados problemas tanto legales como de funcionalidad y efectividad de resultados34. A pesar de la destacada actividad médica cubana a lo largo de los últimos decenios, lo cual ha implicado ciertamente un importante proceso de aprendizaje y reflexión sobre si misma, el hecho de que la colaboración con Venezuela sea de lejos el programa más amplio y complejo jamás emprendido, determina nuevos e insoslayables desafíos que son al mismo tiempo técnicos, éticos y políticos.

Después del giro de 2006-2007, al lado de las Misiones surgidas para experimentar las nuevas políticas e instituciones socialistas, la última generación de estos programas ha abandonado el carácter inicial de complemento a las políticas económicas y de desarrollo, para reproducir, por una parte, políticas meramente compensatorias y focalizadas; y, por la otra, sustituirse a lo que debería ser la acción ordinaria del gobierno y de sus Ministerios.

Lo anterior, evidentemente, está íntimamente atado a la característica estructural de Venezuela en cuanto Estado-nación, esto es, ser un país rentista-petrolero, lo cual produce y reproduce ciertas “creencias en los atajos, las soluciones cortoplacistas, la creencia de un país rico”, con el resultado de que muchas propuestas “en gestión de políticas públicas dirigidas a erradicar a la pobreza, descansen en el asistencialismo y en la transferencia de recursos económicos de forma directa, hacia aquellos sectores poblacionales seleccionados como beneficiarios de los programas sociales” (Viloria, 2011: 8).

Por paradójico que pudiera aparecer, esta condición encuentra un terreno particularmente fértil y potencialmente perverso tanto en el voluntarismo típico de todo proceso revolucionario y muy presente en Cuba a lo largo de su historia, como, por un lado, en una concepción anquilosada del socialismo y del papel del Estado, la cual produce ciertas formas de paternalismo y parasitismo social; y, por el otro, en las urgentes e insoslayables necesidades económicas del régimen cubano y de sus propios cooperantes.

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Camilo Cienfuegos Refinery

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The Venezuela-Cuba Undersea Cable Arriving in Cuba, 2011

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Stephen Purvis, Wrongfully Accused of Spying and Fraud: Letter to the Economist

Posted on September 23, 2013 by Arch Ritter

From The Economist, August 13, 2013

“Dear Editor,

I enjoyed reading about my misfortunes in the Economist, albeit many months after publication and in the company of fellow inmates in the Cuban high security prison, La Condesa. I would ask you to correct the impression that you give in the May 9th 2012 edition and subsequent articles that I was accused and detained for corruption.

During my 8 month interrogation in the Vila Marista I was accused of many things, starting with revelations of state secrets, but never of corruption. After a further 7 months held with a host of convicted serious criminals and a handful of confused businessmen, most of whom were in a parallel predicament to mine, I was finally charged and sentenced for participating in various supposed breaches of financial regulations. The fact that the Central bank had specifically approved the transactions in question for 12 years, and that by their sentencing the court has in effect potentially criminalised every foreign business investing or trading in Cuba was considered irrelevant by the judges. I am thankful however that the judges finally determined that my sentence should not only have with a conditional release date a few days before the trail thus conveniently justifying my 15 months in prison, but, bizarrely was to be non-custodial. So my Kafkaesque experience at the sharp end of Cuban justice ended as abruptly as it began.

I spent time with a number of foreign businessmen arrested during 2011 and 2012 from a variety of countries, although representatives from Brazil, Venezuela and China were conspicuous in the absence. Very few of my fellow sufferers have been reported in the press and there are many more in the system than is widely known. As they are all still either waiting for charges, trial or sentencing they will certainly not be talking to the press. Whilst a few of them are being charged with corruption many are not and the accusations range from sabotage, damage to the economy, tax avoidance and illegal economic activity. It is absolutely clear that the war against corruption may be a convenient political banner to hide behind and one that foreign governments and press will support. But the reasons for actively and aggressively pursuing foreign business are far more complicated.  Why for example is the representative of Ericsson in jail for exactly the same activities as their Chinese competitor who is not? Why for example was one senior European engineer invited back to discuss a potential new project only to be arrested for paying technical workers five years ago when he was a temporary resident in Cuba?

You interpret the economic liberalisation evident at street level as an indication of a desire for fundamental change. It is true that these reforms are welcomed, especially the dramatic increase in remittance flows that have injected fresh hard currency into the bottom strata of a perennially cash strapped economy. But until the law relating to foreign investment and commerce is revised and the security service changes its modus operandi for enforcing these laws, Cuba will remain extremely risky for non-bilateral foreign business and foreign executives should be under no illusion about the great personal risks they run if they chose to do business there.  As businessmen emerge from their awful experience and tell their individual stories perhaps the real reasons for this concerted attack against business’s and individuals that have historically been friends of Cuba will become a bit clearer. In the meantime your intrepid reporters could usefully investigate the individuals and cliques who are benefitting from the market reorganization and newly nationalized assets resulting from this “war on corruption”.

Yours faithfully, Stephen Purvis”

Stephen Purvis and Family after his return to Britain

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Ernesto Hernández-Catá, “Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Venezuela: A Tale of Dependence and Shock.”

Posted on September 18, 2013 by Arch Ritter

The complete analysis is available here: “Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Venezuela:  A Tale of Dependence and Shock.”   September 2013

Introduction

Recently there have been several estimates of Venezuelan economic assistance to Cuba—for example by Lopez (2012) and Mesa-Lago (2013). My latest estimates suggest that payments from Venezuela increased rapidly during the first decade of the XXI century and peaked at almost 19% of Cuba’s GDP) in 2009. They declined over the following two years but remained quite large: I estimate Venezuelan assistance in 2011 (the last year for which the required data are available) at just over $7 billion, or 11 % of Cuba’s GDP. These numbers are large, and they have invited comparisons with Soviet assistance to Cuba in the late 1980s. It has been implied that the adverse effect on Cuba’s real GDP of ending Venezuelan aid would be similar in size to the devastating impact of the elimination of Soviet aid in 1990. This is almost certainly wrong.

Conclusion

The analysis presented in this paper indicates that a complete cancellation of Venezuelan assistance to Cuba would cause considerably less damage than the elimination of Soviet assistance in the early 1990s, with the fall in real GDP estimated at somewhere between 7% and 10%, compared to 38% after the breakdown of Cuban/Soviet relations. Moreover, if the Cuban government were to avoid the policies of   subsidization and inflationary finance pursued in the post-Soviet period, the post-Venezuelan contraction would be at the lower end of the range or approximately 7%.

This is still a lot, however. To be sure, the danger of a sudden elimination of aid inflows has diminished considerably since the Venezuelan election of April 2013. Nevertheless, the prospect of a more gradual reduction in aid remains likely given Venezuela’s economic difficulties. In that case, the effect would be a reduction in the growth of the Cuban economy spread over several years, rather than a sudden contraction of output. Furthermore, current efforts to obtain financing at non-market terms from other countries, like Algeria, Angola and Brazil, would, if successful, diminish the magnitude of the shock. But it would perpetuate dependence and delay the needed adjustment.

The only way to diminish the pain of reduced income and consumption would be a decisive effort to expand Cuba’s productive capacity by intensifying the reform process. The list of required actions is familiar to all: liberalize prices, unify the exchange rate system, dismantle exchange and trade controls, stop the bureaucratic interference with non-state agricultural producers, continue efforts to downsize employment in the state sector, and increase substantially the list of activities opened to the private sector, including (why not?) doctors, nurses, teachers and athletes. Private clinics and schools would pop up, consultancy services would flourish, and the baseball winter leagues would come back to life.

 Karl Marx (1852) credited Hegel with the idea that history repeats itself twice. Unfortunately for him, he added: “the first time as a tragedy, the second time as a farce”. This is not necessarily true. Often the second time is also a tragedy, as when the West gave Eastern Europe to Stalin at Yalta, less than a decade after giving it to Hitler in Munich. And why couldn’t the second time be an epiphany? Cuba’s rulers now have a historic opportunity to allow people to improve their own standard of living, and to stop wasting resources to keep the faded and sinister red banner afloat. Without a doubt, history will absolve them if they take that chance. And then, perhaps, Cuba will be allowed to replace its politically inspired dependence on doubtful friends with free, mutually beneficial trade with all nations.

Ernesto Hernandez-Cata was born in Marianao, Havana, Cuba in 1942. He holds a License from the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland; and a Ph.D. in economics from Yale University. For about 30 years through, Ernesto Hernandez-Cata worked for the International Monetary Fund where he held a number of senior positions. When he retired from the I.M.F. in July 2003 he was Associate Director of the African Department and Chairman of the Investment Committee of the Staff Retirement Plan. Previously he had served in the Division of International Finance of the Federal Reserve Board. From 2002 to 2007 Mr. Hernandez-Cata taught economic development and growth at the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the University of Johns Hopkins. Previously he had taught macroeconomics and monetary policy at The American University.

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“ASSESSING THE GOALS AND IMPACT OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO AFTER 50 YEARS”

Posted on March 25, 2013 by Arch Ritter

The Dean Rusk Center for International Law and Policy, University of Georgia School of Law presented a most interesting conference on The Cuban Embargo: Policy Outlook after 50 Years  on March 22, 2013. The principal organizers of the conference were Ambassador C. Donald Johnson, Director, Dean Rusk Center for International Law and Policy and Laura Tate Kagel, Assistant Director, Dean Rusk Center for International Law and Policy.

The Conference included a broad range of views on the issue from Dan Fisk, the major author of the Helms-Burton Bill to Ambassador Jose Cabanas of the Cuban Interest Section in Washington, and from Ricardo Torres and Jorge Mario Sanchez of the Center for the Study of he Cuban Economy to Vicky Huddleston, former US Ambassador to Cuba. The Dean Rusk Center will publish a “Conference Proceedings” document in the near future and I will make this available on this site when it appears.

In the meantime, here is the Power Point version of my presentation: “ASSESSING THE GOALS AND IMPACT OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO AFTER 50 YEARS”

Below is the Programme for the Conference

Friday, March 22, 2013,  8:30 a.m. – 3:30 p.m. Dean Rusk Hall, Larry Walker Room, 4th Floor

 Program:

8:30 a.m. Registration and Coffee

9:00 a.m. WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION

 Rebecca H. White, Dean, University of Georgia School of Law

 C. Donald Johnson, Director, Dean Rusk Center

 9:15 a.m. PANEL 1— ASSESSING THE GOALS AND IMPACT OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO AFTER FIFTY YEARS

Panelists:

– Archibald R.M. Ritter, Distinguished Research Professor Emeritus, Carleton University,  Ottawa, Canada

– Ricardo Torres, Deputy Director, Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy (CEEC), University of Havana, Cuba

– Ray Walser, Senior Policy Analyst, Latin America, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.

Moderator: C. Donald Johnson, Director, Dean Rusk Center

11:00 a.m. PANEL 2— EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE PATHWAYS TO REMOVING SANCTIONS

Panelists:

– Daniel W. Fisk, Vice President for Policy and Strategic Planning, International Republican Institute, Washington, D.C.

– Vicki Huddleston, former Chief of Mission, Interests Section of U.S.A., Havana, Cuba

– Robert L. Muse, Attorney, Washington, DC

Moderator:   Timothy L. Meyer, Assistant Professor, University of Georgia  School of Law

12:45 p.m. KEYNOTE ADDRESS:  José R. Cabañas Rodríguez, Chief, Cuban Interests Section, Washington, D.C.

1:45 p.m. Break

2:00 p.m. PANEL 3— TRADE AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND THE U.S.-CUBAN ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP IN A POST EMBARGO REGIME

Panelists:

– Jonathan C. Benjamin-Alvarado, Professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska at Omaha

– Gary W. Black, Commissioner of Agriculture for the State of Georgia

– C. Parr Rosson, III, Professor and Head, Department of Agricultural Economics, Texas A&M University

– Jorge Mario Sánchez Egozcue, Senior Researcher and Professor, Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy (CEEC), University of Havana, Cuba

 Moderator:  Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Professor of Legal Studies, Terry College of Business , University of Georgia

3:30 p.m. CLOSING

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Miriam Celaya: “I Don’t Want Siblings Like These”

Posted on February 20, 2013 by Arch Ritter

Once again Miriam Celaya said it best.

From her Blog, Sin Evasion/ Without Evasion

Miriam Celaya

The recent ascent of the Cuban President-General to the head of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the silent tolerance or evident indulgence of thirty democratic nations, even before the arrogance that permeated his speeches, highlights the political cross-dressing of “our America”.

Some specific details on the speeches of Castro II, like lessons he offered his… counterparts(?) with regard to drug trafficking and consumption, based on the Cuban experience, on the strategic utility of the death penalty and the egregious disrespect he demonstrated against  the will of the majority of the Puerto Rican people – who recently endorsed their sovereign decision to remain a commonwealth – when he expressed his regret at the absence of that island nation at the conclave, and his wish that one day it would serve on the CELAC, are just an example of how we need to advance the region’s democratic culture.

The General’s blunders were welcomed by undaunted representatives of Latin-American democracies attending the meeting, who even applauded the rudeness of the old former guerrilla, wearing a civilian costume for the occasion. So we attended, among smiles, compliments, and handshakes, the alliance of democratically elected governments in the region – whose countries have multiparty systems, freedom of movement, of expression and of the press, freedom of association and other civil advantages that embellish democracies – with the ancient Antillean satrapy, thus legitimizing his dictatorship. The new Latin-American principle was explicitly made: gloss over what they have termed “our ideological and political differences in order to consolidate “the unity of our sister countries” and maintain “the respect to self-determination” of each peoples.

Obviously, the thirty-plus Latin American governments meeting in Santiago de Chile decided that the totalitarianism imposed on Cuba is not only an “ideology”, but has long remained in power thanks to the self-determination of the Cuban people (though we have to admit that they may have a point in the latter). Perhaps Chavez’s oil, the subtle detail that the new capital of Venezuela is located in Havana or that the investments of certain Latin-American enterprises in Cuba might have had something to do with such regional empathy.

Another thing that was not clear to me was what commitments the Cuban government might have entered into with the CELAC chairmanship, what advantages Cubans could expect from those commitments and what the projections are for the medium and long terms as far as the progress of the Latin American and Caribbean countries. At least from what they aired in Cuba, the speeches were geared more towards historical references that would justify our supposed common identity, towards the need to overcome poverty, and the command to create a common front in the presence of powerful economies of the developed nations of the First World. Too many clichés in the speeches. As is customary, there were also many “what’s” but few “how’s”.

In this vein, while in Cuba’s interior the dictatorship does not give one iota about civil liberties, it flaunts the presidency of the umbrella organization of democratic nations in the region. The General’s aggressive speech, presenting the violence of the Cuban experience as the legitimate letter of the government, seems to enjoy the complicity of those attending the regional event while the loneliness and helplessness of the Cuban people escalates. The dictatorship’s summit has ended, and, as for me, if those governments exemplify our siblings, then I’d rather be an only child.

 

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“Review of “The Politics of Canada-Cuba Relations: Emerging Possibilities and Diverse Challenges.”

Posted on January 31, 2013 by Arch Ritter

H-Diplo Article Reviews  http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/reviews/  No. 383

Published on 31 January 2013

H-Diplo Article Review Editors: Thomas Maddux and Diane N. Labrosse

 URL: http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/reviews/PDF/AR383.pdf

Review by Asa McKercher, Trinity Hall, Cambridge

Lana Wylie, ed. “The Politics of Canada-Cuba Relations: Emerging Possibilities and Diverse Challenges.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 16:1 (2010): 55-178. “Special Section – The Politics of Canada-Cuba Relations: Emerging Possibilities and Diverse Challenges”

Table of Contents

“Partie Spéciale – La politique des relations Canada-Cuba : Options émergents et défis”

Introduction: Lana Wyle, “Shifting Ground: Considering the New Realities in the Canadian-Cuban Relationship”

Calum McNeil, “To Engage or not to Engage: An (A)ffective Argument in Favor of a Policy of Engagement with Cuba”

Julia Sagebien and Paolo Spaldoni, “The Truth about Cuba?”

Luis René Fernández Tabío, “Canadian-Cuban Economic Relations: The Recognition and Respect of Difference”

Archibald R.M. Ritter, “Canada’s Economic Relations with Cuba, 1990 to 2010 and Beyond”

Heather N. Nicol, “Canada-Cuba Relations: An Ambivalent Media and Policy”

Peter McKenna and John M. Kirk, “Evaluating ‘Constructive Engagement’”

Raúl Rodríguez Rodríguez, “Canada and the Cuban Revolution: Defining the Rules of Engagement 1959-1962”

Trudeau and Castro in Havana, 1976

 Introduction:

In early January 2012, Diane Ablonczy, the Canadian Minister of State for Latin America, travelled to Cuba for her first official visit to the island. In contrast to her party’s longstanding position on Cuba, Ablonczy – one of the more conservative Conservatives – went, not to lecture Cuba on human rights, but to talk business, a softening of Ottawa’s attitude on a thorny issue and a volte-face seen also in recent Canadian policy toward China. At the same time as Ablonczy set off for Havana, Canadians of all sorts were beginning their annual trek from their wintry homeland to Cuba’s sunny shores. Indeed, benefitting from their country’s stance of maintaining open diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba, over one million Canadians were expected to make the trip.1 Yet all was not well with Canadian-Cuban relations that year. In April, on the front page of Granma, Fidel Castro delivered a withering attack on Canada both for the environmental damage wrought by Canadian companies overseas and for Ottawa’s seeming support of London over the Falkland Islands. A week later, at the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Stephen Harper, Canada’s prime minister, sided with Barack Obama in blocking an attempt by Latin American nations to invite Cuba to the next summit meeting.2 As these instances show, relations between Ottawa and Havana can be oddly ambivalent. Still, such ups and downs are reflective of a normal state-to-state relationship, one that stands in stark contrast to the hostility between Havana and Washington.

To assess the Canadian-Cuban relationship, Lana Wylie, a professor at McMaster University who over the last few years has done much to deepen understanding of the Canada-Cuba dyad, has brought together a diverse group of scholars for a special issue of the Canadian Foreign Policy Journal examining “The Politics of Canada-Cuba Relations: Emerging Possibilities and Diverse Challenges”.3 As Wylie explains in her introduction, in light of changes on the island – Raul Castro’s assumption of the presidency and his resulting reforms – and the prospect of a softening of U.S. policy under President Barack Obama, there is a need for such an examination. The contributors, who range from academic stalwarts – John Kirk, Peter McKenna and Arch Ritter – to, importantly, Cuban scholars – Raúl Rodríguez and Luis René Fernández Tabío – provide perceptive prognostications, interesting insights, and prudent prescriptions about the relationship between Canada and Cuba.

Concluding comment…

Disagreements between Canada and Cuba – on human rights, the Falklands, free trade – have not resulted in the sundering of normal relations, nor are there any signs that they will. Engagement between the two countries, constructive or not, thankfully continues, as does the very valuable people-to-people contact between Canadians and Cubans. The contributions to this collection are an excellent example of the benefits of academic exchange between Canadians and Cubans, and scholars and policymakers interested in the bilateral relationship between these two countries will be well-served by reading them.

Fidel Castro at the Funeral of Pierre Trudeau, September 2000

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Brookings Institution: “Opening to Havana “

Posted on January 17, 2013 by Arch Ritter

By: Ted Piccone

Original Essay Here:

http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/01/opening-to-havana

President Obama can break free of the embargo against Cuba by asserting executive authority to facilitate trade, travel and communications with the Cuban people. Ted Piccone drafted this memorandum to President Obama as part of   big bets and black swans: a presidential briefing book.

How should the U.S. initiate a dialogue with Cuban officials on trade, travel and communications?

How does Cuba easing its travel restrictions affect U.S. migration policy?

Congress may be hesitant to pursue talks with Cuba. What can Obama do to secure Congressional support?

Your second term presents a rare opportunity to turn the page of history from an outdated Cold War approach to Cuba to a new era of constructive engagement that will encourage a process of reform already underway on the island. Cuba is changing, slowly but surely, as it struggles to adapt its outdated economic model to the 21st century while preserving one-party rule. Reforms that empower Cuban citizens to open their own businesses, buy and sell property, hire employees, own cell phones, and travel off the island offer new opportunities for engagement.

Recommendation:

You can break free of the straitjacket of the embargo by asserting your executive authority to facilitate trade, travel and communications with the Cuban people. This will help establish your legacy of rising above historical grievances, advance U.S. interests in a stable, prosperous and democratic Cuba, and pave the way for greater U.S. leadership in the region.

Background:

Early in your first term, you made an important down payment on fostering change in Cuba by expanding travel and remittances to the island. Since then, hundreds of thousands of the 1.8 million Cuban-Americans in the United States have traveled to Cuba and sent over $2 billion to relatives there, providing important fuel to the burgeoning small business sector and helping individual citizens become less dependent on the state. Your decision to liberalize travel and assistance for the Cuban diaspora proved popular in Florida and helped increase your share of the Cuban-American vote by ten points in Miami-Dade county in the 2012 election.

As a result of your actions and changing demographics, families are more readily reuniting across the Florida straits, opening new channels of commerce and communication that are encouraging reconciliation among Cuban-Americans and a more general reframing of how best to support the Cuban people. Cuba’s recent decision to lift exit controls for most Cubans on the island is likely to accelerate this process of reconciliation within the Cuban diaspora, thereby softening support for counterproductive tactics like the embargo. The new travel rules also require a re-think of the outdated U.S. migration policy in order to manage a potential spike in departures from the island to the United States. For example, the team handling your immigration reform bill should be charged with devising proposals to reduce the special privileges afforded Cubans who make it to U.S. soil.

Under Raul Castro, the Cuban government has continued to undertake a number of important reforms to modernize its economy, lessen its dependence on Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela, and allow citizens to make their own decisions about their economic futures. The process of reform, however, is gradual, highly controlled and short on yielding game-changing results that would ignite the economy. Failure to tap new offshore oil and gas fields and agricultural damage from Hurricane Sandy dealt further setbacks. Independent civil society remains confined, repressed and harassed, and strict media and internet controls severely restrict the flow of information. The Castro generation is slowly handing power over to the next generation of party and military leaders who will determine the pace and scope of the reform process.

These trends suggest that an inflection point is approaching and that now is the time to try a new paradigm for de-icing the frozen conflict. The embargo — the most complex and strictest embargo against any country in the world — has handcuffed the United States and has prevented it from having any positive influence on the island’s developments. It will serve American interests better to learn how to work with the emerging Cuban leaders while simultaneously ramping up direct U.S. outreach to the Cuban people.

I recommend that your administration, led by a special envoy appointed by you and reporting to the secretary of state and the national security advisor, open a discreet dialogue with Havana on a wide range of issues, without preconditions. The aim of the direct bilateral talks would be to resolve outstanding issues around migration, travel, counterterrorism and counternarcotics, the environment, and trade and investment that are important to protecting U.S. national interests. Outcomes of these talks could include provisions that normalize migration flows, strengthen border security, break down the walls of communication that hinder U.S. ability to understand how Cuba is changing, and help U.S. businesses create new jobs.

In the context of such talks your special envoy would be authorized to signal your administration’s willingness to remove Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, pointing to its assistance to the Colombian peace talks as fresh evidence for the decision. This would remove a major irritant in U.S.-Cuba relations, allow a greater share of U.S.-sourced components and services in products that enter Cuban commerce, and free up resources to tackle serious threats to the homeland from other sources like Iran. We should also consider authorizing payments for exports to Cuba through financing issued by U.S. banks and granting a general license to allow vessels that have entered Cuban ports to enter U.S. ports without having to wait six months. You can also facilitate technical assistance on market-oriented reforms from international financial institutions by signaling your intent to drop outright opposition to such moves.

Under this chapeau of direct talks, your administration can seek a negotiated solution to the thorny issue of U.S. and Cuban citizens serving long prison sentences, thereby catalyzing progress toward removing a major obstacle to improving bilateral relations.

You should, in parallel, also take unilateral steps to expand direct contacts with the Cuban people by:

• authorizing financial and technical assistance to the burgeoning class of small businesses and cooperatives and permitting Americans to donate and trade in goods and services with those that are certified as independent entrepreneurs, artists, farmers, professionals and craftspeople;

• adding new categories for general licensed travel to Cuba for Americans engaged in services to the independent economic sector, e.g., law, real estate, insurance, accounting, financial services;

• granting general licenses for other travelers currently authorized only under specific licenses, such as freelance journalists, professional researchers, athletes, and representatives of humanitarian organizations and private foundations;

• increasing or eliminating the cap on cash and gifts that non- Cuban Americans can send to individuals, independent businesses and families in Cuba;

• eliminating the daily expenditure cap for U.S. citizens visiting Cuba and removing the prohibition on the use of U.S. credit and bank cards in Cuba;

• authorizing the reestablishment of ferry services to Cuba;

• expanding the list of exports licensed for sale to Cuba, including items like school and art supplies, athletic equipment, water and food preparation systems, retail business machines, and telecommunications equipment (currently allowed only as donations).

The steps recommended above would give your administration the tools to have a constructive dialogue with the Cuban government based on a set of measures that 1) would engage Cuban leaders in high-level, face-to-face negotiations on matters that directly serve U.S. interests in a secure, stable, prosperous and free Cuba; and 2) allow you to assert executive authority to take unilateral steps that would increase U.S. support to the Cuban people, as mandated by Congress.

To take this step, you will have to contend with negative reactions from a vocal, well-organized minority of members of Congress who increasingly are out of step with their constituents on this issue. Your initiative should be presented as a set of concrete measures to assist the Cuban people, which is well within current congressional mandates, and as a way to break the stalemate in resolving the case of U.S. citizen Alan Gross (his wife is calling for direct negotiations). Those are winnable arguments. But you will need to be prepared for some unhelpful criticism along the way.

Conclusion:

Current U.S. policy long ago outlived its usefulness and is counterproductive to advancing the goal of helping the Cuban people. Instead it gives Cuban officials the ability to demonize the United States in the eyes of Cubans, other Latin Americans and the rest of the world, which annually condemns the embargo at the United Nations. At this rate, given hardening attitudes in the region against U.S. policy, the Cuba problem may even torpedo your next presidential Summit of the Americas in Panama in 2015. It is time for a new approach: an initiative to test the willingness of the Cuban government to engage constructively alongside an effort to empower the Cuban people.

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Richard Feinberg: The New Cuban Economy What Roles for Foreign Investment?

Posted on December 10, 2012 by Arch Ritter

A new study by Richard Feinberg on direct foreign investment in the Cuban context has just been published by the Brookings Institution.  This is the best recent study on the topic and is well worth a read. The Introduction and the recommendations that are relevant for the Cuban Government are presented below.

The complete report is located here:  Feinberg, The New Cuban Economy, What Role for Foreign Investment 2012

1. Introduction

The Cuban revolution defined itself in large measure in terms of what it was not: not a dependency of the United States; not a dominion governed by global corporations; not a liberal, market-driven economy. As the guerrilla army made its triumphal entry into Havana and the infant revolution shifted leftward, a hallmark of its anti-imperialist ethos became the loudly proclaimed nationalizations of the U.S.-based firms that had controlled many key sectors of the Cuban economy, including hotels and gambling casinos, public utilities, oil refineries, and the rich sugar mills. In the strategic conflict with the United States, the “historic enemy,” the revolution consolidated its power through the excision of the U.S. economic presence.

For revolutionary Cuba, foreign investment has been about more than dollars and cents. It’s about cultural identity and national sovereignty. It’s also about a model of socialist planning, a hybrid of Marxist-Leninism and Fidelismo, which has jealously guarded its domination over all aspects of the economy. During its five decades of rule, the regime’s political and social goals always dominated economic policy; security of the revolution trumped productivity.

Fidel Castro’s brand of anti-capitalism included a strong dose of anti-globalization. For many years, El Comandante en Jefe hosted a large international conference on globalization where he would lecture thousands of delegates with his denunciations of the many evils of multinational firms that spread brutal exploitation and dehumanizing inequality around the world. Not surprisingly, Cuba has received  remarkably small inflows of foreign investment, even taking into account the size of its economy. In the 21st century, the globe is awash in trans-border investments by corporations, large and small. Many developing countries, other than those damaged by severe civil conflicts, receive shares that significantly bolster their growth prospects.

The expansion of foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing countries is one of the great stories of recent decades, rising from $14 billion in 1985 to $617 billion in 2010.1 While FDI2 cannot substitute for domestic savings and investment, it can add significantly to domestic efforts and significantly speed growth.

Today’s ailing Cuban economy, whose 11.2 million people yield the modest GNP reported officially at $64 billion3 (and possibly much less at realistic exchange rates), badly need additional external cooperation— notwithstanding heavily-subsidized oil imports from Venezuela. As with any economy, domestic choices made at home and by Cubans will largely determine the country’s fate. Yet, as Cubans have been well aware since the arrival of Christopher Columbus, the encroaching international economy matters greatly; it can be a source of not only harsh punishments but also great benefits.

In the Brookings Institution monograph Reaching Out: Cuba’s New Economy and the International Response, I explored the modest contributions already being made by certain bilateral and regional cooperation agencies and the larger potential benefits awaiting Cuba if it joins the core global and regional financial institutions—namely the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Inter- American Development Bank, and the Andean Development Corporation.

This sequel explores the contributions that private foreign investments have been making, and could make on a much greater scale, to propel Cuba onto a more prosperous and sustainable growth path.

Sol Melia Havana

6. Policy Recommendations

It is time for Cuba to extract its rightful share of benefits from participating actively in the global economy. But the Cuban economy has a long way to go before most foreign investors would be willing to take significant risks on the island. Most importantly, Cuba needs to overcome its animosities and fears and reach a national  consensus that, as a small island economy, its economic future depends upon a healthy engagement with the international economy. As many other proud nations have discovered, it is possible to accept FDI without sacrificing national sovereignty and governance capacity. On the contrary, FDI can provide resources—including investment capital and fiscal revenues—that enhance national choices.

If Cuba had allowed FDI inflows equal to 5 percent of its GDP during the last decade, or roughly $2.5 billion a year, Cuba would have supplemented its domestic savings by some $25 billion.  This would have enhanced its ability to recapitalize its productive base while preserving and upgrading the quality of its social services. The Cuban government should send clear signals—including to its own bureaucrats—that it has moved beyond ambiguity and distrust toward a reasoned appreciation of the benefits that foreign investment can bring to a small island economy.

To begin to gradually improve the investment climate, Cuba could:

• Complement the 2011 reform guidelines with a coherent national competitiveness strategy that announces a prominent role for foreign investment. In designing this forward-looking strategy, the government should consult with existing joint venture executives.

• Completely overhaul the investment approval process, making it more transparent and much faster, as promised in the 2011 guidelines. To facilitate rational decision making by both parties, representatives of proposed investments should have ready access to responsible government officials. So that potential investors can better design projects to meet Cuban national priorities, official rulings should be accompanied by robust explanations. Smaller investments should be placed on a fast-track authorization process.

• Detail the approval criteria for the new FTZs, with its fiscal incentives, and include a coherent list of priority clusters.

• Remove the fixed-time horizon facing investments outside of the FTZs, which promotes myopic behavior and disinvestment as the deadline approaches.

• Not exclude multinationals that serve the domestic market simply because they do not readily fit into a national export promotion strategy. Cuban firms cannot replicate the massiveR&D and product innovation pipelines that characterize international giants such as Nestlé or Unilever, and whose outputs Cuban consumers will demand.

• Build forcefully on the successful strategy of selling quality Cuban products through established international marketing machines. This can be accomplished, for example, by forging alliances among pharmaceutical giants with global reach to make patented Cuban medical innovations available to consumers worldwide.

• Encourage FDI to integrate local firms into their supply chains. An inter-ministerial committee should build an integrated strategy to assist local firms to meet acquisition requirements. Include private businesses and cooperatives in an ambitious trade facilitation strategy that targets small and medium enterprises.

• Permit foreign investors to form a business association that would allow them to engage in a constructive dialogue with the government. Encourage investors to adapt corporate responsibility practices that observe Cuban laws and national goals and serve corporate stakeholders, including workers, communities, and consumers.

• Sharply reduce the implicit tax on labor, to the benefit of Cuban workers and the competitiveness of exports. Eventually dismantle the dual currency labor payment system altogether.

• Recast the anti-corruption campaign to focus on root causes: low wages and nontransparency.This can be done, for example, by shining sunlight on the procurement procedures of government entities and SOEs. Combating corruption in both the public and private spheres is critical to sustainable economic development, but properly structured incentives, not arbitrary prosecutions, are the more sustainable pathway toward ethical business practices.

• Publish much more data and analysis on the capital account and on FDI, including impacts on savings and investment, employment and wage levels, supply chain integration, and net export earnings.

Cuba could benefit tremendously from learning from other nations that have successfully extracted benefits from foreign investment. The international financial institutions (IFIs) offer a cost-effective short-cut to assess the applicability of comparative country  experiences. As argued in Reaching Out: Cuba’s New Economy and the International Response, now is the time for the international development community to engage in Cuba and support its incipient economic reform process.

Under their own new guidelines, the international financial institutions are capable of working within Cuban national priorities while they contribute their unique bundles of knowledge and capital.  With regard to FDI, IFIs are particularly well equipped. Furthermore, the presence of the IFIs would add credibility to Cuban investment commitments and to contract enforcement—important ingredients in establishing a more secure investment climate in a changing Cuba.

For these reasons, Cuba should signal to the IFIs its interest in entering a gradual path toward receiving, first technical assistance (studies, training) and eventually full membership.

Sherritt International, Cuba

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Cuban Medical Aid to Haiti; One of the World’s Best Kept Secrets

Posted on December 6, 2012 by Arch Ritter

Original here:   Cuban Medical Aid to Haiti , from Counterpunch, April 01, 2010

 by EMILY J. KIRK And JOHN M. KIRK

Media coverage of Cuban medical cooperation following the disastrous recent earthquake in Haiti was sparse indeed.  International news reports usually described the Dominican Republic as being the first to provide assistance, while Fox News sang the praises of U.S. relief efforts in a report entitled “U.S. Spearheads Global Response to Haiti Earthquake”-a common theme of its extensive coverage.  CNN also broadcast hundreds of reports, and in fact one focused on a Cuban doctor wearing a T-shirt with a large image of Che Guevara–and yet described him as a “Spanish doctor”.

In general, international news reports ignored Cuba’s efforts.  By March 24, CNN for example, had 601 reports on their news website regarding the earthquake in Haiti-of which only 18 (briefly) referenced Cuban assistance. Similarly, between them the New York Times and the Washington Post had 750 posts regarding the earthquake and relief efforts, though not a single one discusses in any detail any Cuban support.  In reality, however, Cuba’s medical role had been extremely important-and had been present since 1998.

Cuban-Haitian Medical Collaboration

Cuba and Haiti Pre-Earthquake

In 1998, Haiti was struck by Hurricane Georges. The hurricane caused 230 deaths, destroyed 80% of the crops, and left 167,000 people homeless.[1] Despite the fact that Cuba and Haiti had not had diplomatic relations in over 36 years, Cuba immediately offered a multifaceted agreement to assist them, of which the most important was medical cooperation.

Cuba adopted a two-pronged public health approach to help Haiti. First, it agreed to maintain hundreds of doctors in the country for as long as necessary, working wherever they were posted by the Haitian government. This was particularly significant as Haiti’s health care system was easily the worst in the Americas, with life expectancy of only 54 years in 1990 and one out of every 5 adult deaths due to AIDS, while 12.1% of children died from preventable intestinal infectious diseases.[2]

In addition Cuba agreed to train Haitian doctors in Cuba, providing that they would later return and take the places of the Cuban doctors (a process of “brain gain” rather than “brain drain”). Significantly, the students were selected from non-traditional backgrounds, and were mainly poor.  It was thought that, because of their socio-economic background, they fully understood their country’s need for medical personnel, and would return to work where they were needed. The first cohort of students began studying in May, 1999 at the Latin American School of Medicine (ELAM).

By 2007, significant change had already been achieved throughout the country. It is worth noting that Cuban medical personnel were estimated to be caring for 75% of the population.[3]  Studies by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) indicated clear improvements in the health profile since this extensive Cuban medical cooperation began.

Improvements in Public Health in Haiti, 1999-2007[4]

Health Indicator                                                      1999        2007

Infant Mortality, per 1,000 live births                     80         33
Child Mortality Under 5 per 1,000                         135         59.4
Maternal Mortality per 100,000 live births         523         285
Life Expectancy (years)                                               54          61

Cuban medical personnel had clearly made a major difference to the national health  profile since 1998, largely because of their proactive role in preventive medicine-as can be seen below.

Selected Statistics on Cuban Medical Cooperation
Dec. 1998-May 2007[5]

Visits to the doctor            10,682,124
Doctor visits to patients             4,150,631
Attended births                                86,633
Major and minor surgeries          160,283
Vaccinations                                   899,829
Lives saved (emergency)             210,852

By 2010, at no cost to medical students, Cuba had trained some 550 Haitian doctors, and is at present training a further 567. Moreover, since 1998 some 6,094 Cuban medical personnel have worked in Haiti. They had given over 14.6 million consultations, carried out 207,000 surgical operations, including 45,000 vision restoration operations through their Operation Miracle programme, attended 103,000 births, and taught literacy to 165,000. In fact at the time of the earthquake there were 344 Cuban medical personnel there. All of this medical cooperation, it must be remembered, was provided over an 11-year period before the earthquake of January 12, 2010.[6]

Cuba and Haiti Post-Earthquake

The earthquake killed at least 220,000, injured 300,000 and left 1.5 million homeless.[7] Haitian PrimeMinister Jean-Max Bellerive described it as “the worst catastrophe that has occurred in Haiti in two centuries”.[8]

International aid began flooding in. It is important to note the type of medical aid provided by some major international players. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), for example, an organization known for its international medical assistance, flew in some 348 international staff, in addition to the 3,060 national staff it already employed. By March 12 they had treated some 54,000 patients, and completed 3,700 surgical operations.[9]

Canada’s contribution included the deployment of 2,046 Canadian Forces personnel, including 200 DART personnel. The DART (Disaster Assistance Response Team) received the most media attention, as it conducted 21,000 consultations-though it should be noted they do not treat any serious trauma patients or provide surgical care. Indeed, among the DART personnel, only 45 are medical staff, with others being involved in water purification, security, and reconstruction. In total, the Canadians stayed for only 7 weeks.[10]

The United States government, which received extensive positive media attention, sent the USNS “Comfort”, a 1,000-bed hospital ship with a 550-person medical staff and stayed for 7 weeks, in which time they treated 871 patients, performing 843 surgical operations.[11]  Both the Canadian and US contributions were important-while they were there.

Lost in the media shuffle was the fact that, for the first 72 hours following the earthquake, Cuban doctors were in fact the main medical support for the country. Within the first 24 hours, they had completed 1,000 emergency surgeries, turned their living quarters into clinics, and were running the only medical centers in the country, including 5 comprehensive diagnostic centers (small hospitals) which they had previously built.  In addition another 5 in various stages of construction were also used, and they turned their ophthalmology center into a field hospital-which treated 605 patients within the first 12 hours following the earthquake.[12]

Cuba soon became responsible for some 1,500 medical personnel in Haiti. Of those, some 344 doctors were already working in Haiti, while over 350 members of the “Henry Reeve” Emergency Response Medical Brigade were sent by Cuba following the earthquake.  In addition, 546 graduates of ELAM from a variety of countries, and 184 5th and 6th year Haitian ELAM students joined, as did a number of Venezuelan medical personnel.   In the final analysis, they were working throughout Haiti in 20 rehabilitation centers and 20 hospitals, running 15 operating theatres, and had vaccinated 400,000. With reason Fidel Castro stated, “we send doctors, not soldiers”.[13]

Read more:  Cuban Medical Aid to Haiti

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Cuba’s Medical Diplomacy: Aid, State Profiteering and International Financial Backing

Posted on December 6, 2012 by Arch Ritter

BY MARIA C. WERLAU;  mariacwerlau@gmail.com

Haiti’s President Michel Martelly recently visited Cuba to sign cooperation agreements including in health. No doubt Haiti needs help to deliver needed healthcare, but these accords exploit Cuban workers and contribute to the continued oppression and impoverishment of the Cuban people.

Cuban Medical Worker, Haiti

Currently, around 700 Cuban health professionals are in Haiti. Cuba has similar government-to-government agreements with over 70 countries. These partnerships allow the Castro dictatorship to reap huge financial gains, avoid needed reform, and increase international influence to advance its agendas. Meanwhile, the export of scarce medical resources is causing a severe public health crisis in Cuba. Doctors and basic medical supplies are hard to find and facilities are falling apart.

When the earthquake struck, 344 Cuban health professionals were working throughout Haiti; more were immediately sent and deployed to the most remote areas. Cuba had long been receiving millions from international organizations and countries such as France and Japan for these services. Great need and corresponding international largesse became a golden opportunity. Just weeks after the disaster, Cuba was promoting a gigantic endeavor to build a new healthcare infrastructure for Haiti at an annual cost of $170 million, to be paid for by international donors. Cubans and Cuban-trained medical staff would run it at “half the international prices.”

Countless millions are now pouring into Cuba from the Pan American and World Health Organizations, dozens of NGOs, foundations, companies, and individuals from the United States, Canada, Spain, Belgium and others. Many governments have also donated — Venezuela $20 million to start, Brazil $80 million, Norway $2.5 million. The list of donations is undisclosed, but France, Australia, Japan, and other countries have apparently chipped in. The cost to Haiti is just a $300 monthly stipend to each Cuban health worker plus transportation and housing.

Haiti is just one very profitable subsidiary in Cuba’s global multi-billion dollar ¨humanitarian¨ enterprise. Most of its profits come off the backs of Cubans indentured as “collaborators.” Angola, for example, reportedly pays Cuba $60,000 annually per doctor; the doctor receives $2,940 (4.9 percent), at most. These service exports bring more than three times the earnings from tourism and far more than any other industry — $7.5 billion in 2010, the last year reported. Business is so good that in 2010 the Cuban government reduced an already decimated local health staff by 14 percent to send more abroad.

This unique brand of health diplomacy is only possible in a totalitarian state guaranteeing a steady pool of “exportable commodities.” Leaving Cuba without government authorization is punishable with years of prison; health professionals face the strictest travel restrictions. If they defect while abroad, their family, which must stay behind, cannot joint them for five years; issuing them academic or other records is forbidden.

The average monthly pay of a doctor in Cuba is around $25, barely guaranteeing survival. Abroad, they live off a bare-bones stipend from the host government. But, they receive from Cuba their usual peso salary and a bonus of $180-220 per month, plus are allowed to send home shipments of consumer goods. This paltry compensation package is enough for Cuban doctors to “volunteer” to be exploited abroad rather than at home.

The health workers are sent abroad for at least two years and often to far-flung areas under rudimentary, sometimes dangerous, conditions. In Venezuela, dozens have been killed or raped. Heavy workloads, surveillance, and many arbitrary restrictions add to their hardship.

In this clever scheme of modern slavery, Cuba is partnering with dozens of governments — including longstanding democracies such as Portugal and Uruguay — and receiving funds from reputable countries and international organizations. Ostensibly, the agreements violate the domestic legislation of many host countries and international accords including the Trafficking in Persons Protocol, several International Labor Organization conventions, and standards concerning the prohibition of “servitude” and “slavery.”

The Martelly agreements with Cuba should be made public. If they violate human rights’ standards, Haiti should manage the international aid independently to hire and compensate Cuban workers directly and invite their families to join them. Other countries should take note.

Maria Werlau is executive director of Cuba Archive, a non-profit human rights’ initiative based in Summit, New Jersey.

 

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