Tag Archives: General Economic Analyses

CUBA’S LIMITED ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY WILL SLOW NORMALIZATION

Posted on October 22, 2015 by Arch Ritter

Fulton Armstrong*

 Fulton Armstrong is a Research Fellow at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies. This is the third of four policy briefs that he will write as part of the Center’s Cuba Initiative, carried out with support from the Christopher Reynolds Foundation.  

 October 19, 2015

 As the U.S. embargo—the main obstacle to expanding U.S.-Cuban economic ties—is relaxed by presidential regulatory action and eventually lifted by Congress, limits on Cuba’s own willingness and ability to conduct trade, absorb investment, utilize information technology, and even accommodate tourists risk putting a brake on the normalization of economic relations. Five decades of embargo and failed socialist models have rendered key sectors in Cuba ill-equipped to take advantage of the surge in U.S. business interest in the island. In some areas, the political will to open up and reform is crucial. These problems do not translate into a rejection of normalization but rather into a slower timeline than many on and off the island would hope for.

After 50-plus years of estrangement, bilateral contacts since last December have given rise to high levels of optimism—among U.S. investors, importers, and exporters—about relatively rapid economic engagement. Press reports and information from Cuban and non-Cuban experts suggest that most Cubans, skeptical that their government will make reforms facilitating trade and investment quickly enough, are slightly more pessimistic. But hardly a week goes by that U.S. trade experts, think tanks, and media don’t reflect strong private-sector interest in Cuba. Visiting Havana in October, U.S. Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker emphasized, “What we’re trying to do is be as open as we can until the blockade [sic] is lifted.”

Cuba has not been shy about its desires either. Secretary Pritzker said Cuban officials “have been very forward leaning and wanting more American direct investment.” Last year, the Cuban government announced its “Portfolio of Foreign Investment Opportunities”—some 246 projects in energy, tourism, agriculture, and industry—for which it seeks US$8.7 billion in investment. Moreover, Havana says it wants growth rates to rise to 4–5 percent per year (from an estimated 1.5 percent in 2014), fueled by at least US$2 billion in annual foreign investment. …….

Conclusion: VISION AND PATIENCE

The limits on Cuba’s ability to absorb a rapid expansion in tourism, trade, and investment are significant, but continuing U.S. controls are also imposing obstacles. The Obama Administration has chosen not to use its executive authority under the Cuban Asset Control Regulations, written into the “Libertad [Helms-Burton] Act,” to expand trade with state-owned enterprises beyond those currently licensed—in agriculture, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, and for environmental protection. Apart from these exceptions, trade is only permitted with small entrepreneurs, who have minimal capacity to import and export. These limits, which can be reduced through executive action, pose a major hindrance to the broader normalization process.

Cuba’s challenges in taking advantage of new opportunities are not insurmountable—with political will and time. Havana’s approach to change usually has been gradual and halting,

 but change a la cubana has also been significant. Since the start of the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1989, Cuba’s economy and economic culture have changed more than the government’s socialist slogans would suggest—and further change is certain. The economic contract between the people and the government has changed drastically as hundreds of thousands of workers have been laid off, social services have been cut, and the Cuban people have been admonished by President Castro to embrace reforms “without haste, but without pause.”

The pace of reform and corresponding expansion of Cuba’s absorptive capacity may be maddening slow for many Cubans and Americans alike. But insofar as the U.S.-Cuba normalization process is irreversible, so too is the conviction in Cuba on the need to “update” the systems through reform in order to take advantage of the opportunities it brings.

The challenges implicit in change are not new, and not unique to Cuba’s relations with the United States. Potential U.S. partners eager to engage are about to learn what their European and Canadian counterparts have long known: even with clear incentives on the table, Cuba proceeds at a pace that maximizes its own stability and advantage—which most often means slowly. Those concerns naturally will be especially intense as they inform dealing with the United States, which still rationalizes expansion of commercial ties in terms of the desirability of promoting democracy in Cuba. But Cuban national pride and the Communist Party’s fear of losing control could very well be assuaged as the island experiences the benefits of the engagement. Foreigners, especially the United States, who push too hard, too fast, and too haughtily could fail and even delay this aspect of normalization, just as Cubans who move too passively, too slowly, and too skeptically could stymie the process as well.

Continue Reading: Fulton Armstrong US-Cuba Policy Brief 3, October 2015 (003)

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WHAT YOU MIGHT NOT KNOW ABOUT THE CUBAN ECONOMY

Posted on September 3, 2015 by Arch Ritter

By Jorge I. Dominguez

Harvard Business Review, August 17, 2015

Original Article Here: What You Might Not Know AUG15_17_470622111On the front page of a Cuban newspaper recently there was an item about a two-story home in the old city of Havana that crumbled—and that in the course of its collapse, killed four people. This is a harsh glimpse the physical reality facing many of the buildings across Havana and elsewhere in the country. But it’s also a metaphor for much of the Cuban economy. Cuba is, in many ways, an economy stuck in time and at risk of further unraveling.

Cuba’s economy got a jolt in December 2014, when U.S.-Cuban ties were restored. The U.S. embassy in Havana has reopened. Some travel is easing. Pope Francis will visit in September. So on the surface, it might appear to be full steam ahead for business and beyond.

But in order to understand where Cuba may go, we need to understand where its economy, its people, its governance, and its marketplace have been. Cuba’s growth domestic product per capita in 2015 is approximately what it was in 1985. The short version of Cuba’s recent economic history is that it peaked in the last quarter of 1984 and began a slow slide during the second half of the 80s. It then suffered a catastrophic plunge in the first four years of the 1990s. To the extent that we can estimate, a third of the economy disappeared during this time and a slow recovery followed. There was a spike in the 2000s when Venezuela began to provide petroleum at deeply discounted market prices, and that peaked just before the 2008-09 financial crisis. After 2009, the Cuban economy really didn’t recover. For the most part it has remained at the alleged 2% growth rate, but given the unreliability of statistics from Cuba, it’s likely a lot closer to zero. That’s grim.

Cuba’s population, now shy of 11.2 million, is shrinking and rapidly aging. Cuba has been below the demographic replacement age since 1978. This is not a good scenario for productivity and economic growth. For that, you need people who are in the prime of the workforce. That’s not the Cuban demographic story. Cuba is closing primary schools and opening homes for the elderly, closing pediatric wards and opening geriatric wards. That’s a burden for growth, but also creates business activity and opportunity: Cuba suddenly needs to build retirement communities. Cuba projects a population of 10.8 million in 2030. It is about to go from around two million people over the age of 60 to 3.25 million in 2030.

But it isn’t all bleak. Cuban life expectancy is approximately what you would expect in North America and Western Europe. That means levels of education are good. It means there is access to basic, quality healthcare. It doesn’t mean that you can have a banquet every day, but that basic nutritional needs are met. There are opportunities for sports. These are the kinds of things that contribute to well-being and that require lots of effective institutional arrangements.

When you put all these pieces together around education and health care, it’s clear that Cuba is likely a champion of investment in the development of human capital—but for the last 50 years it has an extremely low economic return on this investment. If you invest in human capital, whether in your company or in your country, sooner or later it will pay off if you have the right set of incentives. In other words, you need the right organizational design so that all these well -trained, well-educated people will be able to do their work. That’s what Cuba doesn’t have.

But it does have a colossally well-trained work force. It is probably the best, most well-trained workforce at the cheapest labor-market price that any international investor could find anywhere in the world. You could find such first-rate people in Singapore, but they wouldn’t be cheap.

This is true despite the country’s very poor infrastructure. In Cuba, there are seven computers per 100 people — one of the lowest ratios in the Americas. Internet access in Cuba is very expensive. Consider that the median monthly salary in Cuba, when converted into dollars, is a bit below $20 a month. Then think about what you pay for a service like Netflix. For many Cubans even at a discount, half your monthly income would go to Netflix.

So how does Cuba make money? Its current principal source of revenue is the export of healthcare services by means of sending physicians, nurses, and healthcare technicians to countries like Venezuela and Brazil—an item that it has yet to record in its published official statistics.

Cuba’s main resource to engage in the world is no longer sugar cane. It has tourism—beach and sun and one of the communist world’s last Jurassic political systems—but the real asset is the brains of its people. It could be an ideal location for healthcare organizations, but also for those in applied sciences, biotechnology, and pharmaceuticals. We know two things about biotech in Cuba. One is that the quality of applied science seems to be first rate. And secondly, the business model for Cuban biotechnology has been laughably bad. They know how to make new products. They don’t know how to market them effectively. That’s a solvable problem, yet they haven’t been able to do it, and so a partnership with a European or a Canadian or a U.S. pharmaceutical company could be a great asset in the future.

Have the doors opened to U.S. company investment? Well, no. The power to authorize U.S. business investment in Cuba still rests with the U.S. Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets control (OFAC)—and the fact is this agency’s documentation contains the exact same formulation that it had before December 17. Economic transactions, trade, and investment with Cuba remain prohibited unless they are specifically authorized by OFAC. The Government of Cuba must also authorize each and every foreign investment from any country, and it has yet to authorize one from the United States.

A lot of people get hung up on the issue of travel between the U.S. and Cuba. JetBlue recently launched direct commercial flights from New York. But there have been charter flights from Miami to Cuba since the late 1970s. OFAC has made particular determinations authorizing different airlines as charter flights for many years for various travel programs to Cuba, especially for cultural, educational, and religious groups. There has been a U.S. embargo on economic transactions with Cuba since 1960. There are still restrictions on American tourist travel. Going to the beach is something that the neither the President of the United States nor OFAC can authorize. It requires an act of U.S. Congress. Congress decided in 2000 that it wanted to prohibit beach tourism and it didn’t want the president to have any discretion whatsoever on this point. Now, while more people will be allowed to visit, they still can’t go to the beach.

On the exports side, President George W. Bush authorized U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba in late 2001 under presidential discretion, which exceeded $5 billion between 2002 and 2014. But, oddly, U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba declined by over one-third (if you compare January-June 2014 to the same months in 2015) since the President Obama’s announcement. The boom in U.S.-Cuba trade has yet to materialize. Cuba does have a private sector, which it calls it the “non-state sector.” It includes mixed enterprises (foreign firms and state enterprises) and a “self-employment sector.” In a population just shy of 11.2 million, there are over 500,000 people who have self-employment licenses, according to President Raúl Castro’s report to Cuba’s National Assembly in July 2015. The rule of thumb among Cuban scholars who study this is for any one license there are on average four lawfully-hired employees. That would amount to over two million people in the self-employment sector.

One reason why the average number of employees is four is because, once you reach five or more employees, your tax rate goes up. The Cuban government’s tax collection system is primitive. There is no personal income tax in Cuba. There is no corporate tax in Cuba. There is no value added tax in Cuba. There is no sales tax in Cuba. But there is a tax on the number of your employees. This tax system discourages economic and job growth.

The Cuban government has a list of occupations that are authorized by name; everything else is prohibited or reserved for state-run enterprises. Authorized occupations include plumbers or electricians. These are skilled workers, but the list rarely includes those who studied at the university. Thus in a country that has invested so much in the development of a human capital, it says in effect: if you attended university, then you’re going to work for the state. Let’s say you go to the medical school at the University of Havana. Healthcare is a state sector, it’s not private activity. So what if you decide you want to make more money? You might realize that the one useful skill gained from your time at medical school is learning English. So, you quit as a physician and become a maid at a tourist hotel. You earn more money because your most marketable asset turns out to be that you can communicate in English. This is a tragedy for the individual and for the society. It turns incentives about acquiring skills upside down. You do have people with university training in the private sector, but often not working in the profession for which they trained. There are some exceptions—for example you could be a tutor in the private sector, but you cannot be a classroom teacher. You can, in the private sector, teach foreign languages, but you cannot teach mathematics. Thus the private sector is tiny.

There is also foreign investment, although not a lot. The 2014 foreign investment law finally authorized wholly owned foreign enterprises, but thus far without exception they are all joint ventures with the government. Cuba’s trade reveals its international partners. In 2013 in U.S. dollar-equivalents, Cuba exported $343 million to China and imported $1.5 billion from it. In contrast, it exported $81 million to, and imported $614 million, from Brazil. Cuba exported $2.3 billion to, and imported $4.8 billion from, Venezuela, its top partner.

But China matters in one decisive way. The Chinese government strongly advocates that the Cuban government should reform its economy to achieve a faster, wider market opening. That’s not the way you might have guessed China would be advocating, hut in fact China’s role in Cuba is to try to persuade the Cuban government to emulate its own market opening.

The extraordinary competence of Cuba’s political leaders is sometimes easy to miss. They’re colossally impressive in the management of politics. They’ve remained in power. Who would have known that all communist regimes in Europe would collapse, but that only Cuba and four East Asian regimes would survive?

Cuba has a really, really well-educated and cheap workforce, as well as substantial evidence of entrepreneurial potential. If its political leaders can manage to lift constraints on investment, create the right incentives, and reform its tax code, the country could really boom. But that’s a lot of change to expect for the insular government of an island nation that’s otherwise stuck in time.

Jorge Dominquez - Vice Provost for International Affairs (cq)Jorge I. Dominguez is the Antonio Madero Professor for the Study of Mexico at Harvard University. He is the lead editor of a special issue on the Cuban economy for the journal Cuban Studies (2016).

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José Luis Rodríguez: LAS TRANSFORMACIONES ECONÓMICAS EN CUBA: VISIÓN EXTERNA

Posted on August 2, 2015 by Arch Ritter

CubaDebate, 12 julio 2015 | 34

Original Article here : http://www.cubadebate.cu/opinion/vision-externa

ministro-economia-jose-luis

 José Luis Rodríguez es asesor del Centro de Investigaciones de la Economía Mundial (CIEM). Fue Ministro de Economía de Cuba.

Algo que sin dudas ha llamado la atención a lo largo de la historia de la Revolución es la proliferación de múltiples interpretaciones externas sobre lo que se hace en el país, especialmente en el orden de la política económica. Desafortunadamente, la cantidad no hace la calidad y muchos de los trabajos que se han publicado adolecen de un mínimo de rigor analítico en sus análisis, en especial, aquellos que parten de una visión anti socialista excluyente de otro modelo que no sea afín a la economía de mercado en las diferentes versiones de la misma.

 En el presente artículo no se pretende realizar un balance exhaustivo de todos estos enfoques, ni siquiera de aquellos que se han producido a lo largo de los últimos cinco años y que se relacionan con la actualización del modelo económico en curso. No obstante, resulta útil destacar algunas tendencias presentes en el ámbito académico y que permiten identificar los principales enfoques acerca de las transformaciones económicas que se desarrollan en Cuba en la actualidad.

Lo primero que valdría la pena subrayar es que no se aprecia una ruptura con paradigmas anteriores que han preponderado a la hora de examinar la realidad económica en Cuba a lo largo de los años. Ello se aprecia en los análisis que se llevan a cabo por la Asociación para el Estudio de la Economía Cubana (ASCE) de Estados Unidos, que se reúne sistemáticamente todos los años desde 1990 y que publica la memoria de sus debates en los que continúa siendo mayoritaria una visión cercana al neoliberalismo más ortodoxo y al mainstream de la cubanología tradicional al evaluar nuestra realidad.

En este sentido destacan –como ejemplo- los numerosos artículos de Luis R. Luis, uno de los editores del blog de ASCE, que se empeña en pintar con los tonos más oscuros posibles la realidad económica en Cuba calificándola como economía arruinada y carente de liquidez internacional, lo cual se aprecia en sus recientes artículos “Cuba’s Feeble International Liquidity” (La débil liquidez internacional de Cuba) publicado en el blog de ASCE el 9 de abril y “Cuba-US Reconciliation and Limited Reforms” (Reconciliación Cuba-EEUU y reformas limitadas) publicado el 22 de mayo pasado. En ambos trabajos se constata la ausencia de un análisis objetivo, que no excluya otros enfoques desarrollados por la academia en los propios EEUU, y que no ignore informaciones oficiales del gobierno cubano tales como el discurso del Ministro de Economía y Planificación Marino Murillo, pronunciado en la Asamblea Nacional en diciembre de 2014, donde se brindan numerosas informaciones sobre la política de financiamiento externo del país, entre otros temas de importancia para el análisis.[1]

Afortunadamente, se pueden encontrar otros enfoques no necesariamente afines a las ideas socialistas, pero que elaboran sus tesis con una mayor seriedad y rigor, aun en el terreno en el que necesariamente se mantienen discrepancias de fondo con los economistas que defendemos la Revolución.

Si se examinan los años transcurridos desde que se aprobaron los Lineamientos de la Política Económica y Social del país en abril de 2011, se proyecta una valoración crítica de las medidas propuestas en diversos trabajos del profesor Carmelo Mesa-Lago tal y como aparecen en su libro “Cuba en la era de Raúl Castro. Reformas económico-sociales y sus efectos” (Editorial Colibrí, Madrid, 2012), que reseñé en la revista TEMAS Nº 73 de 2013. Su valoración resumió diversos argumentos basados en una ideología keynesiana que sustentaba el análisis de errores que en su opinión llevaban a la inviabilidad del socialismo en Cuba.

Con posterioridad al 17 de diciembre de 2014, Mesa-Lago se ha pronunciado sobre los cambios en Cuba, incluyendo la perspectiva que se abre en las relaciones con Estados Unidos. En un reciente trabajo titulado “Normalización de las relaciones entre EEUU y Cuba: causas, prioridades, progresos, obstáculos, efectos y peligros” (Real Instituto El Cano, Documento de Trabajo Nº 6/2015, 8 de mayo de 2015 disponible en www.blog.rielcano.org ) el profesor Mesa-Lago realiza un interesante análisis de la nueva situación y ofrece una visión notablemente objetiva de muchos temas que atañen a la evaluación de los cambios en Cuba, lo cual resulta destacable en relación a otros trabajos anteriores. No obstante, el documento tiene un enfoque negativo sobre las relaciones de Cuba con Venezuela tomando como válidas informaciones y datos que resultan especulativos, especialmente cuando valora el supuesto impacto sobre la economía cubana de una contracción económica en Venezuela este año y ubica la situación de ese país como un motivo para buscar el acercamiento de Cuba con Estados Unidos, lo cual no se corresponde con la verdad.

Igualmente el documento cierra con lo que el autor denomina como el enigma de la posición cubana frente al proceso de negociación con Estados Unidos, el cual revela un alto grado de especulación y desconocimiento de las razones que asisten a Cuba para fundamentar sus posiciones. A pesar de estos aspectos controversiales, el documento revela un análisis profundo y abarcador de las relaciones posibles entre Cuba y Estados Unidos por parte del autor, que revela el fruto de un trabajo sistemático y serio sobre estos temas durante muchos años.[2]

II

Un aspecto que es tomado como premisa en el análisis de las transformaciones más recientes de la economía cubana por la mayoría de los autores, es el fracaso del modelo socialista de desarrollo y lo inevitable de la transición a una economía de mercado.

Al respecto se destacan investigadores como Richard E. Feinberg, ex funcionario del gobierno norteamericano, actual profesor de la Universidad de California en San Diego y Senior Fellow de Brookings Institution, uno de los principales tanques pensantes de Estados Unidos. Este analista ha venido publicando sistemáticamente trabajos sobre la economía cubana, entre los que se destacan sus ensayos “Extendiendo la mano: La nueva economía de Cuba y la respuesta internacional” Iniciativa para América Latina, Brookings Institution, Washington, noviembre de 2011, www.brookings.edu y “¿Aterrizaje suave en Cuba? Empresarios emergentes y clases medias” Iniciativa para América Latina, Brookings Institution, Washington, noviembre 8 de 2013, www.brookings.edu.

En el primero de estos trabajos Feinberg defiende la tesis de que constituye una anomalía la no pertenencia de Cuba a organismos financieros internacionales como el FMI y el Banco Mundial, por lo que propone un programa de aproximaciones sucesivas para superar esa situación, tomando como ejemplo los casos de Nicaragua y Vietnam para ello. Sin embargo, esta propuesta no parte de aceptar los cambios que Cuba se planteó en los Lineamientos de la Política Económica y Social, sobre los que el autor expresa que “Las pautas están plagadas de contradicciones internas y siguen rindiendo culto a la planificación centralizada, pero las fracciones pro reforma fueron lo suficientemente fuertes para incluir un lenguaje que transformaría la cultura política y la ética social cubana si se lo interpretara y actuara en consecuencia.”

Claramente sale a relucir que la transición al capitalismo es a fin de cuentas lo determinante y para ello se cifran esperanzas en lo que Feinberg denomina como “las fracciones pro reforma”.

Adicionalmente faltaría por demostrar que es posible ingresar al FMI y sostener un programa de desarrollo como al que Cuba aspira, especialmente si se tiene en cuenta el papel que ha jugado este organismo en la aplicación de las recetas neoliberales a toda costa, tal y como se refleja en estos momentos en su posición frente al actual gobierno de Grecia en la Unión Europea.

Acerca de este supuesto papel positivo del FMI, bastaría con examinar su desempeño en la transición al capitalismo en Europa Oriental y la antigua URSS, cuestión abordada muy seriamente por la investigadora del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo Emily Morris en el artículo “Unexpected Cuba” publicado en New Left Review Nº 88, Julio-Agosto 2014 www.newleftreview.org [3].

Un analista que trabaja los temas de la economía cubana desde la década de los años 70 del pasado siglo es el profesor de la Universidad de Carleton Archibald Ritter. Autor de uno de los pocos libros sobre la estrategia de desarrollo de Cuba –“The Economic d=Development of Revolutionary Cuba: Strategy and Performance”, Praeger, New York, 1974- ha incursionado con una visión crítica en distintos aspectos del desempeño económico del país, dedicándole especial atención en los últimos años al desarrollo del sector privado. En este sentido Ritter publicó junto a Ted Henken el libro “Entreprenurial Cuba: The Changing Policy Landscape” que vio la luz en 2014[2], trabajo que aborda desde diferentes ángulos la temática del llamado sector no estatal.

Al igual que otros textos, en este libro se examinan las insuficiencias para el desarrollo sin límites de la propiedad privada y cooperativa, por lo que se deja establecido que solo en una economía de mercado pueden evaluarse sus verdaderas potencialidades, con lo que evidentemente se niega la posibilidad de su desarrollo en los límites que supone una economía socialista.

Finalmente vale la pena destacar otro trabajo que –previo al escenario actual de posibles relaciones con Estados Unidos- se elaboró anteriormente. Este es el caso del ensayo de Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Barbara Kotschwar y Cathleen Cimino “Economic Normalization with Cuba. A Roadmap for US Policymakers” Policy Analysis Nº 103, Peterson Institute for International Economy, 2014 www.piie.com . Siguiendo la línea de otros autores, en este análisis se propone para Cuba un modelo de transición a una economía de mercado siguiendo el modelo de Europa Oriental a través de diferentes pasos, que incluyen la apertura del mercado de Estados Unidos y el ingreso a los organismos del sistema financiero internacional, es decir, al FMI, Banco Mundial y Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo.

III

Otros análisis de interés sobre la economía cubana en años recientes, que no toman como premisa una transición inevitable a la economía de mercado en nuestro caso, también puede encontrarse en diferentes autores, sin que se pretenda en este breve artículo hacer un listado exhaustivo de los mismos.

Profundo conocedor de la economía cubana a la que ha estudiado durante muchos años, el economista sueco Claes Brundenius, actualmente Profesor Honorario del Research Policy Institute de la Universidad de Lund, elaboró uno de los libros más importantes sobre el desarrollo socioeconómico en Cuba: “Revolutionary Cuba: The Challenge of Economic Growth with Equity” (Cuba revolucionaria: el desafío del crecimiento económico con equidad) Westview Press, Boulder, 1984, al que siguieron numerosos artículos y libros de especial valor –varios de ellos elaborados en esos años con el destacado profesor Andrew Zimbalist del Smith College.  Entre los trabajos más significativos se destaca “Revolutionary Cuba at 50: Growth with Equity Revisited” (Cuba revolucionaria a los 50: crecimiento con equidad revisados) Latin American Perspectives Volume 36, Nº 2, March 2009.

En uno de sus libros más recientes, coeditado con Ricardo Torres: “No More Free Lunch. Reflections on the Cuban Economic Reform Process and Challenges for Transformation” (No más comida gratis. Reflexiones sobre el proceso cubano de reformas y desafíos para la transformación) Springer, London, 2014; Brundenius ofrece una evaluación sobre los cambios en Cuba y las reformas económicas en Vietnam. Sin dejar de plantear ideas que pueden resultar polémicas, Brundenius arriba –como en trabajos anteriores- a conclusiones más objetivas y balanceadas al afirmar en este libro “Es un poco irónico que mientras nosotros hablamos sobe la crisis del modelo socialista en Cuba, el capitalismo en todo el mundo atraviesa su crisis más profunda desde la Gran Depresión (…) Pero claramente, el capitalismo no es “el fin de la historia” y es ahora más que nunca importante buscar modelos alternativos que puedan combinar la eficiencia de la competitividad de los modelos de mercado con sostenibilidad ambiental combinada con equidad, solidaridad y democracia. Modelos cooperativos pueden ser una importante parte de esas soluciones como se discuten en este volumen.”

Además de Emily Morris ya mencionada anteriormente, un grupo de diversos autores se han destacado por aportes puntuales al análisis socioeconómico de la realidad cubana desde posiciones igualmente objetivas y no prejuiciadas de nuestra realidad.

Entre ellos vale la pena destacar la labor de Albert Campbell, Profesor de Mérito de la Universidad de Utah, que durante años ha emprendido estudios sobre Cuba en el campo de la economía política y la filosofía de indudable relevancia y que fue el editor del más reciente libro publicado en Estados Unidos escrito totalmente por autores cubanos residentes en nuestro país: “Cuban Economist on the Cuban Economy” (Economistas cubanos sobre la economía cubana) The University Press of Florida, Gainesville, 2013.[4]

En este grupo pueden incluirse con diversos matices, los británicos George Lambie –uno de los editores del International Journal of Cuban Studies, del International Institute for the Study of Cuba- y Mervyn Bein, especialista en temas de relaciones entre Cuba y los antiguos países socialistas; el canadiense John Kirk, durante muchos años estudioso de la colaboración internacional brindada por Cuba en el campo de la salud y editor de la colección Contemporary Cuba de la University Press of Florida; los académicos norteamericanos Nelson Valdés Profesor Emérito de Sociología en la Universidad de Nuevo México profundo conocedor de la realidad cubana, creador de uno de los proyectos de investigación más completo sobre Cuba contemporánea –Cuba-L Direct-; Frank Thompson, profesor de la Universidad de Michigan; Paolo Spadoni, profesor asistente de Georgia Regents University y autor del libro “Cuba’s Socialist Economy Today. Navigating Challenges and Change” (La economía de Cuba socialista hoy. Desafíos de la navegación y cambio) Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 2014, libro en el que se realiza un análisis macroeconómico –no exento de criterios debatibles pero interesantes- acerca de las transformaciones en desarrollo actualmente en Cuba; y Jorge R. Piñón un destacado especialista en temas energéticos y director de Latin America and Caribbean Energy Program en la Universidad de Texas en Austin.

Lógicamente, con posterioridad al 17 de diciembre de 2014 el tema de Cuba y su economía ha pasado a ocupar un destacado lugar en todos los análisis, tanto por los especialistas, como por aquellos que comienzan a enfrentarse al estudio de nuestro país.

Un examen sobre estas nuevas visiones y las diferentes teorías que se enarbolan para sustentarlos, merecerá una evaluación más detenida en la misma medida en que se vayan despejando obstáculos que –como la permanencia del bloqueo norteamericano contra Cuba- no permiten una proyección clara de los posibles derroteros de las relaciones económicas entre nuestros dos países a corto plazo.

Por el momento, resulta de mucha importancia para los economistas cubanos mantener un seguimiento de todos los trabajos que se publican en el exterior, especialmente de aquellos académicos que han demostrado una mayor rigurosidad en sus análisis hasta el presente, tomando en cuenta su posible contribución al debate científico y a profundizar en el  desarrollo de los estudios sobre la economía cubana.

Notas

[1] En esta misma línea de pensamiento se incluyen autores como Jorge Sanguinetty, Roger Betancourt, Rolando Castañeda, Joaquín J. Pujol y Ernesto Hernández-Catá todos ponentes regulares de “Cuba in Transition” el anuario que publica la ASCE desde 1990. Ver www.ascecuba.org
[2] En este trabajo no solamente se contrastan críticamente los elementos esenciales de la política económica cubana con la aplicada en los ex países socialistas europeos, sino que se incluye una valoración crítica de los enfoques de la cubanología al respecto, lo cual es un valor añadido muy interesante para el análisis.
[3] Hay una versión disponible en español. Ver “Emily Morris: Cuba ha demostrado que la economía socialista es posible” Cubadebate, noviembre 24 de 2014 en www.cubadebate.cu
[4]La introducción a este libro se encuentra en www.thecubaneconomy.com

 

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RETHINKING CUBA: NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR DEVELOPMENT

Posted on June 16, 2015 by Arch Ritter

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, Washington, D.C., Tuesday, June 2, 2015

 COMPLETE  TRANSCRIPT OF THE EVENT: Brookings, RETHINKING CUBA

PANEL 1: TRENDS IN THE CUBAN ECONOMY IN LIGHT OF THE NEW U.S.-CUBA CONTEXT:

Moderator:

TED PICCONE, Senior Fellow, Latin America Initiative, The Brookings Institution

Featured Speaker:

STEFAN SELIG, Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade, U.S. Department of Commerce

Panelists:

JUAN TRIANA CORDOVI, Professor of Economics, University of Havana

ARCHIBALD RITTER. Distinguished Research Professor, Carleton University

 PANEL 2: FINANCING CUBA’S GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT, AND TRADE:

Moderator:

BARBARA KOTSCHWAR, Research Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics

Panelists:

YAIMA DOIMEADIOS, Professor, University of Havana

RICHARD FEINBERG, Professor, University of California, San Diego

SAIRA PONS, Professor, Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy,  University of Havana

GERMÁN RIOS, Director, Strategic Affairs, CAF Development Bank

 PANEL 3: NEXT STEPS FOR CUBA’S EMERGING PRIVATE SECTOR-CUENTAPROPISTAS AND COOPERATIVES:

Moderator:

RICHARD FEINBERG, Professor, University of California, San Diego

Panelists:

RAFAEL BETANCOURT, Consultant, Havanada Consulting

TED HENKEN, Professor, Baruch College

JOHN McINTIRE, Chairman, Cuba Emprende Foundation

 PANEL 4: A NEW STAGE IN FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT:

Moderator:

HAROLD TRINKUNAS, Senior Fellow and Director, Latin America Initiative, The Brookings Institution

Panelists:

MARK ENTWISTLE, Founding Partner, Acasta Capital

JOSÉ MARIA VINALS CAMALIONGA, Partner and Director of International Operations, Lupicinio International Law Firm

AUGUSTO MAXWELL, Partner, Akerman, LLP

OMAR EVERLENY, Professor, Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy, University of Havana

 CLOSING REMARKS:

TED PICCONE, Senior Fellow, Latin America

 

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BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, EVENT SUMMARY: TIME TO INVEST IN CUBA?

Posted on June 16, 2015 by Arch Ritter

Anna Newby | June 5, 2015

A video of the event is available here.

 800px-11_Tribuna_antiimperialista_(3)

Cuba’s economic future is looking up if Havana undertakes additional reforms. Such was the overall—yet cautious—consensus at this week’s Brookings event titled “Rethinking Cuba: New opportunities for development,” hosted by the Brookings Institution’s Latin America Initiative. The conference brought together a high-level group of experts from Cuba, the United States and other countries to examine the prospects for Cuba’s economy in the context of the historic process of normalization launched on December 17, 2014.

Opening the event, Brookings Senior Fellow Ted Piccone called attention to the gradual but unprecedented progress taking place in Cuba today. Amid “dialogue and confidence-building” between Washington and Havana—including Cuba’s removal from the U.S. State Department’s list of states that sponsor terrorism, an essential step for the full normalization of diplomatic relations—public- and private-sector actors are entering uncharted waters. As the event’s many panelists went on to discuss, financing Cuba’s growth, fostering foreign investment, and engaging the island’s emerging private sector remain enigmas in many ways.

Offering the Obama administration’s perspective, Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade Stefan Selig pointed to new commercial openings in Cuba, such as the operation of Airbnb in the country and the increasing availability of commercial flights. There is “no denying the speed of these developments,” Selig said, and there is “no denying the excitement.” But the process of normalizing relations, Selig emphasized, will be “evolutionary and deliberative.”

Juan Triana Cordoví of the University of Havana and Archibald Ritter of Carleton University underscored the cautious excitement about Cuba’s economic outlook. Recognizing that the Castro government is revising its fiscal and economic policies, surveys of foreign business leaders show expectations that the ease of doing business on the island will improve. Policy moves, in combination with big investments in infrastructure development, have prompted “an important transformation in the image of Cuba,” in Cordoví’s words. And as Ritter pointed out, despite Fidel Castro’s famous interest in making Cuba a “giant school for socialism,” it has actually become “a giant school for entrepreneurship,” with deficiencies in access to capital and information spurring remarkable creativity among Cubans.

On the issue of financing, Brookings Nonresident Fellow Richard Feinberg acknowledged that Cuba is still mired in a low investment, low growth trap—a disappointment, as all panelists agreed, given Cuba’s potential for growth. As Yaima Doimeadíos pointed out, the large Cuban diaspora has been and will continue to be an essential financer of new investments—particularly in tourism. But the fact that Cuba remains outside the Bretton Woods international financial institutions is a major obstacle, andHavana must decide when (not if) to join those institutions, according to Feinberg. Regardless, as Germán Ríos of the CAF Development Bank pointed out, it will take a while before normal financing will be available to Cuba, given financial restrictions on the island and shortcomings in the banking sector. In the short term, capacity-building projects, technical assistance, and efficiency gains will be key; in the longer term, public-private partnerships are a central goal. As Yaima Doimeadíos of the University of Havana pointed out, the reduction in the number of small-scale, state-managed enterprises amounts to an acknowledgement by the Cuban government that it is poorly-equipped for such tasks. One of the best ways for the Cuban economy to achieve productivity gains, she added, will be through efficiency gains—these are more likely to be discovered in the private sector.

Turning to the issue of self-employment—a relatively new sector on the island—speakers agreed that self-employed Cubans still face many constraints. The field remains strictly controlled, as Ted Henken of Baruch College noted, and hardly allows for much creativity: “self-employment in Cuba—in the official sense—isn’t really entrepreneurial, [rather] it’s medieval, survivalist.” Ownership of capital is unclear, as Rafael Betancourt of Havánada Consulting added, and the centralized approval process means long waits.

Nevertheless, Henken emphasized, there is an apparent directive from the top to make improvements, with Raúl Castro writing to his colleagues that “we all” need to work to end the stigmatization of private enterprise and self-employment in Cuba. He likely recognizes the major advantages to removing the country’s “auto-bloqueo” (self-imposed blockade, in Henken’s words) preventing the inflow of capital and knowledge, which the Obama administration has offered to help provide to Cuban entrepreneurs. Conveniently, self-employment fits within the socialist narrative of capital ownership by the workers.

Concluding the event, Piccone reiterated that in spite of the positive outlook for Cuba, changes on the island will be slow and incremental. Basic economic incentives still do not fully align with market-oriented structures, and technological hurdles to development—particularly internet access—remain high. Moreover, many of the most promising developments are at the microeconomic level and are not likely to have widespread effects. He added that U.S.-Cuba relations are only part of the story and that developments vis-à-vis China, Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, and elsewhere could also prove consequential.

One audience member pointed out that the glaring weak link in Cuba’s economic picture is political, not economic, i.e., the government’s political will to modernize and integrate its economy. Cuban law technically prevents nationalization, requires compensation if a foreign asset is expropriated, and guarantees that profits can be repatriated. But foreign investors doubt the Castro government’s seriousness about enforcing those laws, given its history of hostility to foreign business.

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MAKING SENSE OF TODAY’S CUBAN ECONOMY: PROMISES IN THE MAKING

Posted on June 9, 2015 by Arch Ritter

Jose Gabilondo, The Huffington Post, 8 June 2015

Original Here: Making Sense of Today’s Cuban Economy

 The exact path remains uncertain, but Cuba’s economy is on the move. Bright-eyed capitalists have been thumping their tails since President Obama gave the nod last December to restoring diplomatic relations, but the island’s economic model was already in flux. In 2011, the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party outlined its own tropical perestroika in the Lineamientos, a forward-looking blend of goals, strategies, and values intended to adapt the island’s socialist project to the contemporary global order.

 As normalization looms, thought leaders like Brookings and the Bildner Center have been taking up economic questions about Cuba. For most of us, though, this topic remains a black box because the U.S. embargo — intendedly so — also blocks understanding the fascinating amalgam that is Cuba. A tiny loophole lets academics visit and study the island, so I have discussed its Central Bank, its quirky currencies, Cuban-American identity, recent reforms to its economy, and the impact of Cuban-Americans on U.S. policy towards the island.

 To promote wider understanding of this crucial moment in the Cuban economy, let me emphasize three important aspects: macroeconomic structure, microeconomic institutions and economic culture. This post looks at some of the island’s macroeconomic challenges, i.e., the big picture issues that frame the economy as a whole. The work of markets is done not at this level but, instead, mostly by microeconomic institutions like the price mechanism, more so in a capitalist than in a command economy. So later posts will take up that issue, as well as the question of culture since it is real people and not abstractions that bring an economy to life. I speak not in the neo-Plattist spirit of the Helms-Burton Act or with the unsetting hubris of ‘regime change’ advocates, but as a child of the island who wishes the very best for it and intends to make it my home one day.

 Rightsizing the state sector.

 Consistent with the liberalization mandates of the Lineamientos, Raul Castro has sustained a steady pace of incremental reforms to state structure, including laying off public workers and facilitating micro-entrepreneurship, but the state still doles out economic freedom by the thimbleful, be it to cuentapropistas or the Benetton store in Plaza Vieja.

 Front and center is the issue of whether and how the state will marketize the military-run conglomerates that control key sectors. More is needed to free up even the pinkie of the invisible hand, though I dread the horror of a Starbucks in the Parque Central.

 Unifying the Cuban peso.

A Cuban friend once quipped, “Cuba’s system is not socialism — it’s surrealism.” Nowhere is this more true than in its balkanized currency system. It has two official currencies — the “soft” national peso (CUP) and the “hard” currency pegged to foreign currencies (CUC) — neither of which trade off the island.

 And different exchange rates exist. Intra-governmental accounts use a fictional 1 CUP to 1 CUC ratio that leads to implicit subsidies and taxes and makes it hard to identify profit and loss centers. Elsewhere, legal and grey markets perform price discovery that result in a rate of 25 CUP to 1 CUC. In the end, the CUP will trump the CUC, but whether this will happen slowly or all at once remains to be seen.

 Clearing political risk.

 The U.S. has certified several thousand expropriation claims against the island and Cuba estimates the value of its claims against the U.S. for embargo losses to be over one trillion dollars. Until the two countries resolve these dueling claims, political uncertainty haunts the economy. Cuba has many bilateral investment treatments that give foreign investors the right to arbitrate investment disputes, but more expansive remedies against political risk might enhance investment.

 Creating infrastructure for financing the state.

 To make good on its substantial promise, the island would benefit from more multilateral, domestic, and foreign financing. Long overdue (what are we still waiting for?) is Cuba’s membership in the Bretton Woods institutions, e.g., the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank group. Their resources would help with currency reform and what is, in effect, the island’s voluntary structural adjustment program. Though foreign creditors seem to be increasing their willingness to lend, the island may want to mend fences with the Paris Club and its private creditors. Cuba’s financial system would benefit from an interbank funding mechanism and a local public debt market, but those pieces may have to wait.

 Boosting exports.

At present, Cuba imports much more than it exports, so increasing exports would give the island more foreign exchange and improve its terms of trade, something that is possible only after the embargo ends.

 Building a banking system.

 Havana may have some dual-currency ATMs, but it would behoove the island to have more robust banking networks that let Cubans and foreigners settle payments, save money, and borrow.

Building legal infrastructure.

Both the state and the non-state sectors in Cuba would benefit from a more developed legal system. Strictly speaking, this is neither a macro- nor micro- factor. It’s more of a meso-level issue of institutionality that bridges the two. No knee-jerk patriot, I do admire the way that U.S. legal system has built a federal judiciary with the independent power to block both executive overreaching and mob mentalities doing business as ‘democracy’. A robust tradition of judicial review could really help the long-term interest of the Cuban economy.

Because it is the land that neoliberalism and its spawn the Washington Consensus forgot, the island is a real-world laboratory for testing economic theory, especially efforts to modify capitalism and socialism by learning from recent history. Here I’ve sketched some macroeconomic issues only in a very impressionistic way. If you’re interested, consider attending the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy’s annual conference in Miami. It’s a welcoming place where folks expound, challenge, and build out ways of thinking about these issues.

 

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ECONOMISTAS CUBANOS Y DE EEUU DEBATEN EN WASHINGTON SOBRE EL LIBRE MERCADO

Posted on June 3, 2015 by Arch Ritter

Original here: ECONOMISTAS CUBANOS Y DE EEUU DEBATEN

JAIRO MEJIA/EFE

WASHINGTON  3 de Junio de 2015

Conference Program: Rethinking Cuba, New opportunities for Development

12166748-cartoon-like-drawings-of-flags-showing-friendship-between-Cuba-and-USA-Stock-PhotoEl centro de estudios Brookings Institution acogió el martes en Washington un inédito encuentro de economistas cubanos y expertos estadounidenses para analizar los efectos del progresivo e histórico camino en la isla hacia el libre mercado, en paralelo a la normalización de relaciones con EEUU.

En una muestra más de los nuevos tiempos tras el anuncio de normalización de relaciones entre Cuba y Estados Unidos del pasado 17 de diciembre, profesores de la Universidad de la Habana presentaron ante los “cocineros de ideas” de Washington los pasos del castrismo hacia una economía menos regulada.

El subsecretario de Comercio Internacional, Stefan Selig, reconoció que desde la llegada de Raúl Castro al poder Cuba ha realizado reformas para abrir su economía, aunque persisten “profundos desafíos estructurales” para salir del anacronismo.

En su opinión, “Cuba ha estado anclada en el pasado”, algo que no ha permitido a la isla caribeña avanzar del mismo modo que lo hicieron economías que abrieron sus mercados como Chile, Colombia, México o Perú.

“El nuevo rumbo (en Cuba) significará poner el reloj de nuevo en marcha…No nos hacemos ilusiones, sabemos que tomará tiempo y que habrá obstáculos en el camino”, aseguró Selig.

El profesor de Economía de la Universidad de la Habana, Juan Triana, aseguró que, desde la llegada de Raúl Castro, Cuba ha abordado importante reformas, como atestigua el aumento del número de paladares (restaurantes) y alojamientos en el país, que han creado un semillero de pequeños empresarios.

Triana señaló que, desde que comenzó el año, la llegada de turistas norteamericanos ha experimentado un importante aumento, una señal de que las medidas para rebajar las barreras a desplazamientos y transacciones financieras con Cuba adoptadas recientemente por la Casa Blanca han tenido un efecto inmediato.

Pese a los avances en el camino hacia la normalización, que podrían culminar en breve con un anuncio sobre la apertura de embajadas, el levantamiento total del embargo estadounidense a la isla será “largo y tortuoso”, a juicio de Triana.

Por su parte, el economista Archibald Ritter, investigador de la universidad canadiense Carleton, dijo que Cuba debe crear una estrategia de manejo de la inversión extranjera que evite una “walmartización” (término derivado de la cadena de supermercados Walmart, que se refiere a grandes empresas que comen terreno a las pymes) de la economía que acabe con los pequeños empresarios.

Según Ritter, “Raúl Castro es cauteloso y pragmático” en lo que se refiere a las reformas necesarias para que la economía cubana pueda seguir el camino de crecimiento, al tiempo que se abre tras más de un siglo de enemistad con su vecino y primera economía mundial.

Richard Feinberg, investigador de la Universidad de California y experto en Cuba, recordó que el Gobierno castrista sigue manteniendo un férreo control de la economía a través de empresas estatales que no permiten un sector privado sostenible.

La profesora del Centro de Estudios Económicos de la Universidad de la Habana Saira Pons consideró que Cuba necesita dar más libertad a las empresas estatales y crear un marco de relación más acorde con la economía moderna. No obstante, Pons recordó que el gasto social es todavía algo prioritario en Cuba y difícil de recortar. El 20% del producto interior bruto (PIB) cubano se destina a financiar sanidad y educación gratuita.

Yaima Doimeadios, también procedente de la Universidad de la Habana, indicó que una sistema socialista no está dispuesto a rebajar los logros sociales obtenidos, y eso será definitorio en el futuro económico cubano.

Tras más de dos décadas sin el soporte financiero soviético, Cuba se ha visto obligada a dar tímidos pasos hacia una economía más liberalizada, pero la falta de productividad, lastrada por pobres infraestructuras y empresas ineficientes, ha impedido progresos.

“Los ganadores han sido, hasta ahora, los que han producido menos y han sido menos ineficientes”, según apuntó Doimeadios, quien dijo que con la mayor apertura y el posible fin del bloqueo estadounidense persistirán dudas sobre cómo equilibrar crecimiento, estabilidad fiscal y una nueva mentalidad en el país. EFE

Brookings

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REFORMANDO EL MODELO ECONÓMICO CUBANO

Posted on May 20, 2015 by Arch Ritter

Mauricio A. Font y Mario González-Corzo, Editores, Con la asistencia de Rosalina López

New York: Bildner Center for Western Hemisphere Studies, The Graduate Center, The City University of New York, 2015

Documento Completo: Reformando el Modelo Economico Cubano

 New Picture (12)

CONTENIDO

Introducción, Mario González-Corzo

Del ajuste externo a una nueva concepción del socialism Cubano, Juan Triana Cordoví

La estructura de las exportaciones de bienes en Cuba 29, Ricardo Torres

Relanzamiento del cuentapropismo en medio del ajuste structural, Pavel Vidal Alejandro y Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva

Las cooperativas en Cuba, Camila Piñeiro Harnecker

La apertura a las microfinanzas en Cuba, Pavel Vidal Alejandro

Hacia una nueva fiscalidad en Cuba, Saira Pons

Bibliografía

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REFORMING CUBA: BE MORE LIBRE. The transformation of the economy needs to happen much faster

Posted on May 15, 2015 by Arch Ritter

The Economist, May 16th 2015

Original Here: Reforming Cuba: Be More Libre

IT HAS been five months since Cuba and the United States announced that they would end their long cold war, but Cuba’s president, Raúl Castro, is still basking in the afterglow. On his way home from Russia this week he stopped off at the Vatican to see the pope, and said he might return to the Catholic faith. Later François Hollande paid the first-ever visit to Cuba by a French president; he was granted an audience with Fidel Castro, Raúl’s ailing brother, who led the revolution in 1959 and ruled until 2008.

But beneath the bonhomie lies unease. Cuba’s creaky revolutionaries spent half a century blaming the American embargo for all the island’s woes. Now they resist American capitalism for fear of being overrun. The result for most ordinary Cubans is not too much change but too little (see article). The island is poorer than many of its neighbours. Doctors earn just $60 a month—after a 150% pay rise. Food and other basics are in short supply. Boat people still flee to Florida’s shores.

Cuba deserves a proper democracy and a robust market-based economy. Sadly, that is unlikely to happen soon. Some things are changing. Private guesthouses, restaurants, barber shops and the like have begun to flourish, creating the kernel of an entrepreneurial middle class. But if Cubans are to benefit from the opening with America, their rulers need to reform more boldly and quickly than they have done so far.

A cocktail of reform

Where to start? Cuba should begin by opening up many more sectors to private enterprise. Currently, Cubans can be “self-employed” in 201 activities (including reading Tarot cards), but few that require a university degree. In place of a “positive list” of permitted private activities, the government should publish a negative one that reserves just a few for the state. All others would then be open to private initiative, including professions such as architecture, medicine, education and the law. The new bourgeois are potential customers for professional services; catering to that demand would in turn expand the middle class.

Liberalisation is urgent in wholesale markets. Today enterprises such as restaurants are forced to buy supplies from state-run supermarkets where ordinary people shop, which exacerbates shortages. This undermines popular support for the emerging private sector.

The climate for foreign investment must also improve. Cuba woos foreign investors for the expertise, jobs and currency they bring, but treats them shabbily. Under a supposedly friendly new law, they must still recruit workers through state agencies, to which they pay hard currency; the agencies then pay out miserly salaries in pesos. Imported inputs pass through bureaucratic state-run enterprises. Worst of all, legal codes are vague and their application is arbitrary. In recent years several foreign businessmen have been imprisoned (and later released) with little explanation.

How much of this thicket Mr Castro is prepared to clear away is uncertain. The party’s leadership has hinted that its congress would strengthen the National Assembly, a rubber-stamp body. A proper legislature that could write laws would give security to enterprise. Cuba is also bracing for a painful currency unification, which will end a huge subsidy to state companies.

For many of the revolution’s ageing leaders reform and privatisation are yanqui-inspired dirty words. The regime looks to China and Vietnam, where communist governments have embraced capitalism without yielding power. The Cuban communists are wary: they fear that, if they give up too much economic control, they will be obliterated just like the communists of eastern Europe. Yet the bigger risk would be merely to tinker with a system that keeps Cubans poor at a time when their aspirations are rising.

Cuba April 2015 228A Symbol of Santeria, the meaning of which I do not understand.

Not entirely relevant to this Economist editorial. Photo taken in April 2015 on Calle Animas

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¿ACTUALIZACIÓN DEL MODELO O REFORMA DEL ESTADO? Una lectura política del cambio económico en Cuba

Posted on March 26, 2015 by Arch Ritter

Pedro Monreal

 Alicia le pregunta al Gato de Cheshire, ¿podrías decirme, por favor, qué camino debo seguir para salir de aquí?

-Esto depende en gran parte del sitio al que quieras llegar – dijo el Gato.

-No me importa mucho el sitio… -dijo Alicia.

-Entonces tampoco importa mucho el camino que tomes – dijo el Gato.

– … siempre que llegue a alguna parte – añadió Alicia como explicación.

– ¡Oh, siempre llegarás a alguna parte – aseguró el Gato -, si caminas lo suficiente!

Alicia en el país de las maravillas, Lewis Carroll.

 La actualización del modelo económico en Cuba, valorada por su efecto sobre los indicadores económicos claves parece ser, hasta ahora, un proceso intrascendente. Juzgada con severidad, pudiera considerársele como un fracaso; evaluada con benevolencia, pudiese ser vista como una asignatura pendiente. Las tasas de crecimiento del Producto Interno Bruto (PIB) durante los tres años posteriores a la aprobación official del proceso, que no han logrado superar el 3% anual, no proporcionan la “velocidad de despegue” que requiere la recuperación del escenario macroeconómico, ni aseguran el progreso del bienestar material de la población(1).

 Pudiera argumentarse que se requiere de más tiempo, pero tres años es un plazo razonable para juzgar un programa económico gubernamental. En muchos países, cuatro años es el tiempo máximo del que dispone un gobierno para dejar su impronta en la economía de una nación. Parecería prevalecer, sobre todo desde la perspectiva de los economistas, el supuesto de que el futuro político del país depende del éxito o del fracaso de la actualización. Si se parte de esa premisa, las perspectivas no parecerían ser halagüeñas para el Gobierno cubano; pero: ¿qué consecuencias tendría para el análisis de la situación cubana la posibilidad de que tal supuesto no fuese válido?

 Supongamos que existiese la eventualidad de que el éxito del programa del Gobierno hasta el año 2018 –momento que parece ser crucial para el futuro de Cuba- no se apoyase  esencialmente en la actualización del modelo económico sino en una reforma del Estado mucho más amplia que, de manera general, estuviese produciendo resultados plausibles. Esa es una dimensión en la que las posibles relaciones de causa y efecto entre programa y  resultados parecerían ser más sugerentes. Después de todo, conindependencia de las insuficiencias de la actualización, y más allá de cualquier consideración doctrinal que pudiera tenerse sobre el actual modelo de Estado cubano, resulta evidente que la medición de la principales variables políticas del  país –cualquiera sea la “métrica” que se utilice- no permite validar una conclusión alarmista respecto a la relativa estabilidad y resolución del Estado cubano, aún en medio de una situación económica que, a duras penas, logra alcanzar el estatus de reproducción simple.(2) No estoy diciendo que no existan áreas problemáticas de gobernabilidad en Cuba ni que las cosas no pudiesen cambiar en el futuro, pero lo que parece relevante subrayar ahora es un dato de la realidad actual de Cuba: existe una desconexión visible entre los resultados económicos del país y la materialización de una rearticulación de la capacidad del Estado cubano que le permita seguir ejerciendo, sin mayores sobresaltos, aquello que –definida de manera un tanto cruda- es la esencia del poder: la capacidad de ejercer “el mando”, la posibilidad de imposición de una voluntad sobre otra, aún contra la Resistencia de la segunda(3). El poder político es esencialmente eso. Cualquier intento de edulcorarlo, a la larga, resulta fútil (4).

Continue reading: Pedro Monreal 2015 Actualización del modelo o reforma del Estado

Pedro MonrealPedro Monreal

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