CUBA TO BEGIN LONG-DELAYED MONETARY OVERHAUL ON NEW YEAR’S DAY
Ricardo Herrero
Cuban Study Group, 14 December 2020
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CUBA TO BEGIN LONG-DELAYED MONETARY OVERHAUL ON NEW YEAR’S DAY
Ricardo Herrero
Cuban Study Group, 14 December 2020
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By Pedro Monreal in elestadocomotal on November 25, 2020
Original Article: SUGERENCIA PARA UNA NORMATIVA DE PYMES EN CUBA
La legalización de las pequeñas y medianas empresas privadas (PYMES) es, por amplio margen, el “eslabón perdido” del programa oficial de cambios económicos en Cuba. Mencionada, pero no implementada ni siquiera a nivel de preparación de condiciones, al menos públicamente, y “empaquetada” de una manera confusa con algo a lo que se le denominan PYMES estatales, llama la atención la parsimonia con la que se aborda uno de los temas respecto a los que se dispone de mayor evidencia internacional acerca de su potencial efecto positivo en el empleo y en la productividad nacional.
He estimado que el establecimiento de PYMES en Cuba pudiera aumentar el Producto Interno Bruto (PIB) entre 1,5 y 1,7%. (1)
La dilación de la medida introduce un problema de secuencia en el programa económico oficial pues, al aplicarse ahora el llamado “ordenamiento” (una mezcla de hiper-devaluación, alza de precios y salarios, y eliminación de subsidios) se asume un riesgo inflacionario debido a la carencia de una capacidad de respuesta de oferta que pudiera haberse reducido si se hubiesen legalizado primero las PYMES.
Después del anuncio del “paquete económico” del verano, publiqué dos propuestas sobre medidas muy relacionadas. Primero, presenté en agosto una propuesta para el establecimiento de las PYMES, y luego, a principios de octubre, publiqué una propuesta para reformar el trabajo por cuenta propia (TCP) mediante la adopción de un esquema de trabajadores “autónomos”. (2)
A nivel de esos dos temas, el marco de referencia más amplio era la legalización de las PYMES. De hecho, la primera fase de la “travesía” hacia las PYMES consistía precisamente en el establecimiento de un marco normativo del trabajo “autónomo”.
El problema es que, aunque sobre la reforma del TCP se hablado oficialmente de tal manera que parecería ser una acción de mayor inmediatez en comparación con las PYMES, en realidad muy poco se ha hecho en la práctica. Considero que se presta gran atención a la transformación del TCP en sí mismo, sin que frecuentemente se conecte ese posible cambio con otras transformaciones futuras. (3)
Retomo ahora aquellas propuestas, pero con las modificaciones que considero que habría que priorizar en las circunstancias actuales.
¿Por qué retomo las propuestas, y por qué las retomo de manera modificada?
No parece realista asumir que se legalicen las PYMES en el plazo inmediato, pero no debería descartarse que un desbalance macroeconómico eventualmente derivado del “ordenamiento” pudiese tener el efecto de conducir a una modificación de las secuencias del resto del programa económico.
El establecimiento de las PYMES representa la mayor reserva de productividad a corto plazo y la fuente más expedita de creación de empleo neto del país. Es también la fórmula menos costosa -para las finanzas públicas- para lograr esos dos objetivos.
Tomo nota de los argumentos políticos que parecen obstaculizar la legalización de las PYMES, pero llamo la atención sobre los costos políticos de una eventual combinación de estancamiento con inflación debido a la falta de acción en un componente de la economía como las PYMES. (4)
Las PYMES pudieran aliviar eventuales tensiones sociales porque pudieran crear rápidamente empleos e ingresos, así como favorecen el incremento de la productividad, tanto directamente en las PYMES como al facilitar la reforma de la empresa estatal.
En mi modesta apreciación, lo que ha cambiado recientemente es la urgencia sobre la necesidad de disponer de un “plan B” porque considero que el “ordenamiento” contiene fisuras conceptuales y parece haber adoptado varios supuestos polémicos. He comentado anteriormente el tema del “ordenamiento”. (5)
Aclaraciones sobre una nueva normativa de PYMES.
Debido al tiempo que se ha perdido con la reforma del TCP, la propuesta revisada que se presenta a continuación ya no considera esa reforma del TCP como la primera fase de un proceso de establecimiento progresivo de las PYMES.
El enfoque ahora es diferente: se establecen las PYMES como un proceso sin fases en las que determinadas acciones que antes estaban separadas en el tiempo se realizarían ahora de manera simultánea.
Conviene recalcar que la propuesta se enfoca en el establecimiento de las PYMES, específicamente su legalización y puesta en operación. Es decir, posteriormente deberían adoptarse otras medidas adicionales respecto a las PYMES, especialmente en cuanto a las acciones para apoyarlas, pero lo urgente es ponerlas ahora en funcionamiento.
He expresado en un texto anterior que después de lograr la legalización de las PYMES habría que continuar desarrollando el marco normativo para apoyarlas estatalmente porque las PYMES son entidades relativamente frágiles que cumplen funciones importantes en términos de empleo nacional y de “conexión” del tejido económico. (6)
Es también importante aclarar que me limito a identificar los componentes de la normativa de PYMES, desde una perspectiva económica y por tanto no he considerado los componentes jurídicos, los cuales son muy importantes y obviamente habría que precisarlos con las contribuciones de juristas, para poder desarrollar una norma integral para las PYMES.
Aunque no tengo capacidad para pronunciarme sobre los detalles legales, asumo que el establecimiento de ese marco normativo no necesitaría una ley. Quizás sería suficiente un “Acuerdo” del Consejo de Ministros para implementar algo que ya está políticamente aprobado en el documento de la “Conceptualización”. Se complementaría con resoluciones de los ministerios relevantes.
Quince puntos para una normativa de PYMES en Cuba
Desde el punto de vista de sus componentes económicos una normativa para el rápido establecimiento “de PYMES en Cuba debería incluir, al menos, los siguientes aspectos:
La categoría de pequeñas y medianas empresas (PYMES) no distingue entre las pequeñas y las medianas empresas. (8)
Las microempresas son aquellas con un volumen anual de ventas inferior a 10 veces el ingreso nacional per cápita. Las microempresas no se incluyen en la categoría de PYMES.
En el caso del registro “express” solamente se verifican los documentos actuales de la licencia TCP y se formaliza el registro doble (en Registro Mercantil y Registro de microempresas/PYMES) mediante una única declaración jurada.
Nota: los poseedores de licencias de TCP que no deseen registrar su actividad como microempresas o PYMES continuarían ejerciendo el TCP, cuya regulación no es objeto de esta normativa.
III. APOYO AL ESTABLECIMIENTO DE LAS MICROEMPRESAS Y DE LAS PEQUEÑAS Y MEDIANAS EMPRESAS
9.Apoyo a microempresas:
IV DISPOSICIONES PARA LA APLICACIÓN
15 Entrada en efecto: Definición de la fecha de comienzo de aplicación de la nueva norma para las microempresas y PYMES privadas.
Resumiendo,
La tardanza con la legalización de las PYMES privadas ha representado un error en la secuencia de las transformaciones económicas que necesita Cuba. No debería descartarse que el llamado “ordenamiento” produjese desequilibrios macroeconómicos, especialmente de tipo inflacionario, que hicieran necesario fomentar una capacidad de respuesta rápida de oferta mediante el establecimiento de PYMES privadas, lo que a la vez podría crear condiciones favorables para otras medidas, principalmente la reforma de la empresa estatal. Anticiparse a ese eventual escenario implicaría disponer de un “plan B” para la legalización expedita de las PYMES privadas en Cuba.
Notas
1 “El establecimiento de PYMES en Cuba pudiera aumentar el Producto Interno Bruto entre 1,5 y 1,7% ”, El Estado como tal, 28 de abril de 2020 https://elestadocomotal.com/2020/04/28/el-establecimiento-de-pymes-en-cuba-pudiera-aumentar-el-producto-interno-bruto-entre-15-y-17/
2 “Travesía en tres fases hacia las PYMES en Cuba: una propuesta para “destrabar” fuerzas productivas”, El Estado como tal, 19 de agosto de 2020 https://elestadocomotal.com/2020/08/19/travesia-en-tres-fases-hacia-las-pymes-en-cuba-una-propuesta-para-destrabar-fuerzas-productivas/ , y “Hacia un esquema de “autónomos”: propuesta para reformar el trabajo por cuenta propia en Cuba”, El Estado como tal, 5 de octubre de 2020 https://elestadocomotal.com/2020/10/05/hacia-un-esquema-de-autonomos-propuesta-para-reformar-el-trabajo-por-cuenta-propia-en-cuba/
3 “Travesía en tres fases hacia las PYMES en Cuba: una propuesta para “destrabar” fuerzas productivas”. Op. Cit.
4 “Las PYMES y la reforma del modelo cubano: ayúdame que yo te ayudaré”, El Estado como tal, 23 de julio de 2020 https://elestadocomotal.com/2020/07/23/las-pymes-y-la-reforma-del-modelo-cubano-ayudame-que-yo-te-ayudare/
5 “Ordenamiento, salarios y precios en Cuba: notas sobre el riesgo de inflación”, El Estado como tal, 5 de octubre de 2020, 17 de noviembre de 2020 https://elestadocomotal.com/2020/11/17/ordenamiento-salarios-y-precios-en-cuba-notas-sobre-el-riesgo-de-inflacion/
6 “Travesía en tres fases hacia las PYMES en Cuba: una propuesta para “destrabar” fuerzas productivas”. Op. Cit.
7 En el caso de Cuba, tomando el PIB per cápita de aproximadamente 8900 CUP anuales (370 USD aplicando una tasa de 24:1), las PYMES serían entidades con ventas anuales en el rango de 3700 a 371000 USD.
8 Hay especialistas que recomiendan establecer una categoría de PYMES que considere exclusivamente las pequeñas y medianas empresas (sin establecer diferencias entre ambas), y que permita diferenciarlas de las micro empresas y de las grandes empresas. Es un criterio que se apoya en la observación empírica de que en la práctica las microempresas raramente se convierten en pequeñas y medianas empresas, por lo que se trata de dos niveles de escala complementarias, pero con poca dinámica de transformación entre esas dos agrupaciones de entidades. Por otra parte, se considera que a nivel de las pequeñas y medianas empresas existe una marcada intención de transitar hacia una escala mayor y que, aunque las probabilidades de materialización no son altas para muchas de esas empresas, es un fenómeno observable. Ver, Tom Gibson, “Defining SMEs: A Less Imperfect Way of Defining Small and Medium Enterprises in Developing Countries”, Brookings Global Economy and Development, September 2008.
9 Se refiere a la “clase”, identificada por cuatro dígitos en el Clasificador Nacional de Actividades Económicas (CNAE).
Carmelo Mesa-Lago (University of Pittsburgh) and Jan Svejnar (Columbia University)
Florida International University, School of Public and International Affairs, October 2020.
A definitive 2020 analysis of Cuba’s current economic situation.
Full document available here: The Cuban Economic Crisis: Its Causes and Possible Policies for the Transition
William M. LeoGrande, Tuesday, Nov. 17, 2020
Complete Article: ACTION ON REFORMS
Cuba’s economy was already struggling before the coronavirus pandemic, due to persistently poor domestic productivity, declining oil shipments from Venezuela and the ratcheting up of U.S. sanctions. But now, the closure of the tourist sector due to COVID-19 has thrown Cuba into a full-fledged recession, deeper than anything since the economic crisis of the 1990s that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union—what Cubans know as the “Special Period.”
Perhaps paradoxically, the downturn also appears to have broken a logjam of disagreement among Cuba’s senior leaders and accelerated the implementation of economic reforms. Reforms entail risks, President Miguel Diaz-Canel told the Council of Ministers this summer, but “the worst risk would be in not changing and in losing popular support.”
In 2011, the Cuban Communist Party approved a new economic policy to promote growth by giving freer rein to market forces; requiring unproductive state-owned enterprises to make a profit, even if it means laying off workers; promoting small private businesses; and attracting foreign direct investment. Over the ensuing years, however, implementation slowed to a glacial pace, at least in part because of resistance from some segments of the Cuban political elite who stood to lose from the changes. With the economy buoyed by cheap oil from Venezuela and a booming tourist sector, the need for reform was less urgent.
Still, economic growth lagged. GDP increased at an average rate of just 2.1 percent from 2011 to 2019, and only 1.3 percent since 2016. The anemic growth in recent years reflects those declining oil shipments from Venezuela, which Caracas provides in exchange for medical services from Cuban doctors and technicians. In 2016, then-President Raul Castro had to declare an energy emergency and begin rationing fuel to state-owned enterprises.
The one bright spot in the domestic economy has been the spectacular growth of Cuba’s tourist sector in the past three decades. From 1991 to 2018, the number of foreign visitors increased more than 11-fold, from just over 400,000 to 4.7 million. The tourist sector got another big boost in 2014, when then-President Barack Obama agreed with Castro to begin normalizing relations, and the Obama administration eliminated most restrictions on U.S. travel. The number of non-Cuban American U.S. visitors jumped six-fold, from 92,325 in 2014 to a peak of 637,907 in 2018. Including Cuban Americans, U.S. visitors in 2018 comprised about a quarter of all foreign visitors to the island.
But President Donald Trump immediately pledged to “cancel” Obama’s opening to Cuba when he took office in 2017. The Trump administration launched a concerted “maximum pressure” campaign, designed to systematically cut off Cuba’s principal sources of foreign currency. To deter foreign investors, Trump activated Title III of the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act last year, enabling U.S. nationals who lost property after the 1959 revolution, including Cuban Americans, to sue Cuban, U.S. or foreign companies in U.S. federal court for “trafficking” in their confiscated property—that is, making beneficial use of it.
Faithfully executed, the reforms could boost productivity significantly over the next year or two, but shorter-term relief for Cuba will depend on circumstances beyond its control.
The administration also targeted Cuba’s energy supply by imposing sanctions on companies shipping Venezuelan oil to Cuba, aggravating fuel shortages. The State Department pressured other countries to end their partnerships with Cuba’s international medical assistance programs—a major source of foreign exchange earnings for Havana—and conservative governments in Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia and El Salvador quickly obliged. The Brazilian program, by far the largest, involved over 11,000 medical personnel, generating $250 million in annual revenue for Cuba.
But Trump’s most serious blows have focused on travel and remittances. The administration eliminated the people-to-people category of legal travel, thereby blocking the majority of non-Cuban American travelers; severed commercial and charter air links to all Cubans cities except Havana; and banned U.S. cruise ships, which carried some 800,000 people to Cuba in 2018, from docking there. This campaign led to a 20 percent drop in the number of foreign visitors to the island in the early months of 2020 before the onset of COVID-19.
Remittances, which Obama removed limits on in 2009, were capped at $1,000 per quarter. Then, just weeks before the presidential election, Trump announced new rules prohibiting Cuban Americans from sending remittances through Cuban money transfer companies run by the armed forces, which includes almost all of them. The restrictions, which are set to go into effect later this month, would produce deep suffering among the roughly 60 percent of Cubans who rely on $3.6 billion in cash remittances annually for sustenance.
Then came the pandemic. Although Cuba has had considerable success containing COVID-19, by virtue of a health care system premised on prevention and a disaster response apparatus second to none, the impact on Cuba’s economy has been catastrophic. In March, Cuba closed the island to all foreign visitors and has only gradually begun to reopen some of the more remote tourist resorts in the Cuban Keys. The closure has cost Cuba some $3 billion in lost revenue; estimates are that GDP has contracted by 8 percent this year. The shortages of basic commodities, including food and medicine, are severe due to the shortage of foreign exchange reserves, and Cuba has been unable to meet its debt service obligations.
The severity of the crisis prompted the Cuban government to finally act on potentially significant economic reforms it previously promised, but which were delayed due to disagreements within the leadership. Perhaps most significantly, the government has indicated that it will soon eliminate the dual currency and exchange rate system—which includes Cuban pesos for domestic use and convertible pesos that are roughly pegged to the dollar. The Cuban pesos have a 25:1 exchange rate with the convertible peso in the retail sector, and 1:1 rate between enterprises—a distortion of value that stimulates imports while discouraging exports and aggravating the country’s foreign exchange crisis.
In July, the government announced that private and cooperative businesses would be allowed to hold convertible foreign currency bank accounts and import and export directly, rather than having to go through government agencies. To prioritize food security, the government reduced price and administrative controls on private and cooperative farms. To generate and capture more remittances, it lifted the 10 percent tax on U.S. dollars entering the country and opened dozens of stores that accept payment in convertible currency.
Faithfully executed, these reforms could boost productivity significantly over the next year or two, but shorter-term relief for Cuba will depend on circumstances beyond its control: the speed at which the pandemic subsides, allowing the tourist sector to reopen; and the policies of the incoming U.S. president. Cubans celebrated openly when Joe Biden won this month’s election, and the government has signaled its willingness to improve relations. During the election campaign, Biden promised to reverse Trump’s sanctions that disrupted family ties and imposed economic hardship on the Cuban people, which could mean a reopening of travel and elimination of Trump’s restrictions on remittances. That would measurably improve the standard of living for the Cuban people, but sustainable development for the long run depends on Cuba completing the reforms necessary to build a productive economy.
Carmelo Mesa-Lago, 10/6/2020
Tema1
¿Cuál es el estado de la economía cubana en tiempos del COVID-19 y qué políticas de recuperación se prevén?
Resumen
Este documento se divide en cuatro partes: (1) un análisis de la crisis económica en Cuba, con indicadores macroeconómicos internos y externos; (2) una examen de las cuatro causas de la crisis, una interna y tres externas (persistencia de la planificación central, recorte en la ayuda económica venezolana, sanciones de Trump y COVID-19); (3) una descripción de la evolución y efectos en la salud de la pandemia; y (4) una revisión de las potenciales opciones para afrontar el COVID-19 y salir de la crisis económica, así como recomendaciones de organismos regionales para hacer frente a la recesión en América Latina y su potencial aplicabilidad en Cuba.
Cuba está sufriendo una severa crisis económica y parece haber muy pocas políticas (internas o externas) capaces de generar una reactivación. Hay un consenso entre la mayoría de economistas académicos cubanos (y también extranjeros) de que la única salida está en retomar las reformas estructurales interrumpidas y acelerarlas y profundizarlas. Ricardo Torres (2020) apunta que: “… una situación extrema como esta debería servir de catalizador de las transformaciones que requiere el modelo cubano… es hora que se reconozca que el esquema de producción y distribución actual es un rotundo fracaso y requiere ser revisado desde sus fundamentos. En esa revisión el sector privado y cooperativo debe ser empoderado”.
También sugieren un grupo de economistas cubanos (entere los que se encuentra el autor) tres medidas que Cuba podría adoptar internamente, sin necesidad de ayuda internacional, para salir de la crisis y propiciar el desarrollo económico-social (véase Mesa-Lago et al., 2020).
Para aumentar la producción agrícola, Cuba debería seguir las políticas de China y Vietnam: autorizar a todos los productores agrícolas a que determinen por sí mismos qué sembrar, a quién vender y fijar los precios en base a la oferta y la demanda. Estas políticas terminaron con las hambrunas periódicas en los dos países asiáticos, ahora autosuficientes. Hoy Vietnam es un exportador neto de productos agrícolas y envía a Cuba 350.000 toneladas de arroz anuales, que la isla podría producir. Esto requiere eliminar el ineficiente sistema de acopio. Las compras estatales obligatorias de la mayoría de las cosechas a precios fijados por el Estado, inferiores al precio de mercado, son un desincentivo. Si Cuba siguiera las reformas sino-vietnamitas, con las adaptaciones necesarias, podría alcanzar autosuficiencia alimentaria en cinco o seis años, terminar con la importación por valor de 1.800 millones de euros anuales de productos agrícolas y convertirse en exportador neto.
Es esencial expandir el sector no estatal, particularmente el trabajo por cuenta propia y pymes, muy dinámico antes del COVID-19 y esencial en la recuperación con creación de empleo productivo y eliminación del empleo estatal innecesario. Para ello se recomienda: (a) reemplazar la lista de actividades por cuenta propia autorizadas por una lista de actividades prohibidas; (b) autorizar a los profesionales a trabajar por cuenta propia y eliminar las barreras en el sector no estatal; (c) terminar la etapa experimental de las cooperativas de producción no agrícolas y de servicios y aprobar más de ellas; (d) establecer mercados al por mayor para suministrar insumos a todo el sector no estatal; (e) establecer bancos –incluyendo extranjeros– que provean microcréditos; (f) permitir al sector no estatal importar y exportar directamente; (g) eliminar los impuestos más gravosos al sector no estatal; (h) imponer el impuesto a las ganancias en vez de al ingreso bruto y permitir la completa deducción de gastos; (i) empoderar a una asociación independiente de microempresas para negociar condiciones con el gobierno y envolverse en la legislación pertinente; y (j) crear una vía para denunciar a funcionarios estatales corruptos que cobran sobornos a los trabajadores del sector no estatal (Díaz, 2020).
Todos los economistas cubanos la consideran fundamental. Para aumentarla es necesario implementar ciertas reformas, como: (a) autorizar a las compañías extranjeras a contratar y pagar directamente a todos sus trabajadores; (b) aprobar la inversión de capital extranjero (incluyendo a los cubanos en el exterior) en todos los sectores económicos, así como en las microempresas y cooperativas de producción no agrícolas y de servicios; y (c) publicar estadísticas actualizadas en áreas clave en que hay vacíos para infundir confianza en el exterior, como la deuda externa total (no sólo la negociada), la forma de calcular el IPC, incluyendo las operaciones en CUC que ahora se excluyen, y cifras más detalladas de las finanzas públicas.
Estas reformas y otras ayudarían a Cuba a salir de la recesión actual y generarían recursos para poder refinanciar los servicios sociales erosionados y establecer una red mínima de protección social para los sectores más vulnerables a la crisis.
Dos semanas después de un seminario virtual dictado por el autor, patrocinado por las universidades de Harvard, Columbia, Florida Internacional y Miami donde se propusieron dichas medidas, el periódico oficial Granma tildó dichas propuestas (y otras similares, como Monreal, 2020) de “neoliberales” (Luque, 2020). Sin embargo, un par de días después, en una reunión extraordinaria del Consejo de Ministros se exhortó de manera urgente a “cambiar todo lo que debe ser cambiado”, aunque dentro de los parámetros de la planificación central y en un mercado estrictamente regulado. Se ha especulado mucho acerca de dichos cambios, sólo el tiempo dirá si se harán y si finalmente Cuba toma el camino exitoso de la recuperación y el desarrollo sostenido.
Cuba Study Group, October 7, 2020
Aldo Alvarez
On July 16th, 2020, Cuban authorities announced a New Economic Strategy planned for the next few years, initiating a new period of reforms promoted by the Cuban government. Taking this into consideration, it is worthwhile to establish a general guide explaining the reform periods that have occurred—including the counter-reforms that preceded them—during the last 30 years in our nation, beginning with the Cuban crisis post-1991. Understanding these reform processes can serve as a tool to better explain where, presumably, the country is headed.
A partir de los anuncios realizados por las autoridades cubanas el pasado 16 de julio de 2020 sobre la Nueva Estrategia Económica prevista para los próximos años, se inicia un nuevo período de reformas en Cuba promovido por el Gobierno cubano. En este sentido, consideramos que es relevante establecer una guía general de los períodos de reformas – precedidos de períodos de contrarreformas – que se han sucedido durante los últimos 30 años en nuestra nación – a partir de la crisis cubana Post-1991. El entendimiento de dicho proceso de reformas por parte de la ciudadanía bien puede servir como herramienta para entender de mejor manera hacia donde, presuntamente, se dirige el país.
Aldo Alvarez is an attorney and Young Professional member of the Cuba Study Group. He lives in Havana, Cuba. Aldo Alvarez es un abogado y miembro «Joven Profesional» del Cuba Study Group. Vive en La Habana, Cuba.
ECON. Y DESARROLLO vol.164 no.2 La Habana Jul.-dic. 2020 Epub 19-Jul-2020
http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6310-2982
1Centro de Estudios de la Economía Cubana (CEEC), Universidad de La Habana, Cuba.
RESUMEN
El artículo presenta el análisis de la evolución del trabajo por cuenta propia en Cuba desde 1976 hasta la actualidad. Describe las características esenciales de cada etapa con sus avances y retrocesos. Asimismo, se inserta en el debate sobre el papel otorgado al trabajo por cuenta propia en el desarrollo económico del país, a partir del estudio de las regulaciones y los resultados de investigaciones de campo. Por último, se detiene en las normativas jurídicas puestas en vigor en diciembre de 2018 y las insuficiencias de las mismas.
Palabras clave: desarrollo económico; emprendimiento; políticas públicas; trabajo por cuenta propia
INTRODUCCIÓN
En el mundo actual es imposible hablar de desarrollo sin mencionar la innovación y el emprendimiento. Si bien estas dos categorías no significan lo mismo y de alguna manera el emprendimiento es, a nivel de ciencia, el hermano menor de la innovación, no deja de ser cierto que se relacionan, sobre todo cuando se habla de emprendimientos dinámicos.
El estudio del emprendimiento y su debate científico en la literatura es bastante reciente, de finales del siglo pasado e inicios de este. La discusión sobre el tema pasó del análisis del espíritu emprendedor individual al de proceso, que incluye el contexto. Así, emprender es convertir una oportunidad en un negocio, en un entorno, momento y lugar determinado. No hay recetas, solo enfoques conceptuales generales y mucha experiencia práctica.
Cuba, un país que busca el desarrollo, ha elegido diversas vías para ello -en general malogradas- sin enfatizar con la fuerza necesaria en la innovación y mucho menos en el emprendimiento, visto vinculado al enriquecimiento individual y no en su amplio sentido que incluye el intraemprendimiento en empresas existentes. La apertura al trabajo por cuenta propia muestra el espíritu emprendedor de parte de la población, que bien pudiera aprovecharse dentro de las empresas estatales.
El presente trabajo tiene la intención de analizar la evolución del llamado «trabajo por cuenta propia» desde su resurgimiento en los años setenta hasta la actualidad y de interpretar, a partir de la legislación, el papel que se le ha otorgado a este tipo de trabajo en la economía cubana. Para este empeño se estudió la legislación desde 1976 hasta la actualidad, los resultados de investigaciones de campo actuales y sus antecedentes y la estadística disponible.
Continuacion: EMPRENDIMIENTO EN CUBA
CONCLUSIONES
Una mirada contextualizada de las regulaciones sobre el trabajo por cuenta propia nos indica que, de todas las etapas analizadas, la de los años setenta no direcciona el trabajo por cuenta propia por derroteros coyunturales ni por exceso de población en edad laboral ni por la economía sumergida, sino como parte del sistema de dirección de la economía, como complemento necesario para un desarrollo ulterior. Esto no está expresamente declarado ni en la plataforma programática ni en las tesis y resoluciones del Primer Congreso del PCC; no obstante, el hecho de establecer este tipo de trabajo desde el experimento del Poder Popular en Matanzas pudiera indicar la intención de concebirlo como alguna de las vías necesarias para hacer crecer la economía.
Al analizar la etapa de los noventa el trabajo por cuenta propia es la típica medida para paliar la crisis, por vez primera se concibe como forma de empleo ante el cierre parcial o total de empresas estatales. Ciertamente esta medida junto a otras conocidas como la apertura a la inversión extranjera, el desarrollo del turismo, la descentralización del comercio exterior y la despenalización del dólar, permitieron que creciera la economía. Sin embargo, justo a partir de esos crecimientos comienza a endurecerse la legislación y el descenso en el trabajo por cuenta propia. En todos esos años el enfoque de este tipo de trabajo es coyuntural, para solucionar problemas derivados de la crisis, por lo que no se toman acciones legislativas e institucionales para permitir el su desenvolvimiento a largo plazo.
En la segunda década de los 2000 el trabajo por cuenta propia parece llegar para quedarse y derivar en las pequeñas y medianas empresas privadas defendidas tanto en la conceptualización como la constitución. Pero la ausencia de coherencia, estabilidad y transparencia en la política hacia este tipo de trabajo en esos años y especialmente en las últimas normativas jurídicas de 2018, expresan una intencionalidad ajena a concebirlo como emprendimiento dinámico, que pueda ser el germen de las empresas privadas que se desempeñen en vínculo con las empresas estatales.
La historia del trabajo por cuenta propia muestra que nunca se ha concebido como un actor más con todos sus derechos y deberes como cualquier otra empresa y que, por tanto, no tiene un destacado papel en el crecimiento económico del país. Si importante es hoy que el trabajo por cuenta propia haya creado medio millón de puestos de trabajo, aporte al presupuesto y participe del PIB, mucho más importante sería crearle las condiciones para su sano desarrollo, que propiciaría densidad al tejido empresarial y generaría un efecto multiplicador del cual se beneficiaría, ante todo, el pueblo. La sostenibilidad de este tipo de negocio es un reto, sobre todo en países en desarrollo por no existir la institucionalidad necesaria que incentive el desenvolvimiento hacia negocios dinámicos y de crecimiento.
The island was able to control the coronavirus, but the dearth of tourists in the pandemic’s wake strangled an economy already damaged by mismanagement and U.S. sanctions.
By Ed Agustin and Frances Robles
New York Times, September 20, 2020
Original Article: Cuba’s Economy Was Hurting….
HAVANA — It was a lucky day for the unemployed tourism guide in Havana. The line to get into the government-run supermarket, which can mean a wait of eight or 10 hours, was short, just two hours long. And better yet, the guide, Rainer Companioni Sánchez, scored toothpaste — a rare find — and splurged $3 on canned meat.
“It’s the first time we have seen toothpaste in a long time,” he said, sharing the victory with his girlfriend. “The meat in that can is very, very expensive, but we each bought one simply because sometimes in an emergency there is no meat anywhere.”
Cuba, a police state with a strong public health care system, was able to quickly control the coronavirus, even as the pandemic threw wealthier nations into crisis. But its economy, already hurting from crippling U.S. sanctions and mismanagement, was particularly vulnerable to the economic devastation that followed.
As nations closed airports and locked down borders to combat the spread of the virus, tourist travel to Cuba plummeted and the island lost an important source of hard currency, plunging it into one of the worst food shortages in nearly 25 years.
What food is available is often found only in government-run stores that are stocked with imports and charge in dollars. The strategy, also used in the 1990s, during the economic depression known as the “special period,” is used by the government to gather hard currency from Cubans who have savings or get money from friends or relatives abroad.
Even in these stores, goods are scarce and prices can be exorbitant: That day, Mr. Companioni couldn’t find chicken or cooking oil, but there was 17-pound ham going for $230 and a seven-pound block of manchego cheese with a $149 price tag. And the reliance on dollar stores, a move intended to prop up the socialist revolution in a country that prides itself on egalitarianism, has exacerbated economic inequality, some Cubans say.
“This is a store that charges in a currency Cubans do not earn,” said Lazaro Manuel Domínguez Hernández, 31, a doctor who gets cash from a friend in the United States to spend at one of the 72 new dollar stores. “It kind of marks the difference in classes, because not everyone can buy here.”
He left the Puntilla supermarket with a cart full of fruit cocktail, cheese and chocolate biscuits that he loaded into a 1950s Dodge taxi.
Cuba’s economy was struggling before the coronavirus. The Trump administration has worked hard to strengthen the decades-old trade embargo, going after Cuba’s sources of currency. It also imposed sanctions on tanker companies that delivered petroleum to Cuba from Venezuela and cut back on the commercial flights from the United States to the island.
Last month, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced an end to charter flights, too. After the Cuban state energy company Corporación Panamericana faced sanctions, even cooking gas rations had to be reduced. Then Covid-19 put a stop to tourism. Remittances sent by Cubans who live abroad began to dry up as the illness led to huge job losses in the United States.
That left the Cuban government with far fewer sources of revenue to buy the products it sells in state-run stores, leading to shortages of basic goods throughout the island. Earlier this year, the government warned that personal hygiene products would be hard to come by.
Cuba is facing “the triple threat of Trump, Venezuela and then Covid,” said Ted A. Henken, a professor at Baruch College and a co-author with A. Ritter of the book “Entrepreneurial Cuba.” “Covid was the thing that pushed them over the edge.”
The pandemic, and the recession that followed, pushed the government to announce that, after years of promises, it would make good on a series of economic reforms intended to stimulate the private sector.
The Communist Party said in 2016 that it would legalize small and medium-size private businesses, but no mechanism was ever set up to do so, thus business owners are still unable to get financing, sign contracts as a legal entity or import goods. Now, that is expected to change, and more lines of work are expected to be legalized, although details have not been announced.
Cuba also has a history of offering reforms only to rescind them months or years later, entrepreneurs said. “They go back, go forward, then back again,” said Marta Deus, the co-founder of a business magazine who owns a delivery company. “They need to trust the private sector for all its capacity to provide for the future of the economy. We have big ideas.”
The government puts the blame for the current situation squarely on Washington. “Why can’t we export what we want? Because every time we export to someone, they try to cut off that export,” President Miguel Díaz-Canel said of the United States in a speech this summer. “Every time we are trying to manage a credit, they try to take away our credit. They try to prevent fuel from reaching Cuba. And then we have to buy in third markets, at higher prices. Why is it not talked about?”
Mr. Díaz-Canel stressed that despite the hardships, Cuba still managed a successful battle against the coronavirus: The health system did not collapse, and, he said, no children or medical professionals died of the disease.
With 11.2 million people, Cuba had just over 5,000 coronavirus cases and 115 deaths by Friday, one of the lowest mortality rates in the world. By comparison, Puerto Rico, with 3.2 million people, had five times as many deaths.
People who tested positive in Cuba were whisked away to the hospital for two weeks — even if they were asymptomatic — and their exposed contacts were sent to isolation for two weeks. Apartment buildings, and even entire city blocks, that saw clusters were closed to visitors.
Anyone flying in after March also had to isolate in quarantine centers, and medical students went door to door to screen millions of people daily. Masks are mandatory, and the fines for being caught without one are stiff.
With international flights at a virtual standstill, immigration officers are now assigned to stand guard outside quarantined apartment buildings, making sure no one goes in or out 24 hours a day.
At a quarantined building in Boyeros, a neighborhood near the Havana airport, an immigration officer sat in the shade while messengers and family members of those inside dropped off food. Daniela Llanes López, 21, left vegetables for her grandfather, who was stuck inside because five people in his building had tested positive.
“In Cuba, I don’t know anyone who knows anyone who got the coronavirus,” said Ms. Llanes, who studies German at the University of Havana, noting that she does know people in Germany who contracted the illness.
The strategies worked, although when the authorities started lifting restrictions in July, opening beaches, bars and public transportation, the nation’s capital saw an uptick in cases and a curfew was imposed there.
“Cuba is good in crisis and good in preventive health care,” said Katrin Hansing, a professor at Baruch College who spent the peak of the pandemic in lockdown in Cuba. Support for the government was notable, she said; even if the store lines were long, people felt safe from the virus.
Many Cubans are now hoping the economic reforms will stimulate the private sector and allow independent business operators to kick-start the economy.
Camilo Condis, an electrical contractor who has been out of work for months, said the changes must come quickly, and must allow Cuba to function, whether the United States is under a second Trump presidency, or under Joe Biden. “Like we private business owners say here: ‘All I want is for them to let me work,’” he said.
The economy is a failed subject that we must pass, said Omar Everleny Perez
By IPS-Cuba, August 29, 2020
Original Article: Cuba’s Economic Crisis
HAVANA TIMES – In a recent forum economist Omar Everleny Perez maintained that Cuba needs to make use of all its productive potential. Something he said hasn’t happened to date, especially the private sector, to stimulate growth and development.
“It’s time to advance in a new direction where private business isn’t seen as an evil. That appears to be overcome, but not completely. There is a long way to go, said the economist during the forum titled “How to Leave Behind the Crisis?” The sponsor was the YouTube channel of the group Cuba es mi Patria.
The platform was created in March 2020, integrated by Cubans from inside the country and abroad. It hopes to contribute towards a democratic, economically prosperous and socially responsible country.
As a principle, the group rejects the United States embargo and its interventionist policies that affect life in Cuba.
Perez said the measures approved for the post pandemic period, “are better late than never, a very important step”. He recalled that many of them were approved in 2011 with the Communist Party “guidelines”. This reforms document, started by Raul Castro (2008-2018), was expanded in 2016.
Many economists had previously asked, why it takes so along to apply the reforms if they have all the political support? And they also criticized many of our positions, especially about small and medium size companies (PYMES), noted Perez.
“The main task now is to accelerate those decisions. It’s not enough just to say that the PYMES will be created. It takes speeding up the documents that make the task succeed. We shouldn’t work in the past, but for a future.”
Perez noted there has always been “a big distance between academia and decision makers, between researchers and the management system.” He believes that Cuba has better conditions today to promote the necessary changes. President Diaz-Canel’s frequent meetings with scientists and researchers is seen as a positive indicator.
Perez also considers it necessary to clear up some aspects in the reformed Constitution, in effect since April, 2019. One is the article prohibiting the concentration of wealth.
One area needing clarification, he said, is regarding imports and exports. Besides announcing the coming legal status to pymes, they already created the option to export and import to develop a business. “But, what’s the limit allowed for this activity?” We need more information, said Perez.
“The Chinese and Vietnamese weren’t concerned about those subjects (during their economic reforms process). On the contrary, they were concerned about people who lagged behind. It seems to me that Cuba has a divergent policy. It is more concerned about those who succeed than about those who have nothing.”
Perez says the country must change from general to targeted actions to protect vulnerable individuals and groups. “Let all those who can get ahead do so. And help those who lag behind, by using the national budget, social security, and food subsidies.” Ideological contradictions have stopped the application of many of the topics approved in the Communist Party guidelines, said Perez.
He further noted that Cuban society has become unequal. They shouldn’t be providing the same rationed products to a restaurant owner and an 80-year old retiree.
Perez said the country has succeeded in important fields, such as health and education and others where it competes at international levels. But the economy is a failed subject that we must finally pass.
The US embargo
“The embargo is real, and it greatly affects the Cuban economy, but it is not the only problem. Cuba buys cheap chicken from the USA, but it has to be pay in cash. It goes further than the relationship among both countries. European entities and companies are fined, for example.
“Every month there is a new measure from the Trump administration. Their repeal won’t solve all the problems, but it would clear the way. It would finish the arguments that we can’t do anything because of the blockade. Access to credit from international financial entities depends on a better relationship with US. It happened during Obama administration (2009-2017).”
Currency
“The creation of the convertible Cuban peso was a good measure in the old days. But they began to print more CUCs than the USD existing in the Cuban banks. Now the CUC is not convertible, it is a useless currency. What will remain is the regular Cuban peso (CUP), in which 85 percent of Cuban population receive the salary. I don’t think the dollar will be eliminated again from our economy in the medium-term. We have to increase salaries and do a wage reform. The exchange rates used by state companies need a new approach, closer to reality. Thus, creating a fair competition with private companies.”
Hard Currency Shops
“In social and political terms, it is not an appropriate action, because not everyone has USD. The government realized there is a large sum of USD in the country, noticing they didn’t have any participation. The stores selling in hard currency are full of buyers, but since March 2020 there aren’t flights directed to Cuba. Where is all that USD coming from? Cubans use to go to Panama and Mexico to buy products and resell them in Cuba at a profit. The government decided to import some of those items to sell at half the price of the informal trade. The benefits were for Cuban citizens and the government alike.”
Foreign Debt
“The Paris Club cancelled 85 percent (8.5 billion dollars) of the Cuban debt and Russia, 90 percent (more than 30 billion dollars). Cuba asked to defer payments for two years because of the damage caused by the pandemic period and fall of the exports. But the Paris Club gave a them a term for one year. I heard that Cuba will resume payment in 2021.
The Cuban economy is in its worst moment. At the end of 2020, the foreign debt should be around 28.671 billion dollars. That represents around 27 percent of the 106.343 billion dollars calculated as Cuba’s GDP, estimates the Economist Intelligence Unit. The official yearbook for 2019 is not ready yet.”
Communist Party Guidelines
“Ideological contradictions have stopped the application of many of the approved changes. There has always been rejection to a private sector. The perception that an advance in this sector could cause the loss of social achievements. It’s not about copying the Chinese and Vietnamese models, but we must improve agriculture, and solve the food problem. Our economy has no way to go forward without production and tourism. This is a paralyzed country. Infrastructure is deteriorated, and with a different population, many of whom were born after 1990. All ideological obstacles should be left behind.”
Impact of emigration and the loss of young professionals.
“A Cuban engineer arrives to any market in the world and one year later is as competitive as any other professional formed in another school. We have highly qualified human resources. It’s a pity that they are educated here, resources are spent, and then because of the economic situation they go to other countries looking for opportunities. They could do this in Cuba if it would be allowed.
“Many of them go away because they can’t see a solution to their personal economic situation working in a state-run company with a monthly salary of 600 CUP (24 USD). We have to give them a motivation to reduce the exodus of this labor force. This is not only a problem in our country.”
Investment from the Cuban side
“Cuba must give the same treatment for national and foreign investment. There are concepts to change. Some areas will be limited, as security and defense. Many Cubans will be ready to invest if the government changes the rules of the game. It’s seed capital that is there.”
Imports through government companies
“The possibility to import is already recognized and that’s a good measure. However, there are state companies known for their inefficiency and we’ll see if private businesses can work with them. Let’s see in six months how the first operations go. There are still a lot of unnecessary controls.”
The communist government has been forced to allow citizens to spend US currency at special shops, formalising a split between haves and have-nots
Ed Augustin in Havana
The Guardian, Tuesday 18 Aug 2020 10.00 BST
Original Article: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/18/cuba-dollar-stores-coronavirus?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other
On Paseo del Prado, a boulevard in Havana’s colonial district, dozens of people waited expectantly as the staff raised the shutters to open a tatty but revamped shop.
Soon after, Alejandro Domínguez, 23, emerged, brandishing meatballs and a giant tin of chopped tomatoes he had just bought with US currency left as tourist tips at his family’s restaurant. “This is a way to get products you can’t find elsewhere,” he said.
The dollar is back in communist Cuba.
For the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union, Cubans with access to greenbacks are able to buy higher-quality products in exclusive hard currency stores. In the last two years, Cuba has been increasingly boxed in by declining deliveries of cheap oil from its main ally, Venezuela, and hardened sanctions imposed by a Trump administration eyeing the Cuban-American vote in Florida.
But the island’s cash crisis was brought to a head by the coronavirus pandemic, which has left Cuba without revenue from tourism for four months.
“We’re at a crossroads where there’s practically no other way out,” said Oscar Fernández, professor of economics at the University of Havana. “The state is looking for alternatives so it can keep buying food and medicine.”
So on 20 July, the cash-strapped island opened 72 new “dollar stores”, selling everything from cheese to power drills.
Cuba last opened dollar stores in 1993 as an emergency stopgap when its economy was tanking during the so-called Special Period. The dollar was taken out of circulation and replaced by the CUC in 2004.
The government’s rationale for reopening hard currency stores – to increase supply and to rake in foreign currency – is broadly accepted but the mordant irony of the measure escapes few. The new policy is an implicit admission that the CUC – officially valued at 1:1 with the US dollar – is not worth as much as claimed. Photograph: Yamil Lage/AFP via Getty Images
Recognising the dollar – possession of which was once a criminal offence – as legal tender is a reluctant nod to the financial power of the United States. But it’s also an implicit admission that the CUC, which is officially pegged at 1:1 with the dollar, is not worth as much as the government claims.
The measure draws a line between the haves and the have-nots. On a recent morning, Elio Núñez, 45, a welder who receives dollars from abroad, was queueing outside one of them, hoping to buy soap, coffee, ham or “whatever’s in stock”. Achieving absolute equality, he said, is a chimera. “Some people can afford things, others can’t. It’s like that the world over.”
Perhaps with optics in mind, the new supermarkets do not allow customers to pay in cash. Rather, Cubans must deposit greenbacks in a dollar-denominated account and pay by debit card in store.
In a stormy speech last month, President Miguel Diáz-Canel said “the enemy” would cast the measure as “economic apartheid”. But dollar stores were necessary, he said, to generate the foreign exchange needed to keep the regular shops Cubans use better supplied.
Cuba’s domestic response to Covid-19 has largely been successful, but the fallout has brought longstanding problems with the island’s listless, centrally planned economy to the fore.
Agriculture, a perennial achilles heel, has been clobbered: state media recently announced that the country is on track to produce just 160,000 tonnes of rice this year – less than a quarter of what it consumes. Figures like these leave Cuba even more dependent on food imports at a time where there is less cash to make purchases.
This dearth of supply brings stark consequences. While there are no queues at bodegas (which guarantee bare-essential food and hygiene products at heavily subsidised prices), queues outside local-currency supermarkets are mammoth.
In Regla, one of Havana’s better-supplied municipalities, the state has intensified rationing: people must now take their ID cards to make purchases, and can only buy chicken once a fortnight. Crowds gather before dawn, and by 9am, hundreds are waiting outside the main supermarket. People are sweaty and perturbed. The occasional scrap breaks out. In the east of the island, citizens have set up action groups to stop people cutting in line.
Dayana Blázquez, a 35-year-old social worker who was queueing outside a dollar store to buy meat, said that although the effects of US sanctions on the island are “palpable”, decades of economic mismanagement mean the state shares the blame. “Right now things are worse than normal, but we’ve had shortages for years,” she said. “Old and new generations have lived this.”
For Blázquez, the inequity of selling some products in dollars runs deep. “It’s not fair for those who work their whole lives and have to depend on others to get by when they retire. It’s not fair for graduates and professionals. It’s not fair for anyone.”