Tag Archives: Democracy

Cuba Calls for “Cyberdefence” of the Revolution

Posted on December 2, 2011 by Arch Ritter

Original here: Cuba calls for “cyberdefence” of the revolution

By Isaac Risco Dec 2, 2011, December 2, 2011

HAVANA: Just days after Cuban dissident blogger Yoani Sanchez was named one of the world’s 100 “most influential global thinkers” by US magazine Foreign Policy, the Cuban government is

preparing for “active cyberdefence”.

Despite poor Internet access for the average Cuban, which the authorities in Havana blame on the US embargo, Cuba is now stressing the importance of “occupying the web”. The website Cubadebate, the main pro-government online news outlet, has called for a move “from cyberwarfare to active cyberdefence”.

Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez on Wednesday urged more active involvement in the web and for greater defence mechanisms to fight what the island regards as the hostile attitude of major media outlets. “Euphoria over social networks co-exists with the risk of regime change operations, which has increased, as has the threat to peace. But these dangerous conditions make it necessary and urgent for us to make those platforms our own,” he said. “It is essential to have a political strategy in cyberspace.”

Rodriguez was addressing a workshop on “Alternative Media and Social Networks” with participants from 12 countries, to which Sanchez complained she and other bloggers critical of the government had not been invited. The authorities continue “to exclude the alternative part of (Cuba’s) blogosphere and twittosphere,” Sanchez wrote on Twitter. On her Twitter feed, @yoanisanchez, the 36-year-old regularly criticises Cuban authorities for their attitude to the Internet, among other things. Her campaign to denounce what she termed “political apartheid” at the event reached her more than 180,000 Twitter followers.

Indeed, on Wednesday, Foreign Policy said Sanchez’s influence shows “that the Internet really does go everywhere, even Castro’s Cuba”.

Sanchez, in turn, wrote on Twitter of the limitations of online stardom in communist Cuba. “Beautiful paradoxes of life. My name on FP’s list of 100 thinkers, and me now ‘thinking’ how to stretch the rice so as to get to the end of the month,” she wrote in a post.

Such “cyberwarfare” has been waged for some time. Blogs like Vision desde Cuba, which openly support the government, seek to counter the influence of those like Sanchez’s.

Despite “the limitations inherent to narrow bandwidth” and the “archaic and extremely slow dial-up connections”, Vision desde Cuba writes that “revolutionary bloggers” like himself back the government against those who, they argue, are being financed from abroad. Havana has traditionally accused dissidents of accepting funds from the United States.

Cubadebate has carried out a broad campaign to promote the use of social networks. Editor Rosa Miriam Elizalde asked in an article that readers “accept the technological challenge”. “I do not have the slightest doubt that if (Cuban national hero) Jose Marti were alive today he would be on Facebook and Twitter,” she said.

Mariela Castro, daughter of the Cuban leader as well as head of Cuba’s National Centre for Sex Education, also recently entered the world of Twitter. She openly confronted Sanchez, among others, in defence of the Cuban government.

Protagonists:

Mariela Castro, Daughter of the Regime

Yoani Sanchez, Daughter of the Revolution

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Richard Feinberg via Brookings Institution: “Reaching Out: Cuba’s New Economy and the International Response”

Posted on November 19, 2011 by Arch Ritter

FOREIGN POLICY at BROOKINGS

The full document can be found here:Richard E. Feinberg, Cuba’s New Economy and the International Response, Brookings, November 2011

“Reaching Out: Cuba’s New Economy and the International Response,” a new report by Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Richard Feinberg, urges the international development community to reach out to Cuba to promote its economic renewal. The report offers a detailed pathway for a gradual, systematic rapprochement between Cuba and the international financial institutions (International Monetary Fund, World Bank,
and Inter-American Development Bank). In the first such survey, it also provides an overview of the existing foreign assistance programs sponsored by capitalist nations in Cuba.

The study further analyzes the reform process occurring in Cuba today and describes Cuba’s strategy of engaging with the dynamic emerging market economies, largely
overlooked by U.S. analysts. The report finds that since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Cuba has reached out to Europe and Canada, and most dramatically and successfully to the emerging market economies of China, Brazil, and Venezuela. Far from isolated by U.S. sanctions, the Cuban economy has become deeply integrated into global trading and investment markets.

Feinberg asserts that the international financial institutions (IFIs) house a wealth of accumulated knowledge and financial resources that fit well with the needs of a
reform-minded Cuba seeking greater economic efficiency and competitiveness. As
evident in their successful relations with Vietnam and Nicaragua, the IFIs –
having reformed their own terms of engagement – can perform effectively in
proud, strong states allergic to external interference. The study reviews the foreign assistance programs of donors such as the European Union, Spain, and Canada and concludes that development cooperation can achieve results in Cuba, improve the lives of beneficiaries, empower independent small producers, and promote decentralized decision-making to local communities.

Based on these research findings, Feinberg offers these specific policy recommendations:

· The international development community should support Cuba’s incipient economic reform process and bolster the struggling reformist factions within Cuba.

· The U.S. government should recognize that in Cuba today the opportunity is in economic reform, legitimized by the regime and openly debated by the Cuban public. Promoting economic reform is the most realistic option for advancing political pluralism in Cuba.

· The IFIs should complete their historical goal of full universality and bring Cuba in from the cold. The gradual warming of IFI-Cuba relations should begin with the provision of policy advice and technical training – prior to full membership.

· The US should not stand in the way of Cuba’s gradual re-admission to the IMF/World Bank. There is no better way to encourage progressive market-oriented reforms in Cuba.

According to Feinberg, the U.S. and international community can do more to help strengthen reform factions on the island. Feinberg concludes that inside Cuba, the forces of progressive change and the forces of bureaucratic inertia and resistance are locked in a fierce struggle. The United States should join with the international development community to bolster Cuba’s forces in favor of forward-looking economic reform.

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Arturo Lopez-Levy: “Change In Post-Fidel Cuba: Political Liberalization, Economic Reform and Lessons for U.S. Policy”

Posted on May 20, 2011 by Arch Ritter

Arturo Lopez-Levy

Here is the Hyperlink: Arturo Lopez Levy,Change In Post-Fidel Cuba: Political Liberalization, Economic Reform and Lessons for U.S. Policy” New America Foundation, May 2011,

Executive Summary:

This report explores the historic reform process currently underway in Cuba. It looks first at the political context in which the VI Cuban Communist Party Congress took place, including the Cuban government’s decision to release a significant number of political prisoners as part of a new dialogue with the Cuban Catholic Church. It then analyzes Cuba’s nascent processes of economic reform and political liberalization. To conclude, it discusses the challenges and opportunities these processes pose for U.S policy toward Cuba.

In his essay “Change in Post-Fidel Cuba”, Arturo Lopez-Levy, (a lecturer and PhD Candidate at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver and also a graduate of the Carleton University-University of Havana Masters Program in Economics!) presents a wide ranging survey and careful analysis of economic and political changes in Cuba since Raul replaced Fidel in 2006, organizing his analysis around the pivotal Sixth Party Congress of April 2011.  Lopez-Levy tries hard to be even-handed and objective in his analysis. He succeeds well, though virtually no-one anywhere on any of the various political spectrums relevant to Cuba will be pleased with all of his assessments. His knowledge of Cuba at this juncture of its history is deep. He is particularly well qualified for undertaking such an analysis not only on the basis of his knowledge of Cuba and also given his academic work. His examination of Cuba’s political situation, the reform process, and US-Cuba relations is worth serious attention.

On the whole, Lopez-Levy is optimistic that the economic reform process, still in its initial phases, will be pragmatic, deep-cutting and irreversible but possibly excessively gradualistic.  He sketches the various elements of policy change that are slated for implementation and that will lead to a more decentralized and marketized economic framework that should help unleash and harmonize the economic creativity of Cuban citizens.

He is also optimistic that meaningful political liberalization will occur and indeed characterizes the regime under President Raul Castro as “Post-Totalitarian” – following some works of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, Baltimore: John

Hopkins University Press, 1996.) In Lopez-Levy’s words (p. 13), “Totalitarian practices have softened.” This obviously indicates that the author judges that practices indeed were totalitarian under Fidel and that they continue, though now somewhat “lighter”. (Political prisoners were released and independent critics have not been imprisoned.)

Lopez-Levy seems ready to be quite critical of Fidel but tends to give Raul the benefit of the doubt in a number of cases.  His euphemistic characterization of Fidel’s dictatorial rule is in fact damning if also humorous.

“By virtue of his historical leadership, Fidel Castro, in and of himself, embodied the minimum number of votes needed to establish a “winning coalition” in Cuban politics.”

But Lopez-Levy seems to want to find good things to say about Raul. For example,

“As Raul Castro hinted in his inaugural speech to the VI Party Congress2, this reform process will occur in tandem with political liberalization and the emergence of a Cuba more open toward the outside world.”

He also rather generously explains Raul’s selection of Jose Ramon Machado Ventura as First  Vice-President, and Second Secretary of the PCC as follows:

The decision to promote Machado (one year older than Raul)  to the second in command, first in the government, and now in  the Party, can be explained by two factors: 1) the triumph of the alliance of military leaders and provincial party czars as the dominant force in Cuban elite politics (versus government bureaucrats and Fidel’s appointed ideologues), and Raul Castro’s conviction that Fidel’s policy of promotion of young cadres “by helicopter”, not in a step by step Leninist fashion was a mistake.

The author’s own position on the political monopoly of the Communist Party of Cuba, sanctified by Article Five of the Cuban Constitution, does not seem clear. Lopez-Levy does speak supportively of political liberalization and refers to Fidel’s monopoly of the votes. But nowhere that I can see does he raise the over-arching central political issue and confront what he labels Raul’s “softer totalitarianism.”

The New America Foundation’s U.S.-Cuba Policy Initiative, directed by Anya Landau French, seeks to take advantage of recent developments to redirect U.S.-Cuba policy towards a more sensible, mutually beneficial relationship. Learn more at http://cuba.newamerica.net

 

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Cuban Public Opinion Survey, 2011, International Republican Institute

Posted on April 15, 2011 by Arch Ritter

The International Republican Institute has just published the results of a public opinion survey taken in Cuba, the fifth such survey since 2007. A series of questions were asked concerning general perspectives on Cuba, attitudes towards political and economic change, and access to information technology. Some of the same questions have been asked since 2007 providing some interesting comparisons over time.

The complete survey is located here: Cuban Public Opinion Survey, 2011, Int’n’l Republican Institute

The survey methodology was as follows

  • Dates of Interviewing: The fieldwork was conducted Jan, 28 – Feb. 10, 2011.
  • Data Collection Method: Stratified-intercept methodology based on personal, face-to-face interviews in Cuba.
  • Sample Size: 463 Cuban adults (age 18 and older).
  • Sample: Interviews were conducted in twelve (12) Cuban provinces
  • The sample was stratified by province, then by sub-units within each province. Interviewees were allocated by gender and age quotas. The final selection of each interviewee was random.
  • Respondents: The sample selection for province, gender and age are based on the last available Cuban census data, released in 2002.
  • Maximum Sample Margin of Error: Margin of error of ± five percent for a 95 percent level of confidence.

There are a number of interesting results of the survey. Here are a couple.

1. What do you think is the biggest problem in Cuba?   60.7% said that Low Salaries / High Cost of Living were the most serious, up from 40% in 2009,  while 12.7% said that food scarcity was the most serious. 1% of the respondents stated that the Lack of Freedoms / Political System was the most serious. This suggests that Raul Castro’s priority on the economy is not misplaced.

2.      If you were given the opportunity to vote to change from the current economic system to a market economy system – with economic freedoms, including opportunities for Cubans to own property and run businesses – would you vote in favor of, or against, that change?  90.7 of the respondents were in favor. The prospective pro-market reforms of the Sixth Congress would appear to be in line with public opinion.

3.      Do you believe the current government will succeed in solving Cuba’s biggest problem in the next few years?     77% say no, a higher proportion than in any IRI survey since 2007.

4.      If you were given the opportunity to vote to change from the current political system to a democratic system – with multi-party elections, freedom of speech and freedom of expression – would you vote in favor of, or against, that change? 78.2% were in favor.

5.      Do you regularly use a cellular phone?  25.3% said yes, up from 10% in 2007.

Presumably the Government of Cuba conducts similar studies but with differently worded questions that produce results somewhat more congenial to the status quo.

But the results of the IRI surveys certainly must be of deep concern to the Government and the Party.

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Cuba’s Standings in Social, Political, Economic and Environmental Indices in Comparative International Perspective

Posted on February 3, 2011 by Arch Ritter

By Arch Ritter

In the last week of January 2011, the Heritage Foundation (HF), a conservative US “Think Tank”. published its 2011 Report on Economic Freedom. No surprise: Cuba ranks #175 of the 177 countries included in that report, ahead only of North Korea and Zimbabwe.

The concept or definition used for “Economic Freedom” is:

“Economic freedom is the fundamental right of every human to control his or her own labor and property. In an economically free society, individuals are free to work, produce, consume, and invest in any way they please, with that freedom both protected by the state and unconstrained by the state. In economically free societies, governments allow labor, capital and goods to move freely, and refrain from coercion or constraint of liberty beyond the extent necessary to protect and maintain liberty itself.”

The components of economic freedom in the Heritage Foundation’s definition include business freedom, trade freedom; fiscal freedom, government spending, monetary freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom, property rights, freedom from corruption, and labor freedom.

What the HF definition misses is the capability to utilize one’s freedom, such as good health, a useful education, and a reasonable income. Presumably the HF types of freedom are more effective when people live longer, have good health so that they can work and appreciate life, and are not mired in poverty. Cuba would score better if life expectancy, health, education and income distributional measures were included in the concept and the index.

Other Measures of Human Achievement or Performance

The HF’s Economic Freedom Index brought to mind some other measures of social, economic, environmental and political performance. A listing of these and Cuba’s place therein is presented in Table 1 and hyperlinks to some basic definitions and methodological sources are summarized in the next section.

Again, it is no surprise that Cuba fares badly on the political and economic freedom rankings, coming at the very bottom in Latin America on the “democracy” and “freedom of the press” rankings.

Cuba’s high ranking for the EIU Political Instability Index – second only to Costa Rica- is unexpected. Cuba would have scored well on “ethnic fragmentation”, labor unrest (no strikes, collective bargaining or independent unions), economic growth in 2009, income inequality (as officially measured), unemployment (at least the official rate) and “status of minorities”.

Cuba’s standing in the “corruption perceptions” listing does not seem unreasonable.

Cuba’s high standing in the Environmental Performance rankings – again second only to Costa Rica-  will be a surprise to those who have spent time inhaling the exhaust of urban traffic in Havana or observing the fumes of the Havana’s thermal electric plant, pictured below.  Indeed, a close study of the Yale-Columbia-World Economic Forum calculations for Cuba would be worthwhile. One suspects some statistical creativity such as has been employed in the area of basic economic measures such as GDP, unemployment and the Consumer price Index.

Data Sources and Methodology

The full sources of the information are hyperlinked below. The methodologies can also be found at these web sites.

UNDP Measures

1, 2, 3, and 4: Human Development Index 2009, HDR 2009 Statistical Tables

Democracy Measures

5.      The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2010,  This index is based on electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture.

6.      The Economist Intelligence Unit’s “Political Instability Index”. This measure is based on   I. Underlying vulnerability: 1.Inequality Measured by Gini coefficient; 2.State history; 3.Corruption; 4.Ethnic fragmentation; 5.Trust in institutions; 6. Status of minorities; 7.History of political instability; 8.Proclivity to labor unrest; 9.Level of social provision; 10.A country’s neighborhood; 11.Regime type; 12.Regime type and factionalism and II. Economic distress: 1.Growth in incomes Growth in real GDP per head in 2009; 2.Unemployment; 3.Level of income per head

7.      Freedom House, Freedom of the Press index an annual survey of media independence in 195 countries and territories. “The index asesses the degree of print, broadcast, and internet freedom in every country in the world, provides numerical rankings and rates each country’s media as “Free,” “Partly Free,” or “Not Free.””  Freedom House, Freedom of the Press, 2010

8. Press Freedom Index 2010, Reporters Without Borders

9. Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 2010, Tables and Graphs measures freedom according to political rights and civil liberties.

(See also Wikipedia’s list of freedom indices.)

10. The 2010 ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE INDEX, of the Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy, Yale University and Center for International Earth Science Information Network, Columbia University and the World Economic Forum. This measure includes some 25 indicators in 10 categories including Environmental Health. Air Pollution (effects on humans), Water (effects on humans), Air Pollution (effects on ecosystems), Water (effects on ecosystems), Biodiversity and Habitat, Forestry, Fisheries, Agriculture and Climate Change

11. “Index of Economic Freedom” The Heritage Foundation. (See discussion above.)

12. Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index Report, 2010

Havana Thermal-Electric Plant, from Edificio Fochsa, Hotel Capri on the left, 1997, Photo by Arch Ritter

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Ana Julia Faya: Nosotros tampoco viajamos libremente a Cuba

Posted on January 27, 2011 by Arch Ritter

Los permisos de entrada y salida del país son una violación de los derechos de los cubanos.

Published originally on January 26, 2011 in  Diario de Cuba

Jose marti International Airport, Photo by A. Ritter, 1966

Primero fue en la Declaración del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores en respuesta a las medidas de Obama sobre los viajes a Cuba. Después fue la subdirectora de América del Norte de la cancillería cubana, Johana Tablada, en entrevista publicada en Cubadebate. Y más recientemente Fidel Castro en una de sus Reflexiones, o quizás Castro primero y Johana después. Para el caso, no importa. Repiten el mismo desaguisado: que los estadounidenses son los únicos ciudadanos de este mundo que no pueden viajar libremente a Cuba. Craso error.

Los ciudadanos cubanos que vivimos fuera del territorio nacional tampoco viajamos libremente a nuestro propio país, no solo desde Estados Unidos, sino desde Canadá, España, o cualquier otro de los cientos que ocupan el globo terráqueo. Y no es por voluntad del “imperio”, sino por las restricciones impuestas en Cuba por cubanos sobre viajes de cubanos, medidas que ya suman tantas décadas que si no somos especialistas en la materia no sabemos cuándo fue que empezaron, en qué período de la historia antigua de los Castro se decidió cerrarnos las puertas para salir y para entrar.

En la cancillería cubana se sabe muy bien que los cubanos que residimos en segundos países y no le pagamos al MINREX por un Permiso de Residencia en el Exterior, si queremos visitar a nuestra familia en Cuba debemos solicitar antes a las autoridades de la embajada cubana correspondiente que se nos “habilite” el pasaporte cubano. Porque para viajar a Cuba no se nos admite el del país donde tenemos segunda ciudadanía. Y en ese pasaporte se nos estampará un cuño que nos abrirá las puertas del Aeropuerto Internacional José Martí, si los funcionarios encargados de esa gestión no se oponen y no nos incluyen en un largo listado que el defenestrado ministro de Exteriores Felipe Pérez Roque denominara de “personas repugnantes”, y que hasta el momento no tenemos noticia de que Bruno Parrilla haya desechado.

Que Fidel Castro asegure que solo los estadounidenses no viajan libremente a Cuba, bueno, él predijo una guerra nuclear por los días del campeonato mundial de fútbol, el año pasado, y ahora, en medio de su senilidad, se regocija con la bondad de los delfines mientras sobre el modelo cubano dice lo mismo y lo contrario. Pero que el tema de los viajes se especifique en una Nota Oficial del MINREX y que una inteligente funcionaria lo asegure también, da que pensar. Porque si seguimos al pie de la letra lo declarado últimamente por el régimen, en esta nueva era inaugurada por el general Castro con Lineamientos, Congreso y sesiones en la Asamblea Nacional, rigen los llamados a que los funcionarios cambien la “mentalidad”, se enfatiza en la necesidad de eliminar “prohibiciones obsoletas justificadas en el pasado”, y sobre todo se exige actuar con disciplina. Quizás los funcionarios del MINREX se han salido del modelo de conducta exigido por el liderato del régimen y no han cambiado su mentalidad, quizás se debe a que en Cuba hay tantas cosas obsoletas que se confunden al dirigir los tiros, o quizás es ahora el general Castro el que dice lo mismo y lo contrario.

La abolición de los permisos de entrada y salida fue pedida en muchas de las asambleas celebradas en el país convocadas por Raúl Castro de 2007 a 2008, dizque para conocer qué pensaban los cubanos de la isla. “El permiso de salida y de entrada, eso debería abolirse completamente (…) se hizo con otro destino, por otras razones, y ha sobrevivido durante demasiados años en Cuba, y yo no creo que tenga razón de ser”, dijo Silvio Rodríguez entonces. Fueron tantas las declaraciones públicas en ese sentido de conocidos seguidores del régimen, y tantos los rumores de que “ahora sí”, que incluso el corresponsal de El País en La Habana aseguró haber visto el documento donde se levantaban las prohibiciones sobre viajes y que su presentación era cuestión de días. Pero, seguimos esperando.

Ahora pudiera ser un buen reclamo de los delegados al VI Congreso del Partido Comunista, aunque tengan que ser indisciplinados y salirse de la agenda prevista solo para los Lineamientos económicos. En definitivas, ¿no es el Congreso “el órgano supremo del partido y decide sobre todas las cuestiones más importante de la política”? Si es así, la discusión en abril no debiera circunscribirse a las reformas sobre los cuentapropistas, o la compra y venta de casas, sino ampliarse hacia otras cuestiones importantes reclamadas por la población desde hace rato, como los permisos de entrada y salida.

Soy de las que piensa que Obama debiera levantar todas las restricciones de viaje en su país, para que no sean violados los derechos de sus ciudadanos. Los permisos de entrada y salida en Cuba debieran levantarse por lo mismo. No en reciprocidad por las decisiones de Obama, sino por elemental respeto, para que no se sigan violando los derechos de los cubanos.

Playas del Este, Summer 1994 Preparing to Leave

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Still the “Bestest” and the “Worstest” and Maybe the Most Opaque: Cuba in the 2010 UNDP Human Development Report

Posted on November 5, 2010 by Arch Ritter

By Arch Ritter

The 2010 UNDP Human Development Report , published on November 5, 2010, presents the definitive and much-awaited “Report Card” on the social, economic, political, environmental and security dimensions of development for all countries of the world. In this Report, Cuba fares well in some indices, badly on others, but is also “out-of-the-running” on the major UNDP Human Development Indices due to lack of reliable information.

The whole of the UNDP Human Development Report can be accessed here:   2010http://hdr.undp.org/en/mediacentre/

Here are a few of the interesting comparative insights and results for Cuba.

1.      Main Human Development Indices

Cuba is excluded from the main Human Development Indices that the UNDP presents, namely the Human Development Index (Table 1), the Inequality-adjusted Human development Index (HDI) (Table 2) and the Multidimensional Poverty Index (Table 5)  as well as the HDI Trends from 1980 to 2010 (Table 3). This is unfortunate because it is not possible this year to make a comparison of Cuba with other countries or with itself over time.

Due to the existence of the dual exchange rate system in which there is no reasonable single exchange rate, together with the complexity of the highly segmented markets – underground economy, rationing system, farmer’s markets, non-market allocation of some goods and services, and quasi-dollar stores – it was concluded by the UNDP that it was impossible at this time to construct a measure of GDP per capita in purchasing power terms as is done for some 169 other countries. . The UNDP apparently is working with the Government of Cuba to correct this situation. The UNDP’s explanation of the problem is presented in Appendix 1.

2.      Gender Inequality Index

Cuba comes first in Latin America and 47th in the world for this measure, which includes maternal mortality rates, adolescent fertility rate, share of parliamentary seats held by each sex, attainment at secondary and higher education, labor market participation rates, contraception availability, and births attended by health personnel (Table 4).

3.      “Empowerment”” Measures

In a new dimension of its analysis (Table 6), the UNDP brings together a variety of indicators of human “empowerment.”  Cuba fares uniformly badly, and indeed worst in Latin America for many measures:

  • “Democracy”: worst in Latin America;
  • “Press Freedom”: worst in the world, including China;
  • “Satisfaction with Freedom of Choice”: worst in Latin America, with 26% and 28% satisfaction for males and females respectively;
  • “Journalists Imprisoned”: worst in the world with the exception of  China;
  • “Human Rights Violations”: among the worst.

4.      Education

Cuba fares well in education generally (Table 13). One notable feature of Cuba’s comparative experience is that it has the largest tertiary education enrolment in the Hemisphere and the world at 121.5% compared to an average of 36.5% for all of Latin America.

How can this be? Presumably more people than are in the normal tertiary education age cohort are attending colleges or University. This is the result of increasing the supply of tertiary education, by creating alleged “Universities” in every Municipality, plus an increase in the demand for higher education by those who have been put out of work in various areas including the sugar sector. It is difficult to know without further information if the 121.5% figure represents an achievement or a gross misallocation of resources given that Cuba needs to produce real products in agriculture and industry, and seems to be overproducing university graduates – not unlike some higher income countries .

5.      Health

As is well-known, Cuba also fares well in health measures and has been particularly successful in squeezing strong health outcomes from very scarce resources (Table 14).

One interesting measure is the number of doctors per 10,000 people that stands at 64 for Cuba. This again is the highest ration by far in Latin America and the world. Again, this looks like an over-allocation of resources to the “doctor” category in health. However, given that the 30,000 doctors abroad are now the largest earner of foreign exchange for Cuba, it is likely that this over-abundant resource is now being used effectively.

6.      Access to Information and Communications Technology.

Cuba’s performance is in communications and access information is also the weakest in the Hemisphere. Here are a number of indicators noted by the UNDP (Table 16).

  • The access of Cubans to land-line and mobile telephones stands at 13%. This is by far the lowest in the Hemisphere. Even the lower income countries in the region have much higher access to telephones, with Haiti at 33%, Nicaragua 60%, Guatemala 120%; Grenada 86%, El Salvador 131%, Paraguay 103%m and Honduras 96%.
  • The cost of a mobile telephone connection in Cuba is by far the highest in the world, at $120.00.  Obviously this limits the demand for mobile connections and helps explain Cuba’s 13% access rate.
  • Access to the internet is particularly low at 12.9 per 100 persons, though not the lowest in the Hemisphere.
  • The proportion of the population with personal computers was estimated at 5.6 per 100 persons, again low but not the lowest in the Hemisphere.

This illustration shows the HDI trajectories for all countries of the world from 1980 to 2010, excepting Cuba and a few others.
Appendix !: Purchasing power parity conversions and the HDI: an illustration with the case of Cuba (Source: UNDP,  HDR 2010, p.138).

The HDI uses internationally comparable data on gross national income (GNI) per capita from the World Bank (2010g). These data are expressed using a conversion factor that allows comparisons of prices across countries. This conversion, known as purchasing power parity (PPP), is necessary to take into account differences in the value of a dollar across countries.  Four countries have data on all HDI components except for GNI: Cuba, Iraq, Marshall Islands and Palau. For three of these countries (Cuba, Marshall Islands and Palau) this is due to the fact that they do not participate in the International Comparisons Program. Iraq lacks information about GNI for the last 10 years.
To illustrate the options and problems that arise in attempting to reliably estimate GNI per capita in PPP terms, Cuba is used as an example. One well known approach to estimating GNI—used by the Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania (Heston, Summers and Aten 2009)—is a regression that relies on data from the salaries of international civil servants converted at the official exchange rate. However, because the markets in which foreigners purchase goods and services tend to be separated from the rest of the economy, these data can be a weak guide to the prices citizens face in practice. The Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices recognizes this problem, rating its own estimate of Cuba’s GDP as a “D” (the lowest grade).
An alternative estimate applies the exchange rate used in Cuba and the PPP conversion of an economy with similar attributes, but this method goes against the principle of using a country’s legally recognized exchange rate and prices to convert its national aggregates to an international currency. Another option is to not apply any PPP correction factor to the official exchange rate for convertible pesos. Both of these options yield far lower estimated income than the PPP correction does. The wide variation in income estimates arising from these different techniques indicates that no single robust method exists in the absence of reliable data.
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The “FIDEL” Models Never Worked; Soviet and Venezuelan Subsidization Did

Posted on September 9, 2010 by Arch Ritter

“The Cuban model doesn’t even work for us anymore” stated former President Fidel Castro, when asked if Cuba’s economic system was still worth exporting to other nations, by Jeffrey Goldberg, of  The Atlantic magazine during an interview in Havana. (JIM WYSS ,  AND LUISA YANEZ, Miami Herald, September 9, 2010), broken.html.

Was this a throw-away line? A rare moment of candor and  self-criticism? Or a mis-translation? Or is the implication that Raul can’t make things work anymore. but he, Fidel, could if he were back in charge?

In fact, the “Cuban Model” was a series of “FIDEL” MODELs. None of them ever worked effectively. They were all characterized by a dictatorial, overpowering and personal control by Fidel himself. From 1959 to 2006, the central feature of Cuba’s economic existence was Fidel’s micro-management of the economy. This was observed and analyzed in 1962 by the French agronomist Rene Dumont who lamented Fidel’s itinerant and ill-informed decision-making on every issue or problem that came to his attention. We saw it in January 2006, shortly before he left office, with “La Revolucion Energetica” in which again he micro-managed the issue.

The abolition of private enterprise in 1961, 1963 and 1968 (with the “Revolutionary Offensive”) has been a continuous disaster, suppressing and wasting the energies and entrepreneurial capabilities of the Cuban people. The 1961-1963 “Instant Industrialization” strategy was a disaster, quickly aborted. Likewise, the 1964-1970 “10 Million Ton Sugar Harvest” plus “New Man” plus Hyper-Centralization were all fiascos that also were aborted in 1970.

The Cuban economic expanded steadily from 1970 to 1985. Unfortunately this success was ephemeral, based as it was on Soviet support as well as a convertible currency debt build-up that led Cuba ultimately to declare a moratorium on debt servicing in 1986.

Cuba’s “Golden Age” of economic prosperity from 1970 to 1986 or so was one of Soviet economic Orthodoxy under-girded by massive Soviet subsidization.  This subsidization of the Cuban economy occurred mainly through the pricing of merchandise trade products. The USSR paid a ruble price for its sugar imports from Cuban that was a multiple of the prevailing world price at official exchange rates for many years. At the same time, Cuba paid a price that was below the prevailing market price for its petroleum imports from the USSR. The accompanying chart, derived from the work of William Leogrande, and J. M. Thomas illustrates the magnitudes of the assistance. My own quantitative estimates placed the value of this subsidization at around 23% to over 36% of National Income in the 1980 to 1987 period. (See the Table at the bottom of this note for the detail of the calculations.)

When economic stagnation set in 1985, Fidel designed the “Rectification Process” which was supposed to correct previous errors, re-centralize and de-marketize the economy and reignite economic expansion. This also failed.

Then with the termination of Soviet subsidies came the economic melt-down and the “Special Period in Time of Peace”. The latter in fact is not “special” but instead is the real world. In the “Special Period” the expansion of 2004 to 2008 is in large part due to the special relationship with Venezuela and the subsidization that this has produced. President Chávez supports Cuba through low-cost oil exports to Cuba, export and investment credits, and generous foreign exchange payments for Cuban exports of medical services.

In summary, the various development models and approaches that have dominated in Cuba have been Fidel’s personal models. Fidel Castro is correct in stating that they don’t work anymore. However, they have never worked.

Source:

Ritter, Archibald R. M. “The Cuban Economy inb the 1990s: External Challenges and Policy Imperatives.” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 32:3; Fall, 1990.

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An Analysis of Cuban Democracy and the Potential Roles of Diplomats in its Promotion, from the “DIPLOMAT’S HANDBOOK” for Democracy Development Support

Posted on August 31, 2010 by Arch Ritter


The “Diplomat’s Handbook for Democracy Development Support” project of the “Community of Democracies” has just released a study of democracy and democratization in China. It also includes an older Case Study on Cuba that I had never seen and that may be of broad interest.

The Web site of the Diplomat’s Handbook is  http://www.diplomatshandbook.org/

The complete case study on Cuba can be seen on an Adobe file accessed at the above web site.

Below is the Introduction to the study.

Cuban Exceptionalism

INTRODUCTION

This Handbook presents individual country case studies in order to record the practical activity that diplomats from democratic countries have performed there in support of civil society, democracy development, and human rights. Situations can and often do resemble each other in some recognizable respects, and our aim is to enable diplomats and civil society partners in the field to obtain insights and guidance from actions taken elsewhere, without, however, suggesting that the experiences in one country can simply be transposed directly to another, since the trajectory of each country’s development is singular.
The case of Cuba is extreme, and in many ways unique. Cuban history since the late 19th Century is intertwined in a relationship with one country, the United States. The mutual enmity between the two governments for much of the last 50 years has had a direct impact on conditions inside Cuba. Anything that diplomats of democratic countries can do in support of Cuban democracy development pales in significance to the potential effect of placing US-Cuba relations on a normal basis, possibly for the first time.
The only country in the western hemisphere that does not practice some form of electoral democracy, Cuba’s government remains in principle a Marxist-Leninist throwback and a resolute holdout more than two decades after the abandonment of communism in Europe and adoption of the market economy in China. Expectations that Cuban communism would be merely the last domino to fall failed to recognize a signal difference with Eastern Europe where the regimes were judged to be collaborating with an outside oppressor, the USSR. The Cuban government presents itself as the patriotic defender against an outside threat.
The regime has from the outset been symbiotically identified with its Comandante en jefe who led the revolution that propelled it into power on January 1, 1959. Descriptive labels scholars employ to capture its essence range from “extreme paternalism” (Prof. Carollee Berghdorf, Hampshire College, UK) to “charismatic post-totalitarianism” (Prof. Eusebio Mujal-León, Georgetown University, Washington, DC). Exile adversary US Congressman Lincoln Díaz-Balart, has called it “the Fidel Castro regime,” pure and simple. Although an orderly succession has obviously occurred as Fidel Castro retired from public office in July, 2006 and ostensibly turned power over to Raúl Castro, the question arises whether anything significant has changed. Fidel Castro’s moral influence over the country remains, though he is without direct control of all details as before. Having described himself in 1961 as a “Marxist-Leninist until I die,” he recast himself in post-retirement writings as a “utopian socialist,” adding that “one must be consistent to the end.”
The regime he built over the decades, “is not the German Democratic Republic,” as one diplomat in Havana phrased it, but it is an authoritarian one-party state that has used an Orwellian security apparatus to rein in and quash democratic impulses over five decades, often citing the threat from the US as the rationale. Much of the world acknowledges the ability of Castro’s Cuba to have stared down and survived determined efforts by successive US governments to end the regime, by invasion, attempted assassination, a CIA program of subversion, and a punitive economic embargo.
But increasingly, democrats rebuke the regime for its invocation of these real threats to Cuba’s sovereignty to justify the continued and even tighter suffocation of human and civil rights of Cuban citizens.
60
The case study that follows attempts to identify activities by diplomats and democracies in support of Cubans’ efforts to secure rights at home, including discussion of a more open and democratic system. But the study reports the view that these efforts tend to bounce off a tightly controlled and controlling regime that veers between self-confidence and paranoia, and discounts the pertinence of mutual leverage.
Diplomatic efforts meant to support democracy development are in consequence especially challenged in today’s Cuba. Diplomats have to manage seemingly competing professional obligations of non-interference, official engagement, a long-term developmental perspective, and immediate democratic solidarity.
This challenge, familiar to diplomats and international NGOs working in other authoritarian and repressive states, is made especially vexing in Cuba by an authoritarian government that is fearful of change. But some signs of change are present in Cuba. Coming years will engage democrats in support of efforts by the Cuban people to pursue aspirations for more significant change that is theirs alone to accomplish

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Freedom of Expression, Economic Self-Correction and Self-Renewal

Posted on July 7, 2010 by Arch Ritter

An important requirement for the sustained effectiveness of an economic system and society is the ability to analyze and criticize – freely, openly and continuously – its functioning.  Open analysis and criticism in a context of free generation and diffusion of information provide a necessary spur for self-correction, exposing illegalities, flawed policies and errors.  Free analysis and criticism are vital in order to bring illicit actions to light, to correct errors on the part of all institutions and enterprises as well as policy makers and to help generate improved policy design and implementation. This in turn requires freedom of expression and freedom of association, embedded in an independent press, publications systems and media, independent universities and research institutes, and freely-functioning opposition political parties.

The absence of free economic criticisms means that major policy errors or indeed fiascos are not “nipped in the bud” and terminated quickly but steam ahead to disaster. Some major examples of this in Cuba have been

  • The 1961-1963 instant industrialization strategy, aborted in 1963
  • The 10 Million Ton Sugar Harvest effort, from 1964 to 1970;
  • The attempt to use the “New Man” ideology as a labour mobilization device, 1966-1970
  • The shut-down of half of Cuba’s sugar agro-industrial complex (2002)
  • The billion dollar mini-generator component of the “Revolucin Energtica (2006)

Pluralistic democratic countries have free presses and open debate on the issues of the day.  Opposition political parties, academics, interest groups and NGOs, and journalists continuously analyze and critique public policy issues and proposals and the functioning of private and public enterprises and institutions.  Indeed, there is major competition among economic and business journalists as well as academics to be the most perspicacious analysts and critics of public policy.

Unfortunately much of this has been lacking in Cuba.  The media largely performs a cheerleader role, unless issues have been opened up for discussion by the President and the Party.  For example, there was virtually no public discussion or debate concerning the shut-down of half of the sugar sector in 2002, the attacks on self-employment, the dysfunctional parts of the “Revolución Energética” or of the imprisoning of the critics  – or so-called “dissidents” –in  2003.This means that public policies get announced and implemented full-blown without critical input into their formulation, and without subsequent criticism and early correction.

Are the restrictions on freedom of expression becoming more or less severe in recent years? Some indications suggest that there is some relaxation of such restrictions, notably:

  • On June 16 to 20, the Catholic church was able to organize the Semana Social Católica including a Panel on “Economy and Society” with Pavel Vidal Alejandro, Omar Everleny Perez, Carmelo Mesa-Lago y Cristina Calvo.
  • The presentation of information on the economy has improved over the last 10 years. The web site of the Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas is now surprisingly good and the Anuario Estadistico Economico is quite comprehensive and appears in a timely way. (However, the methodologies for the measurement of some fundamental economic data such as labor force, employment and unemployment, consumer price index, and national accounts are opaque and ambiguous so that the analyses based on them are not as strong as they could be.)

But on the other hand, there are also some indications of a hardening of the restrictions on freedom of expression.

  • The containment and harassment of the bloggers continues. They have been denied access to the web. They have been harassed and intimidated – unsuccessfully – by actions of state security. They have been vilified as “mercenaries” in the service of foreign powers. They have been denied the right to travel abroad. They are often denied the right to participate in relevant domestic events such as a conference on civil society and the new media! Their web sites and therefore their commentaries are available within Cuba only with difficulty. But they have not been shut down as of mid-2010, though this could change.
  • The expulsion of Esteban Morales, Professor of Economics and Political Science, University of Havana, from the Communist Party also represents a hardening of restrictions on freedom of expression. Morales comments on the character of racism in Cuba, Challenges of the racial problem in Cuba seemed reasonably innocuous. His April 22 essay entitled “Corruption: The True Counter Revolution” was more hard hitting. But being expelled from the Party looks to me like a reward, not a punishment. Of course, this is not correct, because expulsion from the Party usually means exclusion from foreign travel which is vital for academics as a means of buttressing their inadequate Moneda Nacional incomes.

  • Certain areas of the economy appear to continue to be off limits to analysis and scrutiny, notably the bio-technological industry and the conglomerate enterprises that straddle the peso and the convertible peso economies.
  • The political decision-making process on economic and other matters within the highest levels of the Government continues to be a “black box,” the workings of which we can only speculate about.  Cuban Universities need some real Departments of Political Science!

The near-absence of checks and balances on the policy-making machinery of the state also contributes to obscuring over-riding real priorities and to prolonging and amplifying error.  The National Assembly, dominated by the Communist Party, meets for very short periods of time – four to six days a year – and has a large work load, so that it is unable to serve as a mechanism for undertaking serious analysis and debate of economic or other matters. The cost for Cuba of this situation over the years has been enormous.  It is unfortunate that Cuba lacks the concept and reality of a “Loyal Opposition” within the electoral system and in civil society.  These are vital for economic efficiency, not to mention, of course, for authentic participatory democracy.

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