Category Archives: Featured

THE CONCEPT OF A “LOYAL OPPOSITION” IN THE CUBAN CONTEXT

Posted on November 6, 2014 by Arch Ritter

By Arch Ritter, November 5, 2014

An earlier version of this note was prepared  for presentation as a discussant at a panel entitled “Estado, sociedad civil y oposición en Cuba” at the August 2014 meetings of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy.

Cuba has had and continues to have a “Loyal Opposition”. It consists of a broad range of independent analysts, many or perhaps most of whom are outside official institutional structure. Included here would independent journalists (14ymedio, many “bloggers” or web-based groupings), activists of many sorts, independent economists, and some academics among others.

But while there has been and is a “Loyal Opposition,” it has been effectively suppressed and un-institutionalized. Virtually all shades of opposition have been prohibited. They were perceived by President Fidel Castro as treasonous since the earliest days of the Cuban Revolution. Divergent views competing with Fidel’s hyper-monopolistic visions, ideas, arguments, and conclusions were considered to be counter-revolutionary. Anyone holding these views was silenced, shunned, fired from any responsible job, incarcerated or pushed into emigration with their property confiscated.

The expression of strong oppositional views led one to being labeled by the regime and the power of the monopoly media as a “gusano” or “worm”. Such de-humanization of citizens was despicable.

Unfortunately the United States provided a handy pretext, fully exploited by Fidel, to characterize all opposition as treacherous support for the overthrow of the regime and the reversal of the “Revolution”.

For a while I thought that the Government of Raul Castro had softened its stance on internal dissent. The “Bloggers” for example had not been imprisoned, though they have sometimes been vilified and harassed. Within academia, some analysts such as Esteban Morales Domínguez had pushed the limits but avoided severe penalty.

However, repressive actions have been building up in the last few years, leading to surprisingly large numbers of preventative arrests. For 2014, the total number of short-term preventative detentions had reached 7.215 by October 2014. Some detail on these arrests during 2014 is presented in Table 1.

New Picture (3)Source: Observatorio Cubano, 2014

In the “Westminster” or Parliamentary systems of the United Kingdom and the “Old Dominions”, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the official opposition to the political party that forms the government is labelled “Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition.”  While critical of the policies of the government in power and continuously trying to promote its own views, electoral prospects and political fortunes, this opposition is ultimately loyal to the people of the country and its institutions, these being personalized through loyalty to the Queen.

An effective and institutionalized “loyal opposition” performs a number of vital functions. First, it participates in policy formulation, criticizing policy proposals, preventing stupid mistakes and – one hopes – correcting major blunders as soon as possible. Think, for example, of the 10 million ton harvest of 1964-1970 or the shutting down of about half of the sugar agro-industrial complex in 2002 in Cuba. Would these have been adopted and implemented if there were an effective opposition on operation?

Second, an effective opposition can check the tendencies towards the domination, arrogance and corruption that come with the continuing entitlement to power of a single party monopolizing the political system.

Third, an opposition can provide a new governing team, a “government in waiting” with fresh ideas, new vision, renewed energy and strong initiative, ready to form the government.  At some stage, “Old Regimes” become mired in their sense of entitlement, self-importance, paralytic conservatism, sclerosis, irrelevance, entrepreneurial lethargy, and intellectual exhaustion. An opposition can inject new life into governance when it is time to “throw the rascals out.”

It is interesting to note that in two of the “Parliamentary Democracies” namely Canada regarding Quebec and the United Kingdom regading Scotland, there have been “Oppositions” that have wanted to secede from the Unions. Are such “Oppositions” loyal? Fortunately they have been loyal to the institutions of their democracies and have been willing to put decisions on separation to referenda and they have abided peacefully by the results.

The existence and operation of an effective official opposition in a country is messy, preoccupying and controversial, particularly from the standpoint of the governing Party and leadership in power. Such monopoly politics is exceedingly boring and irrelevant, as typified by the meaningless unanimity of the Assemblies of One-Party states.[1]. Open debate and the uncertainty of genuine democratic participation also is more fun ultimately.

In time, Cuba will accept one institution of the Westminster political system, namely the concept and reality of a “Loyal Opposition.” The Government of Raul Castro obviously is not ready for this yet.Governing is easier for those in power when there is no opposition and no-one can challenge the wisdom of their decisions.

One could conclude that the Cuban regime blocks any opening to an authentic pluralistic and participatory democracy because it fears that it would be voted out of office and lose its monopoly of political power and the perquisites of power. But whether Raul’s regime likes it or not, an opposition, though tightly repressed, will strengthen.

If Raul Castro were truly interested in the long term health of Cuba – and his own “legacy” – he himself would make moves towards such political pluralism. Unfortunately, this is improbable though perhaps not impossible.

Bibliography

El Observatorio Cubano de Derechos Humanos, “Continúan las detenciones arbitrarias en Cuba,” Web Site: http://observacuba.org/continuan-las-detenciones-arbitrarias-en-cuba/, Accessed October 6. 2014.

Schmitz, Gerald. The Opposition in a Parliamentary System, Library of Parliament, Political and Social Affairs Division, Government of Canada: Ottawa, December 1988

The Guardian, “Raúl Castro’s daughter first lawmaker to vote ‘no’ in Cuban parliament,” 19 August 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/19/mariela-castro-raul-no-vote-discrimination, Accessed September 23, 2014  

 

Note:

[1] Even the almost unprecedented single dissenting vote to a proposal put forward in the National Assembly caused relative excitement in Cuba and among some observers of Cuba, admittedly partly because the “no” vote was made by Raul Castro’s daughter Miriela. Hers was the lone dissenting vote on a workers’ rights bill that she argued insufficiently prevented discrimination against people with HIV or with unconventional gender identities. (The Guardian)

mulcair_in_commons_jpg_size_xxlarge_letterbox
ndp
Posted in Blog, Featured | Tagged , , , | Leave a comment

DOES CUBA HAVE AN INDUSTRIAL FUTURE?

Posted on September 10, 2014 by Arch Ritter

By Arch Ritter.

Attached here is the Power Point presentation Does Cuba Hava an Industrial Future made to the 2014 Conference of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy,

New Picture (3)New Picture (3).bmpaaaaNew Picture (4)New Picture (5)New Picture (6)New Picture (7)

Posted in Blog, Featured | Tagged , , , | Leave a comment

Book Review: Al Campbell (Editor) Cuban Economists on the Cuban Economy.

Posted on July 9, 2014 by Arch Ritter

Cuban Economists on the Cuban Economy. Edited by Al Campbell. Gainesville, FL: The University Press of Florida, 2013. Pp. xvii + 337. $79.95 cloth. ISBN: 9780813044235.

indexBy Arch Ritter

Eight years after the accession of Raúl, it is time for an analysis and evaluation of his revised approach to economic management. Not surprisingly, a large number of books dedicated to this task have been published recently.[i] Among these is an interesting volume edited by  Al Campbell of the University of Utah appeared in 2013.

Al Campbell’s collection of essays, Cuban Economists on the Cuban Economy, purposely includes some well-established analysts some of whom are less well-known outside of Cuba because they write in Spanish mainly for domestic policy formulation and publication. It is tempting to label these authors the “old guard” but some such as Miguel Figueras and José Luis Rodríguez can be said to have been moderate reformists as well, and all profess to be supporters of Raúl’s reforms. It is pleasing to see some new work by senior economists such as Figueras,. Rodríguez and the late Ángela Ferriol.

Generally, the volume strikes an “oficialista” tone, and excludes those economists from the University of Havana Center for Studies on the Cuban Economy who have been analyzing the reform process for the last 20 years as well as so-called “dissident” economists.

The volume seems to have passed its “best before….” date as the essays were written in the first half of 2010 using data up to 2008 or 2007. The authors were instructed to focus on the “Special Period” following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and consequent dramatic cuts in Soviet aid to Cuba; they “were specifically asked not to comment on the proposed reforms in their final chapter revisions…”  (Campbell  p.7)  Unfortunately this reduces the relevance of the book for assessing the economic experience and analyzing post 2010 policy reforms during Raúl’s Presidency. It would indeed be interesting to have the frank evaluations of Raúl’s reforms since 2011 from this group of analysts. The volume is nonetheless useful for understanding the economic challenges that Raúl inherited.

The Campbell collection includes twelve essays grouped in three sections.”  Section I, “The Macroeconomy,” includes a chapter by José Luis Rodríguez reviewing the general macroeconomic experience of the 1979-2009 period, a chapter by Oscar U-Echevarría Vallejo on changing development strategies, policy reforms and sectorial changes in the whole 1959-2009 period; a chapter on Cuba’s changing international economic relations during the “Special Period” by Nancy Quiñones Chang, and a description of the planning process prior to the expansion of the private sector after 2010 by Elena Álvares González.

The second section focuses on socioeconomic issues. An essay by Rita Castiñeiras García on “…The Human Dimension….” constitutes an uncritical listing of the achievements of the Revolution. For example, she accepts as a significant advance the expansion of the university system to include over 700 centers (Castiñeiras García p.156). But in 2011 under Raúl, the huge expansion of the university system was reversed and reduced to 119 centers with a large cut in enrolments as well. (Mesa-Lago, p.144) The essay by Juan Carlos Alfonso Fraga on demography and the aging of the population is useful, with its focus on the aging process, its consequences and relevant public policies.  Some analysis of Cuba’s fertility rate, its determinants and relevant public policies would also have been welcome; this is now 1.4 children per woman, the lowest in the Hemisphere, among the lowest in the world and well below the 2.2 level necessary for long-term sustainability.[1]

Ángela Ferriol’s essay on poverty acknowledges its existence in Cuba and outlines the programs designed to reduce it. A chapter on labor issues by Alfredo Morales Cartaya paints a Pollyanna picture, ignoring the collapse of the real value of wages, salaries, pensions and social security payments since 1990. Omitted as well is any consideration of the absence of meaningful collective bargaining, the right to strike and independent labor unions.

The third section then includes two essays on tourism, one on agriculture, and one on “knowledge-based” industries. The latter two essays are particularly unhelpful and offer virtually no serious policy analysis or evaluation.

[1] United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report, 2013. Statistical Annex, Table 14, p. 194.

[i] Among other volumes recently published on the reform process under President Raul Castro are the following:

Cuban Economic and Social Development: Policy Reforms and Challenges in the 21st Century. Edited by Jorge I. Domínguez, Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva, Mayra Espina Prieto and Lorena Barberia. David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, USA, 2012. Pp. iii + 333. $24.99 paper.  ISBN: 9780674062434.

Cuba Since the Revolution of 1959: A Critical Assessment. By Samuel Farber. Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2011. Pp.ix + 369. $24.00 paper. ISBN: 9781608461394.

Cuban Revelations: behind the Scenes in Havana, By Marc Frank, University Press of Florida, 2013. Pp. iii + 327. $29.95 cloth. ISBN: 9789813944651

Cuba Under Raúl Castro: Assessing the Reforms. By Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Jorge Pérez-López. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2013. Pp.xv + 295. $65.00 cloth. ISBN: 9781588269043.

¿Quo vadis, Cuba? La incierta senda de las reformas . Edited by Pavel Vidal and José Antonio Alonso.  Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011. Pp. xvii + 453. $48.00 paper. ISBN: 9780268029830.

Handbook of Contemporary Cuba: Economy, Politics, Civil Society and Globalization, Mauricio A. Font and Carlos Riobo (Editors). Boulder and London: Paradigm Publishers, 2013;

No More free Lunch: Reflections on the Cuban Economic Reform Process and Challenges for Transformation, Claes Brundenius and Ricardo Torres Perez (Editors). Switzerland: Springer, 2013;

The Economy of Cuba after the VI Party Congress,  Alberto Gabriele (Editor). New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2012.

Posted in Blog, Featured | Tagged | Leave a comment

Cuba’s New Foreign Investment Law: Amplified Discrimination against Cuban Small Enterprise Operators and in Favor of Foreign Enterprises.

Posted on April 17, 2014 by Arch Ritter

By Archibald Ritter

Cuba’s new Foreign Investment Law was published in the Gaceta Oficialon April 16, 2014.  It is available here:  Ley de la Inversión Extranjera

foreign-investment-law

The objective of the law is to provide an improved legal, fiscal and regulatory framework for foreign enterprises that decide to operate in Cuba.

Cuba has passed this law because of the perceived benefits that such direct foreign investment can generate for the country, namely technological and managerial transfers, access to foreign markets, higher-productivity employment, higher income levels, financial inflows and increased levels of investment. This last factor is of especial importance in view of the very low levels of investment that Cuba has achieved for the last 20 years. Indeed Cuba’s levels of investment have been the lowest in all of Latin America for the last two decades. In 2011 this rate was 10.2% of GDP vis-a-vis 22.4% for all of Latin America. (UN CEPAL, Balance Preliminary, 2013).  

The law certainly seems to have created a more hospitable environment for foreign firms, providing greater security of tenure, greater control over the hiring and compensation of labor, and most of all, through generous tax breaks. Indeed, the tax advantages for foreign investors now seem to me to be overly generous. One might estimate that the new foreign investment regime will be highly successful in promoting foreign investment from a range of sources and perhaps especially from China and Brazil.

However, there is a major element of injustice in the new law, particularly as it relates to taxation. The new tax regime intensifies the discrimination favoring foreign investors operating in “Mixed Enterprises” (Joint Ventures) or “international economic associations” when compared to the tax regime for small enterprises owned by Cuban citizens. This is both unfair and counterproductive. It may also be unsustainable.

The contrast between the tax treatment of foreign enterprises which will usually big private or (in the case of China) state corporations in comparison the tax treatment for small Cuban-owned firms, is summarized in Table 1.

 

Table 1: Comparison of the Tax Regimes for Cuban Small Enterprise and Foreign Enterprise Operating in Mixed Enterprises  after the 2014 Foreign Investment Law

Small Enterprise Sector

Foreign Investors in Mixed Enterprises or “Economic Associations”

Nominal Tax Rates

Personal Income Tax Rate: 15% rising to 50% of income above CuP 50,000 or $2,000 per year

Profits Tax: 15% of Net Corporate Income [perhaps 50% for resources]; Personal Taxes Exempt for those earning profits.

Effective Tax Base

60 to 90% of Gross Revenues; [Maximum of 10% to 40 % allowable d for input costs, depending on activity]

Net Income after deduction of  all production and investment costs from Gross Revenues

Effective Tax Rates

May approach or even exceed 100% of Net Income

15% of Net Income; [perhaps 50% for mining and petroleum]

Tax Holiday

 None

Eight Years Profit Tax Exemption,

Deductibility ofInvestment Costs from Gross Revenues

Deductible only within the 10% to 40% allowable deduction  limits

Fully deductible from Gross Revenues in determining Taxable Income

Deductibility of Input Costs from Gross Revenues

Deductible only within the 10% to 40% allowable deduction  limits

Fully deductible from Gross Revenues in determining Taxable Income

Employee Hiring Tax

Tax exemption for first five employees; Tax required on six or more

Complete Tax Exemption

Social Security Payments

Yes

Yes

Lump-Sum Taxation

Up-front Cuota Fija Tax Payments Necessary

None

Input Importation Rights

Direct Import Purchases Prohibited

Freedom to Import Directly

Profit Expatriation

No

Yes

 The most obvious difference in tax treatment is that Cuban small enterprise operators pay a marginal tax rate of 50% of Gross Revenues (less deductions) on any income exceeding 50,000 pesos per year this being equivalent to about US$2,000.00 per year or about US 166.67 per month. In contrast, the foreign corporations in mixed enterprises pay 15% of Profits in taxes – but only after an eight year tax holiday.

Perhaps more serious, for Cuban small enterprise owners, taxable income is calculated as an arbitrary percentage of Gross Revenues – from 60% to 90%  – depending on the nature of the economic activity. The costs of inputs of materials, labor, rent, utilities, etc. and all costs of investment are not deductible from Gross Revenues in determining Taxable Income – only the arbitrary amounts of 40 to 10% or Gross Revenues. To my knowledge, no other country taxes its own enterprise sector in this way.

On the other hand, foreign corporations can deduct all costs of investment and inputs of all sorts from Gross Income in calculating Taxable Income. This indeed is standard international practice.  

Or in other words, the effective tax base for foreign firms is Gross Revenues minus all costs of production and investment. In contrast, for micro-enterprise the tax base is gross revenue minus arbitrary and limited maximum allowable levels of input costs ranging from 10 to 40 percent depending on the activity, regardless of true production costs.

The result of this is that the effective tax rates for foreign enterprises are reasonable though generous. But for Cuban small enterprises the effective tax rate can be unreasonable and could reach and exceed 100%. Moreover, investment costs are deductible from future income streams for foreign firms this being the normal international convention.

To add insult to injury, foreign investors receive an eight year tax holiday in which corporate profit taxes are exempt from taxation. Cuban citizens operating small enterprises receive no such tax holiday.

Moreover, under the new legislation, the profits of the foreign enterprises can all be repatriated. In contrast, the infinitely more modest after-tax incomes of Cuban citizens would virtually all be spent within the domestic economy. If their after-tax earnings were to be taken out of the country, they would have to exchange their CUP or Moneda Nacional savings for foreign currency at the rate of about  CUP 26= $US1.00 or about CUP 34.5 = Euro 1.00

Small enterprise owners must make payment of a proportion of their taxes at the beginning of each month. Foreign firms certainly do not have to do this.

Small enterprise owners also must pay a tax on the hiring of more than five employees (not a good mechanism for creating jobs.). Foreign firms are exempt from such a tax.

Foreign firms can import their inputs, equipment and machinery as well as personnel directly from abroad. Cuban citizens with small enterprises must make their purchases from the state Tiendas por la Recaudacion de Divisas (formerly ‘Dollar Stores’)

This differential tax treatment for Cuban citizens operating small enterprises and foreign enterprises represents a surprising type of discrimination against Cuban citizens. One might predict that this type of discrimination will generate major dissatisfaction on the part of Cuban nationalists as well as Cuban small enterprise operators. Before long, political pressures and the climate of public opinion should require greater fairness in the character of taxation.

However, given the seemingly insurmountable difficulties that some countries such as the United States face in constructing fairer tax regimes, perhaps I am naively optimistic. (Who can forget the 15% average tax rate paid by Warren Buffett and the 14.3% paid by Mitt Romney in comparison with the 35% paid by Buffet’s secretary as well as the average US citizen?)

Posted in Blog, Featured | Tagged , , | Leave a comment

Book Review: ¿Quo vadis, Cuba? La incierta senda de las reformas

Posted on April 14, 2014 by Arch Ritter

 

By Archibald Ritter

¿Quo vadis, Cuba? La incierta senda de las reformas . Edited by Pavel Vidal and José Antonio Alonso.  Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011. Pp. xvii + 453. $48.00 paper. ISBN: 9780268029830.

Quo Vadis, Cuba? edited by Pavel Vidal and Jose Antonio Alonso, is a co-production of the Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy of the Universidad de la Habana (CEEC), and the Institute for International Studies at the Complutense University of Madrid  (Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales of the Universidad Complutense de Madrid).[1] The project was financed by the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation.  

61tvArYGP4L__SL1500_.jpg AAA

The volume does not attempt to make a comprehensive overview analysis of the functioning of the economy or a complete set of prescriptions for economic reform. Instead, the objective of the volume is “…to make a modest contribution to the search for useful paths for a “renovated” Cuba,” (Vidal and Antonio Alonso p.24.) and in this it succeeds. The Cuban-Spanish team has produced an outstanding set of analyses of a number of the central economic conundrums facing the Cuban economy.  

The analysts at CEEC have been focusing on Cuba’s economic situation now for some twenty years. They have steadily pushed the envelope, arguing forcefully and courageously from within Cuba regarding the need and possible shapes for reforms. They have also “stayed in the game” – in contrast to the dissident analysts such as Miriam Celaya, Dimas Castellanos and the late Oscar Chepe,  among others who work outside the system. While the CEEC analysts have perhaps had only a limited direct role in decision-making, they have been instrumental in moving the discussion forward and supporting the changing climate of opinion regarding economic institutions and policy.

The first chapter by Juan Triana Cordoví and José Antonio Alfonso, focusing on the foundations of economic growth, begins with some discussion of growth theorizing and possible insights from international experience for Cuba. It then analyzes Cuba’s growth performance, and discusses strategic options. The policy recommendations that it arrives at are fairly standard – namely promoting exports and solving the problem of the dual exchange rate and monetary system.  The third recommendation, which calls for the actualización of policy regarding the promotion of direct foreign investment (to complement domestic savings levels and stimulate technological transfer), is perhaps a bit surprising in view of Cuba’s three decades of policy hostility and then another two decades of policy reticence.[2]  

Ricardo Torres and Isabel Álvarez present a strong analysis of technical innovation, including a quick review of some theorizing, some comparative international experience and an analysis of structural changes in industry, trade and employment and the technological dimension thereof during the Special Period. They attribute the technological lag to low savings and investment levels, weak infrastructure, limited access to technology from abroad, and “the inertia and ‘immovilismo’ of Cuba’s managerial systems…” (Torres and Álvarez p.129.)  Among their policy suggestions are higher levels of savings and investment to permit accelerated incorporation of new technologies and structural change and a broadening of the self-employment sector to permit professional activities that would utilize Cuba’s well-educated labor force more effectively.

This volume also includes outstanding chapters analyzing tax reform and enterprise by Omar Everleny Perez, Saira Pons and Carlos Garcimartin; on Cuba’s social challenges and policy targeting by Anicia Garcia, Susanne Gratius and Luisa Íñiguez Rojas, and a chapter on the decentralization of state programs by Santiago Díaz de Sarralde and Julio César Guanche.             The concluding chapter by the editors entitled “Rules, Incentives and Institutions” outlines the “required institutional transformation” that Cuba needs to undergo, namely “the readjustment of the rules, norms, values and organizations inherited from the past:” The precise form of that readjustment is unstated, but “[t]he framework of economic and social incentives within which Cubans functioned in the past is called upon to transform itself and must be progressively replaced by another that will be coherent with the objectives of the reform” (p. 257).

This challenging chapter discusses the place of institutions in the development process, institutional quality and the process of institutional change in Cuban agriculture, the non-agricultural self-employment and micro-enterprise sector, the cooperative sector, and the direct foreign investment area. It emphasizes the pre-requisites for the functioning of markets (secure property rights, security of contracts, effective competition) and also market failure. It also includes brief analyses of the opposition to current institutional reform (inertia and opposition to change, potential loss of position by vested interests and the social hierarchy, and impacts on income distribution.)  The authors conclude that while reformist gradualism has certain advantages, an activist prioritization of reforms is desirable, such that the first reforms generate clear benefits for broad sectors of the population thereby building support for further reforms. All in all, this book makes valuable contributions to the understanding of the reformist challenges facing Cuba as it resolves some of its most pressing economic problems and moves towards a mixed but more market-oriented economy with major roles for the small enterprise and cooperative sectors.


[1] Six of the seven Cuban authors were from CEEC and five of the Spanish authors are from the Universidad Complutense. The editor on the Cuban side, Pavel Vidal, was at CEEC but is currently at the Pontifica Universidad Javeriana at Cali Colombia.

[2] The authors contrast the highly successful nickel sector, which has had a major role for foreign investment (in the form of Sherritt International) with the autarkic and disastrous sugar sector.

Pavel Vidal.pngAAAPavel Vidal Alejandro

Posted in Blog, Featured | Tagged | Leave a comment

Reordenamiento Laboral: Quién se queda, quién se va?; Labor Force Down-Sizing in Cuba’s Medical System

Posted on April 9, 2014 by Arch Ritter

By Archibald Ritter

On April 7, an article in Trabajadores stated that 109,000 workers in the heath sector were to be declared redundant, generating an expected 2 billion pesos in savings in the national budget, ostensibly without damaging the quality of health care services.

The newspaper where the article was published: Trabajadores ;

The original article is  here: Trabajadores, 7 de abril de 2014, Quien se queda, quien se va

This is  an ambitions action. Indeed, it is draconian. It seems to be well beyond the legendary “shock therapies” or “structural adjustment” programs once promoted by the International Monetary Fund that have been criticized vigorously in Cuba and elsewhere in the past.  

Apparently such a down-sizing is necessary due to the over-staffing of the health care system that seems to have built up over the years. This may be the case, as Cuba continued to judge its medical performance partly on numbers of doctors and medical personnel per thousand population and number of hospital beds – quantitative success indicators that probably contributed to an excessive expansion of the system.

However, the personnel of the Ministry of Health already had been cut back significantly from their peak of 335,622  in 2008 falling to 265,617 in 2011.  This was a personnel reduction  of 23.5%, with a 37% reduction of pharmacists, a 10.5% reduction of nurses, and a 45.4% reduction in auxiliary and technical personnel.  Presumably there are many more employees in the medical system not included in the numbers of the Table, people such as custodians, secretaries, receptionists, administrators, drivers, information technologists and tradesmen, but how many of these were employed in the system is not indicated in the ONE Anuario Estadistico.

Were further cuts required after these reductions? Apparently so.

Personal facultativo, Ministerio de SaludIs the Cuban government expecting that the numerous Cuban medical personnel abroad, and mainly in Venezuela will be returning to Cuba so that cut-backs will be necessary in order to accommodate them in the medical system?  Indeed, with Venezuela teetering on the brink of serious conflagration and economic melt-down, it may well be the case that Cuban medical personnel may not be in Venezuela at current levels for much longer. Is this the expectation of the Cuban government?

It is of interest to note that as was the case with the announcement of the 500,000 target for layoffs in the state sector in 2010, , the announcement of the job cuts were published in the workers’ newspaper, Trabajadores, and the person explaining the cut-backs was a certain Rafael Guevara Chacón, an employee of the Central de Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC), the labour federation. Is this how Cuba’s labour movement defends workers’ interests?

It will not be easy determining who is and who is not redundant in the medical system. What will be the criteria for determining the redundancies? Will favoritism or a person’s political record be significant factors?  What will be the job prospects for the medical personnel that are being poured out of the educational system?

Then there is the question of where the displaced workers are to go. Some will retire, but others will have to be absorbed elsewhere in the system.

Is the cuenta-propista or self-employment sector capable of creating an additional 109,000 jobs without further liberalization of the policy environment within which it operates?

Can personnel cut-backs of this amount actually avoid damaging the medical care system?

All in all, implementing labour force cut-backs in the medical system of this magnitude will undoubtedly be a major challenge for the government.

Cuba Apr 2012 062.jpg AAAA

Maternity Hospital, Avenida G Vedado, in process of reconstruction, 2012-2014; Photo by Archibald Ritter

Posted in Blog, Featured | Tagged , , | Leave a comment

Cuba’s Conception Conundrum: A Valentine’s Day Puzzle

Posted on February 14, 2014 by Arch Ritter

14febrero_down

By Arch Ritter

An interesting phenomenon, namely the seasonal character of the numbers of births in Cuba – and of course the accompanying though implied seasonality of conception rates – is apparent in Table II.5 of the 2012 ONE Anuario Demográfico[i]. This is illustrated in Chart 1 below.

 New Picture (12)

The number of births over the course of the year follows a clear pattern that is apparent in the six years illustrated in the Chart. The number of births peak from September to December, decline sharply during the months of January to April, bottom out from May to June and then rise again from July to September.

In view of the nine-month period between conception and birth, the chart says something interesting about the amorous character of Cuban citizens. The implication of the birth pattern is that conception levels are highest from January to April and lowest from August to October.

Why would Cubans be so much more amorous in the January-April period than the August to October period?   

Is it the weather? Perhaps the cooler sunny weather of Cuba’s winter months is more conducive to amorous events and conception. And, conversely, perhaps the heat and mugginess of summer and the autumn rainy season is less conducive to “amor.”

Is it economics? Possibly there is greater optimism and dynamism during the more prosperous times of the tourist high season (which once corresponded to the Zafra, when sugar was king.)

Is it tourism? The pattern of conception levels corresponds closely to the seasonal pattern of tourism in Cuba as can be inferred from Chart 2 below. ­.

Does Valentine’s Day itself generate more conceptions and related activities, given that births often spike nine months later in October?

If anyone has clearer and more definitive insights into this phenomenon, please let me know!

 New Picture (11)

index

[i] Cuba’s Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas (ONE) recently published the 2012 Edition of the Anuario Demográfico de Cuba 2012. Statistical information for Cuban demography is available comprehensively and conveniently. ONE’s coverage and presentation of demographic statistics is impressive. (In contrast, basic information on the economy such as unemployment, the consumer price index, trade and GDP is opaque, minimalist, not clearly defined, and now very late in appearing on ONE’s web site.)

Posted in Blog, Featured | Tagged , | Leave a comment

POTENTIALS AND PITFALLS OF CUBA’S MOVE TOWARD NON-AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES

Posted on January 30, 2014 by Arch Ritter

Below is an analysis of  Cuba’s move toward non-agricultural cooperatives, presented at the meetings of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy in July 2013 and published in the Proceedings of that Conference.

The complete essay can be read here: Cuba’s Move towards Non-Agricultural Cooperatives

  By Archibald R. M. Ritter

In the process of re-analyzing the issues and problems facing the Cuban economy following the July 2006 accession to power by Raúl Castro, it was concluded that much of the state sector of the economy — and the planning process under which it operated — was irredeemably inefficient. Numerous attempts had been made to improve its operation, but all were without significant success. This was typified sharply by the collapse of the sugar agro-industrial sector, by the inability of the non-sugar industrial sector to be revived after its collapse in 1989-1992, by the continuing shortcomings of the consumer economy and by the burgeoning of the underground economy. In response to this continuing predicament, Raúl Castro’s Government produced the “Draft Guidelines for Economic and Social Policy” of October 2010 with a final version in May 2011, which notably called for the establishment of an enabling environment for small enterprise, among other things. The “Guidelines” document also included a section on the promotion of new non-agricultural cooperative enterprises. This institutional form was the object of considerable analysis within the Cuban Government between 2008 and 2012.

On December 11, 2012, a battery of new laws and regulations on cooperatives were published in the Gaceta Oficial No. 53, including two Council of State Decree-Laws, two Ministerial Resolutions, one Council of Ministers Decree, and one Ministerial “Norma Específica de Contabilidad.” This legislation outlined the structuring, functioning, governance and financial organization of the new cooperatives and provided the legal framework within which they were to operate. It permitted and defined a new type of economic institution for Cuba, one that would have been out of the question under the presidency of Fidel Castro, but that holds the potential for revolutionizing the institutional structure of the Cuban economy. The legislation presented the cooperatives as “experimental,” and indicated that after some 200 were initially approved, the institutional form would be reappraised and modified as appropriate. There is therefore some uncertainty regarding the long-term character of the legislative framework governing the structure and functioning of the cooperatives. However, in our judgment, the reform will more likely be more “loosening” rather than restricting – assuming that Raúl and his successors do not return to the de-marketizing and centralizing orientations of the previous “Fidelista” era.

In essence, the new legal regime for non-agricultural cooperatives provides for ownership and management of the enterprise by its employees, with mainly independent management and control –– over the setting of prices, the purchase of inputs, decisions regarding what to produce, labor relations and the remuneration of members.

Reforms of state enterprises were announced on July 7, 2013 by the Minister responsible for the reform process, Marino Murillo (Frank, 2013). State enterprises were to be granted greater control over their profits – retaining 50% thereof for their own uses – as well as over wages and salaries, investment expenditures, and the purchase of imported inputs. It was still unclear as to whether prices were to be controlled by the state planners or by market forces. It is still too early at the time of writing to say whether these changes in the regimen for state firms will amount to a reliance on the forces of supply and demand for their social control. However, they signal a shift towards a more mixed economy, greater decentralization of economic management, and a diminished role for the central planning authority.

This type of worker ownership and management within a market environment could be regarded as a variant of “market socialism.” Cuba is launched on a path towards a hybrid type of mixed economy with a still-significant state sector, an expanding small enterprise sector, a joint venture (foreign and domestic state enterprise), and now an employee-owned and managed sector.

Only Yugoslavia prior to its break-up included a large part of its economy under a unique form of workers’ management, though it still seems to have involved authentic workers management in theory more than in practice (Carson, 1973). Most other countries have cooperative enterprises of various types that survive and thrive. However, while some cooperative enterprises are large and highly successful, no form of cooperative model has taken over a majority share of the economy in any country since Yugoslavia disintegrated in 1990-1992.

If Cuba’s new legislative framework for non-agricultural cooperatives is sustained, and if they actually function as they are intended, their governance and operation will be quite democratic and egalitarian in terms of the decision-making process within the enterprise and the distribution of income among members.  The adoption of this cooperative model, involving workers’ ownership and management and operating under market mechanisms, could turn out to be a major institutional innovation for Cuba. In the current context of the existing economic structures in virtually all of the countries of the world, this might prove to be innovative and perhaps revolutionary, though it is still too early to judge.

 

THE COOPERATIVE ALTERNATIVE

 THE 2012 LAW ON NON-AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES

 POTENTIAL OF THE COOPERATIVE COMPONENT FOR THE CUBAN ECONOMY

 DIFFICULTIES AND LIMITATIONS OF CUBA’S COOPERATIVE LAW

 IMPLEMENTATION BEGINS

 New-Picture-6

Centro-Asturiano-La-Habana-Cuba-485x728Centro Asturiano

untitled

Centro Gallego

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

            Cuba’s December 2011 initiative for the establishment of non-agricultural cooperatives may permit the emergence of larger scale non-state enterprises that could operate with greater effectiveness than state enterprises. Moreover, such cooperatives may well have advantages over private sector enterprises particularly regarding the equity of their income distribution arrangements and also workers’ incentives and levels of commitment.

If this initiative is implemented broadly in the Cuban economy, it could constitute a change and perhaps an improvement of historic dimension. With much of the state sector of the economy converted to cooperative institutional forms, Cuba could become a country of “cooperative socialism,” which would be quite different from the highly centralized and state-owned system to which it has aspired for half a century.

However, authentic cooperatives are not easy to establish, to manage or to operate effectively. There are also a number of uncertainties and potential problems which are specific to the Cuban case, judging from the legislation. Perhaps the more serious of these potential difficulties include firstly, the approval process which is unclear and susceptible to control from the center; secondly, the nebulous role of the Communist Party in the functioning of the enterprises; thirdly, the limited possibility of hiring of non-member workers;  is very limited and finally, the uncertainty as to whether or not cooperatives providing professional services of various sorts will be permitted.

It is wise that the government is proceeding cautiously and that it is considering the cooperative enterprises’ first phase as “experimental” and tentative in character. The legislative framework within which these cooperatives operate can then be modified on the basis of the initial experience. This pragmatic approach is pointedly different than the decision-making process under President Fidel Castro, in which substantive policy shifts and institutional changes were determined by the President and implemented rapidly such that the full foolishness of the decisions would become apparent only after it was too late to change course.

If it comes to fruition as it is envisaged in the cooperatives legislation, the role of worker management and of worker control could constitute a significant degree of “economic democracy” for Cuba.  This would be a significant and, indeed, a paradoxical development in view of the near complete lack of authentic democracy in Cuba’s political system. Will democracy in the workplace generate a strong pressure and impetus for the spread of genuine participation in the political sphere?

 [1] I would like to thank Ted Henken and Jorge Pérez-López for valuable substantive as well as editorial contributions in the preparation of this essay.

New-Picture-21New-Picture-3

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Carson, Richard. Comparative Economic Systems. New York: Macmillan, 1973.

Caruso-Cabrera,  Michelle. 2013. “Cuba shows beginnings of free enterprise—sort of,” CNBC, July 12.

Ciudad de La Habana.2010. Proceso de reducción de plantillas. (Power Point Presentation) August 24.

Cuba Libre Digital.  “La burocracia ‘socialista’ consume a las nuevas cooperativas no agropecuarias.” 10 de enero de 2013.

 Decree 309, Council of Ministers. Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba, Número 53. 11 de diciembre de 2012.

Decree-Law 305. “De las cooperativas no agropecuarias.” Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba, Número 53. 11 de diciembre de 2012.

Frank, Marc.  2013a.  “Cuba’s non-farm co-ops debut this week amid move toward markets,” Chicago Tribune, June 30.

Granma. September 11 and 14, 2012.

Horvath, Branco. “Yugoslav Economic Policy in the Post-War Period: Problems, Ideas and Institutional Developments,” American Economic Review, June 1971.

International Cooperative Alliance. WebSite: www.ica.coop (accessed January 15, 2013).

Juventud Rebelde. 18 de diciembre de 2012. “Debate sobre la nueva ley de cooperativismo : Se buscan socios.” http://www.cubainformacion.tv/index.php/economia/47243–cuba-extiende-las-cooperativas-a-a-la-traduccion-la-informatica-y-la-contabilidad. Accessed January 16, 2013.

La Nación. “Primeras cooperativas no agropecuarias en Cuba comienzan en una semana.”  San José, Costa Rica. 23 de junio de 2013.

Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. Market, Socialist and Mixed Economies: Comparative Policy and performance, Chile, Cuba and Costa Rica. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000.

Ministry of Finance and Prices. Resolución 427/2012, Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba, Número 53. 11 de diciembre de 2012.

Partido Comunista de Cuba. Proyecto de Lineamientos de la Política Económica y Social del Partido y la Revolución.  La Habana, noviembre de 2010

Partido Comunista de Cuba. VI Congreso. Lineamientos de la Política Económica y Social del Partido y la Revolución. La Habana, 18 de abril de 2011.

Peters, Phil. Reforming Cuba’s Agriculture: Unfinished Business. Arlington Virginia: Lexington Institute, 2012.

Piñeiro Harnecker, Camila. (Compiladora). Cooperativas y Socialismo: Una Mirada desde Cuba. La Habana: Editorial Caminos, 2011.

Piñeiro Harnecker, Camila. “Las cooperativas en el nuevo modelo económico,” in Pavel Vidal Alejandro and Omar Everleny Perez Villanueva (Compiladores) Miradas a la economía cubana: El proceso de actualización. La Habana: Editorial Caminos, 2012.

Piñeiro Harnecker, Camila. “Visiones sobre el socialismo que guían los cambios actuales en Cuba.” Revista Temas, No. 70, abril-junio de 2012, La Habana.

Vanek, Yaroslav. “Decentralization under Workers Management: A Theoretical Appraisal.” American Economic Review, December 1969.

Posted in Blog, Featured | Tagged , , | Leave a comment

Book Review: Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Jorge Pérez-López, Cuba Under Raúl Castro: Assessing the Reforms

Posted on October 28, 2013 by Arch Ritter

 

Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Jorge Pérez-López, Cuba Under Raúl Castro: Assessing the Reforms, Boulder CO: Lynn Rienner, 2013, pp. 1-293, Copyright © 2013;  ISBN: 978-1-58826-904-1 hc

M-L & P-L

Cuba Under Raúl Castro: Assessing the Reforms is, so far, the definitive survey, analysis and evaluation of Cuba’s economic and social policies and of its development experience during the Presidency of Raúl Castro.

This is an excellent volume. Mesa-Lago and Jorge Pérez-López have built on their 50 and 40 years records respectively of their highest quality analyses of the economic strategies, policies and economic performance of Revolutionary Cuba, as well as numerous in-depth analyses of specific issue areas.

This study is comprehensive in scope, yet concise and focused. It is balanced and objective. It is constructed on a solid and broad a foundation of statistical information and a deep knowledge of the meaning and limitations of that information. It includes virtually all possible source materials from inside as well as outside the island.

In sum, it constitutes the best starting point for any observer, analyst, researcher or scholar trying to understand Cuba’s economic experience after Raul Castro’s “Acting” Presidency then Presidency.

Below is the Table of Contents to provide a quick overview of the scope of the volume.

Chapter 1        Cuba’s Economic and Social Development, 1959-2012.

Chapter 2        The Domestic Economy, 2006-2012.

Chapter 3        International Economic Relations, 2006-2012.

Chapter 4        Social Welfare, 2006-2012.

Chapter 5        The Reforms, the National Debate, and the Party Congress.

Chapter 5        Assessing the Reforms: Impact and Challenges.

Carmelo Mesa-Lago is undoubtedly well-known to all all observers and analysts interested in Cuba in view of his prolific and excellent work on Cuba over the last half-century. He currently is distinguished service professor emeritus of economics and Latin American studies at the University of Pittsburgh. He is the author of numerous books on Cuba, most recently Cuba’s Aborted Reform: Socioeconomic Effects, International Comparisons, and Transition Policies (with Jorge F. Pérez-López).

Jorge Pérez-López is executive director of the Fair Labor Association in Washington, DC. He also has been the organizer of the conferences and publications of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy since its inception some 20 years ago. His publications on Cuba have been numerous and excellent – as a spare time activity. His recent publications include Corruption in Cuba: Castro and Beyond. How he manages to carry out his excellent research and writing on Cuba over and above his demanding employment is an amazing mystery to me!

The full Introduction to the book can be read here: https://www.rienner.com/uploads/51cb22c8e9c96.pdf

The Lynne Rienner web site where it can be ordered is here: https://www.rienner.com/title/Cuba_Under_Raul_Castro_Assessing_the_Reforms

New Picture (3)

Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Jorge Pérez-López

Posted in Blog, Featured | Tagged , , , , | Leave a comment

CAN WORKERS’ DEMOCRACY IN CUBA’S NEW NON-AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES CO-EXIST WITH AUTHORITARIANISM?

Posted on October 7, 2013 by Arch Ritter

By Arch Ritter                                                                                               October 7, 2013

 On December 11, 2012, a battery of new laws and regulations on non-agricultural cooperatives was published in Cuba’s Gaceta Oficial, No. 53, including two Council of State Decree-Laws, two Ministerial Resolutions, one Council of Ministers Decree, and one Ministerial “Norma Específica de Contabilidad.”  This legislation outlined the framework for the structure, functioning, governance and financial organization of the new cooperatives and provided the legal framework within which they were to operate.

This major institutional reform may revolutionize the structure and perhaps the functioning of the Cuban economy. It also may have political implications as the cooperatives are to be governed with a form of workers’ management. The legislation presented the cooperatives as “experimental,” and indicated that after some 200 were initially approved, the institutional form would be reappraised and modified. There is thus some uncertainty regarding the long-term character of the legislative framework governing the structure and functioning of the cooperatives.

The establishment of an apparently democratic form of workers’ ownership and control is interesting, surprising and perhaps paradoxical, since Cuba’s political system is characterized by a highly centralized one-party monopoly in which political participation is manipulated effectively from above. Elections in Cuba’s one-party system are a transparent charade and an insult to Cuban citizens.

COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE

The new regime for non-agricultural cooperatives provides for ownership and management of the enterprise by its employees, with mainly independent control over the setting of prices, the purchase of inputs, decisions regarding what to produce, labor relations and the remuneration of members through wages and the distribution of coop profits.

The ultimate authority within any single cooperative will be its General Assembly which would include all its members. This body would be empowered to elect a president, a substitute and a secretary by secret ballot (Decree-Law 305, Article 18.1). The specific managerial structure of the enterprise is to be determined by the complexity and size of the cooperative and the number of members. Cooperatives with fewer than 20 members would elect an “Administrator.” Those with 20 to 60 members would elect an “Administrative Council.” Those with more than 60 members would elect a “Directive Committee” as well as an “Administrative Council.” The cooperative’s financial management will also depend on its size and complexity, and would be the responsibility of a single member for a very small cooperative enterprise or a financial committee for a large coop.  The management structures and functioning are delineated in detail in Decree 309 of the Council of Ministers.

SOME ADVANTAGES OF COOPERATIVES

The new cooperative enterprise involves democracy in the work-place, a major improvement over both state enterprise and privately-owned enterprise, in the view of many observers.

Under the Cuba’s traditional state enterprise system, workers have been “order takers.” Their labor unions have served as conveyor belts for orders from the top to the workers at the bottom. Rather than defending the interests of their membership, the main purpose of Cuba’s unions has been to ensure that the interests of the nation – as determined by its political leadership – are implemented through the unions. In a private enterprise in most market economies, the worker is also an “order taker,” but may or may not have a strong labor union to defend his or her interests.

It is instructive to recall here that the governmental announcement of September 2010 presenting the proposal for the lay-off of some 500,000 workers in the public sector of the economy by March 2011– to be reabsorbed in the self-employment or micro-enterprise sector – was made in a “Pronunciamiento” from the head of the Central de Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC), Cuba’s official labor union confederation and published in Granma.  It is hard to imagine the head of any other national union confederation making such a proposal on behalf of the relevant government.

 On the other hand, within the cooperatives, the members should be in substantial control through the governing mechanisms that the legislation noted above creates. The system would in fact be a form of workers’ management of the sort that we have not seen since the days of Tito in Yugoslavia.

It perhaps should be noted that most so-called “capitalist…” or “mixed market economies” have significant cooperative sectors.  For example, Brazil has 6,652 coops with 300,000 employees; Canada has 9,000 coops with around 150,000 employees; the United States has 30,000 coops employing over 2 million people; and France has 21,000 coops employing 3.5% of the labor force (International Cooperative Alliance.)

Moreover, Cuba had a significant cooperative sector before 1959, including some major “Benevolent Societies” and the Cooperativa de OmnibusAliados.

New Picture (6) New Picture (5) New Picture (4)

Democratic control of economic enterprises is an end in itself, but it also strengthens worker commitment to a shared endeavor thereby improving the intensity, dedication and effectiveness of workers’ efforts.

Thus, greater democracy in the work place should result in improved productivity. If Cuban cooperatives are genuinely democratic, they may function more efficiently and effectively than both state enterprise and privately-owned enterprise.

WILL THE COOPERATIVES BE DEMOCRATIC?

Will Cuba’s non-agricultural cooperatives in fact be authentically democratic? So far, it is too soon to say as the first cooperatives began operation only in July 2013. As noted earlier, the governing legislation will be modified in the light of the operational experience of the first cooperatives.

Governance may be a continuing problem for cooperative enterprises. The “transactions costs” of participatory management may be significant. Personal animosities, ideological or political differences, participatory failures, and/or managerial mistakes can all serve to weaken the decision-making process and to generate dysfunction. Of course this also happens with private enterprises as well as state enterprises

Secondly, the new cooperatives must go through a complex approval process before they can come into existence. They must be approved initially by the municipal “Organs of Popular Power,” then by the “Permanent Commission for Implementation and Development of the Guidelines,” and ultimately by the Council of Ministers. Will this be a reasonably automatic process or will political controls be exerted to determine which cooperatives can come into existence? One can imagine efforts at the highest political levels to approve favored cooperatives or cooperatives in particular areas of the economy and thereby to shape the evolution of the sector in accordance with preconceived official ideas, as opposed to letting the sector evolve spontaneously and naturally. With such controls on the approval process, the emergence of the cooperative sector could be deformed and stunted.

On the other hand, conceivably the approval process will be less controlling and permit all feasible proposals to be attempted. The Chief of the Management Model Sectionof the “Permanent Commission” assured journalists that this process would be “open” (Juventud Rebelde, 2012). But in the same article, he stated that some cooperatives would be established “according to the interests of the state” (Ibid). If this is the case, the principle of voluntary membership could be jeopardized. Cooperatives established in this manner would resemble those in agriculture that were imposed from above, with negative consequences in terms of both worker commitment and the effectiveness of the incentive system in the cooperative. 

Thirdly, what will be the role of the Communist Party in the new cooperatives? If the control of the general assemblies of medium and large-sized cooperatives is captured by nuclei from the Party, not only would workers’ democracy be subverted, but incentives to work seriously would likely be diminished. Will the Party keep out of cooperative enterprise management?

If authentic democracy were to emerge within the cooperatives, would this have a spread effect into the political system? Conceivably. But Cuba’s agricultural cooperatives have had little or no democratizing effects on the political system – although these cooperatives have not been genuinely democratic either. The “UBPCs” or Unidades Básicas de Producción Cooperativa were in reality state enterprises. This was acknowleged by the government of Cuba when it instituted a series of reforms in the management of the UBPCs aimed at converting them into more genuine cooperatives. (Granma, 2012)

Possible democratic spread effects from the cooperatives to the political system do not seem to be of concern for the government of Raúl Castro.

 

CONCLUSION

If this initiative to establish non-agricultural cooperatives is implemented broadly in the Cuban economy, it could constitute a change and perhaps an improvement of historic dimension. With much of the state sector of the economy converted to cooperative institutional forms, Cuba could become a country of “cooperative socialism,” with a state sector, a cooperative sector, a joint foreign/state enterprise sector, and a micro-enterprise sector. This would be quite different from the highly centralized and state-owned system to which Cuba aspired for half a century. Cuba’s economic system would also continue to be unique in the world and to be of consuming interest to observers, analysts and those looking for alternatives on the left to the world’s prevailing “mixed market economies

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

 Decree 309, Council of Ministers. Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba, Número 53. 11 de diciembre de 2012.

Decree-Law 305. “De las cooperativas no agropecuarias.” Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba, Número 53. 11 de diciembre de 2012.

Granma. September 11 and 14, 2012.

International Cooperative Alliance. WebSite: www.ica.coop (accessed January 15, 2013).

Juventud Rebelde. 18 de diciembre de 2012. “Debate sobre la nueva ley de cooperativismo : Se buscan socios.” http://www.cubainformacion.tv/index.php/economia/47243–cuba-extiende-las-cooperativas-a-a-la-traduccion-la-informatica-y-la-contabilidad. Accessed January 16, 2013.

Posted in Blog, Featured | Tagged , , | Leave a comment