El presidente general de la compañía afirma que se
estudian opciones para ampliar la capacidad de producción de la planta de Moa,
que el pasado año quedó por debajo de lo previsto.
El presidente general de la compañía canadiense Sherritt Internacional
Corporation, Leon Binedell, afirmó este miércoles durante una visita a Cuba
que planea aumentar la producción de Níquel en Moa para seguir explotando
los yacimientos por “varias décadas”, informó Granma.
“Estamos considerando opciones para ampliar la capacidad de
producción de la planta y continuar operando en este lugar por muchas décadas
más”, dijo Binedell durante una visita a las instalaciones de la
compañía acompañado por el ministro de Energía y Minas
cubano, Liván Arronte Cruz.
La fábrica procesadora de níquel Comandante
Pedro Sotto Alba, ubicada en el municipio holguinero de Moa, es operada
desde 1995 por la compañía mixta Moa Nikel S.A,administrada por
Sherritt, quien firmó un contrato con el Estado cubano para explotar
yacimientos y ejecutar otras inversiones en el sector energético.
Tras el cambio en la directiva de la compañía canadiense, dado por la
llegada de Binedell en sustitución de David Pathe, las autoridades cubanas
temieron por el fin de los acuerdos, pero el actual director ha manifestado su
interés en mantener los negocios
en la Isla.
Durante el encuentro, reseñado
por la prensa estatal, Arronte Cruz dijo que la fábrica está a
punto de cumplir 27 años de fundada como corporación mixta, lo que
calificó como un buen momento para seguir consolidado su eficiencia.
De acuerdo con la prensa estatal, la planta procesadora de níquel
Comandante Pedro Sotto Alba mantiene récord históricos de producción y
es uno de los ejemplos más referidos respecto a los negocios entre Cuba y Canadá.
Sin embargo, en 2020 la empresa canadiense comunicó que las dificultades que
encaró durante en su planta y negocios mineros en Moa
influyeron negativamente en su balance productivo anual.
El líder mundial en la extracción y refinación de níquel y cobalto
de minerales lateríticos, con proyectos y operaciones en Canadá y Cuba,
anunció que su producción terminada de níquel en Moa fue de 31.506 toneladas en
2020, ligeramente inferior a la
proyección de entre 32.000 y 33.000 toneladas en ese periodo.
Según el balance de la empresa, resumido por el sitio especializado Kitco.com, la producción
se vio afectada por las interrupciones del servicio ferroviario que
tuvieron lugar durante el primer trimestre del año.
Asimismo, Sherritt sufrió el cierre prolongado de la planta Pedro Sotto
Alba durante el tercer trimestre debido a trabajos adicionales y a la
reducción de la disponibilidad del contratista cubano a causa de la pandemia
del Covid-19, así como por reparaciones no planificadas de las autoclaves en el
cuarto trimestre.
Además, numerosos residentes en la localidad han denunciado
el defectuoso sistema de abastecimiento de agua y
la elevada contaminación que provoca la procesadora en Moa.
A la escasez de agua, la sequía y la contaminación ambiental se suma en Moa el desabastecimiento de alimentos y productos de higiene, razón por la cual un centenar de residentes de la localidad protestaron en plena calle a mediados del mes de junio de 2020, según se pudo observar en un video compartido en Youtube.
As noted
in the introduction written by the Council on International Relations to
Charles A. Kupchan’s book How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable
Peace, in his 2008 inaugural address, Barack Obama promised nations “on the
wrong side of history” that the U.S. would “extend a hand if they were willing
to open their fists.”
Thus
began an intellectual presidency, which certainly constitutes a strategic
presidency. With its impressive historical documentation, Kupchan’s book
provided Obama with a set of assumptions and theses that helped guide his
policy towards Cuba.
Two
assumptions in this book are worth summarizing. The first is that the stability
of international relations is not decided by the type of regime a country has.
The second is that economic relations are not as important as diplomacy when
reducing tensions and seeking geopolitical accommodations with countries in
conflict.
Obama’s
policy towards Cuba was designed from these two assumptions. That a policy of
unilateral concessions appeased the enemy, and that a strong investment in a
friendly narrative, respect for sovereignty, and offers of cooperation would be
more productive to achieve the goals of democratization, which Obama left in
the most effective hands: that of the Cubans.
Isolation,
combined with a policy of harassment and attrition, had not led to the stated
goal of U.S. foreign policy toward the Island. This was the strongest argument
against the critics of a policy shift that began with the exchange of
prisoners, the removal of Cuba from the state sponsors of terrorism list, and
the reestablishment of diplomatic relations.
To be
fair, Obama actually modified his message, bringing it closer to Kupchan’s
intellectual vision. He did not wait for the Cuban government to open its fist,
instead introducing changes without the latter modifying its internal and
external policy one iota.
In my
view, and in the case of Cuba, the Obama policy’s greatest strategic success
was to overwhelm the Cuban government on three fundamental levels: in that of
its intentions, in that of its will to change, and in that of its language. Its
impact on Cuban society has been irreversible.
The
policy that preceded it lacked vision; confident that the harsh exercise of
power would put an end to the regime. For 62 years, the Cuban government has
been ostensibly on the verge of crumbling every four years. Obama’s policy
focused on the medium and long term, and for that very reason it was strategic.
Did he
fail? No. Although the type of regime does matter in any conception of foreign
policy—a necessary correction to Kupchan’s postulates—a consequence perhaps not
foreseen by the author, but which I assume was intuited by Obama, is that such
a policy could put an end both rhetorically and practically to the
identification and perception of the Cuban people and government as enemies of
the United States. If the Cuban government continued (continues) to place
itself in the convenient role of the enemy, this was no longer true with its
people. And this is the most important result in terms of the US’s strategic
goals, which not even the return to tough policy under Donald Trump could
reinstate: the possibility of masking the conflict between the Cuban state and
Cuban society behind the conflict between countries reached its limit with this
formulation of foreign policy. Cuba opened up, and society took the lead.
The hard
exercise of power continues with the logic inherited from the times of John F.
Kennedy: instant democracy, hence the idea of restoring the past, and the
United States playing a leading role in this transcript. Quid pro quo demands
on Obama’s policy are born out of this logic, just as his policy sought to
break with it. Obama inaugurated another era. Cubans were the ones who must
advance the changes, and the United States can only be there for what it can
and should do: to assist and support the process. The pace of change depends on
factors that the United States cannot and should not try to control. There are
constraints that the North American power must abide by based on the structural
limitations of its system; this is what the hard-liners recognize to their
chagrin every four years. After every electoral cycle, they always conclude
that its up to the Cubans. They see abandonment “a lo Kennedy” when in reality
it is the best invitation to assume control of our destiny.
Obama’s
approach recognized that quid pro quo policies as a diplomatic game or foreign
policy go beyond the limits imposed by a given time period, especially when it
comes to regime change. He later demonstrated this with his policy towards the
Arab Spring, mainly in Egypt. However, hardliners demand results within a fixed
period from a policy that was repeatedly repurposed over time.
It is on
this enduring and far-reaching foundation, which was put to the test here in July,
that the Joe Biden administration could and should build a revised “third way”
with Cuba, with an approach that connects its foreign policy with the nature of
governing regimes. The Cuban government is an actor and factor of regional
destabilization, with new formulas that can be confused with the mechanisms of
democracies and at the same time uses them. Democratic regimes are the key to
stable peace, the most salvageable of Francis Fukuyama’s thinking. This cannot
be ignored.
Alongside
a dialogue on security issues in the region—including immigration, combating
drug trafficking, and climate change—blanket sanctions should be replaced by
individual sanctions at the beginning of this new post-Donald Trump political
term, which are already being applied in some cases. This would continuously
weaken strong identities in Cuba, like the ones between the country and nation,
and the state and government, which in turn strengthens the citizenry. Miguel
Díaz-Canel will have a very difficult time identifying as, or confusing himself
with, the nation.
Re-establishing
and invigorating people-to-people diplomacy is another imperative. Soft power,
a policy applied by all Chinese administrations toward Cuba, was revealed as
the best option to undo an artificially constructed enmity between the two
countries. One cannot forget that the United States and Cuba have been
historical enemies for at least three generations, a rooted narrative that
served as propitious terrain for an unvoluntary war.
A third
step in this new matrix should raise political recognition for the opposition
and civic recognition for civil society. From backroom conversations, which is
the usual diplomatic style that gives place to democratic alternatives, it is
important to move to a more public and formal stage of dialogue. I think this
is more important than resource aid, and takes advantage of the regime’s
growing legitimacy and legitimization vacuum, which was accelerated after July
11. There should be no doubt that the Cuban government is a government of the
minority.
A fourth
element involves the empowerment of the private sector, both in terms of
training and connections, which is essential for the creation of the middle
classes. I am not so optimistic to think that the middle classes themselves
will lead to democracy. What does seem evident is that they promote economic
and social pluralism and ease the necessary tension between the State and
autonomous economic agents.
A fifth
angle to de-bilateralize the democratization agenda. What Obama started can be
updated today with the North American proposal for a global democratic alliance
to curb the global spread of autocracies. In this sense, a commitment to, and
aid for, the democratization of Cuba is part of the proposal to re-democratize
all societies. On a different scale and in different dimensions, democracies
need to re-democratize. The issue of Cuba could be rethought within this new
framework.
As a
sixth point, it is convenient to consider the vision of change in Cuba as a
process. Cuba has been closer to democracy in the last six years, despite
Donald Trump, than at any time in the previous 56 years. Cuba’s prolonged
dystopia is related to two interconnected and mutually reinforcing factors: the
supposed invasion by the American superpower on the island’s southern and
Caribbean border, which thankfully never came, but in turn fueled the
Revolution’s infallibility as a peripheral power. This had a paralyzing effect
on both global diplomacy and internal debate. The exportation of conflicts,
their causes, and many potential suggestions for change obtained its raw
material in each U.S. electoral cycle.
The Cuban
regime has always had an added strategic advantage with this logic: selling the
diplomatic narrative that the debate for democracy in Cuba is a debate for
sovereignty between two states with equal recognition in the United Nations.
With this, it has managed at times to denationalize the democratic discussion
and halt not only democratic action, but also threats of reform within the
regime.
A process
mindset, on the other hand, accelerates democratization, paradoxical as it may
seem, and authenticates change. This is because only one process is capable of
involving its recipients, which are the Cuban people. This eliminates the
paralyzing obstacles caused by harsh nationalist takes on diversity and
plurality. The social outbreak on June 11 (11J), which exposed the deep rifts
between society and the government, can now be channeled through an intelligent
strategy of democratic change that fuses an inclusive movement with a broad
social base.
Seventh.
It is crucial that political language gradually appropriate what in Colombia
they call the “mechanism of disarming words.” Harsh rhetoric almost always
serves to hide conceptual and strategic weaknesses in political designs. I
would say more: soft rhetoric is more accurate, goes deeper, and avoids the
defensive psychological distractions generated by toxic insults between and
within countries. Most importantly, insults are not practical for resolving
conflicts. Soft rhetoric could fill in many absences. The case of Venezuela
comes to mind, where strong, binary, and radical discourse has drowned out more
than one possibility for concrete advances. As an old international relations
professor told me: you only get to the root through moderation.
This
change in language is essential to interact from abroad with a more diverse and
plural Cuban society, with dissimilar interests, with a new generation that has
risen rapidly to the public stage, and with an elite whose sometimes visible
tensions and fragmentation reflect the underlying currents of change. Like
never before, words must be actions.
Finally,
how to approach the embargo issue in this dual scenario with post-Castroism on
one side and a Democratic administration in the White House on the other? The
discussion about the embargo is still relevant. My opposition of it dates back
to 1991. It is part of my political and ideological identity. Beyond this, the
conversation must be calibrated and balanced for several reasons.
There is
a logical asymmetry between the campaign against the embargo led by the Cuban
government and the complex political process that can lead to its elimination.
If control over the embargo were in the hands of the U.S. executive branch,
such a campaign would have political coherence and consistency because the
embargo’s elimination would be viable. This is well known, but what is lost is
that the Cuban government is also aware of it and uses it for reasons other
than the ostensible interest of removing the embargo. The embargo works
perfectly as a political and diplomatic distraction to hide the government’s
own responsibilities and freeze democratic diplomacy within multilateral
organizations such as the United Nations. Does the Cuban government have a
group of lawyers in Washington that works systematically with Congress, on both
sides of the aisle, to pass legislation that removes the embargo? If it does,
they are not doing their job well. If it is trying but not succeeding that
means they are not doing their job well either. And if it hasn’t tried, it
means that it prefers to spend more money on propaganda than on achieving
specific political goals.
In that
narrative, the embargo also serves the government by clouding its structural
insufficiencies in areas as important as meeting the basic needs of the
economy. And the fact is that the embargo has not prevented, nor does it
prevent, the importation of basic goods from the United States, the dynamics of
which are well hidden in public discussion. The questions that constantly arise
are: is the Cuban government really interested in lifting the embargo? Does it
really help it? I have my doubts. Hence the calibrated analysis, independent of
the ethics of the policy, which requires us to look at through a political
lens.
Calling
for the democratization of Cuba should not be linked to the elimination of the
embargo. If Obama’s policy demonstrated something, which in principle must be
maintained by Biden, it is that reforms in Cuba have no obstacles other than
the political will of the government. If the July protests left any clarity, it
is that an already open Cuban society wants and understands that change is
possible regardless of the United States. If we say and assume that the
solution to the Cuban problem corresponds to and is the exclusive business of
Cubans, we should not confuse facilitating conditions with necessary ones. In
my perspective, there are only two reasons to oppose the embargo. One responds
to the multilateralism of the international order and the other is ethical. And
granted, the latter is a political arena par excellence. Or it should be.
For the
rest, a coalition from an active political center is what we are lacking. It
must be diverse and plural like Cuba but focused on rational and mature
solutions for our multiple challenges, as well as inclusive enough to
accommodate various currents, which are fewer or at least less visible, but
with the capacity, knowledge, and disposition for a realistic exercise of
political imagination. We deserve it.
In a speech to the Communist Party Central Committee on
October 25, Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel
singled out the U.S. Embassy for “playing an active role in the efforts to
subvert the internal order in
our country.” Then he issued a warning:
“Faced with these behaviors,
we will not stand idly by. We are
determined to confront the subversive and aggressive work of that diplomatic representation,” adding “We
have the experience of many
years of diplomatic and operational work with the United States under the guidance of the historical
leadership of the Revolution.”
The United States and Cuba are on a collision course
over U.S. diplomats’ support for “democracy
promotion” programs, and Cuban dissidents may end up as collateral damage,
spending years in prison as a
result.
Cuban officials were already frustrated earlier this
summer by President Biden’s failure to keep his
campaign promise to lift the punishing economic sanctions imposed by President
Trump. Then on July11, at the
height of the COVID-19 pandemic, spontaneous protest
demonstrations erupted across the island, fueled by shortages of food,
medicine, and fuel, and by people’s anger at the government’s failure to meet their needs.
Washington reacted by denouncing the arrest of protesters and imposing targeted sanctions against a number of senior Cuban officials in the military and police. In addition, President Biden pledged to step up support for dissidents on the island, signaling his embrace of the regime change strategy that has animated Washington’s policy for the past 62 years, with a brief hiatus during President Obama’s final two years.
In September, a group of Cuban artists and
intellectuals calling themselves the Archipelago
Project joined with traditional
dissidents to call for nationwide “Marches for Change” on November 20, later moved to November 15, the day Cuba is
scheduled to reopen its tourist industry. The government responded
to this challenge by declaring the proposed marches illegal and threatening
criminal charges against the
organizers. The dissidents are not backing down, setting the stage for another confrontation.
It appears that the July 11 demonstrations have
resurrected Washington’s pipedream that the Cuban
regime is on the verge of collapse, and that the November 15 demonstrations
will be a step toward its demise.
By wholeheartedly endorsing the demonstrations, the Biden administration is throwing
gasoline on an already volatile situation and giving the Cuban government ample
ammunition to accuse the dissidents of being mercenaries paid
and directed by United States.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Embassy in Havana, though still
understaffed because the “Havana
Syndrome” injuries U.S.
personnel suffered in 2016-2017, has taken a leading role supporting dissident
activists, pushing the
boundaries of what’s normally allowed under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The Cuban government thinks U.S.
diplomats have pushed well past those boundaries.
Tension around this issue is nearing a breaking point.
Díaz-Canel’s October 25 warning about the behaviour of U.S. diplomats echoes the one Fidel Castro issued in 2003, another moment when Cuban officials felt under threat in the wake of the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq — and amid semi-serious joking in Washington that Cuba would be next. As President George W. Bush intensified sanctions and stepped up support for dissidents, the U.S. diplomatic mission (then an Interests Section) served as a support base for regime opponents.
On March 6, 2003, Fidel Castro denounced
the Interest Section as “a breeding ground for
counterrevolutionaries and a command post for the most offensive subversive
actions against our country.”
But rather than close the mission, as the Bush administration hoped he would,
Castro ordered the arrest of
over 100 dissidents with whom U.S. diplomats had been in contact. Seventy-five were subsequently convicted
of receiving U.S. support in violation of Cuba’s foreign agents laws and sentenced
to prison terms ranging from six to twenty-eight years.
There has been little real diplomatic engagement
between Cuba and the United States since 2017, but the Cuban government is not likely to close
the U.S. embassy in response to its support for dissidents. After all, the last time relations were
broken (in 1961) it took 54 years to restore them. Instead, as Díaz-Canel hinted, the government is more
likely to follow the “guidance of the historical leadership” and once again punish the people Washington
has been helping.
In the past decade or so, the Cuban government had moved away from sentencing dissidents to long stints in prison, instead pursuing a strategy of harassment and short-term detentions to discourage opposition activity. But Cuban officials are feeling under siege from the combined forces of COVID, economic shortages, discontent spreading on social media, U.S. sanctions, and U.S. funding for dissidents. In this environment, the Biden administration’s aggressive support for anti-government activists runs a serious risk of provoking Cuban officials to resume handing out heavy prison terms for those receiving U.S. aid.
President Biden has a long history of justifiable skepticism about the feasibility of nation-building and regime change schemes — a realists’ recognition of the limits of U.S. power. But his deeply held belief that U.S. foreign policy should promote human rights and democracy collides with that realism when a small country like Cuba is involved. Realism gives way to the temptation to deploy overwhelming U.S. power to overthrow unfriendly regimes, especially in “our own backyard.” Yet the long history of U.S. efforts at regime change in Latin America and beyond offers ample evidence that interfering in the internal affairs of other countries —even when it succeeds — rarely ends well for either U.S. interests or the people we presume to help.
Cuba
faces the worst economic crisis and public protests since the 1990s. This
essay: 1) analyzes the multiple causes of the crisis and protests, 2) examines
the factors that have facilitated the social unrest, and 3) measures the
magnitude of the crisis using various socio-economic indicators.
Causes of the Crisis and Protests
Extremists
reduce the causes of the crisis to a single culprit: for the Cuban government,
it is the U.S. embargo (known in Cuba as the “blockade”). For the most radical
exiles in Miami, only the communist system is to blame. In reality there are
multiple causes, summarized below (Mesa-Lago and Svejnar, 2020).
The inefficient centrally planned economic system and the deep state dominance over the market and non-state property, which has failed throughout the world including in Cuba. Raúl Castro attempted market-oriented structural reforms, but they happened very slowly and were plagued with obstacles, disincentives, taxes and policy zig zags, so they had no tangible effects on the economy. The government has rejected the successful Sino-Vietnamese “market socialism” model. President Miguel Díaz-Canel supports continuity, but at the beginning of 2021 he decreed the monetary-exchange unification. Although necessary, it was begun at the worst economic moment. So far, it has only generated adverse effects.
The serious economic and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela has radically reduced its financial relationship with Cuba: a 24% decrease in purchasing Cuban professional services (the island’s primary source of foreign-currency revenue); a 62% reduction in oil shipments with favorable terms (which covered 50% of Cuban needs); and an $8 billion drop in direct investment (Mesa-Lago and Vidal, 2019). This relationship reached its peak in 2012-2013 at US $ 16,017 million and decreased by half by 2018. In relation to GDP, it contracted from 22% to 8% and the decrease continued in 2019-2020.
The Cuban economy has been unable to finance its imports with its own exports due to the drop in domestic production, which makes it unsustainable. The total value of Cuban exports contracted by 65% in 1989-2019, while imports increased as did the merchandise-trade deficit. For example, Cuba’s economic relationship with China reached its zenith in 2015-2016, when it became Cuba’s primary trading partner, briefly surpassing Venezuela. Their trade relationship represented 17% and 20%, respectively, but decreased by 36% from 2015-2019 (14% of trade). The main reason was a negative trade balance—Cuba exports much less than it imports from China, representing a deficit of US $2 billion in 2015, leading China to reduce its exports to Cuba by almost half (ONEI, 2016 to 2020).
The tough measures imposed by Donald Trump’s administration, which reversed President Barack Obama’s process of rapprochement with Cuba and reinforced the embargo, have paralyzed investment. This includes the application of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, which had been suspended every six months by previous presidents (including Trump) and that allows the suing of foreign companies that have “trafficked” with assets confiscated by the Cuban government. Other measures were the restriction of flights to Cuba and the banning all cruises; the imposition of a limit on remittances and prohibiting Western Union from sending remittances to a Cuban agency run by the military; the tightening of sanctions on international banks that do business with Cuba; and the reinstatement of the country on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism.
Thus far President Biden has not lifted those sanctions. Obama’s policy of rapprochement with Cuba, which I supported, resulted in numerous concessions from the U.S. without Cuba yielding one iota. On the contrary, the Cuban leadership continued to criticize the U.S. government for maintaining the embargo that Obama did not have the authority to eliminate, since the Republicans had a majority in both houses (Mesa-Lago, 2015).
The pandemic is now at its highest number of cases and deaths despite inoculating the population with two vaccines produced in Cuba (the efficacy of neither has been proven). COVID-19 has virtually eliminated all international tourism. The government requires travelers to pay in advance for an “isolation package” to stay in hotels during a quarantine period.
The pandemic has also prevented the travel of so-called “mules,” people who previously traveled back and forth carrying remittances, food, and other goods for relatives or for informal sale in Cuba. The combination of Trump’s measures and COVID-19 has led to the departure of Spanish tourism companies such as Meliá and Bankia.
The implementation, at the beginning of 2021, of the “currency and exchange rate unification” which, although in the long term should yield positive results, in the short term has aggravated many of the previous problems, such as a huge increase in inflation, pressure to increase unemployment, a notable rise in the price of goods, and a severe shortage of food and medicine, which we describe in more detail below. CONTINUE READING
Los patrones de análisis del “caso Mariel” revolucionaron indudablemente los enfoques posteriores sobre la relación entre inmigración, oportunidades de empleo y educación, y consolidaron la fama de Card como un adelantado en el estudio de los mercados laborales.
La
noticia se escurrió entre los agasajos y las exaltaciones que comporta el
nombramiento de un Premio Nobel, pero el tema cubano se asomó este año
en la selección de la Real Academia de las Ciencias de Suecia para determinar a
los ganadores del galardón en la rama económica.
El pasado
11 de octubre, el Premio Nobel de Economía fue entregado, de manera
compartida, al canadiense David Card, y al dúo compuesto por el
israelí-estadounidense Joshua David Angrist y Guido Imbens, de origen
holandés. Los tres considerados especialistas luminarias en materia de
economía laboral.
En el
caso de Card, profesor de la Universidad de California en Berkeley, se trata de
una personalidad pionera en el uso de una original metodología de experimentos
naturales para indagar los efectos de la inmigración y del salario mínimo en
el mercado laboral. Pero muchos desconocen que lo que catapultó su fama,
consolidó sus hallazgos científicos y lo posicionó como uno de los economistas
prominentes en el ámbito internacional fue un estudio realizado sobre el éxodo del Mariel en 1980.
La
historia de su interés en el fenómeno de los “marielitos” se remonta
a 1983, cuando Card obtuvo un doctorado en Economía en Princeton bajo la
tutela del profesor Orley Ashenfelter, uno de los adelantados economistas que
se arriesgó a fomentar el uso de métodos empíricos para explorar los mercados
laborales. El profesor Ashenfelter motivó a su nuevo estudiante de posgrado a
que investigara si los programas de formación para trabajadores desfavorecidos
o personas desempleadas resultaban realmente efectivos.
Card
terminó por organizar el estudio como un experimento científico aplicando lo
que él definió como “métodos estadísticos econométricos más
sofisticados” para analizar los datos obtenidos. La investigación obtuvo
resultados sorprendentes a los ojos del Departamento de Trabajo de Estados
Unidos, que le posibilitó financiamiento para emprender otros proyectos de
interés social.
Las bases
de experimentación quedaron establecidas para que en 1990 Card viera la
oportunidad de realizar una investigación más amplia que abarcara la relación
entre los empleos, los salarios y la inmigración. La integración de la fuerza
laboral de los marielitos en el área de Miami, que asimiló más de la mitad de
los 125,000 cubanos llegados durante el éxodo de 1980, era el laboratorio
perfecto para comprobar sus teorías nada convencionales.
Card se
dio cuenta de que estaba ante un singular experimento natural que raramente los
economistas se disponen a investigar. El foco de su estudio estuvo en indagar
el efecto de la oleada de inmigrantes en las oportunidades de empleo de los
trabajadores locales de Miami, toda vez que los marielitos aumentaron en un 7%
la mano de obra en las ocupaciones e industrias menos cualificadas.
El
economista diseccionó la manera en que Miami logró absorber la avalancha de
inmigrantes cubanos y comparó los indicadores económicos locales con los de
otras ciudades estadounidenses. Los resultados de la investigación causaron una
verdadera conmoción en tanto desacralizaban mitos inamovibles sobre el impacto
de los inmigrantes en las tasas de desempleo y los salarios.
Luego de
estudiar los datos desde múltiples ángulos estadísticos, Card demostró, a
contracorriente de las convicciones de varios de sus colegas, que los cubanos
recién llegados no tuvieron ningún efecto ni en los salarios ni en los índices
de desempleo de los trabajadores no cubanos de Miami, y
consiguieron una “rápida absorción” en la fuerza laboral de la
comunidad.
La
revelación sobre el fenómeno del Mariel en Miami echó por tierra la teoría
económica clásica y Card se vio envuelto entonces en un fuego cruzado de
críticas. Pero el estudio sobre el Mariel fue durante años el más citado en
materia económica en Estados Unidos y foros internacionales, y aún sigue
desatando controversias entre sus antagonistas, quienes aseguran que el
economista canadiense interpretó erróneamente los datos.
Pero los
patrones de análisis del “caso Mariel” revolucionaron indudablemente
los enfoques posteriores sobre la relación entre inmigración, oportunidades de
empleo y calificación laboral.
En 1995
recibió la medalla John Bates Clark, concedida a “aquel economista
estadounidense menor de 40 años que ha hecho la contribución más significativa
al pensamiento y al conocimiento económico”, en referencia a su
investigación sobre el éxodo del Mariel en Miami.
El comité
del Premio Nobel reconoció a Card “por sus contribuciones empíricas a la
economía del trabajo”, y justificó su designación con los argumentos
siguientes:
“Utilizando
experimentos naturales, David Card ha analizado los efectos en el mercado
laboral de los salarios mínimos, la inmigración y la educación. Sus estudios de
comienzos de la década de los 90 desafiaron la sabiduría convencional, dando
lugar a nuevos análisis y conocimientos adicionales. Los resultados mostraron,
entre otras cosas, que el aumento del salario mínimo no conduce necesariamente
a un menor número de puestos de trabajo. Ahora sabemos que los ingresos de las
personas que han nacido en un país pueden beneficiarse de la nueva inmigración,
mientras que las personas que inmigraron en una época anterior corren el riesgo
de verse afectadas negativamente. También nos hemos percatado de que los
recursos de las escuelas son mucho más importantes para el futuro éxito de los
estudiantes en el mercado laboral de lo que se pensaba”.
La
contribución de los “marielitos” a la sociedad estadounidense está
fuera de toda discusión, como también resulta sustancial su aporte al
sostenimiento de la familia cubana en la isla. Pero lo que nunca pudo
vislumbrar Fidel Castro cuando lanzó la rotunda afirmación de que “no
los queremos, no los necesitamos” es que 41 años después de la forzosa
estampida estarían reconocidos como una inusual fuerza de renovación en la
economía laboral de Estados Unidos, asociados nada menos que a la designación
de un Premio Nobel de Economía.
Una conexión cubana que tiene sobradas razones para instalarse en el beneplácito nacional, aunque cueste todavía salir del asombro.
HAVANA,
Oct 20 (Reuters) – Cuba has reached a deal with the Paris Club of creditor
nations to postpone an annual debt payment due in November until next year,
according to diplomats from five of the governments involved, the latest sign
the Communist-run country is suffering a grave foreign exchange crisis.
The
historic 2015 Paris Club agreement with Havana forgave $8.5 billion of $11.1
billion in sovereign debt Cuba defaulted on in 1986, plus charges. Cuba agreed
to repay the remainder in annual installments through 2033, but only partially
met its obligations in 2019 and defaulted last year.
The
outlines of an amended deal, worked out between the parties in June and not
previously reported, calls for resumption of payments in 2022 and adjustment of
the payment schedule, the diplomats said, requesting anonymity to comment.
The Cuban
government and Paris Club had no comment on the matter.
The parties in June said in a statement that “this agreement provides more time to the Republic of Cuba to honor several payments due under the 2015 Arrangement, while maintaining the present value of these amounts.”
Banco Central de Cuba
Cuba has
now fallen behind by around $200 million on payments, including this year, the
diplomats estimated.
It is not
clear if penalties will apply as the pandemic crunch has led lenders to waive
fees on other debtor nations. Cuba said
this week it had vaccinated 99.2% of its population with at least one dose of
its locally developed COVID-19 vaccines, and plans to reopen its borders to
international tourism by mid-November after nearly two years of
coronavirus-induced stagnation.
The
Caribbean island nation depends heavily on tourism to inject much-needed
foreign exchange into its otherwise inefficient state-run economy, and for the
cash it needs to repay lenders.
“I
expect a fairly robust return of tourists impacting other activities and that
should improve the outlook somewhat for payment in 2022,” one of the
diplomats said.
Over the
last decade, Cuba also restructured debt with Russia, China, Germany, Mexico
and Japanese commercial debt holders.
“Its
my understanding most of those payments are also on hold,” another
diplomat said, with a colleague seconding that view.
Harsh
U.S. sanctions on vital foreign exchange earners such as tourism, remittances
and foreign investment, many implemented under then-U.S. President Donald Trump
and maintained under his successor, Joe Biden, also complicate inflows.
Foreign
exchange revenues fell by some $4 billion beginning in 2020 and the import of
basic goods and inputs for agriculture and production in general plunged nearly
40% as a result, the government reported.
The
economy contracted 10.9% last year and another 2% through June, compared with
the same period in 2020, resulting in shortages of food, medicine and other
basic goods. The government this year
predicts the economy to grow 2%, just barely beginning to recoup last year’s
downturn.
Under the
original Paris Club agreement, seen by Reuters, interest was forgiven through
2020, and after that was just 1.5% of the total debt still due. Some of that
money due was allocated to funds for investments in Cuba. The diplomats who spoke to Reuters said they
did not expect any significant changes to that portion of the agreement.
Cuba last
reported foreign debt of $18.5 billion in 2018, and experts believe it has
risen since then, especially to suppliers and investment partners who reported
serious payment issues as early as 2018. The country is not a member of the
International Monetary Fund or the World Bank.
The Cuba group of the 22-member Paris Club comprises Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
Abstract During the Cold War, Havana symbolised the struggle for national liberation in Latin America. Yet in few other places on the island of Cuba did the Revolution’s visions of development materialise as they did in the southern city of Cienfuegos. This article examines why two half-finished nuclear reactors and a decaying ‘nuclear city still remain in Cienfuegos. Through a comprehensive spatial and infrastructural transformation of Cuba, the revolutionary government sought to remedy the evils of dependency and unequal exchange. Cienfuegos, and its shifting place in the Cold War political economy, demonstrates how a radical critique of urbanisation merged with the spatiality of centralised energy infrastructure in the pursuit of ultimately-failed nuclear modernity. The history of Cienfuegos draws the academic gaze away from Latin America’s major cities to broaden the ‘geographies of theory’in urban, energy and Latin American studies.
Conclusion The rationale behind the policy for urban restructuring and centralised energy development emerged from a critique of the colonial political economy. Embedded in the pursuit of nuclear modernity, it also took on distinct urban form. Ciudad Nuclear represented an article of faith in infrastructural integration, centralised redistribution and automated technology powered by oil and nuclear energy as determinants of social progress. However, Cuba’s spatio-infrastructural transformation was contingent on relations extending beyond its cities in space and time. iDeationally, Cienfuegos’ Cold War development was a success as long as Cuba was taking part in qualitatively different, equal-exchange relations with the CMEA. The government’s inability to sustain these relations after the col lapse of the Soviet Union suggests that Cuba’s nuclear modernity ultimately was a failure, a failure manifested in the decay of Ciudad Nuclear and the ruins of the reactors in Juraguá. Despite this, Cienfuegos’vital position in the revolutionary economy invites us to look beyond Havana and Latin America’s major cities if we want to understand the Cold War in the region. Cienfuegos brings circulations of knowledge to light that broaden the ‘geographies of theory’in urban, energy and Latin American studies.113 The city’s history demonstrates the significance and dif iculty of achieving alternative, possibly more equitable, urban forms in Cuba and beyond.
President Xi meets Fidel Castro
during a visit to Cuba in 2014
Cuba has signed up to an energy
cooperation pact with China, solidifying relations at a time when the US has
been cautioning against the Asian giant’s growing influence in the region.
Chinese
companies will be invited to upgrade Cuba’s ageing energy sector. The financing
for the project is expected to be backed by the Chinese government.
The
announcement comes as the Biden administration attempts to convince countries
in Latin America to turn away from China’s Belt and Road trade and
public works programme, which critics say traps recipients in unsustainable
debt, while providing Beijing raw materials and geopolitical leverage for
decades to come.
At a
conference of the “Belt and Road energy partnership”, held in
Qingdao, a delegation from Cuba said it would “deepen ties” between the two
countries. Cuba’s industry minister, Liván Arronte Cruz, said the pact would
“promote solidarity and international co-operations in favour of developing
countries”. Green technologies will be prioritised, the minister said.
The other countries in the region which have signed up to the broad Chinese cooperation agreement are Bolivia, Suriname, and Venezuela, all of which have left-wing governments.
ver the
past 15 years, China has become the biggest trading partner for most of the big
economies in Latin America, overtaking the United States. More recently, China
has spent billions of dollars buying up several key energy companies in the
region, including the largest electrical company in Peru.
Earlier
this month, President Biden’s deputy national security adviser Daleep Singh
visited Colombia, Ecuador and Panama, all of which have conservative
governments, as part of a pitch for US-backed infrastructure funding, called
“Build Back Better World”. US officials say the so-far undefined projects on
offer will be built to higher environmental and labour standards than those
China is financing, with full transparency for the terms, in contrast to
Beijing’s secrecy.
Singh
however has insisted that Washington is not asking the region to make a stark
choice between the US and China. “We’re there to compete because we do think we
have a better product,” he told the Financial Times. China’s arrangement with
Cuba, a political ally and one of the smallest economies in the region, is not
seen as likely to trouble the Biden administration, given it maintains the US’s
decades-old embargo on the communist island, prohibiting most American
companies from doing any business with its ruling regime. But it is seen as
symbolic of Beijing’s increased clout at the doorstep of the United States.
Already
Cuba is China’s largest trading partner in the Caribbean. China is helping Cuba
build a modernised port in the city of Santiago, as well as undertaking
dredging operations, and setting up wind and solar farms. ChinaPetro, the state
oil conglomerate, is running drilling rigs in Celimar and Boca de Camarloca.
China’s direct investments in Cuba reached $149 million at the end of 2019.
President
Xi last visited Cuba in 2014, when he met the former dictator of the island
Fidel Castro. “The common dream and pursuits have brought China and Latin
America closely together,” he told a conference later. “Let’s seize the
opportunity, work hard, advance hand-in-hand and create a beautiful future for
the China-Latin America relations”, he said.
Others
suspect more nefarious aims, and there are suspicions that Beijing bases some
of its regional intelligence on the island. US media reports have claimed a
Soviet-era signals station near Havana is operated by China to intercept
communications in the US.
Any
further help China can offer to improve the Cuban energy network will be
welcomed by its communist leadership. Electrical blackouts since June have
fuelled discontent, which in July broke out into street protests, the largest
seen since the 1959 revolution.
Following
those protests, after the US sanctioned Cuba’s national revolutionary police
and its top two officials, China said: “The recent US sanctions against Cuban
institutions and officials severely violate the basic norms governing
international relations.”
HAVANA IS
A WILLING ALLY FOR XI
First it was the Soviet Union, then it was Venezuela (Stephen Gibbs writes).
Will China now step in as Cuba’s next patron to ensure the survival of the last
communist bastion in the western hemisphere?
Cuba’s
dependence on China is growing. In 2014, President Xi visited Fidel Castro and
assured the retired revolutionary that he would “inject new impetus” into
bilateral relations.
By 2017,
China had become the island’s main trading partner. Cuba joined China’s Belt
and Road infrastructure initiative in 2018.
The
evidence of Beijing’s influence is everywhere. Yutong buses and Geely cars are
common sights in Havana. Modern Chinese trains can occasionally be seen on the
island’s decrepit railways. A brand new Haier fridge or washing machine has
become a status symbol among those few Cubans that can afford such luxuries.
Chinese
companies have also played a key part in Cuba’s telecommunications
infrastructure, a role which some see as having sinister undertones. During
anti-government protests last July, the government shut off the internet in
demonstration hotspots, using technology thought to come from China.
Those
protests were partly fuelled by weeks of power cuts in high summer. Finding the
fuel for Cuba’s old-tech power stations has long been a challenge.
During
the Cold War, Cuba would get most of its oil from the Soviet Union in exchange
for sugar, a spectacularly good deal on the Cuban side. More recently it has
been receiving subsidised fuel from Venezuela, but its own economic collapse
means Caracas has become far less generous, sending about half as many barrels per
week as it once did.
China has
far deeper pockets and sees Cuba as an important foothold to expand its
influence in the Americas. Propping up an amenable Cuban regime is part of that
strategy.
At least
nine young Cuban baseball players have defected during a tournament in Mexico,
officials say, in the largest defection of Cuban athletes in years.
Cuban
officials called the players’ actions during the World Cup for athletes under
the age of 23 “vile abandonments”, state media report.
The rest
of the team, which originally had 24 players, will return on Monday.
Cuban
athletes have a long history of defecting while competing abroad.
Baseball
players often leave to sign up with Major League Baseball (MLB) clubs in the
US, as strained relations between the US and Cuba prevent them from taking part
in a regular hiring process.
The
statement by Cuba’s National Sports Institute, published on the official JIT
website and quoted by the Associated Press news agency, did not name the
players who had stayed in Mexico.
But baseball
journalist Francys Romero said a total of 12 players had defected.
A deal
that allowed some Cuban players to sign with MLB clubs was cancelled by
President Donald Trump in 2018, in an attempt to pressure the island’s
Communist government to implement political changes. The agreement meant
athletes no longer had to abscond and leave Cuba illegally.
Defections
of high-profile sportsmen and women from Cuba is nothing new – but is always an
indication of the extent of the problems at home. And if this latest round of
pitchers, batters and catchers to flee their hotel in Mexico is anything to go
by, economic conditions on the island are especially acute at present.
The mass
defection is of particular frustration and embarrassment to the Cuban
authorities not only for the number of players to defect at once, but also
their ages. In their early 20s, they represented the future of Cuban baseball,
charged with returning Cuba to the top after the island failed to qualify for
the Olympics in Tokyo 2020 for the first time in its history.
Unsurprisingly,
the government responded by attacked the players for being “weak” in
morals and ethics. However, its main criticism was for the US for maintaining
the decades-long economic embargo while offering such lucrative contracts that
the cream of Cuban baseball can hardly refuse. Cuba also accuses the MLB of
engaging in practices tantamount to human-smuggling in order to bring the
players to the US.
The truth is, however, as long as those multi-million dollar contracts and endorsements are available just 90 miles (145km) away from Cuba, defection will remain a sorely tempting option for any aspiring baseball star on the increasingly impoverished island.
The most
recent high-profile player to defect was 22-year-old César Prieto, one of the
country’s top baseball stars, who abandoned the team earlier this year while in
Florida for an Olympics qualifying event.
Ballet
dancers and footballers are also among athletes who have fled during major
competitions.
Cuba is in the midst of an economic crisis, with food and medicine shortages, and has been hit hard by US sanctions and Covid-19. In July, thousands of people joined the biggest anti-government protests in the island for decades.
El profesor de economía Archibald Ritter, de la
Universidad de Carleton, en Canadá, analizó a finales de 2010 los grandes
errores que Fidel Castro cometió tras su llegada a La Habana en 1959.
LA HABANA, Cuba. – Los líderes comunistas de Cuba aún no se ponen de acuerdo
en decir por qué ocurrió el Período Especial: si fue a partir de 1959 cuando
Fidel Castro cometió el gran error de no dejar títere con cabeza, acabando con
los pequeños propietarios y poniéndolo todo en manos del Estado; o después, con
la caída de la URSS, lo que acentuó la consabida ineficiencia del modelo
cubano.
El profesor de economía Archibald Ritter, de la Universidad de Carleton, en
Ottawa, Canadá, analizó a finales de 2010, dos años después de la llegada al poder
de Raúl Castro, el gran error que el “Comandante” cometió a su llegada a La
Habana en 1959 con respecto a la industrialización instantánea, ya que esto
requería de importación de maquinaria y equipos, materias primas, bienes
intermedios, personal calificado y equipos de reparación y mantenimiento.
Fidel Castro ignoró el sector azucarero, ocasionando que la zafra, entonces de 6,7 millones de toneladas de azúcar en 1961, fuera de 3,8 millones en 1963;y dando como resultado que Cuba se volviera más dependiente que nunca de la Unión Soviética.
Un poco después, cerca ya de 1970, cometió otro gran error: se le ocurrió la
meta de los 10 millones de toneladas de azúcar, convirtiendo esa idea en una
preocupación dominante en “defensa de su honor, su prestigio, la seguridad y la
confianza en sí mismo”, como la gran campaña militar que nunca había librado.
Otro de sus grandes errores está en el invento del sistema financiero
presupuestado, que no es otra cosa que empresas que operan sin autonomía
financiera y sin contabilidad, sin recibir ingresos por las ventas de su
producción ni pagar por sus insumos con tales ingresos. Con relación a este
invento, el mismo Castro dijo el 7 de diciembre de 1970: “¿Qué es este pozo sin
fondo que se traga los recursos humanos de este país, su riqueza, los bienes
materiales que tanto necesitamos? No es otra cosa que ineficiencia,
improductividad y baja productividad”.
La lista de errores es larga, según Ritter. Un análisis breve de ellos
arroja que se agravaron a partir de 1968, cuando el régimen expropió la mayor
parte de las pequeñas empresas privadas que quedaban, tras llamarlas
“capitalistas”. De esa forma, las empresas fueron empujadas a la economía
subterránea y el robo y las ilegalidades se convirtieron en algo normal hasta ahora.
Varias décadas después el “Comandante en Jefe” decidió que no había futuro
con el azúcar. Eliminó una gran parte de las tierras sembradas de caña y se
deshizo de unos 100 000 trabajadores, sin pensar que los precios del azúcar
aumentarían un poco después, cuando ya los bateyes estaban convertidos en
pueblos fantasmas.
Otro de los grandes errores que señala Ritter es el medio siglo de controles
monetarios sin convertibilidad por el cual responsabiliza al Che Guevara,
entonces presidente del Banco Nacional de Cuba, y al propio Fidel Castro.
Cabe aquí una pregunta imprescindible: ¿Tiene en realidad autoridad política suficiente el presidente Díaz-Canel, además de valor y amor por Cuba, para rectificar los errores de su maestro y guía? ¿O lo tienen quienes mandan en Cuba tras bambalinas, es decir, Raúl Castro y su vieja guardia militar?
