Unprecedented political protests in Cuba on July 11 have forced the issue
of Cuba policy to the top of President Biden’s agenda after it languished for
months on the backburner. On July 19, the administration
announced that it was forming a Working Group on Remittances to explore
ways to enable Cuban Americans to help their families on the island.
However,
as a senior official told The
Hill, “The administration is focused on only allowing such transfers if
we can guarantee that all of the money flows directly into the hands of the
Cuban people instead of allowing a portion of the proceeds to be siphoned off
into regime coffers.” That echoes what President Biden
himself said a few days earlier when he expressed his reluctance to lift
President Trump’s sanctions on remittances for fear “the regime would
confiscate those remittances or big chunks.”
Sen. Bob
Menendez, an outspoken critic of restoring remittances, has been in direct
contact with the White House urging the president not to lift Trump’s
sanctions. In a Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on May 19, Menendez
claimed that the Cuban government was “taking 20 percent of remittances to
Cuban families, then converting the balance of the remittance to Cuban pesos
that are worth a fraction of what Americans send to their families, that can
only be used at state-owned stores.”
That is
an inaccurate, outdated account of how the flow of remittances works, who
benefits, and how the Cuban government uses the dollars that flow into the
country. Before July 2020, the Cuban government did capture the lion’s
share of remittances. In 2004, it began charging a 10
percent tax on US dollars coming into Cuba in the form of cash. Cuban
officials justified this as necessary to cover the cost of circumventing the
U.S. embargo to use dollars in the international financial system. The tax did
not apply to wire transfers of dollars, or to other convertibles currencies, so
Cuban Americans could avoid it entirely by using these other options.
From 2004
to 2020, dollars were not legal tender in Cuba, so Cubans had to exchange
dollars for Cuban convertible pesos, or CUC, to spend them, an exchange for
which the government charged a three-percent fee. A Cuban could then use CUC to
buy certain imported goods, mostly durable consumer goods that were only
available for purchase in convertible pesos. The mark-ups were
notoriously high—upwards of 200 percent.
Adding up
all the fees and markups, it was fair to say that the Cuban government was
extracting more than half the real value from dollar remittances. But that
changed in July 2020.
The Cuban
economy was in recession amid the pandemic, and the government was short of
foreign exchange currency to import basic necessities. To create more of an
incentive for Cuban Americans to send remittances, the government abolished
the 10 ten-percent tax on dollars entirely. Today, Cubans can deposit
remittances in a debit card account and can use the card in stores that sell
goods priced in dollars. There is no 10 percent tax, no requirement that
dollars be exchanged for Cuban pesos, and no exchange fee.
For now,
Cubans who have dollars in cash and want to exchange them for pesos cannot do
it officially. The banks are not taking cash dollar deposits because the
government has trouble spending U.S. currency abroad due to Washington’s
unilateral financial sanctions. But Cubans can exchange their dollars for pesos
on the street at almost triple
the official exchange rate.
Markups
in the hard currency stores, especially for basic consumer staples, are much
reduced from what they were in the CUC stores. This is the result of market
forces, not the government’s benevolence. Before the pandemic, entrepreneurs
travelled abroad to buy consumer goods, bringing them back to Cuba and
selling them privately at prices below the CUC prices in state stores. An
estimated 25 million dollars per month in foreign exchange currency was leaving
the country through these private channels. The competition forced the
government to reduce prices in the state stores to win back market share.
As a
result of the July 2020 policy changes, the only profit the Cuban government
currently makes on remittances wired to Cuba is this markup on goods sold in
the hard currency stores.
What does
the government do with the money? The dollars it takes in flow right back out
to finance imports. First, the government has to import goods to restock the
shelves in the hard currency stores. The profit from the stores finances general
imports, about a third of which are food and other consumer goods, and
another third are fuel. (Cuba imports 70 percent of its food and 59 percent of
its fuel.)
Fifty-six
percent of Cuban families received remittances before Trump’s sanctions;
the rest depend on social
assistance or their ration cards to buy food and other staples at low
prices subsidized by the state, a 30 billion peso annual expense for the
government (worth about 1.25 billion dollars at the official exchange
rate of 24:1). A high-end estimate
of the remittances going to Cuba before Trump closed the spigot was 3.5
billion dollars, so whatever profit the government is earning in the hard
currency stores is certainly less than what it spends to import the basic goods
it provides at subsidized prices to Cubans who don’t receive help from family
abroad.
In short,
the Cuban government is not gaining windfall profits from remittances. There is
no way to prevent the Cuban government from receiving those dollars when Cuban
recipients spend them, so if that’s the condition the Biden administration
envisions, then nothing will change. But if the goal is simply to assure that the
government is not extracting value in excess of normal business expenses, then
that condition is already being met.
President
Biden
says he “stands with the Cuban people.” Immediately reopening the channel
for Cuban Americans to send remittances to their families is the single most
important thing he can do to prove it.
On july 11th thousands of
protesters took to the streets spontaneously in more than 50 Cuban towns and
cities. They had a long litany of grievances: recurring electricity shortages,
empty grocery shops, a failing economy, a repressive government and an
increasingly desperate situation regarding covid-19. In a display of discontent
not seen on the communist island for perhaps six decades, people of all ages chanted
and marched, some of them to the tune of clanging spoons and frying pans. They
shouted “Patria y Vida!” (Fatherland and Life)—a riff on the revolutionary
slogan “Patria o Muerte” (Fatherland or Death), and the name of a rap song
which criticises the government—along with “Libertad!” (Freedom) and “Abajo la
dictadura!” (Down with the dictatorship).
Although protests continue, by the
next day cities were quieter as the police went from house to house, rounding
up the demonstration leaders. Riot police spread out across cities,
plainclothes officers took to the streets and pro-government mobs brandishing
images of Fidel Castro were called in to chant revolutionary slogans and wave
Cuban flags. Miguel Díaz-Canel, the president and first secretary of the Communist Party,
appeared on television to declare: “Cuba belongs to its revolutionaries.” Around
150 people have gone missing, and one protester has been killed. There are
rumours that young men are being forcibly conscripted into the army.
The big question is how much staying
power the protests will have. The coming weeks will show whether the regime’s
stock response of swatting down any signs of dissent will work again. The
government has little leeway to buy social peace. Cuba has been badly hit by
covid-19 and by a precipitous drop in tourism, on which it heavily depends. A
lack of foreign currency with which to buy imports has led to acute food shortages and blackouts. Under
the administration of Donald Trump, the United States tightened sanctions on
Cuba. These have added a little to the island’s longstanding economic troubles.
Cuba’s reluctance to buy foreign
vaccines, born of a mix of autarky and a shortage of cash, means that only 16%
of the population is fully inoculated. Home-grown vaccines are being developed, but
have not yet been fully rolled out; meanwhile, pharmacies are short even of
basics like aspirin. Whereas tourism has resumed in nearby places where
covid-19 has receded, such as Jamaica and the Dominican Republic, Cuba is
suffering from rising infections. Even the official data show the number of new
cases doubling every seven days. In a video posted to Facebook, Lisveilys
Echenique, who lives in the city of Ciego de Ávila, described how her brother
spent 11 days battling covid-19 without treatment because he could get neither
medicine nor a hospital bed. After he died, his corpse remained in her home for
seven hours before an ambulance arrived.
The Cuban economy came close to
collapse in the early 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union brought foreign
aid to an abrupt halt. There were public protests then, too, which were quickly
dispersed. But Cubans now have access to the internet and are adept at using it
to mobilise. Videos of police violence and arbitrary arrests have been
circulating rapidly in recent days. At one point in the afternoon of July 11th,
as the protests reached their height, the authorities appeared to block all
internet access. Some social-messaging sites have also been suspended.
But much as the government may wish
to turn the internet off, it cannot afford to: the exorbitant access fees
charged by the state telecoms monopoly are an important source of foreign
exchange. The internet is also a vital conduit for remittances from Cubans
abroad. Mobile data and Wi-Fi charges bring in perhaps $80m a month for the
government, estimates Emilio Morales of Havana Consulting Group in Miami.
“The government has closed itself up
like an oyster,” says José Jasán Nieves Cárdenas, editor of El Toque, a Cuban magazine mostly published online.
“Instead of acknowledging that it has to come out and establish a dialogue with
its people, it has chosen repression.” Tear gas and rubber bullets were used
against crowds, although in some instances security officers were so
outnumbered by protesters that they were forced to retreat. As things
escalated, police cars were overturned and some dollar stores, symbols of the
regime’s economic incompetence, were ransacked.
Mr Díaz-Canel blames Cuba’s troubles
on the embargo imposed by the United States, as the government always does. He
has ignored the complaints of the protesters, dismissing them as mercenaries,
and offered excuses rather than plans for reform. After the president gave a
speech on July 12th more protesters gathered outside the Capitol building in
Havana. Other than stepping down, there is not much Mr Díaz-Canel could do to
make amends to his people, says the owner of a small business. “You can’t cover
the sun with one finger,” she says. Rumours are circulating that even members
of the police are starting to defy their orders, as some think the protesters
have a point.
Alfred Martínez Ramírez, a member of 27n, a group of activists, artists and intellectuals campaigning for greater freedom of expression, joined a protest outside the Ministry of Culture in November. Some 300 people were present, which at the time seemed a huge number. Cubans rarely protest, not least because unauthorised public gatherings are illegal. Seeing thousands of people on the streets of Havana and elsewhere in Cuba gives Mr Martínez Ramírez hope that his group is not alone, and that they may have even helped many others overcome their fear of dissent. “There has been an awakening,” he says.
Thousands of
protesters thronged the streets on July 11th. Some stoned the police and
looted posh shops. Such outbursts are unprecedented in Cuba since the
communists secured their hold on power in the 1960s. “Freedom!” and “Down with
the dictatorship!” they chanted, and “Patria y Vida!” (Fatherland and Life),
quoting an underground reggaeton song that mocks Fidel Castro’s tired slogan of
“Fatherland or Death”.
All this poses an extraordinary
challenge to the dull bureaucrats who rule Cuba, after the death of Fidel and
the retirement of his younger brother, Raúl, earlier this year. The regime has
responded with repression. “Revolutionaries, to the streets,” urged
Miguel Díaz-Canel, the president who this year took the helm of the Communist
Party, unleashing troops, police and loyalist mobs wielding baseball bats. At
least one person was killed. Scores have been detained and the government has
sporadically cut access to the internet.
Repression may work in Cuba, as it
has elsewhere. But something there has snapped. The tacit contract that kept
social peace for six decades is broken. Many Cubans used to put up with a police
state because it guaranteed their basic needs, and those with initiative found
a way to leave. Now Cubans are fed up. When Mr Díaz-Canel blames the protests
on “American imperialism”, all he shows is how out of touch he is. The
protesters are young, mainly black and dismiss the Castros’ revolution of 1959
against an American-backed tyrant as ancient history.
They have plenty to complain about.
The pandemic has shut off foreign tourism, aggravating the economy’s lack of
hard currency. Raúl Castro launched economic reforms, but they were timid and
slow, permitting only minuscule private businesses. It was left to Mr
Díaz-Canel to take the most momentous step, by ordering a big devaluation in
January. Without measures to allow more private investment and growth, that has
merely triggered inflation. As its sanctions-hit oil industry collapses,
Venezuela, Cuba’s chief foreign patron over the past 15 years, has curbed its
cut-price oil shipments, prompting power cuts during the heat of summer.
Chronic shortages of food and medicine have become acute. Despite Cuba’s
prowess at public health and its development of its own vaccine, the government
has failed to contain the pandemic. The sick are dying, abandoned at home or on
hospital floors.
Two other factors explain the
outburst. One is the change of leadership. The Castros commanded respect even
among the many Cubans who abhorred them. Mr Díaz-Canel, without a shred of
charisma, does not. And the internet and social media, allowed only in the past
few years, have broken the regime’s monopoly of information, connecting younger
Cubans to each other and the world. They have empowered a cultural protest
movement of artists and musicians. Its message, in the unanswerable lyrics of
“Patria y Vida”, is “Your time’s up, the silence is broken…we’re not scared,
the deception is over.”
Mr Díaz-Canel faces a choice: to turn
Cuba into Belarus with sunshine, or to assuage discontent by allowing more
private enterprise and greater cultural freedom. That could weaken the army and
the Communist Party, but it would eventually salvage some of the revolution’s
original social gains.
Curiously, many Republicans in the
United States echo Mr Díaz-Canel’s description of America’s role in the
protests. President Donald Trump tightened the economic embargo against Cuba,
barring American tourists, curbing remittances and slapping sanctions on state
firms, largely reversing Barack Obama’s opening to the island. Like Cuba’s
president, Republicans argue that the unrest proves the embargo is working at
last.
Not so. True, the embargo has made
life harder for the Cuban government. But its restrictions mainly hurt
Americans. The regime can still buy American food and medicine and trade with
the world. The causes of Cuba’s social explosion lie at home.
Open the windows
Joe Biden should draw the obvious conclusion. So far he has left Mr Trump’s Cuba policy intact, so as not to annoy hawkish Cuban-Americans. Instead he should return to Mr Obama’s approach. The big threat to a closed regime is engagement with the world, especially the United States. Mr Biden should lift the embargo and deprive the regime of an excuse for its own failures.
En días pasados estallaron protestas sociales en diversas localidades de Cuba. Para los dirigentes cubanos y los medios oficiales de prensa que responden al gobierno cubano, se trata de “disturbios, desorden, causados por una operación comunicacional que se prepara desde hace tiempo”, propiciados por “mercenarios al servicio del imperialismo”. Sin embargo, más allá de una retórica que se basa en el no reconocimiento de la realidad política, económica y social que vive el país y en achacar la responsabilidad de las protestas, denominadas desórdenes -aunque los hubo como en todas las protestas-, a agentes al servicio de intereses extranjeros, Cuba enfrenta desde hace muchos años una crisis económica y social de graves proporciones que se ha transformado en una crisis política. Es imprescindible debatir acerca de las causas pero también abrir un debate sobre las alternativas y posibles soluciones, con el objeto de evitar que el país llegue a un callejón sin salida.
Las
razones económicas.
La
situación económica actual de Cuba es la más terrible desde el llamado Período
Especial de los años noventa del pasado siglo. En 2020, el Producto Interior
Bruto (PIB) cayó un 11,3% pero ya en 2019 se había producido una caída del 0,2%
y el crecimiento promedio anual entre 2015 y 2019 fue de solo 1,7%, lo cual es
insuficiente para asegurar una senda de desarrollo económico. El gobierno
cubano ha insistido en responsabilizar al bloqueo estadounidense y a los
efectos de la pandemia con la situación económica del país. El recrudecimiento
de las sanciones económicas durante la administración de Trump y la aparición y
ahora el empeoramiento de la pandemia han tenido efectos nocivos indudables en
la economía cubana, sin embargo, no son los responsables de los graves
problemas estructurales que ésta padece.
A lo
largo de más de seis décadas se han ido acumulando serios problemas que
dependen, principalmente, de los sucesivos errores de política económica
cometidos por la dirección del país, que han conducido a un incremento de la
vulnerabilidad externa de la economía cubana y han dificultado el desarrollo de
la producción nacional, debido a la excesiva centralización de las decisiones
económicas, a la incapacidad para generar suficientes estímulos al desarrollo
productivo y a los frenos que se han impuesto al emprendimiento.
Las
reformas económicas que se han realizado desde los años noventa han sido
parciales e insuficientes, no han abordado los cambios estructurales de forma
sistémica y no han apuntado a la promoción del emprendimiento empresarial. La
mayor parte de las ramas de la industria nacional y varias de las más
importantes producciones agropecuarias en 2019 tenían niveles inferiores a los
de 1989. A partir de la crisis de los noventa el gobierno optó por el
desarrollo del turismo. Fue una decisión parcialmente correcta pero lo que no
debió ocurrir es que ese desarrollo obviara las necesidades del desarrollo
industrial y agrícola del país.
La
excesiva dependencia respecto al turismo es una causa estructural fundamental
en la debacle actual de una economía que prácticamente carece de reservas y de
alternativas productivas, con una industria azucarera que está produciendo a
niveles de principios del siglo XX, con el resto de la industria prácticamente
colapsada y con una agricultura afectada por una estructura de precios y
excesivos controles que desestimulan el desarrollo de la producción de
alimentos y de materias primas.
Con
campañas políticas no se resuelven los problemas de la producción. El país está
importando gran parte de los alimentos que podría producir y carece de las
divisas necesarias para importarlos. Para colmo, se insiste en el control
monopólico estatal del comercio exterior. Sigue sin dar los pasos necesarios
para promover la legalización de pequeñas y medianas empresas privadas que
promuevan el emprendimiento y canalicen el empleo superfluo que es una excesiva
carga al presupuesto del Estado. Persisten en la planificación centralizada en
condiciones de una inmensa escasez y no generan otras alternativas. En los años
noventa el turismo fue una alternativa y a comienzos del siglo XXI, la
exportación de servicios profesionales, principalmente a Venezuela, se
convirtió en otra opción muy importante de ingresos en divisas. Estos junto a
las remesas, aseguraron la subsistencia económica del país.
En la
actualidad, el turismo está en niveles mínimos, las remesas afectadas por las
limitaciones de sus fuentes debido a problemas económicos de los remitentes y
al endurecimiento de las sanciones durante la era de Trump, mientras que los
ingresos por exportaciones de servicios están afectados por su cierre en
ciertos países pero sobre todo por la terrible crisis económica venezolana.
Entonces, el gobierno no ha querido salirse del guión que ha determinado la
política económica, ha actuado con muchísima lentitud y ha adoptado medidas
económicas equivocadas.
Los
errores más recientes de política económica.
A lo
largo de estas décadas se han acumulado una serie de errores de política
económica, pero en las condiciones actuales quisiera concentrarme en dos: 1) la
llamada Tarea Ordenamiento y 2) la apertura de tiendas en monedas libremente
convertibles (MLC) para la venta de productos que originalmente se describían
como “suntuarios” pero que en realidad resultaron de primera necesidad, no solo
para las condiciones de la vida moderna sino incluso para la subsistencia.
El
llamado Ordenamiento monetario no fue tal. Desde hace tiempo muchos economistas
hemos destacado la necesidad de abolir la dualidad monetaria por el desorden en
los sistemas de costos, en el funcionamiento de las empresas y en el
establecimiento de precios relativos respecto a la economía internacional.
Adoptaron la unificación monetaria y cambiaria como un lineamiento del 6º
Congreso del PCC en 2011 y finalmente en 2021 decidieron unificar los tipos de
cambio a una tasa sobrevaluada, a la cual el Banco Central no puede asegurar la
venta de la divisa extranjera, con lo que, inmediatamente, se desarrolló el
mercado negro de divisas en el que el dólar se cotiza a varias veces por encima
del valor oficial.
En lugar
de establecer la soberanía del peso cubano como moneda nacional, crearon
tiendas en MLC, re-dolarizando parcialmente la economía y vendiendo en ese
mercado bienes a los cuales no tiene acceso la población que carece de remesas
o de opciones de ingresos en divisas, generando un grave problema social debido
a la marginación de un sector considerable de la población en la capacidad de
adquirir dichos bienes.
La
unificación cambiaria llegó acompañada de un incremento de salarios en el
sector estatal y de pensiones en niveles claramente inferiores a los
incrementos reales en los precios, producidos por una estampida inflacionaria,
lo cual ha causado gran insatisfacción en una parte considerable de la
ciudadanía que continúa sin asegurar sus necesidades básicas a partir de sus
ingresos debidos al trabajo.
Los
problemas sociales.
La
insatisfacción creada por los errores de política económica y la persistencia
de los mismos a veces ha podido canalizarse por los mecanismos controlados por
el poder pero ni esas ni aquellas que ni siquiera han podido ser planteadas
oficialmente sino que se expresan en redes sociales, han tenido una respuesta
creíble más allá de achacar al bloqueo de todo cuanto no funciona. No se trata
de anexionistas, ni de delincuentes, ni de agentes de alguna potencia
extranjera. Se trata simplemente de ciudadanos cubanos que necesitan satisfacer
aspiraciones en la única vida probada que tienen y que sienten que el gobierno
del país no está siendo capaz de ofrecer las alternativas de solución
necesarias.
La
sociedad cubana de hoy es claramente diferente a la que decidió permanecer en
el país tras el triunfo revolucionario. Existe un porcentaje creciente de
jóvenes, que están a dos o tres generaciones de la que hizo la Revolución y que
tiene esperanzas de vida, intereses, aspiraciones y proyecciones políticas y
sociales propias y muy probablemente diferentes y a las que incluso la
Constitución actual les priva del derecho a definir el tipo de Estado y de
sociedad que prefiere. Y dentro de este grupo, existe una parte considerable de
personas que viven en condiciones de subsistencia y no ve opciones de
mejoramiento de las mismas.
En otras
oportunidades, la emigración, incluso con cierto nivel de masividad, como
ocurrió en los primeros años sesenta, en 1980 y en 1994, ha actuado como
válvula de escape para solucionar las insatisfacciones individuales, pero
también para reducir el factor de oposición social interna. En esta ocasión
esta posibilidad está claramente muy limitada.
La
emigración carece de derechos políticos, pero a ella se ha apelado, una y otra
vez, para que haga valer sus derechos al envío de remesas familiares pero sin
reconocerla socialmente como un factor importante para la solución de los
problemas económicos del país y sin integrarla políticamente en un sistema
democrático. La emigración es un factor decisivo en la solución de muchos de
los problemas económicos del país y también debería ser un importante actor
político a partir de su experiencia en otras realidades.
En la
sociedad cubana existe una parte considerable que carece de opciones y de
perspectivas, que vive en una situación de pobreza que no es reconocida
públicamente por las autoridades cubanas. En consecuencia, gran parte de esa
población salió a las calles como explosión de una situación de hastío. Sin
embargo, hay que tener en cuenta que antes de eso ya se habían producido una
serie de indicios de protesta pacífica en diversos sectores sociales, incluidos
los artistas, reclamando espacios de diálogo que solo han encontrado la
intolerancia y el rechazo como respuesta.
Los
problemas políticos.
Todo este
conjunto de cuestiones ha llevado a una crisis política de la cual estas
protestas públicas han sido solo un primer momento, si consideramos su
capacidad de difusión y su masividad. Sin embargo, existe una parte de la
sociedad cubana inconforme con la situación del país que no se expresa por
miedo a las consecuencias negativas que pueden sufrir debido a una cultura
arraigada de exclusión de las opciones políticas diferentes a las defendidas
desde las estructuras de poder. El gobierno cubano debería considerar esta
realidad política y actuar en consecuencia si realmente quiere evitar que la
fractura social y política en la sociedad cubana se profundice y supere el nivel
de polarización que ya es gravísimo.
En 2019
se adoptó una nueva Constitución que establece en su artículo 1 que “Cuba es un
Estado socialista de derecho y justicia social, democrático, independiente y
soberano, organizado con todos y para el bien de todos como república unitaria
e indivisible, fundada en el trabajo, la dignidad, el humanismo y la ética de
sus ciudadanos para el disfrute de la libertad, la equidad, la igualdad, la
solidaridad, el bienestar y la prosperidad individual y colectiva”. Sin
embargo, existen ejemplos que demuestran que muchos de esos preceptos no
reflejan la realidad política del país.
El
artículo 5 de la carta magna le otorga al Partido Comunista de Cuba, la
condición de “fuerza política superior de la sociedad y del Estado”, lo cual,
en la práctica, coloca al Partido por encima de la sociedad. Esta realidad no
tiene nada de democrática, toda vez que tampoco el Partido Comunista es una
organización democrática en su vida interna.
En esa
misma Constitución se garantizan el derecho a la vida, la integridad física y
moral, la libertad, la justicia y la seguridad …. (artículo 46); el derecho a
que se respete su intimidad personal y familiar … (artículo 48); a la
inviolabilidad de su domicilio (artículo 49); a la inviolabilidad de la correspondencia
y demás formas de comunicación (artículo 50); las personas no puede ser
sometidas a desaparición forzada, torturas ni tratos o penas crueles inhumanas
o degradantes (artículo 51); el Estado reconoce, respeta y garantiza a las
personas la libertad de pensamiento, conciencia y expresión (artículo 54); se
reconoce la libertad de prensa (artículo 55); los derechos de reunión,
manifestación y asociación, con fines lícitos y pacíficos, se reconocen por el
Estado siempre que se ejerzan con respeto al orden público y el acatamiento a
las preceptivas establecidas en la ley (artículo 56); se reconocen a las
personas los derechos derivados de la creación intelectual (artículo 62); los
ciudadanos cubanos tienen derecho a participar en la conformación, ejercicio y
control del poder del Estado, lo cual implica: estar inscriptos en el registro
electoral, proponer y nominar candidatos, elegir y ser elegidos, participar en
las elecciones, plebiscitos, referendos, consultas populares y otras formas de
participación democrática, pronunciarse sobre la rendición de cuenta que le
presentan los elegidos, ejercer la iniciativa legislativa y de reforma de la
Constitución, desempeñar cargos públicos y estar informados de la gestión de
los órganos y autoridades del Estado (artículo 80).
La mayor
parte de estos artículos, relacionados con derechos humanos y políticos está
sin reglamentar, pero al margen de esto, la propia Constitución contradice
algunos de esos derechos. Por ejemplo, la libertad de elegir y ser elegidos,
mediante el voto de los ciudadanos es restringida por el inciso “c” del
artículo 205 que establece como excepción a “los que no cumplan el requisito de
residencia en el país previstos en la ley”. Es decir, a los cubanos residentes
en el exterior, que constituyen más de un 20% de la población actual del país y
cuyas remesas han contribuido a la subsistencia del país, se les niega ese
derecho elemental que está consagrado en la mayor parte de las constituciones
de las repúblicas latinoamericanas. De igual forma, la iniciativa legislativa y
la reforma de la Constitución, contenidas también en el artículo 80 son
restringidas por el artículo 227 que trata sobre la iniciativa para promover
reformas a la Constitución, porque la iniciativa de los ciudadanos debe ser “mediante
petición dirigida a la Asamblea Nacional, firmada por un mínimo de 50.000
electores”, además de que la Constitución solo puede ser reformada por la
Asamblea Nacional en una “votación nominal no menor a dos terceras partes del
número total de sus integrantes”, es decir, que no permite que la Constitución
sea reformada o elaborada por una Asamblea Constituyente, elegida libremente
por la ciudadanía, tal y como ocurrió en 1940. Si la Asamblea Nacional es
elegida con base a una lista única que responde a las orientaciones del Partido
Comunista, es fácil intuir que sería imposible contar con ella para reformar
una constitución hecha a la medida de los intereses de la dirigencia de dicho
partido, que no necesariamente se corresponde con los intereses reales de parte
de su membresía.
A
diferencia de la mayor parte de los países latinoamericanos, los ciudadanos
cubanos carecen del derecho a elegir, mediante sufragio universal y directo,
entre varias alternativas, al Presidente y Vicepresidente de la República, a
los diputados a la Asamblea Nacional, y a las autoridades de gobierno
provinciales y municipales.
Las leyes
cubanas posteriores a 1959 no han permitido el derecho a la huelga, ni a la
formación de asociaciones sociales, profesionales o políticas que estén por
fuera del control del poder político, con lo cual se conculcan los derechos
proclamados en los artículos 54 y 56 de la Constitución.
Así, en
las cuestiones relativas a los derechos políticos, la Constitución de 2019, al igual
que la de 1976, retroceden respecto a la de 1940 que, dicho sea de paso, fue el
resultado de una Asamblea Constituyente, elegida democráticamente, en la que
también participaron delegados comunistas junto a otros del amplio espectro de
fuerzas políticas que caracterizaba a la sociedad cubana de entonces.
La
Constitución de 2019 fue aprobada en referendo nacional por una mayoría
significativa de la población, pero en su proceso de discusión y debate, solo
tuvo cabida la pedagogía del SI y en dicho referendo no se permitió votar a la
población cubana residente en el exterior que aun ostenta un pasaporte cubano.
Hasta en el régimen pinochetista en Chile se permitió la pedagogía del NO.
En los
tiempos recientes han ocurrido varios episodios en los que autoridades cubanas
han violado la Constitución aprobada por esa inmensa mayoría alcanzada entre
aquellos que tuvieron la oportunidad de ejercer su derecho al voto. Se han
producido detenciones de ciudadanos por el simple hecho de caminar por una
calle portando un cartel que exige la libertad para alguna persona detenida;
han sido detenidas personas por expresar su inconformidad y rechazo al sistema
político; fuerzas de la policía han obligado, de forma ilegal, a ciudadanos que
no están condenados judicialmente, a permanecer en sus casas en contra de su
voluntad y cuando éstos se han negado alegando su derecho a la libre movilidad,
han sido detenidos; no se han atendido solicitudes de hábeas corpus, a pesar de
que esta figura jurídica está presente en la nueva Constitución y es un derecho
universalmente reconocido en las sociedades civilizadas; se mantiene la
práctica de expulsar de ciertos centros de trabajo a personas que expresan
opiniones contrarias a las que se sostienen desde el poder político, incluso cuando
en algunos casos esas opiniones ni siquiera han cuestionado la esencia del
sistema político y social; se ha promovido y en otros casos, permitido
situaciones de hostigamiento a personas identificadas como desafectas al
gobierno del país; para solo mencionar algunos ejemplos de violaciones de la
ley suprema de la República, generadas desde las estructuras de poder, que
deberían ser sus garantes ante la sociedad.
Desde las
estructuras de poder se ha dicho que las manifestaciones del 11-J han sido
orquestadas desde el exterior. Es cierto y además público que algunos llamados
“influencer” de ciertas redes sociales ha realizado llamados a la desobediencia
civil y a la insurrección. Sin embargo, si fuera cierto que estas protestas
fueron el resultado de estos llamados y de la labor de zapa del gobierno de los
Estados Unidos, esto podría significar que el Partido Comunista carece del
liderazgo y la influencia que en Cuba que se establece como precepto
constitucional. Argumentar que las protestas fueron orquestadas desde el
exterior es un insulto a la ciudadanía y a su derecho a expresar un descontento
que antes no ha encontrado otras vías de canalización, debido a la soberbia, al
autismo y al escaso espíritu autocrítico de muchos de los que ejercen
responsabilidades de dirección en el país y que mantienen un discurso alejado
de la realidad del país.
Las
protestas sociales, a diferencia de lo que se sostiene desde el discurso
oficial, fueron el resultado de la combinación de todos esos factores a los que
se suma el hastío de muchos ciudadanos que no encuentran una salida
esperanzadora a una situación de crisis que persiste en la sociedad cubana
desde hace varias décadas pero que en las circunstancias actuales ha cobrado
una gravedad extraordinaria.
En las protestas hubo saqueos y destrucción de propiedad pública y privada, que no fueron masivos. ¿En cuáles protestas no ocurren? Es lamentable y condenable. Sin embargo, vale la pena llamar la atención sobre cuales han sido los objetos de estos actos deplorables. En unos casos, fueron algunas tiendas en MLC, que son un símbolo evidente de la diferenciación social establecida en Cuba entre los que tienen acceso a ellas y los que no, por el solo hecho de no disponer de cuentas en una moneda que no se obtiene como resultado del trabajo sino que proviene de remesas desde el exterior. Se produjo el volcamiento y destrucción de algunos automóviles de la policía y de instituciones oficiales. También se produjeron enfrentamientos entre fuerzas antimotines y de policía, tanto uniformados como vestidos de civil y los ciudadanos que protestaban. Las imágenes de supuestos civiles, perfectamente organizados, transportados en vehículos públicos y armados de palos y bates de béisbol para golpear a quienes protestaban son una muestra del insulto que ese día se profirió contra el ideario de la Revolución Cubana. Y la orden fue proferida desde el más alto nivel de dirección del país. No es la primera vez que esto ocurre, sin embargo, si es la ocasión en la que alcanzó las mayores proporciones.
Las
opciones.
A pesar
de la profundidad de la fractura social y política del 11-J y del nivel de
polarización que ha alcanzado la sociedad cubana, para bien del país, la
política debería imponerse a la golpiza.
Me opongo
a los llamados a una intervención militar extranjera que solo causaría sangre y
dolor a las familias cubanas y también en las de quienes, eventualmente,
pudieran intervenir. Y me opongo a la represión militar, policial y paramilitar
ejercida por quienes tienen el deber de proteger la seguridad del pueblo y no
mancillarlo. La vida y la dignidad deben ser preservadas.
Siento un
profundo compromiso con la idea original que inspiró la Revolución Cubana, es
decir, la democracia y la justicia social. La democracia nos ha sido confiscada
y la justicia social se despedaza en cada medida que crea excluidos en nuestra
Nación.
Una
opción que parece imponerse en el discurso oficial es la de reprimir a quienes
han sido identificados como participantes de las protestas y hacer caer sobre
ellos el peso de cuestionables figuras jurídicas, y de paso, amedrentar a
quienes pudieran protagonizar eventos similares en el futuro con medidas
ejemplarizantes. Esta opción solo profundizará la fractura de la sociedad y
solo postergaría una futura crisis política y social que podría tener
gravísimas consecuencias.
Otra
opción, que considero necesaria, sería liberar a todas las personas que han
sido detenidas por las protestas y antes de las mismas, por expresar su
desacuerdo con el gobierno o con el sistema político actualmente vigente. A fin
de cuentas, ellos no realizaron un asalto armado a un cuartel del ejército. No
hay que reprimir al descontento sino crear las condiciones para que el
descontento pueda ser convertido en satisfacción y esperanza o que al menos ese
descontento tenga vías legítimas de expresión, y ello pasa necesariamente por
una reconfiguración pacífica de nuestro sistema político.
La
Constitución actual no satisface las aspiraciones democráticas de todo el
pueblo, precisamente porque excluye a una parte del mismo en el derecho a
ejercer su soberanía por lo cual debe ser enmendada, aunque en mi opinión
debería ser elaborada una nueva que garantice el establecimiento de un sistema
democrático. Para esta enmienda, el elemento inicial debería ser la reforma de
los artículos 205, 226 y 227.
En el 205
debería eliminarse la excepción en el derecho al voto de los ciudadanos cubanos
residentes fuera del país. En el 226 debería permitirse que la Constitución sea
reformada por una Asamblea Constituyente, elegida libremente por la ciudadanía,
mediante sufragio universal, además de la actual facultad de la Asamblea
Nacional. En el 227 debería modificarse el inciso f que le otorga iniciativa a
la ciudadanía para la reforma constitucional solo como petición a la Asamblea
Nacional, mediante la recolección de 50.000 firmas, y permitir que estas firmas
puedan ser válidas para la convocatoria de una Asamblea Constituyente.
En tales
circunstancias y para hacer valer el carácter democrático del Estado que define
el artículo 1 de la Constitución, debería convocarse a una consulta nacional
vinculante, en la que puedan participar todos los ciudadanos cubanos sin
distinción de lugar de residencia e identificados con un pasaporte cubano
válido vigente y en la que los electores puedan escoger una de dos alternativas
que podrían ser: a) Desea Usted que la Constitución vigente se mantenga como
está y que su posible reforma posterior solo sea una facultad de la Asamblea
Nacional del Poder Popular; y b) Desea Usted que se convoque a una Asamblea
Constituyente, elegida mediante sufragio universal directo y secreto con
candidatos nominados o auto-nominados libremente, que elabore una nueva
Constitución.
Lo
verdaderamente revolucionario, lo verdaderamente progresista, no solo es la
urgente necesidad de liberar las fuerzas productivas y el emprendimiento
productivo que pueda iniciar la recuperación de la economía y encauzar el
proceso de desarrollo, sino también resulta urgente la construcción de un nuevo
consenso político, sobre la base del establecimiento de una sociedad
verdaderamente democrática en la que tengan cabida las diferencias políticas y
el imperio de la ley y de la justicia social.
mauriciodemiranda
La
Habana, 1 de abril de 1958. Doctor en Economía Internacional y Desarrollo,
Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España. Licenciado en Economía, Universidad
de La Habana, Cuba. Profesor Titular del Departamento de Economía de la
Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Cali, Colombia. Ver
todas las entradas de mauriciodemiranda
Washington
(CNN)President
Joe Biden has directed his administration to examine remittances to Cuba in the wake of protests on the island
to determine ways for those residing in the US to send money to the country, a
senior administration official told CNN.
“At President Biden’s
direction, the United States is actively pursuing measures that will both
support the Cuban people and hold the Cuban regime accountable,” the
official said.
The “Remittance Working
Group” will work to “identify the most effective way to get
remittances directly into the hands of the Cuban people,” the official
said.
Biden had said last week he
believed that under the current circumstances, remittances — the practice of
Americans transferring money to their Cuban relatives — would end up in the
hands of the regime. But since then he’s faced pressure to show solidarity with
protesters.
Cuba’s government controls the
financial sector on the island and all communications. Getting around the
government to send money or improve internet access is a challenge other US
administrations have tried and failed to overcome.
But the issue has taken on
increased urgency in recent days alongside the largest protests on the island in
decades. Thousands of Cubans took to the streets across the nation
this month to protest chronic shortages of basic goods, curbs on civil
liberties and the government’s handling of a worsening coronavirus outbreak,
marking the most significant unrest in decades.
The State Department also is
reviewing its plans to bolster staffing at the US Embassy in Havana “to
facilitate diplomatic, consular and civil society engagement, and an
appropriate security posture,” the official said.
The White House is exploring
whether to sanction “Cuban officials responsible for violence, repression
and human rights violations against peaceful protesters in Cuba,” the
official said. The US will “intensify diplomatic engagement with regional
and international partners to support the aspirations of the Cuban
people.”
Last week, Biden said he was
looking into the potential for restoring internet access to Cuba. The official
said Monday that the US would “work closely with the private sector and
the US Congress to identify viable options to make the internet more accessible
to the Cuban people.”
Under the Obama administration,
Cuba oversaw the reopening of embassies and relaxing of many restrictions long
in place since the embargo. But the Trump administration enacted some of the
toughest economic measures against Cuba in decades, reinstated travel
restrictions and — before leaving office — named Cuba a state sponsor of terrorism.
Cuba’s
one-party communist state outlaws political pluralism, bans independent media,
suppresses dissent, and severely restricts basic civil liberties. The
government continues to dominate the economy despite recent reforms that permit
some private-sector activity. The regime’s undemocratic character has not
changed despite a generational transition in political leadership between 2018
and 2019 that included the introduction of a new constitution.
Key Developments in 2020
The government achieved some
success in controlling the COVID-19 pandemic, reporting just 145 deaths to
the World Health Organization by year’s end, but the global crisis took a
heavy toll on the economy. In July, partly in response, the government
announced that it would liberalize rules regulating the tiny private
sector, including by allowing private businesses to trade more freely and
obtain legal status as enterprises, eliminating the restrictive list of
permitted occupations for self-employment, and expanding experiments with
nonagricultural cooperatives.
The government at times
cited the pandemic to justify crackdowns on dissident gatherings. In
November, when members of the Movimiento San Isidro (MSI)—a collective of
dissident artists—gathered and went on hunger strike to protest the arrest
of rapper Denis Solís, police violently detained them on the pretext of
controlling the spread of the coronavirus. This led to a sit-in by
numerous artists and intellectuals at the Ministry of Culture. While the
government initially agreed to negotiate with the group, protest
participants later reported police harassment, intimidation, and charges
of violating health restrictions.
During the year, the
government continued to expand its list of so-called regulados, the
more than 200 Cuban citizens who are not allowed to travel abroad due to
their dissident political activities, human rights advocacy, or practice
of independent journalism. The government also stepped up interrogations,
threats, detentions, raids, and exorbitant fines targeting independent
journalists and activists who publishing critical stories on foreign
websites or social media.
Cuba has
one of the lowest connectivity rates in the Western Hemisphere, and while the
government has significantly improved technical infrastructure and lowered
prices in recent years, regular internet access remains extremely expensive,
connections are poor, and authorities both monitor usage and work to direct
traffic to the government-controlled intranet. The state engages in
content-manipulation efforts while blocking a number of independent news sites.
Political dissent is punishable under a wide range of laws, including Decree
Law 370, which has frequently been used against online journalists. However,
despite heavy restrictions, Cubans continue to circumvent government censorship
through grassroots innovations.
Cuba is a
one-party communist state that outlaws political pluralism, bans independent
media, suppresses dissent, and severely restricts basic civil liberties. The
government continues to dominate the economy despite recent reforms that permit
some private-sector activity. The regime’s undemocratic character has not
changed despite a generational transition in political leadership between 2018
and 2019 that included the introduction of a new constitution.
Cubans have been living under dictatorship in some form since 1952. They spent most of the 1950s living under the corrupt rule of Fulgencio Batista, an army colonel who overthrew the last elected Cuban leader, Carlos Prío Socarrás, in a coup d’état. Batista was himself overthrown seven years later, on Jan. 1, 1959, by Fidel Castro’s guerrilla army.
Today Cubans live
under the political system imposed by Castro 62 years ago, a tropical version
of the state socialist model that prevailed in Eastern Europe until 1989.
Roadside billboards still exhort Cubans to build socialism, but the economy has
been all but bankrupt since the Soviet Union cut off aid shipments in the early
1990s.
I spent over a year
in Cuba in my early twenties. During my stay on the island, I got to see beyond
the romantic iconography of “Fidel” and “Che” (for the Argentine revolutionary
Ernesto “Che” Guevara) that are so often synonymous with Cuba. Some days it
would be impossible to find soap or toilet paper in the state-run shops. I used
to sneak into a hotel on the Malecón, Havana’s iconic seawall, to pilfer
breakfast and take it home to the Cubans I was staying with. The monthly Libreta
de Abastecimiento, or supplies booklet that Cubans were given by the
government, hardly covered a week, let alone a month. Most of my young Cuban
friends were plotting their escape from the island, usually via marriage with
some love-struck European or Canadian tourist.
When I returned to
England, I noticed two things. One, invariably, was the sheer level of material
comfort I could enjoy. No more blackouts or whiling away hours every day
waiting in lines. No more toilets without a functioning flush. No more waiting
outside the police station for friends who had committed the “crime” of
fraternizing with tourists.
I was also struck
by the stubbornness with which many Western friends would cling to their
illusions about Cuba, even though few who actually lived on the island seemed
to believe in socialism anymore. While my Cuban friends were seeking a way out
of Castro’s dungeon, left-wing companions who lived thousands of miles away
behaved as if Cuba remained a tropical paradise.
For those willing
to admit that things might not be perfect on the island, the poverty and lack of
democracy were usually blamed on Yankee imperialism. The same friends who would
raise hell when they heard about any injustice in the West would “suddenly
become wise historiosophists or cool rationalists when told about worse horrors
of the new alternative society,” as the Polish philosopher and former communist
Leszek Kołakowski wrote during the Cold
War to the English historian EP Thompson. Thompson had accused Kołakowski of
apostasy for abandoning the revisionist communism of his youth.
To be sure,
occasionally some better-known admirer of the dictatorship was honest enough to
admit that they themselves could never live under the Cuban system. The late
Colombian writer Gabriel García Márquez once told The New York Times
that he would “miss too many things” were he to actually live in Cuba. “I
couldn’t live with the lack of information. I am a voracious reader of
newspapers and magazines from around the world,” García Márquez said. For the
Cubans, however, these apparently were acceptable privations.
The Cuban
government and its supporters have a reflexive response to criticism, which is
to blame the United States for the situation on the island. Much of the left
has responded to the wave of spontaneous protest currently sweeping Cuba by
echoing the line from Havana. Cuban protesters have been filmed chanting “libertad”(freedom)
and “abajo la dictadura” (down with the dictatorship). Yet according to the
Democratic Socialists of America, the largest socialist organization in the
United States, what Cubans are really protesting is the “blockade,” which is
actually a trade embargo: Cuba is free to trade with anyone in the world except
the United States. “DSA stands with the Cuban people and their Revolution in
this moment of unrest. End the blockade,” the group’s International Committee
tweeted on July 11.
The explicitly
Leninist reasoning of this logic—that the Cuban people are represented by the
communist dictatorship whether they like it or not—has its roots partly in a
crude strain of anti-Americanism that is popular among young, politically
active, and left-leaning Americans.
But it also makes a
virtue out of self-deception and forgetting. It is now over three decades since
the Berlin Wall came down and the Soviet archives were prized open, revealing
the grisly manner in which Stalinist political systems impoverished and
oppressed those unfortunate enough to live under their rule. And yet political
convenience—along with tropical sunshine and the romantic iconography of
bearded men in olive-green fatigues—is the midwife of historical amnesia. In The
God that Failed, an autobiographical essay on his disillusionment and
abandonment of Marxism published in 1949, the novelist Arthur Koestler likened
communist fellow travelers to Peeping Toms, peering through a hole in the wall
at “history” while not having to experience it themselves. In Koestler’s time,
one might (just about) have pleaded ignorance as to what was taking place under
“actually existing socialism.” No such moral leeway can be granted to their
contemporary equivalents.
It is true that the
U.S. has long exerted a malign influence over Cuba. It has invaded the
island and tried to murder its leaders. Furthermore, it has attempted to
subvert the Cuban economy for decades through its trade embargo.
The U.S. has pursued
this course not to promote democracy in Cuba. Rather, it decided many decades
ago that it was going to squeeze Cuba because the Cubans nationalized American
businesses on the island. Before the revolution, the U.S. had more money invested in
Cuba than in any other Latin American country except Venezuela. To make the
point in a slightly different way, the U.S. maintains cordial relations with
countries that have worse human rights records than Cuba, but those countries
have not had the temerity to interfere with American business interests.
Yet the situation
in Cuba—the poverty, the repression, the top-down Leninist political
structure—is as much a product of forces within Cuba as a consequence of U.S.
policy. Havana’s Communist Party veterans have no intention of opening Cuba up
to the world; that would risk diluting the power they wield over their
subjects. Nor are things as simple as saying that the United States “pushed
Cuba into the arms of the Soviet Union” during the 1960s, as the popular
liberal explanation goes for Cuba’s descent into tyranny. It is more accurate
to say that the United States’ belligerence towards Cuba strengthened the hand
of those in Castro’s revolutionary movement who already considered the USSR
their ideological lodestone. As Che Guevara told the French weekly L’Express
in 1963: “Our commitment to the [Soviet model] was half the fruit of constraint
and half the result of choice.”
The Soviet model of
socialism still exists in Cuba.Elections are a sham. There are no
independent trade unions. There is one official newspaper, Granma, and
the Communist Party decides what gets published. Speak out against the
government and you will lose your job and possibly end up in jail. The exiled
Cuban writer Reinaldo Arenas, who was driven out of his homeland in 1980 for his
writing and homosexuality, put it well in his autobiography: “The difference
between the communist and capitalist systems is that, although both give you a
kick in the ass, in the communist system you have to applaud, while in the
capitalist system you can scream.”
Committees for the
Defense of the Revolution exist on every block in every town and city in Cuba
to, as Fidel Castro once put it, “know who everyone is, what each person who
lives on the block does, what relations he had with the tyranny, to what he is
dedicated, whom he meets, and what activities he follows.”
But Cuba’s
Soviet-style, state-run economic model does not work even if the U.S. embargo
makes the situation worse. Day-to-day macroeconomic policy consists of
centralized control of systematically induced shortages. It is no coincidence
that Cuba is plagued by the same economic distortions that once beset Eastern
Europe’s vanished communist dictatorships. Central planning always turns out
like this, which is why countries such as China have long abandoned it.
The wave of
protests this past week show that Cuba may soon be approaching
its own 1989 moment. Thousands of people marched in cities and towns across the
island to protest the conditions imposed on them by the dictatorship. Foreign
news organizations have noted the protests over vaccines and blackouts, but in
many of the videos that have emerged the Cubans themselves could be heard
demanding “freedom.”
For those of us who
closely follow events in Cuba, this has been a remarkable and unprecedented
development. As Stephen Gibbs writes for the Times
of London: “Millions of Cubans who have never seen any significant protest in
their lifetimes saw one unrolling live before them. They now know what is
possible.”
I have seen the
slogan “Hands Off Cuba” being used by sections of the Western left in response
to this week’s protests. But if such slogans are to mean anything, they should
be directed at the decrepit dictatorship, which right now is the biggest fetter
to Cuba’s future.
Cuba is a nation of
more than 11 million people who have waited 70 years for the right to interfere
in their country’s internal affairs. It is a diverse and complex society; it is
more than Fidel and Che. The left should stand with the protesters, even if it
means letting go of comforting romantic illusions.
James Bloodworth is a journalist and the author of Hired: Six Months Undercover in Low-Wage Britain.
The
greatest threat to U.S. national interests in Cuba is the possibility, however
slim, that U.S. policy there will succeed.
Sixty-two
years ago this month, the Eisenhower administration concluded that Fidel Castro’s revolutionary
regime was incompatible with the national interests of the United States.
Washington has been actively trying to destabilize it ever since. Even during
the two-year hiatus from 2014 to 2016 when President Obama began normalizing
relations, the U.S. government spent millions of dollars on “democracy
promotion” programs to bolster the Cuban opposition.
But
fostering misery and chaos in Cuba in pursuit of regime change is not cost-free
for Washington. Although the Cuban government is not on the verge of collapse,
the economic situation on the island is desperate — as bad it has been since
the deep depression of the “Special Period” in the 1990s following the collapse
of the Soviet Union. The recent anti-government demonstrations in Havana and a
dozen other cities, some of which involved violence and looting, are a reminder
that many Cubans are deeply discontented with the economic and political status
quo. The possibility of further social unrest is real.
In
Washington, the protests have given new life to the pipedream that the Cuban
regime is on its last legs, prompting calls from various quarters for the Biden
administration to administer the coup de grâce. Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) called on Biden to
“challenge” the Cuban regime by appealing to the Cuban military to overthrow
it. Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) warned of a “horrific bloodbath” unless Biden
toughens his policy toward the island.
The last
time the Cuban economy was in such bad shape, regime collapse seemed imminent.
An August 1993, a CIA National Intelligence Estimate predicted “a
better than even chance that Fidel Castro’s government will fall within the
next few years.” But this was no cause for celebration, as the intelligence
report explained: “If Cuban authorities lose control, massive, panicky illegal
emigration toward the United States will occur,” it warned. “There would also
be pressure for US or international military intervention, especially if a
large number of exiles became involved on the island.”
The CIA’s
dire warning led Rick Nuccio to sound the alarm in a memo to his boss,
Assistant Secretary of State Alec Watson. “The fundamental security threat
facing the United States in Cuba is a societal crisis that leads to widespread
violence. Such a development is the most likely to produce either significant
outflows of refugees, or active involvement of U.S. forces and/or Cuban
Americans in Cuba.” Another of Watson’s advisers, Phil Peters, tried to jolt
the administration into action, writing, “Given the situation on the island, I
would argue that policy continuity, or even marginal change, is not the
low-risk option. It’s positively scary.”
Nuccio
and Peters had different ideas about what ought to be done; Nuccio wanted to
focus on building Cuban civil society to promote a peaceful transition to
democracy, whereas Peters favored relaxing some sanctions and engaging with the
Cuban government. Other State Department officials argued for turning up the
heat to accelerate regime collapse.
President
Bill Clinton, however, was more focused on politics in Miami than on
developments in Havana, so months went by without any coordinated U.S. policy
response to the deepening crisis on the island. By the summer of 1994, it was
too late. A riot on the Havana waterfront, not unlike some of the
demonstrations last weekend, was followed by the “rafters” migration
crisis.
Echoes of
these dangers can be heard today. Miami Mayor Francis Suarez has called for U.S. intervention
in response to the protests on the island, while Cuban American demonstrators blocked the Palmetto Expressway
demanding an end to the Cuban regime. (They were not arrested, despite
violating Gov. DeSantis’ new anti-riot law). Social media spread proposals to
open a “humanitarian corridor” into Cuba, even though the
Cuban government is already accepting humanitarian assistance. At sea, the U.S. Coast Guard is intercepting a growing number
of Cubans trying to reach the United States in small boats and rafts.
Another
cost of the sanctions President Trump imposed on Cuba — sanctions Biden has
left in place — is a deterioration in counter-narcotics cooperation. Until 1998, Cuban
air space and territorial waters were a blind spot that traffickers could
exploit to evade the U.S. Coast Guard. But a Clinton era agreement establishing
cooperation was so effective that traffickers shifted to routes through Mexico.
For the
past decade the U.S. Southern Command, in its annual Posture Statement, has cited transnational crime,
especially drug trafficking, as one of the top threats to U.S. security in the
Hemisphere. Yet the Trump administration halted consultations between the Coast
Guard and Cuban Border Guards, and U.S. sanctions have left the Cubans without
the fuel they need to patrol their coasts.
The steps
President Biden could take to reduce the danger of worse social unrest in Cuba
and to safeguard U.S. security interests would not require any radical new
initiatives. The United States and Cuba already have bilateral cooperation
agreements on law enforcement, narcotics interdiction, and migration. Biden
simply has to reactivate them and hold up Washington’s end of the bargain,
especially the U.S. obligation to give Cubans a minimum of 20,000 immigrant
visas annually so Cubans have a safe, legal way to emigrate rather than risking
their lives at sea.
Cuban
Americans have been able to send remittances to family on the island ever since
Jimmy Carter was in the White House — until Donald Trump cut them off as one of his final acts in office.
President Biden could restore the ability to send remittances with a stroke of
the pen, sending urgently needed relief to millions of Cuban families.
The rapid
spread of COVID in Cuba is a natural disaster worse than
the hurricanes that periodically ravage the island. Previous U.S. presidents,
including George W. Bush, who could not be accused of being soft on Cuban
communism, have offered Cuba humanitarian aid in the face of such disasters —
aid channeled both through non-governmental organizations and to the government
directly.
There is
no reason President Biden’s pledge to combat COVID globally should exclude
Cuba. “This is about our responsibility,” he said in June, “our humanitarian obligation to
save as many lives as we can — and our responsibility to our values.” Four U.S.
Catholic bishops recently called upon
international governments to provide Cuba with the medical supplies they need
to cope with COVID, calling it “a moral imperative.” Private humanitarian
relief efforts to have been heroic but inadequate. Rather than spending
millions to subvert the Cuban government, USAID should be spending the money to
help vaccinate the Cuban people.
President Obama made the point succinctly on December 17, 2014 when he announced his decision to shift from a policy of regime change to one of engagement: “It does not serve America’s interests, or the Cuban people, to try to push Cuba toward collapse,” he argued. “Even if that worked – and it hasn’t for 50 years – we know from hard-earned experience that countries are more likely to enjoy lasting transformation if their people are not subjected to chaos.”
The Cuba Study Group: A non-profit, non-partisan organization comprised of business and community leaders of Cuban descent who share a common interest and vision of a free Cuba. Washington DC
We call on the #Biden administration to restore support for the Cuban people by prioritizing policies that focus on reinstating travel, reauthorizing remittances, re-opening consular services in #Havana, collaborating on COVID-19 solutions, and supporting #Cuba‘s private sector.
