Soaring
international food and shipping prices and low domestic production are further
squeezing import-dependent Cuba’s ability to feed its people.
Cuba
traditionally imports by sea around 70% of the food it consumes, but tough U.S.
sanctions and the pandemic, which has gutted tourism, have cut deeply into
foreign exchange earnings.
For more
than a year Cubans have endured long waiting lines and steep price rises in
their search for everything from milk, butter, chicken and beans to rice, pasta
and cooking oil. They have scavenged for scant produce at the market and
collected dwindling World War II-style food rations.
This
month the Communist-run government announced flour availability would be cut by
30% through July. Diorgys Hernandez,
general director of the food processing ministry, said when he announced the
wheat shortage that “the financial costs involved in wheat shipments to
the country” were partly to blame. That
was bad news for consumers who had been buying more bread to make up for having
less rice, pasta and root vegetables at the dinner table.
“People
eat a lot of bread and there is concern there is going to be a shortage of
bread because that is what people eat the most,” Havana pensioner and cancer
survivor Clara Diaz Delgado said as she waited in a food line.
Cuba does
not grow wheat due to its subtropical climate. The price of the commodity was
$280 per tonne in April, compared with $220 a year earlier.
The
government has also said the sugar harvest was short of the planned 1.2 million
tonnes by more than 30%, coming in at less than a million tonnes for the first
time in more than a century. Cuba will
have trouble making up for a shortage of domestically produced sugar as
international prices are around 70% higher than a year ago.
Adding to
the pain, the cost of international container shipping is up as much as 50%
over the last year and bulk freight more.
The U.N.
Food and Agriculture Organization reported its international food price index
was up 30.8% through April compared with the same month last year, and the
highest since May 2014.
The Cuban
state has a monopoly on foreign trade and purchases around 15% of the food it
imports from the United States for cash under a 2000 exception to the trade
embargo.
John
Kavulich, president of the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, which follows
the trade, said sales fell 36.6% last year to $163.4 million, compared with
2019. They recovered in the first quarter, reaching $69.6 million, though that
represented less food due to higher prices.
Chicken,
Cuba’s most important U.S. import, is badly affected. A U.S. businessman who
sells chicken to Cuba said he shipped drumsticks at 24 cents a pound in January
and 48 cents in April. He did not wish to be named. “Resuming global demand, increased prices for
product inputs and labor shortages suggest that commodity prices will not
decrease soon,” Kavulich said.
The
economy declined 11% last year and according to local economists contracted
further during the first trimester of 2021 as a surge in the new coronavirus kept
tourism shuttered and much of the country partially locked-down. The government reported that foreign exchange
earnings were just 55% of planned levels last year, while imports fell between
30% and 40%.
Incoming
container traffic was down 20% through April, compared with last year,
according to a source with access to the data, who requested anonymity.
The
government has not published statistics for the notoriously inefficient and
rustic agricultural sector since 2019 but scattered provincial and other reports
on specific crops and livestock indicate substantial declines for rice, beans,
pork, dairy and other Cuban fare. This
was confirmed by a local expert who requested anonymity and said output was
down by double digits due to a lack of fuel and imported fertilizer and
pesticides.
Cuba has
begun a mass Covid-19 vaccination drive using two homegrown shots before they
have full regulatory approval, after declaring a health emergency as cases
surge.
The
government said it aimed to vaccinate the entire adult population with its
Abdala and Soberana 2 shots. The programme began in Havana on Wednesday for
residents aged 60 years or older, with frontline workers in other provinces
also receiving the vaccines.
The Pan
American Health Organization said this week that Cuba was driving most new
Covid-19 infections in the Caribbean. Although case rates in the
communist-ruled nation have been low by international standards, it recorded
its worst month for infections in April since the pandemic began, with 31,346
cases and 229 deaths among its 11m population. The number has continued to
creep up this month.
José
Angel Portal Miranda, public health minister, said he expected full approval
for both vaccines in June but that Cuban law allowed the step to be bypassed in
an emergency. “This makes it possible to initiate intervention in risk groups
and territories with Cuban vaccine candidates,” he said after announcing the
emergency last Friday.
Abdala’s
phase 3 trials — the final stage before regulatory approval is normally sought
— ended on May 1 while those for Soberana 2 will be completed this weekend.
More than 300,000 Cubans have been vaccinated to date, including trial participants
and frontline workers.
Cuban
health authorities say both shots have proved safe and highly effective but
have not released trial data.
Cuba
opted not to join the World Health Organization-backed Covax vaccine
procurement facility or accept jabs from allies such as Russia and China. The
island nation has been manufacturing vaccines for years and authorities cite
long experience and a policy of not depending on others as behind the decision.
All but
bankrupted by US economic sanctions and
the Covid-induced crisis, Cuba is suffering its worst economic crisis since the
collapse of the Soviet Union three decades ago. The economy declined 11 per
cent last year and local economists said it continued to lose ground during the
first quarter as the pandemic crippled tourism, which accounts for about 11 per
cent of gross domestic product.
Both of
Cuba’s vaccines require two doses, and a third booster shot has been added to
combat new variants of the virus.
Portal
Miranda said 70 per cent of the population would be vaccinated by September and
the remainder by the end of the year.
Patients
and medics preparing for vaccination on Wednesday expressed confidence in the
programme. Physiotherapist Vladimir Lahenes did not believe Abdala, named after
a famous poem by national revolutionary hero José Martí, which he was about to
receive in the Havana municipality of Playa de Este, would prove unsafe or
ineffective.
“Here
there’s lots of experience with Cuban vaccines. Everyone knows, everyone is
confident,” he said.
Family
doctor Yolanda, who asked that her full name not be used, said she had been
preparing for weeks. “I have been giving Cuban vaccines forever. I’m already
vaccinated and very glad my patients will now be too,” she said.
Eduardo
Martínez Díaz, president of BioCubaFarma, the state pharmaceutical monopoly,
said last week that Cuba “will probably be the first country to immunise its
entire population with its own vaccine”.
HAVANA,
May 10 (Reuters) – With Cuba’s sugar harvest poised to draw to a close as the
coronavirus pandemic rages, production stands at little more than two-thirds of
planned levels, an industry official said on Monday, indicating the smallest
crop in more than a century.
In yet
another blow to the ailing Cuban economy, Jose Carlos Santos Ferrer, first vice
president of state sugar monopoly AZCUBA, told the state Cuban News Agency that
as of end-April, production had reached 68% of the Communist-run country’s
plan. With the planned target announced earlier this year as 1.2 million tonnes
of raw sugar, that means a harvest of 816,000 tonnes – the lowest since 1908.
The harvest
was also hit hard by a shortage of foreign exchange to purchase fuel,
agricultural inputs and spare parts due to the COVID-19 pandemic and fierce
U.S. sanctions. Mills were temporarily shuttered due to fuel and cane
shortages, as well as COVID-19 outbreaks, Santos Ferrer said.
Cuba
consumes between 600,000 and 700,000 tonnes of sugar a year domestically and
has an agreement to sell China 400,000 tonnes annually. It was not clear if
authorities planned to cut domestic consumption, exports to China or both.
Cuba’s
sugar harvest begins in November and usually winds down by May, when yields
plummet as the summer heat and rainy season set in. Even if the country manages
to reach 900,000 tonnes of raw sugar, that would still mark the lowest since
1908.
Cuba’s
output has averaged around 1.4 million tonnes of raw sugar over the last five
years, compared with an industry high of 8 million tonnes in 1989.
While no
longer a top export, and behind other foreign revenue earners such as medical
services, tourism, remittances and nickel, sugar still brings Cuba hundreds of
millions of dollars a year from exports, including derivatives. It’s also used
to produce energy, alcohol and animal feed at home.
Like
other industries, agriculture and cane cultivation face structural problems in
the import-dependent command economy which the government is only just
addressing.
Over the
last six months it has adopted monetary and other market-oriented reforms, but
these will take time to kick in.
Cuban
economist Ricardo Torres said the measures established a minimum base to
relaunch the sugar sector, but were not nearly enough. “As the overall reform progresses, new
opportunities will emerge for the sector, but it requires a fresh look to begin
the recovery, possibly with outside advice,” he said.
Cuba’s
economy shrank 11% last year and continued its decline through April, local
economists said, as a COVID-19 surge gutted tourism and combined with shortages
of even the most basic goods to hit retail sales and agriculture in general, as
well as sugar.
“The results are not good and we are at the start of the rainy season which effectively ends the harvest,” a local sugar expert said, confirming the country would not reach a million tonnes for the first time in over a century and requesting anonymity as he was not authorised to talk with journalists.
For decades now, the U.S. government has carried out
democracy projects aimed at undermining Cuba’s socialist government. One deal
that has always intrigued me was the $15.5 million, three-year contract awarded
to Creative Associates International in October 2008. The fact that Creative
Associates ran the program from a secret
base in Costa Rica added to the allure.
In 2014, the Associated Press scooped everyone with revelations that Creative
Associates had set up a secret
Cuban Twitter. USAID protested
the story. Still, the AP report triggered a flurry of interest and an
Office of Inspector General investigation
soon followed.
But ZunZuneo was only the tip of the iceberg, making up $1.7 million of the
$5.3 million in projects that Creative Associates funded. A review of 22
Creative Associates reports from 2008 to 2012 provides fresh insight into the
NGO’s sprawling program and illustrates its dogged efforts to recruit young
people and members of Cuba’s counterculture.
“Travelers” and “consultants” from at least 10 different countries in the
Americas and Europe took part in the program. Projects and people were
identified by code. USAID sent in supplies using via diplomatic mail service,
coordinating closely with the embassy staff.
Download the Creative Associates documents here.
Some of the details I found interesting are below:
Edited by Mervyn J. Bain and Chris Walker – Contributions by Mervyn J. Bain; Jeffrey DeLaurentis; H. Michael Erisman; Liliana Fernández Mollinedo; Adrian Hearn; Rafael Hernández; John M. Kirk; Peter Kornbluh; William LeoGrande; Robert L. Muse; Isaac Saney; Paolo Spadoni; Josefina Vidal and Chris Walker
Cuban
International Relations at 60 brings together the perspectives of leading
experts and the personal accounts of two ambassadors to examine Cuba’s global
engagement and foreign policy since January 1959 by focusing on the island’s
key international relationships and issues. Thisbook’s first section focuseson
Havana’s complex relationship with Washington and its second section
concentrates on Cuba’s other key relationships with consideration also being
given to Cuba’s external trade and investment sectors and the possibility of
the island becoming a future petro-power. Throughout this study due attention
is given to the role of history and Cuban nationalism in the formation of the
island’s unique foreign policy. This book’s examination and reflection on Cuba
as an actor on the international arena for the 60 years of the revolutionary
period highlights the multifaceted and complex reasons for the island’s global
engagement. It concludes that Cuba’s global presence since January 1959 has
been remarkable for a Caribbean island, is unparalleled, and is likely to
continue for the foreseeable future. Scholars of international relations, Latin
American studies, and political science n will find this book particularly
interesting.
Lexington Books
Pages: 306 • Trim: 6 x 9
978-1-7936-3018-6 • Hardback •
May 2021 • $110.00 • (£85.00)
Introduction: Reflections on Cuba’s Global
Connections (1959-2019)
Mervyn J. Bain and Chris Walker.
Part I: Cuban – U.S. Relations
Chapter 1 The Process of Rapprochement
Between Cuba and the United States: Lessons Learnt. Remarks at the “The Cuban
Revolution at 60” conference. Dalhousie University, Halifax, October 31, 2019. Josefina Vidal
Chapter 2 US-Cuban Relations: Personal
Reflections. Remarks by Ambassador (ret.) Jeffrey DeLaurentis. Saturday,
November 2, 2019 Jeffrey DeLaurentis
Chapter 3 Coercive Diplomacy or
Constructive Engagement: Sixty Years of US Policy Toward Cuba. William LeoGrande
Chapter 4 The President has the
Constitutional Power to Terminate the Embargo.
Robert L. Muse
Chapter 5 [Re]Searching for the ‘Havana
Syndrome’. Peter Kornbluh
Chapter 6 From Eisenhower to Trump: A
Historical Summary of the US-Cuba Conflict (1959-2020). Liliana Fernández Mollinedo
Part II: Cuba on the Global Stage
Chapter 7 Cuba is Africa, Africa is Cuba. Isaac Saney
Chapter 8 Cuba-Canada Relations: Challenges
and Prospects. John Kirk
Chapter 9 Cuba-China Relations and the
Construction of Socialism. Adrian H.
Hearn and Rafael Hernández
Chapter 10 Cuba-European Union Relations. A
Complex and Multifaceted Relationship. Liliana
Fernández Mollinedo and Mervyn J. Bain
Chapter 11 Havana and Moscow; Now, the
Future and the Shadow of the Past. Mervyn
J. Bain
Chapter 12 Havana and Caracas:
Counter-Hegemonic Cooperation and the Battle for Sovereignty. Chris Walker
Chapter 13 Cuba’s Struggling External
Sector: Internal Challenges and Outside Factors. Paolo Spadoni
Chapter 14 Cuba as a Petropower? Foreign
Relations Implications. H. Michael Erisman
Conclusions: Reflections on Cuba’s Global
Connections. Mervyn J. Bain and Chris
Walker
By Pavel Vidal, Profesor de la Universidad Javeriana Cali y ex analista del Banco Central de Cuba
Por ahora
los errores que se aprecian en el ordenamiento parecen ubicarse dentro del
margen esperado, dado el tamaño de la devaluación y las características propias
que la corrección de precios relativos tiene en Cuba.
La
devaluación de la tasa de cambio oficial del peso cubano a partir del primero
de enero de 2021 es la medida crucial de la reforma monetaria. Ello permite
avanzar en la unificación cambiaria, facilita la salida del peso convertible
(CUC) de circulación y genera un cambio de precios relativos que promueve la
transparencia financiera y reorienta los incentivos económicos a favor de
decisiones más eficientes en las familias, las empresas y el gobierno. Estos
efectos se potencian con el aumento de los salarios, la rebaja de subsidios y
las nuevas reformas estructurales que comienzan a ponerse en práctica.
14ymedio, Juan Diego Rodríguez, Havana, 22 April 2021
At least one man was seriously injured on Thursday when two buildings
completely collapsed and part of a third also fell on Havana’s
Malecón. The buildings were semi-dilapidated, fenced with metal,
uninhabited, and at the time of the collapse they were being demolished by
construction workers.
The two buildings and the fragment of a third that collapsed are located
on what is officially called Maceo Avenue between Águila and Crespo streets,
very close to the Prado de La Habana. According to a nearby resident, “the
workers demolishing them were using a jackhammer when what was left of the
buildings fell down.”
“At least one man was seriously injured, because he was passing by on
the sidewalk and the metal fence gave way with the pieces that fell. Half of
his body was buried under the rubble and other people also suffered minor
injuries,” detailed the neighbor, who also added: “It was a danger even for the
cars passing on the street.”
“There wasn’t any
good signage telling people not to pass by,” a neighbor told this newspaper,
noting that “not only were the buildings collapsing, but there were electrical
cables on the sidewalk and every time I passed by I had to step off the
sidewalk, but this a street with fast-moving traffic and every time you step
off the sidewalk your life is at stake.”
“Everything around here is grim, the day will come when we will see the
entire Malecon collapse,” laments another neighbor. “They don’t fix things here,
they just paint them when an important visitor is coming, or tear them down to
build hotels,” he complained. “This demolition work should not have been done
without closing the block.”
“The east building has just collapsed right now, right here in front of
me,” a passerby reported through a live broadcast on the social network
Facebook, and who also recorded the moment when the injured man was taken from
the place in a vehicle heading to a hospital. “It fell on a man,” he
explained in the video.
The images show a group of people trying to rescue the injured man from
under the fragments of the building. “The debris reached to the other side of
the street,” explained the internet user in a transmission of slightly longer
than a minute.
The collapsed building is located in the municipality of Centro Habana,
one of the most populated in the capital and which for decades has been an area
characterized by the high presence of tenements, with infrastructure problems
and overcrowding. Many of the buildings are from the early twentieth
century and have not received repairs for more than fifty years, not even
painting on their facades.
In the vicinity of the Malecon, the buildings have suffered especially
the effects of the salt air which, together with the lack of maintenance, have
turned the housing stock in the area into one of the most damaged in the Cuban
capital. The successive programs launched by the Government have not resolved
the increasingly frequent collapses.
It has been three years since the Government acknowledged a deficit of
almost one million homes on the island, a very serious situation that it
aspired to alleviate in a period of ten years. However, the shortage of materials
due to a persistent crisis exacerbates a problem that continues to leave
millions of people in suspense, not knowing when they might see their roof
coming down.
According to a report from the Cuban Observatory for Human Rights last October, almost half of the homes in the country need repair, and 11% of families live in places at risk of collapse.
Continuidad política y reformas económicas de calado, y más lo segundo que lo primero, he ahí donde se juega el futuro de la Cuba tras el VIII Congreso del Partido Comunista, que tuvo lugar el pasado fin de semana en La Habana. El encuentro unificó todo el poder político en el presidente cubano, Miguel Díaz-Canel, y en una nueva generación de líderes nacidos después del triunfo revolucionario. Su principal desafío será realizar una apertura económica e introducir transformaciones profundas, que necesariamente deben ampliar el marco del mercado y de la iniciativa privada, avanzando hacia un modelo mixto, para tratar de hacer sostenible el sistema heredado, sin negar su espíritu..
Es la primera vez que se alinean el Gobierno y las estructuras de la
cúpula del partido, hasta ahora encabezado por la vieja guardia, en la figura
de un civil que no luchó en la Sierra
Maestra, Diaz-Canel, que ya ejercía la presidencia desde 2018. Hasta
este jueves el Partido Comunista de Cuba (PCC) rendía cuentas a Raúl Castro y a
los históricos, que ahora abandonan todos los cargos.
Sabido es que el modelo de partido único no va a cambiar, pero
mantenerse en el inmovilismo y en las reformas rácanas sería el mejor modo de
que la economía se vaya a pique, lo que equivale a decir todo el sistema, dado
que la crisis y la situación por la que atraviesa la isla es de extrema
gravedad. Los
problemas estructurales acumulados y la ineficiencia de la empresa estatal,
agravados por la epidemia y el recrudecimiento del embargo norteamericano, no
se resuelven con parches, se admite en las altas instancias, y también que las
reformas introducidas hasta ahora claramente han sido insuficientes para
garantizar un mejor nivel de vida a los cubanos, principal reto de los nuevos
dirigentes, que no cuentan con la legitimidad “histórica” sino que la
valoración que se haga de ellos dependerán de lo que logren.
“El PCC necesita ampliar las zonas de legitimidad de su mandato con un desempeño económico que lo justifique o se le va a complicar la gobernabilidad”, opina el académico cubanoamericano Arturo López-Levy, señalando que “a mediano plazo, la economía es el primer renglón para medir sus capacidades”. Hay bastante consenso en este punto, y también en otro asunto que menciona López-Levy: “Se necesita orientar prioridades y recursos hacia la seguridad alimentaria, pues sin comida no hay país, por muchos hoteles que se construyan o reparen. Díaz-Canel ha enfatizado el discurso de la continuidad para asegurar la confiabilidad de los que lo han elegido, pero para resolver las demandas y quejas de una Cuba globalizada y signada por una crisis estructural, va a tener que prometer y hacer grandes cambios, tanto sustantivos como en la forma de gobernar”.
¿Qué lectura puede hacerse del VIII Congreso? ¿Defraudó las expectativas
de los que esperaban una apuesta decidida por la apertura? ¿O era lo que podía
esperarse de un cónclave cargado de simbolismo en el que lo que se escenificaba
era la despedida de Raúl y la generación histórica? Hay diversas opiniones. En
su informe central, Raúl Castro criticó el “egoísmo” de los que demandan el
ejercicio privado de algunas profesiones y reclaman la importación comercial
privada para establecer un sistema no estatal de comercio, advirtiendo que hay
“límites” que no se pueden rebasar porque implicarían la
destrucción del socialismo. La mención cayó como un jarro de agua
fría en los sectores que defienden la apertura y en muchos emprendedores,
aunque pasados los días, y tras el primer discurso de Díaz-Canel, algunos de
los analistas consultados se inclinan a pensar que “la reforma va” y que cada
vez será más profunda. Hasta donde se llegará, sea por propia voluntad o por
necesidad, es la gran incógnita.
“El VIII Congreso del PCC no ha traído grandes sorpresas, pero tampoco ha significado un retroceso en lo que al sector privado se refiere”, asegura Oniel Díaz Castellanos, fundador de Auge, empresa consultora que brinda asesoramiento a decenas de emprendedores privados. Admite que “ciertas palabras en el Informe Central alarmaron a varios colegas”, entre los que se incluye, pero dice que “una mirada serena” a las intervenciones de Díaz-Canel así como a las resoluciones emanadas de la cita, confirman que “hay una combinación de voluntad política para abrir más espacios económicos, a la vez que se establecen límites que no se deberían pasar según la lógica del PCC”. Su conclusión: “en ninguno de los Congresos anteriores se ha hablado y escrito tanto” sobre el sector no estatal, de las pymes y la iniciativa privada, de lo que deduce que “no hay marcha atrás” en la reforma.
Es de la misma opinión el economista Omar Everleny, que apunta que “el Congreso tiene varias lecturas: podría parecer que no hay cambios ya que se critica a personas que quieren obtener más ingresos y se precisa que Raúl estará presente en la toma de las decisiones fundamentales; pero por otro lado, se ha apelado a hacer ingentes esfuerzos por salir de la crisis económica, de implementar en el corto plazo medidas para potenciar el trabajo, la necesidad de descentralizar decisiones, de utilizar las formas no estatales, de implementar las pequeñas empresas….”. El camino, cree, no es inmovilista sino “reformista, pues si no será complejo producir los resultados económicos que espera la nación”.
En la composición del nuevo Buró Político, destaca Everleny la entrada
de dos figuras “con un corte empresarial”: Manuel Marrero, que hoy es primer
ministro, “pero que fue presidente de la corporación turística Gaviota”, y Luis
Alberto López-Callejas, que al frente de GAESA (el grupo empresarial del
ejército) “controla el mayor por ciento de los negocios en divisas cubanos sean
tiendas, hoteles, marinas, aviación, y la zona Especial de Mariel, y no es un
político al estilo de los que se conocen, sino un hombre de negocios clásico”.
Rafael Hernández, director de la revista Temas y miembro del PCC, consideró fuera de la realidad a los que pensaron que el Congreso iba a “rifar” el sector estatal y que “ahora sí era el turno de la privatización”. “Naturalmente, esos augurios no tenían sustento”, opinó, aclarando que ninguna “las resoluciones aprobadas desandan lo avanzado durante el año y pico de pandemia respecto a la legitimidad y consolidación del sector privado”. “La Resolución sobre la Conceptualización del modelo reitera ‘reconocer y diversificar las diferentes formas de propiedad y gestión adecuadamente interrelacionadas”, asegura.
Diversos economistas han puesto énfasis en que tan relevante como el
Congreso fue lo sucedido justo antes de su inauguración, cuando Díaz-Canel
presidió un inédito encuentro con emprendedores privados y representantes de la
empresa estatal, en el que se habló del necesario impulso a las pymes y el
papel creciente que ocupará el sector no estatal. En otra reunión con el sector
agrícola, en la que resulto cesado el ministro del ramo, se aprobaron un
conjunto de medidas para incentivar a los productores privados y reactivar esta
esfera de la economía, vital en estos momentos de crisis, y allí el presidente
advirtió de que no había “tiempo para pensar en el largo plazo”.
Sobre los “límites” en la apertura al sector privado de los que
habló Raúl Castro —pero
que no especificó—, López-Levy considera que no es la cuestión más relevante.
“Los límites y las líneas rojas irán moviéndose con la vida. Las reformas
traerán más presión de otras reformas, y otro tipo de cambios llegarán por
carambola”. Los más escépticos indican que otros intentos de reforma se
frustraron en el pasado, cierto, aunque hoy la situación es distinta, el tiempo
y el ritmo son ahora vitales, pues la crisis es gravísima y las urgencias son
cada vez mayores. Habrá que ver los próximos movimientos de los encargados por
los ‘históricos’ en asegurar la “continuidad” y hacer sostenible el socialismo
cubano.
The Castro era in Cuba came to a
carefully choreographed end on Monday, as President Miguel Díaz-Canel was
elected head of the ruling Communist party, replacing the retiring leader,
89-year-old.
The Castro era in Cuba came to a carefully choreographed end on Monday,
as President Miguel Díaz-Canel was elected head of the ruling Communist party,
replacing the retiring leader, 89-year-old Raúl Castro.
The reshuffle in the top ranks also saw the departure from the politburo
of the final survivors of the 1959 revolution that brought brothers Fidel and
Raúl Castro to power. For those hoping for a significant shift in policy,
however, there was little to cheer about.
The changes came at a four-day party congress held largely behind closed
doors under the banner of “Unity and Continuity”. During the proceedings, many
dissidents found their phone and internet service was cut, and they were not
allowed to leave their homes, making it all but impossible to comment.
Among those promoted to the politburo was Brigadier-General Luis Alberto
Rodríguez López-Callejas, once married to Raúl’s daughter Deborah and head of
the armed forces’ civilian holding company, GAISA, which controls important swaths of the
economy such as tourism and the retail trade. Rodríguez López-Callejas is close
to Díaz-Canel, who has referred to him as his economic adviser, according to
two European diplomats. He is also a competent businessman, according to three
foreign counterparts who have worked with him.
“He comes by early in the morning once a week to check on everything and
tour the place,” said one manager at the Mariel Special Development Zone just
outside Havana, requesting anonymity. He is already under sanctions imposed by
the Trump administration.
The appointment of the head of the military’s civilian companies will
anger hardline Cuban exiles in the US and is unlikely to please the Biden
administration, which has already signalled that it does not plan any overtures
towards Havana in the near term.
As part of its tightening of restrictions on Cuba, the Trump
administration placed sanctions on nearly all military-run companies on the
island from hotels to financial services. The Biden administration has given no
indication that it plans to lift these.
Monday’s appointment consolidates the power of Díaz-Canel, who has risen
steadily through the ranks of Cuba’s bureaucracy with a reputation as a capable
but cautious leader focused on economic reform. His Twitter account is peppered
with the hashtag #SomosContinuidad (We are continuity).
Raúl Castro said upon stepping down at the weekend that “as long as I
live, I will be ready with my feet in the stirrups to defend the motherland,
the revolution and socialism with more force than ever”, a remark taken to
indicate his continued involvement. Díaz-Canel confirmed this on Monday, saying
his mentor “will be consulted about strategic decisions”.
Raúl Castro has been effectively running the country since his ailing
brother Fidel handed power to him in 2006. Fidel Castro died in 2016.
One of the new leadership’s first orders of business will be to conduct
a nationwide discussion of Raúl Castro’s last central committee report, in which
he doubled down on existing foreign policy, the need for a single-party system
and cautious market reforms to avoid “a restoration of capitalism and
dependence on the United States”.
Nevertheless, many analysts believe the crisis that has led to widespread
food shortages and long queues in shops for basic necessities will push forward
economic reforms, particularly now that younger generations hold almost all
positions. “A new cohort of leaders
will have a much freer hand to implement policies permitting a gradual turn to
a more market-driven economy,” said Brian Latell, a former CIA Cuba analyst who
followed the Castros for decades.
For example, Raúl Castro in the report castigated party members for
their reticence to fully support the integration of small- and medium-sized
private business into the national economy, while simultaneously drawing a red
line over the extent of changes.
He said allowing private businesses to engage in foreign trade without
going through the state was unacceptable. “There are limits that we cannot exceed
because the consequences . . . would lead to . . . the very destruction of
socialism and therefore of national sovereignty and independence.”
Similar words were uttered before just about every reform undertaken
over the past decade, signalling that serious resistance remains in the ranks.
The party congress spent a great deal of its time on the need to improve
cadres and strengthen ideological work as the internet smashes its information
monopoly at a time of crisis and destabilising monetary reforms. Opposition to
the system was characterised as part of a US plot.
Bert Hoffmann, a Latin America expert at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies, said Cuba’s old guard might remain influential behind the scenes, particularly in the military. He added: “To weather the current crisis, further economic policy change will be imperative for Cuba.”
Brigadier-General Luis Alberto Rodríguez López-Callejas
There is much to admire in Cuba
in its commitment to principles of universal education, health care and
equality. Yet, something is not working well enough and these commitments
cannot be adequately supported. What jumps out is the potential benefits
of a self-reorganizing of society made possible by free markets.
This
observation became apparent when studying participatory democracy. It
does not seem fair to write off Cuba as non-democratic when certain aspects of
Cuban governance involve high levels of engagement of citizens in the elections
of representatives at the municipal level and indirect elections at provincial
and national levels.
In
describing the activities of elected officials, much of their time seems
preoccupied with the central administration of bakeries not working well,
deterioration of buildings, lack of local services, line-ups at grocery stores
etc. Topics that would rarely, if ever, attract the attention of elected
officials in free market societies.
If a
bakery provides poor service, someone establishes another and provides better
service. A lack of local services becomes a recognized need and an
opportunity for someone to set up a business to serve that need.
Local
contractors compete based on affordability and quality of service. There
should be no need to wait for the next council meeting in several months with
follow-up another six months later.
A freer
marketplace allows for timely improvements and creation of new services with
little or no effort by government and greater overall efficiency.
I respect
that it is not as simple as that. A bakery unable to get flour is not
able to bake bread. A grocery cannot provide vegetables if they are
rotting in the farmers’ field because of transportation problems or fuel
shortage. However, even these difficulties will generate needs that
enterprising individuals can address and improve.
Gradually,
the improved efficiency in providing services and products will lead to an
improvement in the overall economy. This is already very evident through
the expanding activities of innovative cuenta propistas (self employed).
It is
therefore important to look at free markets as an important aspect of how
people behave not as ideology – not as capitalism. Free markets are
possible in conjunction with Cuban societal commitments to fairness and
equality.
Keynes
observed that while excessive inequality is undesirable, a little inequality is
a driver for improvement, a way for people to do a little better.
Accordingly,
the objective should be to limit excessive inequality. Successful
societies apply progressive, but not punitive, income taxes and inheritance or
wealth taxes.
A
continued stress on a commitment by individuals to a well-functioning fair
society could allow Cuba to benefit from the efficiency of free markets and, at
the same time, better support Cuban principles and objectives.
Raul
Castro did say that he would move forward, carefully, but without pause.
He also said the Cuba has to learn, even from capitalists.
Unfortunately,
it is during times of change that people get dissatisfied as the desire for
change outstrips the rate of change. I think that now is such a time and
Cuba should open up more rapidly to free market philosophies without
compromising Cuban commitments and principles.
