Tag Archives: International Relations

The New Analysis of Cuba’s Monetary Situation by Pavel Vidal Alejandro: “Cuban Monetary and Financial Jigsaw Puzzle”

Posted on November 25, 2010 by Arch Ritter

An insightful new analysis of Cuba’s monetary, exchange rate, banking and balance of payments imbroglio by Pavel Vidal Alehjandro has just been published by the Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid. A bruef extract is included below.

The full document is available here: The Cuban Monetary and Financial Jigsaw Puzzle

Theme: The 2008-09 balance of payments crisis and a succession of errors in economic policies have resulted in new monetary and financial complications in the Cuban economy, to be added to the costs and distortions of currency duality.

Summary: The Cuban economy currently operates with two local currencies –the Cuban peso and the convertible peso, both with convertibility problems and multiple and overvalued exchange rates– and has been subject to a banking crisis since 2009. It is a veritable monetary and financial jigsaw puzzle. In order to do away with the dual currency and overcome financial imbalances, monetary policy must devalue the two domestic currencies. Cuba’s banks are facing a systemic liquidity crisis with no lender of last resort to help them out of it. The country cannot access a last-resort loan from the IMF, the World Bank or the IDB since it is not a member of these institutions. The government has been applying a tough adjustment policy which has led to the reduction in the fiscal deficit and to a surplus in the balance of payments, which has served to pay off debt and gradually unfreeze bank accounts, although the matter is far from being fully settled

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An Analysis of Cuban Democracy and the Potential Roles of Diplomats in its Promotion, from the “DIPLOMAT’S HANDBOOK” for Democracy Development Support

Posted on August 31, 2010 by Arch Ritter


The “Diplomat’s Handbook for Democracy Development Support” project of the “Community of Democracies” has just released a study of democracy and democratization in China. It also includes an older Case Study on Cuba that I had never seen and that may be of broad interest.

The Web site of the Diplomat’s Handbook is  http://www.diplomatshandbook.org/

The complete case study on Cuba can be seen on an Adobe file accessed at the above web site.

Below is the Introduction to the study.

Cuban Exceptionalism

INTRODUCTION

This Handbook presents individual country case studies in order to record the practical activity that diplomats from democratic countries have performed there in support of civil society, democracy development, and human rights. Situations can and often do resemble each other in some recognizable respects, and our aim is to enable diplomats and civil society partners in the field to obtain insights and guidance from actions taken elsewhere, without, however, suggesting that the experiences in one country can simply be transposed directly to another, since the trajectory of each country’s development is singular.
The case of Cuba is extreme, and in many ways unique. Cuban history since the late 19th Century is intertwined in a relationship with one country, the United States. The mutual enmity between the two governments for much of the last 50 years has had a direct impact on conditions inside Cuba. Anything that diplomats of democratic countries can do in support of Cuban democracy development pales in significance to the potential effect of placing US-Cuba relations on a normal basis, possibly for the first time.
The only country in the western hemisphere that does not practice some form of electoral democracy, Cuba’s government remains in principle a Marxist-Leninist throwback and a resolute holdout more than two decades after the abandonment of communism in Europe and adoption of the market economy in China. Expectations that Cuban communism would be merely the last domino to fall failed to recognize a signal difference with Eastern Europe where the regimes were judged to be collaborating with an outside oppressor, the USSR. The Cuban government presents itself as the patriotic defender against an outside threat.
The regime has from the outset been symbiotically identified with its Comandante en jefe who led the revolution that propelled it into power on January 1, 1959. Descriptive labels scholars employ to capture its essence range from “extreme paternalism” (Prof. Carollee Berghdorf, Hampshire College, UK) to “charismatic post-totalitarianism” (Prof. Eusebio Mujal-León, Georgetown University, Washington, DC). Exile adversary US Congressman Lincoln Díaz-Balart, has called it “the Fidel Castro regime,” pure and simple. Although an orderly succession has obviously occurred as Fidel Castro retired from public office in July, 2006 and ostensibly turned power over to Raúl Castro, the question arises whether anything significant has changed. Fidel Castro’s moral influence over the country remains, though he is without direct control of all details as before. Having described himself in 1961 as a “Marxist-Leninist until I die,” he recast himself in post-retirement writings as a “utopian socialist,” adding that “one must be consistent to the end.”
The regime he built over the decades, “is not the German Democratic Republic,” as one diplomat in Havana phrased it, but it is an authoritarian one-party state that has used an Orwellian security apparatus to rein in and quash democratic impulses over five decades, often citing the threat from the US as the rationale. Much of the world acknowledges the ability of Castro’s Cuba to have stared down and survived determined efforts by successive US governments to end the regime, by invasion, attempted assassination, a CIA program of subversion, and a punitive economic embargo.
But increasingly, democrats rebuke the regime for its invocation of these real threats to Cuba’s sovereignty to justify the continued and even tighter suffocation of human and civil rights of Cuban citizens.
60
The case study that follows attempts to identify activities by diplomats and democracies in support of Cubans’ efforts to secure rights at home, including discussion of a more open and democratic system. But the study reports the view that these efforts tend to bounce off a tightly controlled and controlling regime that veers between self-confidence and paranoia, and discounts the pertinence of mutual leverage.
Diplomatic efforts meant to support democracy development are in consequence especially challenged in today’s Cuba. Diplomats have to manage seemingly competing professional obligations of non-interference, official engagement, a long-term developmental perspective, and immediate democratic solidarity.
This challenge, familiar to diplomats and international NGOs working in other authoritarian and repressive states, is made especially vexing in Cuba by an authoritarian government that is fearful of change. But some signs of change are present in Cuba. Coming years will engage democrats in support of efforts by the Cuban people to pursue aspirations for more significant change that is theirs alone to accomplish

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The Marketing of “Che” Guevara: A Review of “Che’s Afterlife: The Legacy of an Image”, by Michael Casey

Posted on July 21, 2010 by Arch Ritter

Review of Che’s Afterlife: The Legacy of an Image. By Michael Casey. New York: Vintage Books, 2009. Pp. 388. $15.95 paper. ISBN: 9780307279309.

Michael Casey, from Perth, Western Australia, and recently the Dow Jones Newswires Bureau Chief in Buenos Aires, has written an excellent book on the commercialization of Che Guevara. In Che’s Afterlife, Michael Casey follows Korda’s famous photograph of a Christ-like Ernesto “Che” Guevara into the consciousness of people around the world. This image is a well-defended and trademarked icon (copyright VA-1-276-975) owned by Korda’s daughter, Diana Díaz, and used in collaboration with the government of Cuba.

Korda’s “Che”

For some, the Korda image of “Che” is a quasi-spiritual symbol of hope for a better future. For others – those sporting the Che T-shirts for example – it is a symbol of undefined but earnest youthful rebellion. But for still others, it is an abhorrent symbol of the kangaroo justice meted out in La Cabana fortress – converted to a prison – in East Havana where Che as commander of the prison presided for 11 months over the summary trials and executions of somewhere around some 220 prisoners or of many more.

For me, Che may be all of the above and more. But he is also the economic czar who damaged the Cuban economy immensely. First, as President of the Central Bank, he presided over the loss of convertibility of the Cuban peso which has continued for half a century. Convertibility of the Cuban peso now appears far from current realities.  Second, as Minister of Industry he  amalgamated five sub-units into a behemoth Ministry responsible for running some 1,800 work units with 150,800 employees. Attempting to run so many enterprises from office towers in Havana was a central planning folly of immense proportions. Third, he was the prime mover of the attempt to use the “New Man” concept as a means of mobilizing the work efforts of Cuban citizens in the second half of the 1960s and also the author also of the so-called “budgetary system of finance” that abolished accounting and the financial autonomy of productive enterprises. Implementation of these approaches was in President Castro’s hands, not Guevara’s. These two dimensions of running the economy from 1965 to 1970 compounded the problems and dislocations of the attempt to produce 10 million tons of sugar. These three interlinked dimensions of running the economy met with such disastrous results that they were reversed in 1971. Cuba then moved to Soviet economic orthodoxy – plus Soviet loans and hidden subsidization – which produced surprisingly better results.

Casey has written an intriguing history of the image’s trajectory over the last half century. He brings together research into the lives of both Korda and Guevara, a command of the history of Revolutionary Cuba, knowledge of countries where the Guevara mythology is important, an understanding of copyright law, and original investigative interviewing and reporting.

Casey begins his narrative with the instant when the photo was taken on 5 March 1960. He sketches Che’s role in the new government—notably as chief of La Cabaña prison and overseer of the swift executions of prisoners—his secretive and disastrous Congo operation, and his guerrilla campaign in Bolivia, putting the launch of Che as icon and of the “Heroic Revolutionary” brand at the 18 October 1967 memorial ceremony at the Plaza de la Revolución.

Casey also presents an account of Korda’s activities in Havana, the first publications of his photograph, and the cultural ferment of the early years of the Revolution, followed by the disillusionment of many in the mid-1960s.

Alberto Korda

He traces the peregrinations of Korda’s “Che” through Argentina, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Miami, as well as in the student ferment of 1968 from Paris to Berkeley. His later chapters focus on the use of Che’s image as a brand by the government of Cuba; here, it no longer signifies a heroic guerrilla promoting revolution, but has instead become an advertisement, selling Cuba in the international tourist marketplace. The essence of the image ia now “the idea of revolutionary nostalgia” (306). After some thirty-seven years during which the photograph was freely available for use by anyone, copyright ownership now applies and control is exercised through legal means when necessary.

Casey takes us on a fascinating journey through the life and afterlife of Che and through a half century of international social and political history, using Che’s image as a prism. His book should find a wide readership, of all political stripes, who have an interest in Cuba or in major political and social movements. Those with interests in marketing, branding, and copyright law will also find this volume illuminating.

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International

Posted on July 7, 2010 by Arch Ritter

Cuba-Venezuela Relations

Rolando Castaneda, LA AYUDA ECONÓMICA DE VENEZUELA A CUBA: SITUACIÓN Y PERSPECTIVAS. ¿ES SOSTENIBLE? – Misceláneas de Cuba (18 August 2009)


Cuba-Canada Relations

Rachel Pulfer, “Castro’s Favourite Capitalist” (Will Sherritt International come to regret dealing with Communist Cuba? CEO Ian Delaney doesn’t think so) The Walrus, Tuesday, January 26, 2010

Lana Wylie, Reassessing Canada’s Relationship with Cubain an Era of Change, Canadian International Council, October 2009.

Cristina Warren, Retooling Canada’s Cuba policy for the post-Castro era, Vanguard, Canada.s Premier Defense and Security Magazine, May 2008 A

No cigar on Cuban relations, John M. Kirk and Peter Mckenna. The Globe and Mail. Montreal, Monday, June 4, 2001

Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, Report from the Round Table on Canada Cuba Relations (CCFPD), Ottawa, Canada, January 18, 2000

YVON GRENIER, Our Dictatorship: Canada’s Trilateral Relations with Castro’s Cuba, Vanishing Borders: Edited by Maureen Appel Molot and Fen Osler Hampson. Oxford Univesity Press, 2000.


Cuba- China Relations

Yinghong Cheng, Beijing and Havana: Political Fraternity and Economic Patronage, The Jamestown Foundation, China Brief Volume: 9 Issue: 9, April 30, 2009

Daniel Erikson, CUBA, CHINA, VENEZUELA: NEW DEVELOPMENTS, Cuba in Transition, ASCE, 2005


Cuba-European Union Relations

Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on Evaluation of the EU Common Position on Cuba, 2951st External Relations Council, Luxembourg, 15 Juin 2009

Joaquín Roy, The Attitude of the European Union and Spain Towards Cuba: An Assessment A Year After Castro’s Illness, WP 38/2007, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 4/9/2007

Joaquín Roy, From Stubbornness and Mutual Irrelevance to Stillness and Vigil on Castro’s Crisis: The Current State of European Union-Spain-Cuba Relations, WP 16/2006, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 31/08/2006

Christian Freres, An Overview of the Linkages Between Spain’s Regions and Cuba, Background Briefings (RFC-05-02), FOCAL, Canada, 2005

Joaquín Roy, The European Union Perception of Cuba: From Frustration to Irritation, Background Briefings (RFC-03-2) FOCAL Canada, September 2003

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The Economic Consequences of Lifting the US Travel Restrictions on Cuba

Posted on July 1, 2010 by Arch Ritter

On Wednesday, June 30, 2010,  the House Agriculture Committee approved  by 25 to 20 to take the Travel Restriction Reform and Export Enhancement Act (H.R. 4645) for a vote in the House of Representatives. This bill was introduced in the United States House of Representatives on February 23 2010 by Representatives Collin Peterson (D, Minnesota) and Jerry Moran (R, Kansas) with forty bi-partisan House cosponsors.

The Peterson-Moran Bill may be a winner. It would be difficult for Congressmen and Senators in the Republican farm states to vote down an agricultural promotion bill – even with the travel provision. The Bill is supported by a coalition of some 130 US organizations including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, National Farmers Union, the American Farm Bureau Federation, AFL-CIO, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, the Brookings Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Cato Institute.

A group of 74 of Cuba’s most prominent political prisoners, independent librarians, bloggers, independent journalists, magazine editors, clerics, intellectuals, artists, members of the civil society and of political organizations also supported the Bill in a letter to the Members of the United States House of Representatives and its Agriculture Committee. It is therefore difficult for remaining hard-liners in the US Congress to argue that the Bill is objectionable because it would be supportive of the Cuban Government.  Of course the Cuban Government would benefit from the foreign exchange earnings from tourism. But all citizens would benefit. Most important,  the process of normalization would be well launched.

Enactment of the Bill would generate major benefits for both countries. By modifying financial terms and requirements of sales to Cuba, it is expected that the US share of Cuba’s food imports will increase further. It is already the largest exporter of agricultural products to Cuba, with food exports reaching US$ 711 million in 2008. The U S quickly displaced Canada as the main food supplier following the 2000 liberalization of agricultural exports by the Bush Administration.

American citizens will acquire a right to travel that they lost, in large part, in 1961. However, Cuban Americans have been able to return to Cuba and many other US citizens have travelled to Cuba for educational and religious reasons, or illegally. In fact, in 2003, there were some 85,000 US visitors.  Last year, following the liberalization of travel for Cuban-Americans, this number was estimated at around 300,000.

Cuba will benefit from lower cost food imports from the US – though this will further reduce the incentive for Cuba to improve its own faltering agricultural economy, where the 2010 sugar harvest will likely be about 1 million tons, the lowest since 1908.

A Tourism “Tsunami ” for Cuba?

Free travel for US citizens to Cuba will produce a deluge of US visitors to Cuba. Among the varieties of tourists would be the following:

  • Curiosity tourism. There could be a huge tourist influx of US citizens wanting to see Cuba for the first time since 1961. Relatively few US citizens appear to have broken US travel restrictions so that the pent-up demand is enormous.
  • Family Reunification tourism. When all controls are lifted on the US side for travel to Cuba, a large increase in short-term visits by Cuban-Americans for family purposes is likely to occur. Such an increase already occurred in 2009-10.
  • Sun, Sea and Sand tourism. Many US citizens, especially from the North Eastern and Central parts of the country will likely follow the winter-escaping Canadians to Cuban beaches for one to two week periods.
  • “Snow-bird” tourism. Some US citizens, mainly retirees, will spend several of the winter months in Cuba. This will be limited until accommodation arrangements such as time-share condominium arrangements are possible.
  • Medical tourism. There may be some travel to Cuba for access to medical services which will likely continue to be inexpensive relative to the United States.
  • Convention tourism. Short-term visits for conventions could increase significantly.
  • Cultural and Sport tourism. One might expect more visits for purposes of interacting with and experiencing Cuban art, music, cinema, and sports.
  • Educational tourism. It is likely that American students and teachers at various levels would enroll or visit Cuban institutions of higher learning or cultural and sports centers for courses, years abroad, sabbaticals, language training etc., in much greater numbers than have been possible under the embargo.
  • “March-Breaker” tourism. Students from the US are likely to try a visit to Cuba for the March Break, instead of the Maya Riviera, Florida or elsewhere.

One could imagine US tourism quickly doubling the 2009 Canadian level of 915,000 and redoubling again in a decade or so, as Cuba’s capacity to accommodate more tourists expanded. This would perhaps double Cuba’s total foreign exchange earnings from tourism within a decade, which were already at about $US 2.6 billion by 2008.

The “Jitters” for President Raul Castro?

The Peterson-Moran Bill will also give the Cuban leadership the jitters as 50 years of pent-up tourism from the US inundates the Island.  While the Act is an economic “win-win” for both countries, the deluge of US visitors could have an impact on internal politics in Cuba.  It has often been said – perhaps with some truth – that the best ambassadors for the US are its own citizens. They undoubtedly will be treated warmly and will bring charm and goodwill as well as dollars. They may also bring “contamination” from the perspective of the Government of Cuba  as Cuban citizens learn more about life in the United States on a first hand basis. Increased knowledge and independent income generation will make Cuban citizens more restless – especially if the Cuban government does not immediately liberalize foreign travel for its own citizens.  Indeed, the Cuban government may attempt to decelerate the wave.

Negotiating normalization with Cuba is a politically contentious, complex but ultimately low priority issue for the Obama Administration given all the other problems it faces. It is helpful for Obama to have the normalization process move forward by independent bi-partisan Congressional action.

Will the Cuban Government respond constructively by releasing the political prisoners incarcerated in 2003, or by dropping the 10% tax on US dollar remittance payments and transfers?

Will the Cuban Government, in reply, liberalize travel abroad for its own citizens to the US and elsewhere?

Actions such as these would facilitate additional steps by the United States in the difficult process of normalization and reconciliation.

School Children, Parque Central Havana, Circa 1996

Photograph by the Author

 

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