Retiring
Cuban Communist Party leader Raul Castro promised a decade ago he would
transform the Soviet-style command economy into a more mixed and market-driven
one “without haste and without pause.”
The April
16-19 congress comes as Cubans battle worsening shortages of basic goods,
including food and medicine. An economic crisis has been exacerbated by a
tightening of decades-old U.S. sanctions and the coronavirus pandemic.
“I hope
that the congress will take a deep look at our internal problems, not to
reiterate promises but to quickly solve them,” said Julian Valdes, a
government accountant in Havana.
Most
experts say reform has been undermined by vested bureaucratic interests and
ideologues within the party. They will be reading the tea leaves as new leaders
emerge in the all powerful politburo at the summit.
The
congress will mark the end of the Castro era as the 89-year-old Raul Castro –
the brother of late revolutionary leader Fidel – resigns as party secretary,
the most powerful position in Cuba.
President
Miguel Diaz-Canel is widely expected to replace him. “If President Miguel
Diaz-Canel is given the post of party secretary, it would strengthen his
ability to take decisions and it might augur well for more expansive
reforms,” said Carlos Saladrigas, president of the Cuba Study Group,
composed of Cuban-American business people in favor of engagement with their
homeland.
“If,
however, someone else is appointed, especially from the ‘old guard’, it would
possibly indicate… continuing economic stagnation,” he added.
A
long-time European investor in Cuba agreed, saying the government needed to
push ahead with reforms to improve competitiveness, including further
devaluation of the peso currency, liberalization of agriculture, and greater
incorporation of small- and medium-sized companies into the economy.
The pace
of that would be dictated by personnel changes announced at the congress, he
said, requesting anonymity.
Diaz-Canel,
60, said at a meeting last week on agriculture that “everything that
stimulates production, eliminates red tape and benefits producers is
favorable.” That captures the
essence of reforms adopted by the party at its sixth congress in 2011 and again
five years ago at the seventh congress, but which have stalled amid resistance
from some party members and ideological infighting.
The party
has previously pledged to regulate and tax, not administer state-owned
businesses; allow markets more sway over the central planning system and
agriculture; do more to attract foreign investment; and support private
initiative.
PEOPLE DO
NOT EAT PLANS
John
Kirk, a Cuba expert at Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia, said there was much
more to be done to free up the private sector, agriculture and foreign
investment.
“The
Cuban government has taken only baby steps in all of these areas, and needs to
show greater initiative,” he said.
Over the
last nine months, following four years of stagnation and in 2020 an 11%
contraction of the economy, the government has made more forceful changes.
It has
granted more autonomy to state businesses to earn and spend hard currency and
loosened regulations on small private ones. It has also unified its two
currencies and devalued the remaining peso, cut utility and other subsidies,
and decentralized the pricing and sale of some farm products.
“People
do not eat plans,” Prime Minister Manuel Marrero said this month,
expressing the new sense of urgency.
That will
be the underlying theme of the economic debate at the congress, according to
Cuban economist Omar Everleny.
Everleny
said Cubans understood U.S. sanctions and the pandemic were partly to blame for
the hardships they faced, but also were tired of excuses and foot-dragging by
authorities.
“The
people demand more concrete actions and results from the party,” he said,
using agriculture as an example. “It
is not enough to make an effort: there must be results. Thousands of measures
have been taken in agriculture, but the results are not yet on the shelves of
the average Cuban,” he said.
In response to crippling economic
stagnation, Cuba has passed regulations which hint at a turn towards a more
market-driven economy. However, political control over key sectors including
education and the media still lies heavily with the state. The most striking
policy, which allows thousands of professions to run outside the remit of the
state, will change the character of business within Cuba and may lead to
increased innovation and interaction with international markets. Could Cuba’s
economic liberalisation lead to further political freedoms?
Hints of Change
In 2020,
the number of tourists visiting Cuba dropped by 80% and its economy accordingly shrank by 11%.
Times are hard for Cubans, with queues growing outside grocery stores and
businesses being forced to close. The economic downturn has been lurking for
many years. In particular, Cuba has suffered from the Trump Administration’s
sanctions, imposed to placate the Republican voter base by designating the
Cuban government as a “sponsor of terrorism” from its support for
Venezuela’s Maduro.
In
response to economic hardships and US sanctions, Cuba has indicated an
intention to liberalise the economy. A strong signal of change to Castroist
economic ideas are demonstrated by the Díaz-Canel government’s removal of the somewhat confusing dual currency system
in January 1, 2021, previously established in 1994 after the loss of Soviet
subsidies. This major change, which led to a surge in inflation and devaluation
of the peso, had costly implications for Cubans by placing downward pressure on
the purchasing power of salaries and pensions.
A Landmark Shift in Business Privatisation
The
currency change is just one part in a series of major reforms. On 6th February,
Labour Minister Marta Elena Feito Cabrera stated that the government would
allow private participation in more than 2000 professions; a stark contrast to
the previous limit of 127 professions. The expansion in private participation
means that previously illegal enterprises can now function openly.
It is
hoped that this will unleash a wave of innovation in a wide range of sectors. This
could work in tandem with recovery from the pandemic. For instance, there
has been encouraging news regarding Cuba’s own “Soberana 2” Covid-19 vaccine: The government
believes that it can administer this vaccine to the whole of Cuba’s population
by the end of the year and export the vaccine to Latin America as a source of
income.
However,
the new private business law does have many caveats: private enterprises lack
certain resources and access to supply chains that state-owned enterprises
possess. For instance, the government maintains control of all large industries
and wholesale shops and monopolises 124 professions, thereby restricting
options for obtaining supplies. In the short-term, the large restructuring of
the economy will inevitably cause painful effects with bankruptcies and unemployment rising.
Yet, in the long-term, opening up may yield positive benefits through increased
opportunities for entrepreneurs. The sectors included within the 124 professions remaining under state remit (including
law enforcement, defence, the media, education) suggest that Cuba is looking to
follow the model of China or Vietnam through the
introduction of capitalist economic policies with the maintenance of tight
political control.
Could Improved Relations with the US Spur Political
Change in Cuba?
One
follow-on effect of Cuba’s economic liberalisation could be a strengthening of
relations with the Biden administration. Indeed, the recent theme of economic
policy changes would require more foreign investments and capital, for which
improved relations with the US would be important.
Strengthened
ties could have political liberalisation effects in Cuba. The Obama
Administration’s relationship with Cuba was emblematic of this trend: Obama’s approach
of normalising relations with Cuba, which was designed to “create economic opportunities for the Cuban people”,
increased US influence in other spheres of Cuban society. Citizens began to criticise issues such as access to medical care,
education, unemployment and domestic media sources while religious leaders and
artists started to articulate positions contrary to the official narrative. This
suggested that civil society was for the first time open to vocally opposing
the political system, despite the government responding with detentions of some dissidents and censorship of blog posts . A similar phenomenon
is possible if Havana’s new economic policies leads to a strengthening of
economic ties with the Biden Administration.
Is a new Cuba Realistic?
Cuba is ripe for change. The push and pull of reform efforts in recent years suggest disputes between traditionalists and more progressive, youthful factions. In April, Raúl Castro will step down as leader of the Communist party which will see the end of the Castro name in Cuban politics for the first time in over 60 years. This has major symbolic significance: Fidel Castro established the political and economic systems that endure today, such as the characteristics of a one-party state with complete control of the media. Combined with the election of Biden, who will likely take a more lenient approach to Cuba in comparison to Trump, and an array of free market policies in the midst of an economic crisis, it seems a realistic possibility that Cuba could undergo major structural change in the coming years.
Author’s Note – This article originally appeared
in Spanish in La Joven Cuba (Young Cuba), one of the most important
critical blogs in the island, where the Internet remains the principal vehicle
for critical opinion because the government has not yet succeeded in
controlling it. The article elicited some strong reactions including that of a
former government minister who called it a provocation.
The New Economic Policy (NEP) introduced by the revolutionary government in
1921 was in fact an attempt to reduce the widespread discontent among the
Russian people with measures designed to increase production and popular access
to consumer goods. Even though the Civil War (1918-1920) caused great hardship
among the rural and urban populations, it was the politics of War Communism,
introduced by the Bolshevik government during that period, that significantly
worsened the situation. This led to a profound alienation among those who had
been the pillars of the October Revolution in 1917: the industrial workers, and
the peasantry that constituted 80 percent of the population.
In the countryside, the urban detachments, organized to confiscate from the
peasantry their agricultural surplus to feed the cities, ended up also
confiscating part of the already modest peasant diet in addition to the grain
needed to sow the next crop. The situation worsened when under the same policy
the government, based on an assumed class stratification in the countryside
that had no basis in reality, created the poor peasant committees (kombedy)
to reinforce the functions of the urban detachments. Given the arbitrary
informal and formal methods that characterized the operations of the kombedy,
these ended up being a source of corruption and abuse, frequently at the hands
of criminal elements active in them, who ended up appropriating for their own
use the grain and other kinds of goods they arbitrarily confiscated from the
peasantry.
Moreover, during the fall of 1920, symptoms of famine began to appear in the
Volga region. The situation became worse in 1921 after a severe drought ruined
the crops, which also affected the southern Urals. Leon Trotsky had proposed in
February 1920, to substitute the arbitrary confiscations of War Communism with
a tax in kind paid by the peasantry as an incentive to have them grow more
surplus grain. However, the party leadership rejected his proposal at that
time.
The politics of War Communism was also applied to the urban and industrial
economy through its total nationalization, although without the democratic
control by the workers and the soviets, which the government abolished when the
civil war began and replaced with the exclusive control from above by state
administrators. Meantime, the workers were subjected to a regime of militarized
compulsory labor. For the majority of the Communist leaders, including Lenin,
the centralized and nationalized economy represented a great advance towards
socialism. That is why for Lenin, the NEP was a significant step back.
Apparently, in his conception of socialism, total nationalization played a more
important role than the democratic control of production from below.
The elimination of workplace democracy was only one aspect of the more general
clampdown on soviet democracy that the Bolshevik government launched in
response to the bloody and destructive civil war. Based on the objective
circumstances created by the war, and on the urgent need to resolve the
problems they were facing, like economic and political sabotage, the Bolshevik
leadership not only eliminated multiparty soviets of workers and peasants, but
also union democracy and independence, and introduced very serious restrictions
of other political freedoms established at the beginning of the
revolution.
Since the
decade of the nineties, and especially since Raúl Castro assumed the maximum
leadership of the country in 2006–formally in 2008 – economic reform has been
one of the central concerns of the government. The logic of that
economic reform points to the Sino-Vietnamese model–which combines an
anti-democratic one-party state with a state capitalist system in the
economy–and not to the compulsory collectivization of agriculture and the
five-year plans brutally imposed on the USSR by Stalinist totalitarianism after
the NEP. The Cuban government’s decision to authorize the creation of the PYMES
(small and medium private enterprises), a decision frequently promised but not
yet implemented, would constitute a very important step towards the establishment
of state capitalism in the island. This state capitalism will very probably be
headed by the current powerful political, and especially military, leaders who
would become private capitalists.
Until
now, the Cuban government has not specified the size that would define the
small and especially the mid-size enterprises under the PYMES concept. But we
know that several Latin American countries (like Chile and Costa Rica) have
defined the size in terms of the number of workers. Chile, for example, defines
the micro enterprises as those with less than 9 workers, the small-size with 10
to 25 workers, the medium-size with 25 to 200 workers, and the big size with
more than 200 workers. Should Cuba adopt similar criteria, its mid-size
enterprises would end up as capitalist firms ran by their corresponding
administrative hierarchies. If that happens, it is certain that the official
unions will end up “organizing” the workers in those medium size enterprises
and, as in the case of Chinese state capitalism, do nothing to defend them from
the new private owners.
Regarding
political reform, there has been much less talk and nothing of great importance
has been done. As in the case of the Russian NEP, the social and economic
liberalization in Cuba has not been accompanied by political democratization
but, instead, by the intensification of the regime’s political control over the
island. Even when the government has adopted liberalizing measures in the
economy, like the new rules increasing the number of work activities permitted
in the self-employed sector, it continues to ban private activities such as the
publication of books that could be used to develop criticism or opposition to
the regime. This is how the government has consolidated its control over the
major means of communication –radio, television, newspapers and magazines –
although it has only partially accomplished that with the Internet.
The
government is also using its own socially liberalizing measures to reinforce
its political control. For example, at the same time that it liberalized the
rules to travel abroad, it developed a list of “regulated” people who are
forbidden to travel outside of the island based on arbitrary administrative
decisions, without even allowing for the right of appeal to the judicial system
it controls. Similar administrative practices lacking in means for judicial
review control have been applied to other areas such as the missions organized
to provide services abroad. Thus, the Cuban doctors who have decided not to
return to the island once their service abroad has concluded, have been victims
of administrative sanctions – eight years of compulsory exile – without any
possibility of lodging a judicial appeal.
Still
pending is the implementation of the arbitrary rules and the censorship of
artistic activities of Decree 349, that allows the state to grant licenses and
censor the activities of self-employed artists. The implementation of the
decree has been postponed due to the numerous and strong protests that it
provoked. All of these administrative practices highlight the fact that the
much discussed rule of law proclaimed by the Constitution is but a lie. Let us
not forget that the Soviet constitution that Stalin introduced in 1936 was very
democratic … on the paper it was written. Even so, Cubans in the island should
appeal to their constitutionally defined rights to support their protests and
claims against the Cuban state whenever it is legally and politically
opportune.
At the
beginning of the Cuban revolutionary government there was a variety of
political voices heard within the revolutionary camp. But that disappeared in
the process of forming the united party of the revolution that established the
basis for what Raúl Castro later called the “monolithic unity” of the party and
country. That is the party and state model that emulates, along with China and
Vietnam, the Stalinist system that was consolidated in the USSR at the end of
the twenties, consecrating the “unanimity” dictated from above by the maximum
leaders, and the so-called “democratic centralism”, which in reality is a
bureaucratic centralism.
The Cuban
Communist Party (CCP) is a single party that does not allow the internal
organization of tendencies or factions, and that extends its control over the
whole society through its transmission belts with the so-called mass
organizations (trade unions, women’s organization), institutions such as the
universities, as well as with the mass media that follow the “orientations”
they receive from the Department of Ideology of the Central Committee of the
CCP. These are the ways in which the one-party state controls, not necessarily
everything, but everything it considers important.
The
ideological defenders of the Cuban regime insist in its autochthonous origins
independent from Soviet Communism. It is true that Fidel Castro’s political
origin is different, for example, from that of Raúl Castro, who was originally
a member of the Socialist Youth associated with the PSP (Partido Socialista
Popular), the party of the pro-Moscow orthodox Communists. But Fidel
Castro developed his “caudillo” conceptions since very early on, perhaps as a
reaction to the disorder and chaos he encountered in the Cayo Confites
expedition in which he participated against the Trujillo dictatorship in the
Dominican Republic in 1947, and with the so-called Bogotazo in Colombia in
1948.
In 1954,
in a letter he wrote to his then good friend Luis Conte Aguero, Fidel Castro
proclaimed three principles as necessary for the integration of a true civic
movement: ideology, discipline and especially the power of the leadership. He
also insisted in the necessity for a powerful and implacable propaganda and
organizational apparatus to destroy the people involved in the creation of
tendencies, splits and cliques or who rise against the movement. This was the
ideological basis of the “elective affinity” (to paraphrase Goethe) that Fidel
Castro showed later on for Soviet Communism.
So, what
can we do? The recent demonstration of hundreds of Cubans in front of the
Ministry of Culture to protest the abuses against the members of the San Isidro
Movement and to advocate for artistic and civil liberties, marked a milestone
in the history of the Cuban Revolution. There is plenty of room to reproduce
this type of peaceful protest in the streets against police racism, against the
tolerance of domestic violence, against the growing social inequality and
against the absence of a politically transparent democracy open to all, without
the privileges sanctioned by the Constitution for the CCP. At present, this
seems to be the road to struggle for the democratization of Cuba from below,
from the inside of society itself, and not from above or from the outside.
The
lesson of the Russian NEP is that economic liberalization does not necessarily
signify the democratization of a country, and that it may be accompanied by the
elimination of democracy. In Cuba there has been economic and social
liberalization but without any advance on the democratic front.
CUBA EMPRESARIAL. EMPRENDEDORES ANTE UNA CAMBIANTE POLÍTICA PÚBLICA, by Ted Henken and Archibald Ritter, 2020, Editorial Hypermedia Del Libro of Spain. This is an up-dated Spanish-language version of the book ENTREPRENEURIAL CUBA: THE CHANGING POLICY LANDSCAPE, by Archibald Ritter and Ted Henken.
The publication details of the volume are as follows:
Carmelo Mesa-Lago. Hasta ahora, este libro es el más
completo y profundo sobre la iniciativa privada en Cuba.
Cardiff Garcia. Este libro aporta una lúcida explicación a la particular
interacción entre el incipiente sector privado en Cuba y los sectores
gubernamentales dominantes.
Sergio Díaz-Briquets. Cuba empresarial es una lectura obligada para los interesados en la situación actual del país. Su publicación es oportuna no sólo por lo que revela sobre la situación económica, social y política, sino también por sus percepciones sobre la evolución futura de Cuba.
Richard Feinberg.Los autores reconocen la importancia de
las reformas de Raúl Castro, aunque las consideran insuficientes para
sacar a la economía cubana de su estancamiento.
Se
requiere más tiempo para que se estabilicen los nuevos equilibrios y la
economía reaccione con energía a los nuevas señales e incentivos. Con reformas
estructurales complementarias se pueden acortar estos tiempos y potenciar la
reacción.
March 04, 2021
No
debería sorprender el remezón que la devaluación del peso cubano y salida del
CUC están provocando en
los costos de producción,
los precios mayoristas,
el valor de la canasta básica,
las tarifas eléctricas y los precios de los mercados agropecuarios,
de trabajadores por cuenta propia y
de todo tipo de transacciones en los mercados informales.
No
debería ser motivo de asombro, aunque sí de mucho análisis, que esté cambiando
radicalmente la realidad financiera de empresas estatales, cooperativas,
negocios privados y hogares. Se trata de una devaluación de 24 veces de la tasa
de cambio oficial y de alrededor de 10 veces de la tasa de cambio promedio en
la economía,[1] una de las mayores en la historia de tipos de
cambio múltiples en América Latina.
Durante mucho tiempo los economistas explicamos que
la unificación monetaria constituiría un choque financiero inmediato con
múltiples beneficios, pero que en su mayoría se materializarían gradualmente en
el mediano y largo plazo. Nunca se ocultó que era un trago amargo para el
sistema productivo, pero que había que tomarlo porque es imposible desarrollar
una economía con dos monedas nacionales y múltiples tipos de cambio.
Con estas distorsiones monetarias llevábamos casi
tres décadas completas midiendo mal los hechos económicos, sobrevalorando o
subvalorando costos de producción, salarios, retornos y riesgos financieros,
deudas y activos financieros, minimizando el valor de muchas buenas decisiones económicas
y ocultando el costo de un montón de malas decisiones y reformas pospuestas. No
todo lo que hicimos antes de 2021 estuvo mal calculado, pero sí una gran parte.
La unificación monetaria representa un choque
financiero que produce cambios en los precios relativos a una velocidad mucho
mayor que la capacidad de respuesta promedio del sistema productivo. Durante un
tiempo las unidades económicas quedan atrapadas en el medio, gran parte de lo
que venían haciendo ya no tiene sentido económico, pero todavía no logran
entender todo lo nuevo que deben hacer, y cuando comienzan a comprenderlo no
tienen la forma de reaccionar en la proporción que necesitan. En
correspondencia, las políticas económicas necesitarían trabajar en dos aspectos
fundamentales para mermar el impacto de corto plazo del choque financiero:
minimizar la incertidumbre y aumentar la capacidad de reacción de las unidades
económicas.
El éxito de la reforma monetaria no está
garantizado por el solo hecho que la unificación de las monedas y las tasas de
cambio oficiales eliminan distorsiones.
En estos dos frentes hay muchas cosas que el propio
diseño inicial de la “tarea ordenamiento” ya tiene incorporado, y hay muchas
otras que se podrían añadir. El diálogo permanente de las autoridades económicas
con los empresarios estatales, agricultores, emprendedores privados,
empresarios extranjeros y gobiernos locales será una fuente de información
fundamental para corregir y negociar lo que no se previó. Para aumentar la
capacidad de respuesta son varias las reformas estructurales que se deben ir
acometiendo. En este caso hay recomendaciones elaboradas por economistas como Pedro
Monreal, Ileana Díaz, Mauricio de Miranda, Carmelo
Mesa-Lago, Omar
Everleny, Oscar
Fernández, Juan Triana y Ricardo Torres, entre otros.
Es importante subrayar que el éxito de la reforma
monetaria no está garantizado por el solo hecho que la unificación de las
monedas y las tasas de cambio oficiales eliminan distorsiones. La política
económica no puede achantarse y esperar a que se vayan materializando los
beneficios de mediano y largo plazo. Tampoco puede caer en la complacencia de
publicitar algunos de los beneficios puntuales que se pueden apreciar en el
corto plazo, tales como más personas buscando trabajos formales o determinados
ahorros en el consumo de los hogares. Son buenas señales y constituyen los
primeros ejemplos de lo que se puede lograr con un cambio en los incentivos
económicos, pero distan mucho del cambio estructural y el salto de eficiencia
que podría derivarse de la “tarea ordenamiento”, que evidencie que valió la
pena asumir el riesgo de devaluar 10 veces la moneda en un solo día.
El gobierno tampoco debería prometer y forzar unos
beneficios irrealizables de corto plazo, especialmente en lo que tiene que ver
con el aumento del poder adquisitivo de los salarios y las pensiones. Las
proyecciones contrafactuales siempre son muy especulativas, pero podría decirse
que en un escenario hipotético sin pandemia y sin una caída del 11% del PIB,
tal vez sí se hubiese podido lograr algún aumento de los salarios y pensiones
reales a partir de la redistribución de riqueza e ingresos y de un cambio en la
estructura del gasto público. Esta era el escenario de la reforma monetaria en
el papel, pero la realidad de 2020 y 2021 ya sabemos que es otra muy diferente.
Pretender que este aumento nominal de ingresos se vaya a traducir en mejoras reales en el contexto actual no es realista.
Entiendo que la manera en que el equipo económico
técnico logró “vender” políticamente la “tarea ordenamiento” fue combinando la
devaluación de la tasa de cambio con el aumento de salarios y pensiones. Sin
embargo, pretender que este aumento nominal de ingresos se vaya a traducir en
mejoras reales en el contexto actual no es realista, genera falsas expectativas
y promueve incentivos perversos en los entes reguladores y políticos. En un
reciente panel en la Asociación de Estudios
Cubanos (ASCE) presenté
una estimación que apunta a una probable caída de alrededor del 15% del salario
promedio real en el sector estatal en 2021. De lograrse en el complejo
escenario económico y financiero actual, esto debería apreciarse como un gran
logro.[2]
Para
esclarecer mi posición, creo que fue acertado combinar ambas acciones de
política económica, incluso (y especialmente) en el escenario de 2021. El
aumento nominal de salarios y pensiones permite proteger a un grupo grande de
hogares de los costos sociales de la devaluación. Pero es diferente presentar
el aumento salarial y de pensiones como una protección, a prometer un
incremento de los ingresos reales en medio de un ajuste tremendo de la tasa de
cambio y de los precios relativos, en una economía que ha visto reducida
prácticamente a cero una de sus principales fuentes de ingresos externos por la
caída internacional del turismo.
Es este
mismo panel en ASCE expuse una proyección de inflación que ubica la tasa más
probable para este año alrededor de 500%. Cerca del 300% de la inflación se
debería al efecto traspaso, es decir, al impacto de la devaluación de la tasa
de cambio sobre los precios. El otro 200% se explicaría principalmente por el
exceso de demanda, es decir, el aumento de salario por encima de la
productividad. Y es importante anotar que en este escenario ya se reconoce el
esfuerzo del gobierno para intervenir administrativamente y controlar el efecto
traspaso, tomando en consideración los límites que ha colocado el Ministerio de
Finanzas a los precios mayoristas empresariales y los subsidios que se
mantienen. En este escenario de inflación de 500% se asume que con estas
regulaciones el gobierno podría llevar el traspaso al valor medio que se
observa en las economías en desarrollo, según las estimaciones del Banco
Mundial.[3] De hecho, si no se considera el efecto de
estas regulaciones del Ministerio de Finanzas, la inflación superaría los 900%
y el salario real caería un 50%.
Bajo
estos cálculos, tanto el objetivo oficial de aumento de los precios promedios
en solo 1,4 veces, como el objetivo de aumento del poder adquisitivo de
salarios y pensiones parecen inalcanzables este año. Estimular a los entes
reguladores y políticos a reprimir la inflación más allá de lo que es posible
va a provocar más daño que beneficio, y puede llevar a destruir los mismos
resortes que se necesita para la recuperación. Una vez más podemos recordar el
fracaso en obtener los 10 millones de la zafra de 1970 y el desgaste que
representó concentrar los esfuerzos en un objetivo inalcanzable.
Se puede reconocer la necesidad de regular …los precios de las empresas estatales y de otros mercados donde primen estructuras monopólicas, pero es un error imponer precios donde existen mercados que pueden cumplir esta función sin intervención estatal.
En una
economía más descentralizada, con un número mayor de actores económicos y
mercados más abiertos y competitivos, la mayor parte de las correcciones de
precios relativos podrían confiarse a las interacciones y contrapesos del
sistema productivo, pero dada la estructura monopólica y cerrada de donde parte
el ajuste monetario cubano, la negociación y la corrección sistemática de los
controles de precios es la única vía para compensar parcialmente la rigidez e
ineficiencia inherente a la fijación centralizada de los precios. Se puede
reconocer la necesidad de regular mediante medidas administrativas los precios
de las empresas estatales y de otros mercados donde primen estructuras
monopólicas, pero es un error imponer precios donde existen mercados que pueden
cumplir esta función sin intervención estatal.
El éxito
de la “tarea ordenamiento” no puede medirse a partir de los indicadores de
2021. La tasa de cambio y los precios se han movido en una mejor dirección,
pero con una alta velocidad y en un complejo contexto. Se requiere más
tiempo para que se estabilicen los nuevos equilibrios y la economía reaccione
con energía a los nuevas señales e incentivos. Con reformas estructurales
complementarias se pueden acortar estos tiempos y potenciar la reacción.
[1] Tomando en cuenta que la población y el sector
privado operaban desde antes con la tasa 24 pesos por dólar, y que en 2021 el
mercado paralelo refleja una tasa de 50 pesos por dólar.
Republica de Cuba, Ministerio de
Trabajo y Seguridad Social
10/02/2021
The announcement by the Ministry of Labour
and Social Security that some 2000 activities were to be open to small
enterprise while only 124 activities were to be excluded from the list gave the
impression that this was a major liberalization of small enterprise. Indeed, this may well be the case, at least to
some extent. But some important areas
such as architecture, engineering, accounting, some other professional
activities and services to enterprises and are still prohibited.
Journalism is prohibited [110.Actividades de periodistas. (9000)].
This is indeed most regrettable, confirming once again the limits on liberty of
expression in Cuba. How this is implemented remains to be seen. It looks as though it provides a l
justification for shutting down the independent bloggers and most notably the
producers of the on-line newspaper, “14
y medio.” If this were to
happen, all hell will break loose.
ACTIVIDADES DONDE NO SE PERMITE
EL EJERCICIO DEL TRABAJO POR CUENTA PROPIA
El Clasificador Nacional de Actividades Económicas (CNAE), está integrado
en 4 niveles de agregación que se reparten en 21 secciones identificadas
mediante un código alfabético de una letra, subdivididas a su vez en 87
divisiones, 237 grupos, 421 clases, que en total contienen 2 mil 110
actividades, limitándose total o parcialmente algunas de estas estructuras, o
solo determinadas actividades, que la propuesta se propone limitar 124 de
ellas.
La lista no incluye actividades consideradas ilícitas para todos
los actores económicos o prohibidos expresamente por ley como, por ejemplo: la
caza y pesca de especies prohibidas y en peligro de extinción, explotación de
las plantas endémicas, empleo infantil y trabajo forzado, entre otras.
Desde
hace varios días en diversos medios de prensa cubanos han comenzado a aparecer argumentos
sobre la necesidad de proceder a la unificación monetaria y cambiaria, haciendo
énfasis en las consecuencias negativas del establecimiento de una dualidad
monetaria en los años 90 del siglo XX. A esto se suman muy recientes rumores,
no confirmados, que indicarían la posibilidad de que en poco tiempo se suprima
la circulación del peso convertible y la unificación de precios en pesos
cubanos de los bienes y servicios que se ofrecen en las redes comerciales
estatales, así como una nueva tasa de cambio única que devaluaría
considerablemente el tipo de cambio oficial actual de 1 USD = 1 CUP que solo
funciona para las empresas del Estado, pero que, al parecer, revaluaría la
actual tasa de mercado, también oficial, de 1 USD = 24 y 25 CUP (según se trate
si es tipo de cambio de compra o de venta de la moneda extranjera). A estos
rumores se suma la existencia de una supuesta nueva escala salarial que
funcionaría para el sector estatal y que multiplicaría en varias veces todos
los niveles salariales actuales (sin que se diga nada de las pensiones de
jubilación antiguas).
Lo
curioso es que todo esto ocurra unos meses después que el gobierno cubano
decidiera abrir tiendas minoristas en las que se venderían una serie de
artículos, considerados de “alta gama”, pero que después se ampliaron a bienes
de primera necesidad, usando tarjetas magnéticas, respaldadas por depósitos en
dólares u otras monedas libremente convertibles (MLC), lo que ha significado,
en la práctica, una nueva segmentación del mercado en productos que se venden
en divisas extranjeras y productos que se venden en las monedas nacionales y
que, eventualmente, se venderían en una sola, como resultado de la
“unificación”. Así las cosas, vale la pena aclarar que toda vez que circulen
diversas monedas en un mercado, así sea a partir de la existencia de depósitos
a la vista, no estamos en presencia de una real unificación monetaria.
Uno de los problemas de la dualidad monetaria existente ha sido la multiplicidad de tipos de cambio, pero sobre todo la persistencia, durante 60 años, de un tipo de cambio fijo, artificialmente sobrevaluado, del peso cubano respecto al dólar estadounidense, que no refleja las condiciones económicas reales de la economía nacional en relación con la economía internacional y que ha distorsionado seriamente la competitividad de todo el sistema empresarial cubano.
Se puede
establecer una nueva tasa de cambio, se pueden modificar los precios y se
pueden reformar los salarios y jubilaciones, pero con ello solo se pondrá un
orden momentáneo a las relaciones monetarias y a los sistemas de precio y de
salarios en el país, pero no necesariamente se pondrá fin a las distorsiones
del sistema económico cubano ni del sistema monetario en particular.
La
existencia de un mercado, por limitado que pueda resultar, en el que el peso
cubano no cumple sus funciones como dinero va a generar una demanda adicional
de las divisas extranjeras en el mercado informal, generando opciones de
beneficios extraordinarios para quienes operen este mercado informal. Si, como
es usual, se persigue a estos actores económicos con medidas punitivas solo se
conseguirá aumentar la brecha entre los tipos de cambio entre los mercados
formales e informales. Por tanto, sería prudente adelantarse a este tipo de
escenarios con la adopción de medidas económicas adecuadas.
¿Cuáles
deberían ser este tipo de medidas?
Será necesario definir qué
tipo de sistema cambiario va a establecerse. ¿Una caja de conversión como
la que determinó la paridad del peso cubano con el dólar antes de 1959 o
como la que produjo el establecimiento del llamado CUC? Esto significaría
un anclaje nominal del peso con el dólar, en la cantidad que se defina, y
la variación del tipo de cambio con las demás divisas, siguiendo el curso
del dólar. Esta medida, no evitaría que el país afronte una crisis
cambiaria cuando se produzca una nueva crisis de balanza de pagos, lo cual
puede ser algo previsible en el caso cubano, si no se solucionan los
problemas estructurales, no se alcanza un mayor ritmo de crecimiento
económico y no se logra una mejor inserción internacional de la economía.
¿Un tipo de cambio flexible? Podría resultar lo más lógico para que el
tipo de cambio fuera el que absorbiera los choques externos y la política
macroeconómica no quedara supeditada al sostenimiento de una determinada
paridad cambiaria. Sin embargo, en este escenario habría que estar
preparados para una depreciación sostenida del peso cubano en la medida en
la que no mejoren las condiciones de producción de bienes y de servicios y
con las consecuentes presiones inflacionarias.
La realidad indica que tanto
el peso cubano como el peso convertible están sobrevalorados, tanto en el
tipo de cambio del primero como del segundo, lo cual significa que ambos
valen más de lo que deberían valer. El tipo de cambio oficial con el que
funcionan las empresas es absurdo y no guarda relación alguna con la
realidad. El tipo de cambio de las CADECA, que durante mucho tiempo se ha
mantenido estable, parece mostrar signos de sobrevaloración ante la
reaparición de un mercado informal con valores que en estos momentos han
estado oscilando entre 1,30 y 1,80 CUC por dólar. Esto es consecuencia de
dos fenómenos muy concretos: a) la ruptura de la “caja de conversión” que
sustentaba la condición de convertibilidad del CUC a una paridad de 1 USD
= 1 CUC y según la cual solo se emitirían CUC como USD existieran para
respaldarlos y b) la reaparición de un mercado en el que solo se opera en
MLC, por lo que la demanda por las divisas foráneas aumenta
considerablemente. La sobrevaloración de una moneda nacional desestimula
las exportaciones porque las encarece y estimula las importaciones porque
las abarata relativamente. Si se adopta un tipo de cambio de partida, de
forma administrativa, que no refleje las condiciones reales de la
economía, se reproducirán las distorsiones actuales, porque el tipo de
cambio es el precio relativo que permite conectar la economía de cualquier
país con la economía internacional. Por esa razón, en lugar de adoptar
medidas administrativas sería mucho mejor tener en cuenta las señales que
ofrece el mercado. Así las cosas, el CUP podría cambiarse a 25 por CUC
actuales para efectos internos, pero el tipo de cambio del USD con el CUP
que se establezca como nivel de partida, debería considerar esas señales
del mercado y, por tanto, devaluarse en lugar de revaluarse.
Para que el peso cubano
(CUP) sea realmente convertible debe asegurar su plena convertibilidad
interna, garantizando el funcionamiento adecuado del mercado cambiario y
permitiendo que la moneda nacional opere de manera plena con fuerza
liberatoria ilimitada y curso forzoso en todo el territorio nacional, lo
cual cuestiona el funcionamiento de las nuevas tiendas en MLC, fuertemente
criticadas por la población por justas razones.
Nada de esto tiene sentido
si no se adoptan las medidas económicas necesarias para impulsar la
producción de bienes y de servicios. Si no se adoptan las medidas para
aumentar la oferta de bienes y de servicios, se corre el riesgo de una
espiral inflacionaria, que si se pretende impedir de forma artificial, con
los racionamientos o con topes de precio, se manifestará en la forma ya
conocida de “inflación reprimida”, que no es otra cosa que la escasez y
las colas y la dinamización del mercado subterráneo. Así las cosas, lo más
adecuado sería eliminar todas las cortapisas que han impedido el
desarrollo de la producción de bienes y de servicios por parte de
productores privados y cooperativos, junto a la autonomía operativa y
financiera de las empresas estatales. En tal sentido, es imprescindible
adoptar la secuencia adecuada y ello significa que lo primero sería
eliminar las restricciones actuales al funcionamiento de las pequeñas y
medianas empresas (PyMES) privadas y cooperativas, las cuales, en un clima
adecuado podrían absorber la fuerza de trabajo que actualmente resulta
excesiva en el sector estatal y podría producir bienes y servicios que el
sector estatal se ha mostrado incapaz de producir. Para ello es necesario
crear el clima institucional adecuado para promover el ahorro interno y la
inversión tanto foránea como doméstica, sin restricciones de tipo de
propiedad. Esto debería ir acompañado de la modificación de las normas
adoptadas recientemente para regular la participación del sector privado y
cooperativo en el comercio exterior que son, a todas luces, inadecuadas.
El costo
económico y político de continuar despreciando las leyes económicas puede ser
muy grave para el país. La política económica debería orientarse a la adopción
de las medidas que permitan salir de la crisis y conducir a una ruta de
crecimiento sostenido que tenga un efecto positivo en el mejoramiento del nivel
de desarrollo económico y social, superando las barreras ideológicas derivadas
de concepciones dogmáticas.
HAVANA
(Reuters) – A major monetary reform that will hike prices and state wages in
Cuba starting on Friday is sparking widespread uncertainty as the Communist-run
island resumes market-oriented changes to its Soviet-style economy after years
of flip-flopping. The reform, announced
earlier this month by President Miguel Diaz-Canel, will eliminate a complex
dual currency and multiple exchange rate system that masked a host of
government subsidies, pegging the remaining peso currency at a single rate.
To
reflect the resulting steep devaluation and reduced subsidies, Cuba is raising
prices on goods and services ranging from transport to electricity at varying
rates. It will also quintuple pensions and wages in the state sector, which
employs around two-thirds of the working population, from the current low rates
to better reflect the real value of labor.
The
measures, which will accelerate the transition from late revolutionary leader
Fidel Castro’s paternalistic model, will bring more transparency to the economy
and should help raise competitiveness over time, economists say, albeit only if
combined with other reforms. Yet the immediate impact of the changes remains a
worrying puzzle to many Cubans already struggling to get by amidst the
country’s worst economic crisis in decades, one that has spurred a partial
dollarization of the cash-strapped, import-dependent economy.
Hours-long
queues outside shops amid shortages of even the most basic goods have
lengthened as some Cubans rush to buy what they can before the measures go into
effect, the value of the dollar on the black market has risen and banks have
been overwhelmed with queries.
Private
businesses and foreign investors also are scrambling to gauge the impact on
their operations and whether they can adjust prices and wages. “It’s going to
be tight, so I’m just buying what I can now,” said Sulema Sotto Rojas, a
57-year-old cleaner for a state firm, as she waited in line to buy cooking oil
and tomato sauce at one store after waking up eight hours earlier to queue at
another for chicken.
While she could actually stand to gain from the monetary reform, her company has still not confirmed her new wage level and the government has been making last-minute tweaks to some electricity and gas rates in response to widespread consternation that they were too high.
INFLATION WORRIES
The
reform is part of a package of measures Communist Party leader Raul Castro
unveiled a decade ago to make the economy self-sufficient after decades of
dependence on Soviet and then later Venezuelan aid in the face of domestic
inefficiency and a crippling U.S. trade embargo.
The
government had stalled or even backtracked on some of the changes due to
opposition from entrenched bureaucratic and ideological interests, but a new
generation of leaders headed by Diaz-Canel has opted to resume them amid the
current crisis. That means, however, more short-term pain will be inflicted on
an economy that already has shrunk 11% this year in the wake of the coronavirus
pandemic and the tightening of U.S. sanctions.
Many
state companies working with an exchange rate of one peso to the dollar likely
won’t be able to survive at the new rate of 24 to one. The government says it
will give these enterprises a year to become competitive, subsidizing them in
the meantime, though that could prove too little, especially given the feeble
global economy and Cuba’s lack of capital to upgrade its creaking
infrastructure.
“If the
government had taken structural reforms to boost the agricultural, private and
state sectors first, the economy would be in a much better condition to face
this,” said Ricardo Torres, an economist with the Havana-based Center for the
Study of the Cuban Economy.
The
Communist Party has resisted such moves because doing so would reduce its
political power, said Pedro Monreal, author of a popular blog on Cuban
economics. Now it will have to pay the price, Monreal said, as a wage-fueled
rise in demand for goods and services in the absence of an increase in supply
will lead to inflation and further hardship in an economy with a flourishing
black market.
“This is
a purgative we need to take,” said Mauricio Alonso, who rents out rooms in his
apartment in Havana. “Obviously it will generate inflation.”
BRAVE NEW WORLD
While
Cubans are still struggling to figure out whether they will be better or worse
off, one thing seems clear: those who have savings in a local currency or who
work in the non-state sector, which will not automatically hike wages, stand to
lose.
The
government has set price caps on agricultural produce and said the fledgling
private sector cannot raise prices more than threefold, with anything above
that considered “abusive” and violators subject to fines.
Several business
owners told Reuters they would need time to gauge the compensatory impact of
smaller recent reforms, such as being able to import and export via state
companies and to offset all costs against their taxes.
“There
are many challenges at the same time,” said Liber Puente, the owner of a
private tech firm, who hired a financial strategist to help him map a strategy.
The entrepreneur, who wants to keep wages competitive vis-a-vis those in the
state sector, said he would hold off on developing other projects until the
dust settled, predicting six months of uncertainty.
One
important unknown worrying all Cubans is the value of the greenback on the
black market, as many basic items like shampoo and cheese can now only be
purchased with dollars at special stores or with hard currency on the informal
market supplied by “mules” from abroad.
The black
market dollar rate has appreciated to around 1.5 times the official rate this
year, given that it has become almost impossible for residents to acquire
dollars through state financial institutions.
“Already
prices are rising everywhere and not because of the currency reform, but
because of the lack of dollars,” said Maykel Suarez, who owns a private
cellphone repair shop.
The
government says the controversial dollar stores, which were opened this year,
are a temporary solution to its cash crunch. U.S. President-elect Joe Biden has
said he will loosen the existing sanctions on Cuba, and Cuban officials expect
tourism and trade to pick up slightly next year.
Havana
has also tinkered with some other minor economic reforms over the past year,
including allowing firms to retain a larger share of their export revenue
rather than depend on the centralized allocation of hard currency.
Economists, though, are urging the government to quickly enact further-reaching structural reforms like the legalization of small and medium enterprises and the liberalization of the ailing farm sector to solve underlying problems. “I just hope the measures that need to be taken in parallel to this (monetary reform) to increase production and services will be approved in a short time period,” said Omar Everleny, a Cuban economist.
HAVANA
(Reuters) – The Cuban government announced on Thursday it would start a
long-awaited monetary reform in January, unifying its dual currency and
multiple exchange rate system in a bid to bring more dynamism to its centrally
planned economy.
The
reforms were first adopted by the Communist Party a decade ago as it moved
toward a more market driven system and closer links with the international
economy but foundered thanks to bureaucracy and internal divisions.
HOW DOES CUBA’S MONETARY SYSTEM WORK?
For
nearly three decades, two currencies have circulated in Cuba: the peso and the
convertible peso (CUC), both officially valued at one-to-one with the dollar.
Neither are tradable outside the country.
The currencies are exchanged at various rates: one-to-one for
state-owned businesses, 24 pesos for 1 CUC for the public and others for joint
ventures, wages in the island’s special development zone and transactions
between farmers and hotels. Cuba created
the system as part of a package of measures to open up its economy after the
collapse of the Soviet Union.
While the
system helped Cuba get through the shock of the Soviet collapse, it ended up
also hiding the real economic situation.
WHAT CHANGES NOW?
The CUC
will be eliminated. President Miguel Diaz-Canel said it would leave the peso at
a single fixed rate of 24 to the dollar, scrapping other more favorable rates
in the first official devaluation of the peso since Cuba’s 1959 revolution.
GOODBYE CUC, HELLO DOLLAR!
The
government has also begun opening stores that sell consumer goods for dollars
and other traded currencies, though only with a bank card.
Havana
says this is a temporary measure but the partial dollarization will also
provide some stability, especially for families who receive remittances.
Meanwhile,
state and private companies can now keep tradable currency accounts with up to
80% of their export earnings instead of handing them over to the state.
SHOCK THERAPY?
Devaluation
is inflationary, while ending subsidies leads to layoffs, yet the Cuban
government says it expects to avoid any “shock therapy” in the economy where
the state sets most prices and wages. Economists
expect triple digit inflation, and the government has said the initial
devaluation will be accompanied by a five-fold increase in average state wages
and pensions even as many state-controlled prices also may rise.
But the
wage increase does not apply to around 2 million of the 7 million plus labor
force in the private sector, informal sector or who simply do not work.
Meanwhile
the government says state-run companies, as a rule, will no longer be
subsidized.
Cuban
economists estimate around 40% of state companies operate at a loss and though
some will benefit with the reform, others will go under. Still, the government
says some companies will be given a year to get their books in order before
ending subsidies.
The
government says residents will be given 180 days to exchange convertible pesos
once they are taken out of circulation.
WHY NOW?
Cuba is
seeking to reverse its worst crisis since the fall of the Soviet Union, with
growth seen plummeting more than 8% this year by boosting business conditions
and productivity.
The
country is dependent on imports for more than 50% of food and fuel, plus inputs
for agriculture and pharmaceuticals. Yet a combination of U.S. sanctions, local
economic blunders and the COVID-19 pandemic have gutted Cuba’s ability to earn
tradable currency.
Cuba has
been rapidly piling up debt in recent years, while still being plagued by a
scarcity of basic goods, from food and personal hygiene products to medicine
and fuel.
