One
Sunday last summer, 18-year-old Eloy Cardoso left his mother’s house on the
outskirts of Havana to collect an Atari game console from a friend. He’d stayed at home the previous day, while
the largest anti-government demonstrations since the
revolution had ripped through Cuba.
The authorities had managed to quell the protests in most of the country overnight, but not in La Güinera: unrest was still raging in the humble and normally calm neighbourhood, and Eloy walked out into a bloody brawl. Shops were smashed and looted, party supporters wielded clubs, police wrestled with youths, and one man was shot dead. Amid the tumult, Cardoso began to throw stones at the police.
He was
arrested a few days later, and at a closed trial earlier this week he was
sentenced to seven years in prison. The
trial is one of scores currently playing out across the island, as, six months
after the demonstrations, Cuban courts have quietly started imposing draconian
sentences on the protesters who – sometimes peacefully, sometimes less so –
flooded the streets last summer.
Though
the state has a history of issuing stiff sentences to organised political
dissidents, the punishments now being meted out are unusually severe.
“They
want to make an example of him,” said Cardoso’s mother, Servillia Pedroso, 35,
holding back tears. Eloy Cardoso’s
mother, Servillia Pedroso, left, and Migdalia Gutiérrez, whose son, Brunelvil,
has been sentenced to 15 years.
Because
her son is at college, police initially told her he would get a “second chance”
charging him with “public disorder” and telling him he would get away with a
fine. But in October, the charge was
upgraded to sedition: in other words, inciting others to rebel against state
authority.
Since
December, more 50 people in La Güinera have been sentenced for sedition,
according to the civil society organisation Justicia
11J. Most are poor, young males.
Justicia 11J said more than 700 people were still being detained
following July’s protests, with 158 of those accused of or already sentenced
for sedition. Last week one man in the eastern province of Holguín was
sentenced to 30 years.
Erika
Guevara-Rosas, Americas director at Amnesty International, said
detainees have faced summary proceedings without guarantees of due process or a
fair trial. “Prosecutors have pushed for
disproportionately long sentences against people who were arrested in the
protests. In addition, many people stand accused of vague crimes that are
inconsistent with international standards, such as ‘contempt’ which has been
consistently used in Cuba to punish those who criticise the government,” she
said.
“The
state is trying to send the message that there are dire consequences to
rebelling against the government,” said William LeoGrande, professor of
government at American University in Washington. “The fact that the government feels under and
is under unprecedented threat – not just from increased US sanctions but from
the pandemic and the global economic situation – makes it less willing to
tolerate any type of dissidence.”
Trump-era
sanctions contributed to the food and medicine shortages people were
protesting against. The sanctions also slowed vaccine production, aggravating a Covid
surge that was sweeping through the island at the time, and contributing to the
fury. But many protesters also wanted freedom from Communist rule.
Economic
complaints are a constant in La Güinera: it’s hard to afford shoes and
medicine. A schoolbag costs 2,500 pesos – more than half a teacher’s monthly
salary.
“I’m sure
that if it wasn’t for the economy, none of this would have happened – but the
economy never improves,” said Yusniel Hernández, 36, a teacher turned taxi
driver, who said a dozen friends had been incarcerated for throwing stones and
assaulting police officers.
Analysts
say the government is using exemplary sentencing to snuff out any further
protests because it is bracing for further economic hardship. As sanctions have
hardened, a longstanding siege mentality among the leadership seems to have
ossified in recent years. The fact that the Biden administration reversed its policy of normalisation with the
island after July may be another contributing factor.
But the
pain from the crackdown is palpable. “None
of these kids were activists, they don’t belong to any organisation,” said
Migdalia Gutiérrez, 44, whose son, Brunelvil, 33, has been sentenced to 15
years. If someone has nothing to do with
politics, and you are accusing them of political stuff, then you are making
them political prisoners,” she added.
Her
nextdoor neighbour, María Luisa Fleitas Bravo, 58, lives in poverty. The roof
of her kitchen, living room and second bedroom collapsed when Hurricane Irma
struck in 2017. The state provided her with the breeze-blocks she needed to
rebuild, but four years later the cement still hasn’t arrived. Her rotting wood ceiling is covered with
plastic sheets secured by clothes pegs, but it still leaks when it rains. Her unemployed 33-year-old son, Rolando, was
sentenced to 21 years for attacking a police officer during the protests (a
charge he denies).
Pedroso has
been running a small online campaign to free her son. But shortly after she and
seven other local mothers made a video demanding justice , she received a visit
from the police, who informed her that the video was being shared on Facebook
for “counterrevolutionary” ends.
She has
since been questioned by state security, and told that if she takes to the
street to protest for her son’s release, she could be charged with public
disorder.
Pedroso,
a housewife, had applied for a job at Havana’s international airport, to work
in immigration. The job was all but in the bag, she said, until she was asked
about her son during a final check-up interview. That was September. She hasn’t heard back
since.
“Nobody
who has a child accused of anything can work in the airport,” she said, before
adding, with a touch of gallows humour: “In fact, yes: they can be accused of
murder, but not of counterrevolution.”
Cuba’s prestigious biotech sector has developed five different Covid vaccines to date, including Abdala, Soberana 02 and Soberana Plus — all of which Cuba has said provide upwards of 90% protection against symptomatic Covid when administered in three doses.
The country of roughly 11 million remains the only country in Latin America and the Caribbean to have produced a homegrown shot for Covid.
The WHO’s potential approval of Cuba’s nationally produced Covid vaccines would carry “enormous significance” for low-income nations, John Kirk, professor emeritus at the Latin America program of Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia, Canada, told CNBC via telephone.
Cuba has vaccinated a greater percentage o of its population against
Covid-19 than almost all of the world’s largest and richest nations. In fact,
only the oil-rich United Arab Emirates boasts a stronger vaccination record. The tiny Communist-run Caribbean island has
achieved this milestone by producing its own Covid vaccine, even as it
struggles to keep supermarket shelves stocked amid a decades-old U.S. trade
embargo.
“It is an
incredible feat,” Helen Yaffe, a Cuba expert and lecturer in economic and
social history at the University of Glasgow, Scotland, told CNBC via telephone. “Those of us who have studied biotech aren’t
surprised in that sense, because it has not just come out of the blue. It is
the product of a conscious government policy of state investment in the sector,
in both public health and in medical science.”
To date,
around 86% of the Cuban population has been fully vaccinated against Covid with
three doses, and another 7% have been partly inoculated against the disease,
according to official statistics compiled by Our World in Data. These figures include children from the age
of two, who began receiving the vaccine several months ago. The country’s
health authorities are rolling out booster shots to the entire population this
month in a bid to limit the spread of the highly transmissible omicron Covid
variant.
I think it is clear that many
countries and populations in the global south see the Cuban vaccine as their
best hope for getting vaccinated by 2025.
Helen Yaffe Lecturer in economic
and social history at the University of Glasgow
The
country of roughly 11 million remains the only country in Latin America and the
Caribbean to have produced a homegrown shot for Covid.
“Just the
sheer audacity of this tiny little country to produce its own vaccines and
vaccinating 90% of its population is an extraordinary thing,” John Kirk,
professor emeritus at the Latin America program of Dalhousie University in Nova
Scotia, Canada, told CNBC via telephone.
Cuba’s
prestigious biotech sector has developed five different Covid vaccines,
including Abdala, Soberana 02 and Soberana Plus — all of which Cuba says
provide upwards of 90% protection against symptomatic Covid when three doses
are administered.
Cuba’s
vaccine clinical trial data has yet to undergo international scientific peer
review, although the country has engaged in two virtual exchanges of
information with the World Health Organizationto initiate the Emergency
Use Listing process for its vaccines.
Unlike
U.S. pharmaceutical giants Pfizer and Moderna, which use mRNA technology, all of Cuba’s vaccines are
subunit protein vaccines — like the Novavax vaccine. Crucially for low-income countries,
they are cheap to produce, can be manufactured at scale and do not require deep
freezing. It has prompted international
health officials to tout the shots as a potential source of hope for the
“global south,” particularly as low vaccination rates persist. For instance,
while around 70% of people in the European Union have been fully vaccinated, less than 10% of the African population have been
fully vaccinated.
Vicente
Verez, head of Cuba’s Finlay Vaccine Institute, told Reuters last month that
the U.N. health agency was assessing Cuba’s manufacturing facilities to a
“first-world standard,” citing the costly process in upgrading theirs to that
level.
Verez has said previously that the necessary documents and data would be submitted to the WHO in the first quarter of 2022. Approval from the WHO would be an important step in making the shots available throughout the world.
‘Enormous significance’
When
asked what it would mean for low-income countries should the WHO approve Cuba’s
Covid vaccines, Yaffe said: “I think it is clear that many countries and
populations in the global south see the Cuban vaccine as their best hope for
getting vaccinated by 2025.” “And
actually, it affects all of us because what we are seeing with the omicron
variant is that what happens when vast populations have almost no coverage is
that you have mutations and new variants developing and then they come back to
haunt the advanced capitalist countries which have been hoarding vaccines,” she
added.
Kirk
agreed that the WHO’s potential approval of Cuba’s nationally produced Covid
vaccines would carry “enormous significance” for developing countries.
“One
thing that is important to bear in mind is that the vaccines don’t require the
ultra-low temperatures which Pfizer and Moderna need so there are places, in
Africa in particular, where you don’t have the ability to store these global
north vaccines,” Kirk said.
He also
pointed out that Cuba, unlike other countries or pharmaceutical companies, had
offered to engage in the transfer of technology to share its vaccine production
expertise with low-income countries. “The
objective of Cuba is not to make a fast buck, unlike the multinational drug
corporations, but rather to keep the planet healthy. So, yes making an honest
profit but not an exorbitant profit as some of the multinationals would make,”
Kirk said.
WHO chief
Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus warned last month that a “tsunami” of Covid cases
driven by the omicron variant was “so huge and so quick” that it had
overwhelmed health systems worldwide. Tedros
repeated his call for greater vaccine distribution to help low-income countries
vaccinate their populations, with more than 100 countries on track to miss the U.N. health agency’s target
for 70% of the world to be fully vaccinated by July.
The WHO
said last year that the world was likely to have enough Covid vaccine doses in
2022 to fully inoculate the entire global adult population — provided that
high-income countries did not hoard vaccines to use in booster programs.
Alongside
pharmaceutical industry trade associations, a number of Western countries —
such as Canada and the U.K. — are among those actively blocking a patent-waiver proposal
designed to boost the global production of Covid vaccines. The urgency of waiving certain intellectual
property rights amid the pandemic has repeatedly been underscored by the WHO,
health experts, civil society groups, trade unions, former world leaders,
international medical charities, Nobel laureates and human rights
organizations.
An absence of vaccine hesitancy
The
seven-day average of daily Covid cases in Cuba climbed to 2,063 as at Jan. 11,
reflecting an almost 10-fold increase since the end of December as the omicron
variant spreads. This comes as the
number of omicron Covid cases surges across countries and territories in the
Americas region. The Pan American Health Organization, the WHO’s regional
Americas office, has warned that a rise in cases may lead to an uptick in
hospitalizations and deaths in the coming weeks.
PAHO has
called on countries to accelerate vaccination coverage to reduce Covid
transmission and has repeated its recommendation of public health measures,
such as tight-fitting masks — a mandatory requirement in Cuba.
Yaffe has
long been confident in Cuba’s ability to boast one of the world’s strongest
vaccination records. Speaking to CNBC in February last year — before the
country had even developed a homegrown vaccine — she said she could “guarantee”that Cuba would be able to administer its domestically produced Covid
vaccine extremely quickly. “It wasn’t
conjecture,” Yaffe said. “It was based on understanding their public health
care system and the structure of it. So, the fact that they have what they call
family doctor and nurse clinics in every neighborhood.”
Many of
these clinics are based in rural and hard-to-reach areas and it means health
authorities can quickly deliver vaccines to the island’s population. “The other aspect is they don’t have a
movement of vaccine hesitancy, which is something that we are seeing in many
countries,” Yaffe said.
HAVANA
TIMES – Minister of Labor and Social Security, Marta Elena Feito Cabrera,
ratified the ban on practicing as a tour guide in the private sector. A letter
dated December 28, 2021, was delivered this week to the six representatives of
a large group of tour guides who are calling for their activity to be granted
legal status as self-employment. So far they are out of luck.
The
letter rules that travel agencies and tour operators “are associated with
tourism products developed and commercialized by Cuba’s state tourism business
system and, according to the Ministry of Tourism’s policy, these cannot be
commercialized by natural persons, nor are they able to work as part of private
micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, cooperatives or as self-employed.”
This
negative response comes after almost a year since over a thousand persons
linked to the sector called for this activity to be legalized. They organized and
sent petitions to the corresponding ministries and even engaged in
conversations with officials from these institutions. Here is a summary of this
process.
Driver, not a Tour Guide
TIMELINE of a NO
February
10, 2021 the
Ministry of Labor and Social Security issued a list of 124 economic activities
that banned in Cuba’s private sector; including tour operator services and
travel agencies. This led to a heated debate from people linked to tourism
services.
In the
following weeks, dozens of people linked to the sector began to mobilize and
send letters to the corresponding bodies. They also shared an online petition
for the legalization of private travel agencies and the document was signed by
over 1500 people.
May 20,
2021 In
response, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security wrote a written response to
one of its signatories saying that “with the new Social/Economic Strategy to
push the national economy in the interest of encouraging local development and
production linkages between the public sector and private forms of management,
the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, alongside the Ministry of Tourism,
are analyzing whether to allow these activities and others relating to the
tourism sector.”
June 7,
2021 the Cuban
Republic’s Official Gazette published Resolution 132/21 by the Ministry of
Tourism (MINTUR), a new series of regulations for “national travel agencies”.
While the
regulations don’t explicitly state who can create these agencies; it does
recognize that natural Cuban persons (including the self-employed) can be “providers
of tour services” that offer “the sale of these in groups, programs, circuits,
excursions or other tourist services” via national travel agencies. It doesn’t
explain how this relationship would work; but the lack of clarity in these
regulations was also a spark of hope for the more optimistic.
August
19, 2021 To many
people’s disappointment, the activity of travel agencies and tour operators
reappeared on the banned list again within a new series of decrees and
resolutions that regulate private sector enterprises (including MSMEs,
cooperatives and self-employment).
September
22, 2021 Faced
with continuous complaints, officials from the Ministry of Tourism and the
Ministry of Labor and Social Security agree to meet with six representatives
from the Facebook group Guías
Turísticos por su legalización como TCP (Tour Guides wanting
legalization as the Self-Employed), which had over 800 members at the time
(today, there are 1100).
At this
meeting, MINTUR asked the guides to hand in written project proposals so they
can “better understand how far they want to go so they can identify the
red-tape that the activity “tour guide” would face as self-employment, to
legislate and find a solution to this red-tape and giving them wide-ranging and
unrestricted participation,” according to a summary of the meeting that was
posted by the group’s members.
January
7, 2022 Group
representatives from Guías
Turísticos por su legalización como TCP who
took part in the meeting with MINTUR and MTSS receive a letter from Minister
Feito, who ratified the ban on the practice of tour guides and travel agencies,
both as self-employment activities, as well as MSMEs and cooperatives.
Rubrick Biegon (Lecturer in international relations at the University of Kent, Canterbury, UK. R.Biegon@kent.ac.uk.)
Books Included in this Review
Aviva Chomsky, Barry Carr, Alfredo Prieto, and Pamela Maria Smorkaloff, eds.,The Cuba Reader: History, Culture, Politics. 2nd ed., revised and updated. Durham: Duke University Press, 2019. Figures, notes, index, 744 pp.; hardcover $129.95, paperback $32.95, ebook $32.95.
Carmelo Mesa-Lago, ed., Voices of Change in Cuba from the Non-State Sector . Pitts-burgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2018. Abbreviations, appendixes, figures, tables, notes, bibliography, index, 178 pp.; paperback $29.95, ebook $28.76.
Scott Morgenstern, Jorge Pérez-López, and Jerome Branche, eds., Paths for Cuba: Reforming Communism in Comparative Perspective . Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2018. Tables, figures, bibliography, index, 408 pp.; paperback $37.95, ebook $29.57.
Louis A. Pérez, Jr., Rice in the Time of Sugar: The Political Economy of Food in Cuba. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2019. Tables, figures, bibliography, index, 264 pp.; hardcover $90, paperback $29.95, ebook $22.99.
Margaret Randall, Exporting Revolution: Cuba’s Global Solidarity . Durham: Duke University Press, 2017. Notes, bibliography, index, 270 pp.; hardcover $99.95, paperback $26.95, ebook $25.60.
Introduction
Cuban politics and society are in a period of extended transition. From 2006 to 2008, Fidel Castro transferred authority to his brother Raúl, who subsequently sought to “update” Cuba’s economic model. The younger Castro stepped down in 2018, not long after Fidel’s death in 2016. Miguel Díaz-Canel, born after the Cuban Revolution, became head of state. Raúl retired from his position atop the Partido Comunista de Cuba (PCC) in April 2021. As the country settles into the post-Castro era, it wrestles with a myriad of social and cultural issues intertwined with ongoing processes of reform and modernization. Academic research has sought to make sense of these developments while situating new trends in the wide sweep of Cuban history.
Cuba’s foreign relations have also seen profound (if uneven) change in recent years. Most prominently, the dramatic events of December 2014, when Barack Obama and Raúl Castro simultaneously announced their intent to reestablish diplo-matic relations, ushered in a new dynamic with the United States, as leaders pledged to move beyond decades of animosity. The two countries formally reestablished full diplomatic ties in 2015. The following year, Obama became the first sitting US pres- ident to visit the island in nearly a century. Donald Trump was elected after pledg – ing to cancel Obama’s “deal,” however. The Trump administration retightened Washington’s embargo on the country, which had been relaxed under Obama. Even as Havana has forged new international partnerships, scholars have been compelled to scrutinize the twists and turns in Cuba’s all-important, highly asymmetrical rela – tionship with the United States (Biegon 2020; Hershberg and LeoGrande 2016).
The six books under review offer a variety of perspectives on Cuba’s contemporary reality, the historical contexts structuring recent political and economic shifts, and the international currents shaping the country’s post-Castro trajectory. Published after the 2014–16 rapprochement with the United States, they reflect a broadly forward-looking atmosphere in Cuban studies. Written as the generation of revolutionary históricos exited the leadership scene, the texts reinforce the notion that Cuba’s transition is both real and ambiguous. Instead of painting a uniform picture, they offer critical and, at times, competing insights on the intersection of the political and economic reforms undertaken by Cuba’s leadership and the social, cultural, and global dynamics beyond the scope of state authority. The authors cover a breadth of interrelated topics sure to motivate scholarly discussions of Cuba for the duration of the 2020s and beyond.
La última
crisis migratoria protagonizada por cubanos ocurrió en 2015. En los primeros
nueve meses de ese año cerca de 27 000 cubanos ingresaron al territorio
estadounidense por la frontera sur según una nota del diarioGranma. Miles de
personas abandonaron el país cuando se normalizaron las relaciones diplomáticas
entre Cuba y Estados Unidos e intentaron, por cualquier vía, llegar a tierras
norteamericanas ante el inminente fin de la política «pies secos, pies
mojados».
Migrar ha
sido una salida para escapar de los problemas del país. Datos delDepartamento de Asuntos Económicos y
Sociales de Naciones Unidas (UN, DESA) confirman un aumento de la
población de personas procedentes de Cuba en países centro y sudamericanos.
Aunque Estados Unidos y España siguen siendo los principales destinos, en los
últimos años se han diversificado las rutas migratorias, algunos utilizan
mecanismos oficiales y otros se arriesgan con vías ilegales.
Al otro lado del Atlántico
Entre La
Habana y el punto más occidental de Europa hay casi 7 000 km. El océano
Atlántico ha marcado el ritmo de la migración cubana hacia el Viejo Mundo: la
vía legal es la única alternativa para quienes salen de la isla hacia el
continente, siendo España el principal destino. La relación histórica, los
vínculos familiares y las facilidades del idioma hacen del país ibérico un
lugar deseado.
Aunque
Rusia ofrece libre visado a los cubanos, también se ha utilizado como trampolín
para llegar por vías ilegales a Europa. Por ejemplo, de Moscú a Bielorussia y
Polonia hasta Alemania, donde residen poco más de 14 000 isleños, o por
los Balcanes rumbo a Italia o a España. Recientemente elConsulado de Cuba en Rusia
informó que serían regresadas a la isla 71 personas detenidas en el aeropuerto
Vnúkovo por no cumplir con los requisitos de las autoridades locales.
Incluso
en los países africanos encontramos potenciales destinos migratorios para
cubanos que buscan una alternativa a las condiciones de vida en el país.
«Realmente,
fue la primera oportunidad que tuve y la tomé», dice Alina Brito (52 años)
mientras prepara la clase del día siguiente. Como maestra de Geografía le
apasionaba no solo describir el mundo, sino también la posibilidad de
conocerlo, pero cuenta que nunca pensó vivir en Guinea Ecuatorial.
Comenzó a
documentarse sobre el país después de que unos guineanos que conoció le
ofrecieran un contrato de trabajo en una escuela primaria privada de Malabo, la
capital. Hasta entonces pensaba en África solo como un continente pobre, con
muchas zonas selváticas y enfermedades contagiosas.
Su
indagación arrojó muchos aspectos que contradecían esa idea: Guinea tiene un
clima agradable, muy similar al de Cuba, y es el tercer productor de petróleo
del África subsahariana después de Angola y Nigeria, con un PIB que ha
aumentado 10 veces en 10 años (1999-2009). Portales oficiales del país lo confirman. «Y también me sorprendió que había bastantes
cubanos. Nunca pensé encontrar tanta gente de mi tierra en un país tan pequeño
y lejano como este», comenta Alina.
Según la
plataforma Datos Macro, solo en 2019
se reportó la entrada a Guinea Ecuatorial de 1 704 inmigrantes procedentes
de Cuba, una cifra similar a las llegadas anuales que se registran desde 2005.
No es el único país de África con presencia de ciudadanos de la Mayor de las
Antillas. También destacan República del Congo, Namibia y Sudáfrica. Este
último país encabeza el podio del continente, y se calcula que solamente en
2019 recibió casi 2 700 emigrantes cubanos.
«Para mí
uno de los aspectos más favorables en Guinea es el idioma. Es uno de los poquísimos
países de África que tiene el español como uno de sus idiomas oficiales. Si a
eso se le suma la demanda de personal calificado, se vuelve una opción muy
buena a explorar por los cubanos, sobre todo por los profesionales», agrega
Alina.
En tierras sudamericanas
Guyana se ha convertido en uno de los destinos principales para cubanos que desean
cruzar fronteras hasta llegar a Estados Unidos. Al tener libre visado para
extranjeros, muchos isleños llegan hasta Georgetown, su capital, desde donde
emprenden rumbo a Brasil o Venezuela para continuar el trayecto al Norte.
En la
mañana del 3 de abril de 2020 Ernesto Abel Rodríguez (29 años) revisó su
celular y respiró aliviado. Los mensajes de su familia en Cuba le contaban que
solo dos días antes el Gobierno cubano había suspendido los vuelos comerciales y chárteres desde y hacia la isla.
«Si no hubiera salido antes, sabrá Dios por cuánto tiempo me hubiera
quedado allá», comenta. Se especulaba que con la llegada de la COVID-19 a Cuba
existía una gran posibilidad de que cerraran las fronteras, así que se apresuró
a sacar su pasaje a Guyana antes de que eso sucediera. Aunque compró boletos de
ida y vuelta (porque así lo exigen las autoridades), esta vez no regresaría.
Ernesto se encuentra ahora en la ciudad brasileña Santarém, a casi 900 km de la frontera con Guyana, ubicada en el Estado Roraima. Aunque este pueblo se aleja bastante de la frontera colombiana —la próxima que debe cruzar—, era su única opción para reunir un poco de dinero que le permitiera continuar su trayecto. En Santarém tiene un techo, comida y un trabajo en la construcción que le ha garantizado un amigo cubano que vive en Brasil como refugiado.
Brasil es
uno de los países que más refugiados cubanos recibe. De 2000 a 2015 se procesaron
alrededor de 1 300 solicitudes de asilo. Solo en el último lustro, esa
cifra creció casi doce veces.
Los
refugiados aumentaron con el fin del programa Más Médicos, integrado por casi
20 000 cubanos profesionales de salud. En 2018 el Gobierno de la islacanceló el convenio de cooperación
luego de que el presidente brasileño Jair Bolsonaro decidiera cambiar las bases
del acuerdo.
En medio
de la euforia, Bolsonaro prometió otorgarle asilo político a todo aquel médico
cubano que lo requiriera. En realidad, esto no sucedió; pero más de2 500 profesionales abandonaron
la misión y permanecieron en el país. La mayoría quedó desamparada y sin
posibilidad de ejercer la medicina; algunos, incluso, se trasladaron a otros
territorios.
Si bien
este contexto propició el aumento de cubanos en Brasil, la principal causa de
llegada irregular de migrantes es la cercanía de Guyana al Estado Roraima. La
vía que utilizó Ernesto.
Por otra
parte, aquellos que deciden continuar el viaje hacia el Norte para llegar a la
frontera estadounidense con México deben enfrentar un largo recorrido por
toda Centroamérica, atravesando previamente el Tapón del Darién, entre
Colombia y Panamá.
Quienes
han sobrevivido al trayecto relatan la crudeza del viaje: cadáveres en el
camino, violaciones, hambre, naufragio, enfermedades… Miles de kilómetros a pie
para cruzar un continente y conseguir «el sueño americano».
Hace poco
varios medios difundieron la
trágica historia de una familia cubana que perdió a dos de sus miembros, madre
e hijo, mientras cruzaban la selva colombo-panameña. La progenitora murió en un
naufragio; unas semanas después el niño de 14 años falleció a causa de un
infarto. Escenas como estas se repiten…
Entre
enero y septiembre de 2021 más de91 000 inmigrantes han atravesado el Darién
camino a Estados Unidos. Al menos 13 000 son cubanos.
Otros,
para sortear la «ruta de la muerte», prueban la travesía marítima por el
Pacífico y entran a Panamá por la costa de Jaqué, ubicada en el distrito
Chepigana. La suerte depende de cuánto resistan las embarcaciones, casi siempre
precarias y cargadas con más personas de las que pueden soportar.
«Emigrar
cruzando fronteras es en sí una cuestión de suerte, dice Ernesto. Suerte de que
no te asalten, de que no pierdas tu dinero, de no enfermarse o sufrir un
accidente fatal. Suerte de poseer una visa para algún país de Centroamérica; lo
cual te acorta meses de viaje, y si es para México ni hablar, porque solo te
queda un pasito», comenta.
A las puertas de Estados Unidos
A decir
de Laritza Beltrán (32 años), ella es una persona que no se puede quejar de su
suerte. En 2017 la Embajada mexicana en Cuba le otorgó una visa de turismo por
diez años. Al principio, viajaba a comprar mercancía para revender en la isla.
Luego, valiéndose de métodos que prefiere no explicar, logró obtener la
residencia en el país en poco tiempo y montó una tiendecita en Cancún, donde
otros cubanos iban a comprar productos para llevar a la isla.
«Fueron
tiempos muy buenos. Ni siquiera pensaba en irme a Estados Unidos porque ahí
tenía todo lo que necesitaba, el negocio iba bien y podía viajar a Cuba cuando
quería, de una forma rápida y barata, pues el pasaje de Cancún a La Habana
costaba menos de 120 dólares».
Históricamente
México ha sido una vía de tránsito hacia los Estados Unidos, sin embargo, el
endurecimiento de las políticas migratorias durante el mandato de Donald Trump
impidió que muchos migrantes cruzaran la frontera y se plantearan la
posibilidad de residir en este país. En 2019 Trump estableció los Protocolos de
Protección al Migrante (MPP, por sus siglas en inglés), conocidos como «Quédate
en México»; un programa que obliga a los solicitantes de asilo estadounidense a
esperar el fin de su proceso en el territorio azteca.
Aunque el
actual Gobierno liderado por Joe Biden inhabilitó la medida a inicios de 2021,
la orden fue revocada por la corte y, al margen de las críticas, este mes se
reanudó el programa. El MPP no solo deja inseguras a las personas que aguardan
una decisión, también las fuerza a establecerse de forma permanente en tierra
mexicana y pedir asilo.
Sin
embargo, con la llegada de la COVID-19 y su impacto en las economías nacionales
y personales, muchas de las personas radicadas en esta nación consideraron
partir hacia Estados Unidos.
«Con el
coronavirus los precios de la mercancía que yo vendía aumentaron. Por otra
parte, Cuba cerró sus fronteras y los vendedores cubanos quedamos prácticamente
sin compradores durante varios meses. Vi como gran parte de nuestras tiendas en
Cancún Centro comenzaron a desaparecer, así que muchos de los cubanos que
estaban en esta área decidieron cruzar la frontera aprovechando que Biden había
eliminado el «Quédate en México», y que
el procedimiento era más fácil. Entre los que partieron hacia la frontera
norteamericana para solicitar refugio estábamos mi esposo y yo», cuenta
Laritza.
El
Anuario de migración y remesas (2021) documenta que Cuba es el tercer país que
más solicitudes de protección presenta en México, solo por detrás de Honduras y
Haití. De enero a septiembre de 2021,7 683 viajeros cubanos
han pedido protección, de acuerdo con el reporte más reciente de la Comisión
Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados (Comar).
LaConvención sobre el Estatuto de los
Refugiados define como «refugiado» a toda persona que debido al
temor de «ser perseguida por motivos de raza, religión, nacionalidad,
pertenencia a determinado grupo social u opiniones políticas, se encuentre
fuera del país de su nacionalidad y no pueda o, a causa de dichos temores, no
quiera acogerse a la protección de tal país».
El
78 % del total de migrantes cubanos vive en Estados Unidos; esto
representa tres cuartas partes de la población cubana que reside en el
extranjero. Además de la proximidad geográfica y los lazos familiares que
existen entre ambos países, la llegada de inmigrantes procedentes de la isla
está motivada por ventajosas y exclusivas políticas migratorias.
En
Estados Unidos, los asilados tienenderecho a trabajar en el
territorio, posean o no el documento que lo autoriza. Además, pueden obtener
una tarjeta de Seguro Social, pedir asilo para la familia, solicitar residencia
permanente e, incluso, orientación profesional y adiestramiento en el idioma.
Si la
solicitud de refugio no les es concedida, pueden acogerse al año y un día a laLey de Ajuste Cubano,
vigente desde 1966, que facilita el proceso de elegibilidad para convertirse en
residente permanente de los Estados Unidos.
Tras la
crisis de los balseros (1994), el texto se modificó para incluir la política
«pies secos, pies mojados». Al amparo de esta resolución, los cubanos que
tocaran suelo norteamericano eran aceptados legalmente; en cambio, de ser
interceptados en el mar, serían devueltos a la isla.
Este
programa fue derogado en 2017 por la Administración de Barack Obama, sin
embargo, esto no detuvo la salida ilegal de los cubanos por vía marítima. Según
informa la Guardia Costera, en lo que va del año fiscal 2021 se han
interceptado838 migrantes cubanos en el
mar, una cantidad diecisiete veces mayor a lo reportado en 2020.
Solo en
2019, la Oficina de Aduanas y Protección Fronteriza de Estados Unidosregistró11 798 detenciones en
el paso fronterizo, una cifra récord en la última década, que se prevé aumente.
En
febrero de 2021, ante el riesgo de una gran ola migratoria hacia EE. UU.
tras la apertura de las fronteras cubanas, el presidente estadounidense Joe
Biden se refirió a la necesidad de continuar con laEmergencia Nacional respecto a Cuba.
La carta indica que la entrada ilegal de cubanos a los Estados Unidos a gran
escala perturbaría las relaciones de este país con Cuba por permitir o
proporcionar los medios para que ocurra una migración masiva. En caso de que
suceda, sería considerado una amenaza a la seguridad nacional.
«No sé
decir a ciencia cierta cuántas personas estaban en la frontera cuando yo crucé,
pero eran muchísimas. Los cubanos se están apurando para cruzar porque saben
que en algún momento esto volverá a restringirse. La gente tendrá que buscar
otras vías, o irse a otros lugares, por suerte eso lo veré desde el lado de
acá», dice Laritza.
***
Los
expertos temen una nueva ola en los próximos meses como consecuencia de la
actual crisis económica del país. Aunque el Anuario Demográfico publicado por la Oficina
Nacional de Estadística e Información (ONEI) registró en 2020 apenas 4 474
nuevos cubanos radicados en el extranjero —la cifra más baja desde 2014—, la
principal causa de este descenso fue la pandemia provocada por el SARS-CoV-2 y
el cierre de fronteras.
La
escasez de productos esenciales, la inseguridad alimentaria y los altos precios
en el mercado informal —donde compra y vende la mayoría— podría acelerar la
salida de miles de cubanos hacia destinos diversos.
Los
cambios en la política migratoria y la flexibilización de los requisitos para
viajar a algunas naciones han definido la ruta de los migrantes irregulares
procedentes de Cuba en la última década. En el continente americano países como
Granada, Trinidad y Tobago, Santa Lucía y Belice no exigen visado para los
ciudadanos cubanos.
El 15 de
noviembre de 2021 se abrieron las fronteras internacionales, luego de que los
vuelos comerciales a la isla estuvieran limitados por más de un año debido a la
pandemia.
Una
semana después, el 22 de noviembre el Ministerio de Gobernación de Nicaragua
informó que permitiría la entrada de los isleños sin necesidad de visa, «con el
fin de promover el intercambio comercial, el turismo y la relación familiar
humanitaria». Si seguimos la tendencia, todo indica que el territorio se
convertirá en otro trampolín hacia el Norte, como sucedió antes con Ecuador
(2008-2015) y Guyana ( 2016).
El libre
visado establecido por el Gobierno de Daniel Ortega confronta la postura que
asumió en 2015 cuando ordenó cerrar todos los accesos terrestres al país para
interrumpir el paso de una caravana de cubanos varados en Costa Rica. De un año
a otro, el flujo de migrantes pasó de ser un cuentagotas a torrente, ante el
temor de que los privilegios de la Ley de Ajuste Cubano serán eliminados.
Aunque el
gigante del Norte continúa acaparando las mayores atenciones de los migrantes
cubanos, se pronostica también un aumento del número de cubanos en otros
territorios muchas veces movidos por los juegos políticos y migratorios de turno;
como la eliminación del visado, una frontera débil o el mensaje de un amigo o
un familiar diciéndole que es el momento, que se vaya ahora y no espere más.
A fin de
cuentas, marcharse de la isla ha sido una alternativa política, económica y
social para los cubanos. La historia posrevolucionaria, marcada por tres
grandes olas migratorias (la salida por Boca de Camarioca en Matanzas, en 1965;
el éxodo del Mariel, en 1980, y la conocida crisis de los balseros en 1994), y
la salida sistemática en pequeña escala de su población así lo demuestran.
It is essential to deepen the reforms where reality
has shown that what has been done is not enough. Delaying that deepening is not
healthy, as we know.
The good news that the decline in the national
economy has stopped thanks to the good performance of the second and third
quarters of this year, is doubly good because in general and due to the
seasonal nature of our economy the first and the last quarter of each year are the
busiest. So in 2021, that performance has changed.
It is
also good news that a growth of 4% is planned for 2022, something that will
require a significant effort if we take into account that the recovery
conditions of the international economy are still far from reaching the years
preceding COVID-19; that world inflation, and especially in the United States,
seems to be turning into a big headache; and that world trade will continue to
suffer from excessively expensive freight, a shortage of containers and high
prices for them; foreign investment will continue to have a weak recovery
and tourism flows on a world level will still be far from what they were three
years ago.
Global inflows of FDI, forecast
for 2021-2022. UNCTAD
Macroeconomic
stability
Growth is
much more than a goal, a slogan or an exhortation, and having done a good
planning exercise is not enough. It is necessary to achieve a minimum of
macroeconomic stability that reduces uncertainty for all economic agents, that
guarantees that the rules of the game will be followed, that discretion will
have adequate limits, that the adjustment will produce the necessary changes at
the microeconomic level to transform the business system, clean it of
inefficient enterprises — because not all those that are in losses are — and
that the allocation of resources is guided by efficiency criteria. Efficiency
and productivity must be rewarded, and the costs of this adjustment must be
cushioned with adequate policies. Condemning efficient enterprises to losses is
not the best decision in a country that needs to purge its production system.
Inflation,
what to do?
Much has
been written about inflation in Cuba this year. Today it is the factor that
generates more instability, uncertainty, a reduction in the purchasing power of
“reorganized” wages and, logically, social unrest. At least we economists know
that speculation is not its cause, in the same way that we know that appealing
to the good faith of sellers will not solve, even momentarily, this scourge.
Three
exchange rates instead of one, as the design promised, the reincarnation of the
CUC in the freely convertible currencies whose access is more restrictive and a
passive monetary policy are among its monetary causes. If reality surpassed the
design, then the design must be adapted to this new reality.
The other
cause is historical, secular and structural, the insufficient supply that has
accompanied us since the early 1960s, due to the weak production system and restrictions
to import, especially as of the 1990s. Generating a significant increase in
supply keeping in mind a speedy recovery of the production system does not seem
achievable (500 state companies in losses, and 67% of cooperatives in an
“unfavorable” situation indicate the opposite).
Production, even in those economies that function with high dynamism, lags
behind in relation to demand, it is less elastic in the face of a variation in
income. It will not be there where in the short term prices can be dealt with.
Improperly regulating them produces worse effects, it has also been proven. The
other component of the supply remains, imports, also limited in the state
sector by the availability of foreign exchange. But there are reservations and
they involve sharing the consumer market and encouraging non-state agents —
national and non-national — to have a greater participation and share the
risks.
Consolidating
and deepening the reforms
In the
annual seminar of the Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy, my colleague
Antonio Romero synthesized the characteristics of the environment we will have
for 2022, taking into account the performance of recent years:
Deep drop in global economic
activity in 2020. Record for some regions/countries.
Strong recovery process
since late 2020/early 2021 in most regions/countries.
The per capita income levels
reached in December 2019 will not be exceeded until 2023.
Asymmetric recovery, and
with great risks/uncertainties:
a) Recurrence of
outbreaks/peaks of the pandemic
b) High and rising inflation
for some sectors/markets
c) Dangers of the process of
reducing monetary stimuli (liquidity) by the main central banks
Tensions in the international energy
market
Problems with some supply
chains/logistics internationally
Growing conflict between
major global actors (USA, China, EU and Russia).
Inflation
in the United States and Mr. Biden’s “forgetting” his pre-election promises are
the other two factors that complicate the national situation.
And at
the same time he pointed out the opportunities that this same evolution offered
to our country:
-Increase in demand for goods and
services in foreign partners,
-Increase in the price of some
basic export products (sugar and nickel) and
-Revaluation of the health
industry (especially the strategic importance of vaccines).
Sugar
prices have gone up by 38% from January to October 2021. It is true that our restriction
is on production. Save the sugarcane industry! The phrase deserves more than
one book. Saving the sugar industry is not recovering it, it is making it new,
from the furrow to the shipping terminal. From 2016 to 2020, this industry
received investments of 1.035 billion dollars, less than the trade sector
(1.563 billion and not to mention 15.541 billion in the real estate sector).
Year after year we witness a new unfulfilled plan to recover
the sugar industry, hopefully, this time it will be different.
Nickel
prices also offer an opportunity (37% increase in their prices from January to
October) and world demand seems to maintain a certain dynamism. Our limit is
once again in the productive capacity. Mining was allocated 1.413 billion in
the same period and not everything was for nickel mining.
Undoubtedly
the greatest opportunity could be in the healthcare and pharmaceutical
industries. Despite the complicit silence of some
international institutions regarding Cuban vaccines, it is indisputable that
today it is our greatest strength in the industrial sector.
The
recovery of tourist flows on a global scale will depend on the performance of
the pandemic, which has once again shown its face in the omicron variant and
complicates our source markets again.
World
foreign investment flows will not reach the dynamics of before 2019. Competing
for scarce flows with other markets is a difficult task. It is true that
something has been announced in relation to FDI, but it seems that time does
not count and the necessary reform of requirements and procedures did not
arrive in 2021. It is not enough to recognize that “the little
progress is not attributable only to the difficulties generated by the blockade
and, in the last two years, by the international crisis derived from the
COVID-19 pandemic, but also internal factors.” And if we know which ones, then
why don’t we just eliminate them?
Because
there are external factors on which there is no way to influence to achieve
favorable changes to our economy, because there are structural failures that
will not be resolved in the short term; consolidating the reforms will be
decisive. It is a difficult exercise that requires many means, from the timely
and adequate coordination of actions and organizations to the competence of the
people who work in it; also agreeing to pay unavoidable costs until the
resizing of the state business sector is promoted, not only in terms of its
size, but also in the way it operates in the economy. This exhortation to achieve
greater autonomy must be made really effective. And also that other that
demands a greater relationship with the private and cooperative business
sector. More than a thousand SMEs in three months, in the worst conditions in
which an enterprise can be born, is enough to understand how dynamic this
sector can be. More effective support, better incentives — especially tax
incentives —, less prejudice and greater spaces for action are still necessary.
Today
there are more than seven hundred local development projects. Local governments
should understand that having more local development projects and promoting a
greater number of small and medium-sized enterprises is decisive for the
prosperity of their municipalities. Thinking of the local as the small, as the
complementary, does not seem to be the best option. “The local is not the
utopia of a development from the small, but the construction of capacities from
the territory to promote sustainable development at the municipal, regional,
national and international level”1 It is necessary to take a look at the
curb of the well and look from there inward and outward.
It is
essential to deepen the reforms where reality has shown that what has been done
is not enough. Delaying that deepening is not healthy, as we know.
If a 4%
growth is achieved, we will still be very far from the growth dynamics we need,
far even from what was achieved in a year like 2019 and we all know that even
in that year our production was not able to adequately satisfy that part of the
demand that depended on it. It will be good to grow and it will be better if
all Cubans manage to perceive it.
Note:
1 Carrizo Luis and Gallicchio
Enrique (2006): “Desarrollo local y gobernanza. Enfoques transdisciplinarios.
Investigación y políticas para el desarrollo en América Latina,” Uruguay, Latin
American Center for Human Economy, CLAEH.
Part I Religion, Culture, and Society: Theoretical,
Methodological, and Historical Perspectives
Chapter 1 Theoretical and Methodological Reflections
about the Study of Religion and Politics in Latin America, Daniel H. Levine,
University of Michigan.
Chapter 2 Civil Society in Cuba: A Conceptual Approach\, Ariel Armony, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars & Colby College.
Chapter 3 Cuban Diasporas: Their Impact on Religion,
Culture, and Society Margaret E. Crahan, Hunter College and The Graduate
Center, City University of New York.
Chapter 4 The
Evolution of Laws Regulating Associations and Civil Society in Cuba Alfonso
Quiroz,Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars & Baruch College
& The Graduate Center, City University of New York.
Chapter 5 Foreign Influence through Protestant
Missions in Cuba, 1898-1959:A Quaker Case Study Karen Leimdorfer, University of
Southhampton
Chapter 6 The
Jewish Community in Cuba in the 1990s Arturo López Levy, Columbia University
Part II Religion, Culture, and Society: Transnational
Perspectives
Chapter 7 The
Catholic Church and Cuba’s International Ties Thomas E. Quigley, United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops
Chapter 8 Religion and the Cuban Exodus:A Perspective
from Union City, New Jersey Yolanda Prieto, Ramapo College of New Jersey
Chapter 9 Cuba’s Catholic Church and the Contemporary
Exodus Silvia Pedraza, University of Michigan
Chapter 10 God
Knows No Borders:Transnational Religious Ties Linking Miami and Cuba Katrin
Hansing & Sarah J. Mahler, Florida International University
HAVANA
TIMES – After three months on the air, La Colada podcast sees this year
out with the last episode of its first season. The podcast’s hosts, writer and
journalist Jorge de Armas and political analyst Enrique Guzman Karell, went
over some of the events that marked a turbulent 2021 in Cuba.
Over the
course of approximately an hour, they discussed the protests on July 11th,
November 15th, the difference between the San Isidro Movement and Archipielago,
the figure of Miguel Diaz-Canel as the representative of a decaying system and
Cuban women in the struggle for freedom and democracy on the island.
July
11th: Cries for freedom and the order for combat
July 11th
is a date that will go down in Cuban history because of its dimensions. The
flame that was lit with a mass protest in San Antonio de los Baños on the
outskirts of Havana, and quickly spread like wildfire in dozens of other towns
and cities across the country. Thousands of Cubans took to the streets to
protest, a kind of domino effect on a people desperate for freedom and fed up
of living in crisis.
What the
Government had tried to prevent for 62 years, broke out that Sunday. Cubans of
all ages demanded their rights loud and clear, and they displayed their
explicit rejection of the Cuban government, whose repressive response reached
its climax with President Miguel Diaz-Canel’s order for combat, calling upon
the Cuban people to stand up to protestors.
“The
order for combat has been given, revolutionaries take to the streets,” said
Diaz Canel on national TV that day. “This is a fascist phrase, a phrase which
encourages a genocide among Cubans to some extent, a civil war,” Jorge de Armas
said.
“This
order given by somebody with a clearly fascist character like Fidel Castro
could have resulted far worse,” he warned.
According
to the writer and journalist, Diaz-Canel symbolizes the Cuban government’s lack
of a comprehensive approach to politics. Guzman Karell adds that this is also
the expression of a system in decline that has already reached breaking point.
“It
remains a sad fact that we have such a bleak, unenlightened figure at the head
of a country in crisis on all fronts, nothing good can come of this,” he
explains.
Moderators
of La Colada recalled how Diaz-Canel later said he didn’t regret pitting
the Cuban people against one another and how he lied when he said that there
weren’t any disappeared or tortured persons after July 11th.
Likewise when he said there aren’t any political prisoners in Cuba and that
“people who aren’t with the Revolution are free to protest freely,” when NGOs
have reported over 1300 arrests linked to the protest.
Five months after the protests, over 700 Cubans are still behind bars, including minors. Dozens of protestors have been subjected to summary hearings, charged with crimes such as public disorder, attempt, incitement and contempt.
San
Isidro and Archipielago
The San
Isidro Movement (MSI) was born in late 2018 as a direct response to the Government’s
Decree-Law 349, a threat to freedom of artistic creation and speech in Cuba. It
takes its name from the poor and marginalized Havana neighborhood where it is
based, and gathers a group of artists and activists who advocate for civil
rights and democracy on the island.
MSI
started making lots of noise all over Cuba in November 2020, when a group of
artists, activists and journalists entrenched themselves at their headquarters
to demand the release of one of its members, anti-establishment rapper Denis
Solis, who had been given a prison sentence during a summary hearing, and
without a legal defense.
Many
Cubans both in Cuba and abroad supported the hunger strike, and the Government
launched a repulsive slander campaign in the media and stepped-up intimidation.
Then its security agents dressed up as doctors to forcefully remove those who
were part of the sit-in and arrested them. This led over 300 artists of all
ages to gather outside the Ministry of Culture, on November 27th 2020, to
demand an explanation and for them to respect rights of speech and freedom of
artistic creation in Cuba.
MSI’s
main leader, artist Luis Manuel Otero Alcantara, has been in police custody
since July 11th. He has become one of the most emblematic faces of Cuba today
and is one of the main threats to the Government, because of his close ties to
marginalized groups over the years, and his power to mobilize people.
“The
great threat San Isidro poses is the same as what the Cuban people pose. The
November 27th protest wasn’t so much a threat. I believe the San Isidro
Movement represents the majority of what Cuba is today, maybe not what it was
70 years ago, but Cuba today resembles San Isidro more than anything else,” De
Armas weighs in.
In 2021,
a citizen-led platform appeared in Cuba, driven by playwright Yunior Garcia
Aguilera, one of the leaders of the November 27th protest. The project was
called Archipielago and its main call was for a civic protest for change
on November 15th to demand the release of political prisoners, among other
things. The initiative was thwarted in the end by the Government and Garcia
Aguilera went into exile in Spain soon after, which led to a break in the
platform, and many of its members left the project.
Guzman
Karell talked about those who define citizen-led platform Archipielago
as a Leftist party, an idea that he doesn’t share “precisely because this
symbology refers to a more classist, more university-educated, more white, more
organized Cuba, which is far-removed from the Cuba we saw on July 11th in Cuban
towns and neighborhoods.”
One of
the things that upsets De Armas the most in regard to the dismantling process
of Archipielago, isn’t the deception many of its members had – which he
points out is valid – but rather the deception of those who believed and
followed the project.
“There is
a duty in hope and a tragedy in disenchantment, and this is what
totalitarianism has always played with, the Cuban government with its people,”
he explains.
He
pointed out that the positive thing that came from 15N was the wave of
solidarity it unleashed. Cuban artists coming forward, such as Leo Brouwer,
Jose Maria Vitier, Chucho Valdes, and celebrities on the international public
scene such as Ruben Blades and Mario Vargas Llosa.
“Patria
y Vida” phenomenon
In February
2021, Cuban artists Yotuel Romero, Alexander Delgado, Randy Malcom, Descemer
Bueno, Maykel Osorbo and El Funk released the song “Patria y Vida”,
which became an anthem for freedom in Cuba and the soundtrack for protests of
Cubans around the world.
More than
a song, “Patria y Vida” (Homeland and Life) became a social phenomenon
and served as an impetus to amplify the Cuban people’s cries for freedom on
different platforms.
The
symbolic value that it has taken on also depends a lot on the social context it
represents. De Armas points out that the most important thing about this is
that a song like “Patria y Vida” has become a symbol of social needs.
The song
won the Best Urban Song and Song of the Year categories at the Latin Grammy
Awards that was recently held in Las Vegas. During the gala, Cuban artists
performed an acoustic version of “Patria y Vida” and dedicated it to
political prisoners, especially to Luis Manuel Otero Alcantara – who appears in
the music video – and to Maykel “Osorbo” Castillo, one of its composers, who
has been in a Cuban prison, since May.
“This has
a special merit in my eyes, and the fact that the Grammy Awards ceremony and
how controversial it could have been and what it sparked on social media, was
all as important as the Latin World seeing Ruben Blades, Residente, and Mario
Vargas Llosa talk about Cuba. I believe that “Patria y Vida” did in
fact, to some extent, put the issue of Cuba on the table within this space of
pop culture,” De Armas pointed out.
“The Patria
y Vida phenomenon managed to unify Cuba’s cultural space, with both
residents and its diaspora community,” he adds; an opinion that Guzman shares
because “if a people embrace an artistic representation, this is the greatest
achievement.”
The
political analyst highlighted the fact that “Patria y Vida” as a song
and phenomenon, also represents the Cuban people. Out of everything that has
happened in recent years in Cuba, the San Isidro Movement is closely linked to
what happened on July 11th, as well as Patria y Vida.
“This
might seem trivial, but it’s no coincidence. It’s extremely significant that
all of these young people are black. They are responding to a particular
history and tradition,” he says.
Cuban
women in the anti-establishment struggle
One of
the most important issues that this last episode of La Colada paid
special attention to was the role of Cuban women in the fight for change in
Cuba. The struggle that the Ladies in White have been playing a role in for
years, or with growing women’s representation in independent journalism and
different platforms.
The
podcast’s hosts made a special mention to Cuban activists Saily Gonzalez,
Daniela Rojo, Camila Lobon, Anamely Ramos, Omara Ruiz Urquiola, Thais Mailen
Franco, Katherine Bisquet and Tania Bruguera, whose names, complaints and work
for freedom has marked this year.
“If
somebody has been at the forefront of this front against the government that
oppresses society, for over 20 years, that’s Cuban women. With all clarity,
with all strength. They were there before the Ladies in White, but especially
with the Ladies in White. For they were able to firmly embrace a discourse, but
the idea they proposed was also peace,” stressed Guzman Karell.
In early
December, the independent magazine El El Estornudo published a feature
article with five complaints of sexual abuse against folk singer Fernando
Becquer. The article sparked a heated debate on social media and encouraged
over twenty victims of the musician to come forward and tell similar stories.
As a
result of the discussions that recent sex abuse allegations against Becquer
have sparked, two key issues in Cuba society have returned to the table, in
addition to the legal vulnerability of women on the island, which date back to
Cuba being founded as an independent State: race and gender.
“Until we
as a society understand this and all of the responsibility this implies, this
country will never be free, even when we shake ourselves free of
totalitarianism, if we don’t face these issues head-on, we will never be free
and we will never live in a free and prosperous society,” Guzman says.
Regarding
harassment, sex abuse and violence against women, De Armas pointed out that the
problem is that there is no representation within the Cuban State to protect
Cuban women from this harassment, abuse and rape. “It isn’t culture, it’s a
lack of social interest.”
Despite
growing numbers of cases of gender-based violence across the country, and in a
country with a high percentage of female lawmakers and professionals, the
legislative agenda passed up until 2028, still lacks a comprehensive law
against gender-based violence.
“Power in
Cuba continues to be disgustingly macho, and white,” Enrique Guzman points out.
“It’s clear that this is a systemic problem because after you’ve managed to overcome
a great deal of conflict, you go to the police to file a complaint, and they
don’t listen to you, they don’t keep you in mind, they mock you, it’s
terrible.”
“I
believe that change in Cuba has to be female, otherwise change won’t come,” De
Armas stressed.
El Programa Nacional de Desarrollo Económico y Social 2030, los Lineamientos de la Política Económica y Social del Partido y la Revolución, y la Estrategia de Desarrollo Económico Social del país, constituyen las herramientas fundamentales para la conducción de la economía y la sociedad, y referentes claves para el diseño e implementación de políticas y acciones nacionales y locales. Entre ellos se establece una unidad indivisible, con eslabones que se complementan, para una conducción más integrada, articulada y sostenible del desarrollo. Todos los lineamientos tienen algún grado de relación (directa e indirecta) con los proyectos de los macroprogramas. Muchos de ellos se ven reflejados en más de un macroprograma, demostrando el carácter integrador y multidimensional del sistema de trabajo del gobierno. Al mismo tiempo, se identifican temáticas en los lineamientos que son abordadas en varios proyectos, reflejo de la importancia estratégica que revisten y la prioridad que deben tener para alcanzar los objetivos propuestos en el Programa Nacional de Desarrollo Económico y Social 2030.
El sistema de trabajo diseñado para su implementación a través de macroprogramas, programas y proyectos constituye el mecanismo de gobierno a emplear para la implementación y evaluación de los lineamientos de la Política Económica y Social del Partido y la Revolución para el período 2021-2026 y las medidas contenidas en la Estrategia de Desarrollo Económico Social. Se refuerza la importancia del método empleado para la conducción y evaluación del cumplimiento del Programa Nacional de Desarrollo Económico y Social 2030, el que supone una modificación significativa en la manera de dirigir, organizar y gestionar el desarrollo de la economía y la sociedad, lográndose un mayor rigor, integralidad e intersectorialidad de acciones, desde la concepción del proyecto, su implementación, evaluación, rendición de cuenta y la participación y alianzas entre todos los actores. Hasta aquí he abordado en apretada síntesis un resumen de la rendición de cuenta de mi gestión como Primer Ministro, consciente de que existen otros temas y dificultades en las que también estamos trabajando; tenemos identificadas las insuficiencias que nos corresponde solucionar, con objetivos, metas e indicadores, así como las prioridades antes mencionadas
Finalmente, quiero agradecer al General de Ejército Raúl Castro Ruz, al Presidente de la República Miguel Díaz- Canel Bermúdez, al Presidente de la Asamblea Nacional Esteban Lazo Hernández, al Consejo de Ministros, a los diputados, y al pueblo en general, la confianza y el apoyo que nos brindan. Es nuestro compromiso de seguir en el
combate, hasta la Victoria
Siempre,
HAVANA,
Dec 12 (Reuters) – A cash short and crippled Cuban economy will grow 4% next
year as the Communist-run country struggles to recover from an economic crisis,
according to a report by the prime minister posted over the weekend.
Prime
Minister Manuel Marrero’s annual report said the
economy began a slow recovery of around 2% this year after declining 10.9% in
2020 and stagnating for several years before that.
New U.S.
sanctions on top of the decades-old trade embargo and the coronavirus pandemic
cost the import-dependent nation at least $4 billion in revenues over the last
two years, according to the government.
The
shortfall led to a 40% decline in imports and has hobbled the government’s
ability to provide Cubans with food, medicine, consumer goods and inputs for
industry and agriculture. Cuba has defaulted on some payments
to its creditors and suppliers.
The government’s decision to devalue the peso for the first time since Cuban leader Fidel Castro’s 1959 revolution combined with increased dollarization of the economy have sparked triple-digit inflation estimated by local economists at around 500% this year.
The goal
of 4% growth could indicate that Cuba will still see shortages of critical
goods and have continued difficulty paying creditors, said a western
businessman in Cuba with years of experience in the market.
The
government is preparing measures to tame inflation and strengthen the peso,
Marrero said. The peso is trading for around 70 to a dollar on the informal
market versus the official rate of 24 pesos.
“A set of
measures must be adopted with a view to stopping the inflationary spiral,”
Marrero said in his report, without stating what they might be.
Marrero
credited a vaccination campaign that has reached 80% of the country’s
population for clearing the way for a nascent recovery next year.
